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ABSTRACT
Liberation by Emigration: Italian Communists, the Cold War, and West-East Migration
from Venezia Giulia, 1945-1949
Luke Gramith
In the years after World War II, several thousand Italians from the Italo-Yugoslav
borderlands emigrated eastward across the emerging Iron Curtain, hoping to start new and better
lives in Communist Yugoslavia. This dissertation explores what these migrants hoped
Communism would be and how the experiences of everyday life under the preceding Fascist
dictatorship shaped these hopes. It suggests that these Italians envisioned Communist society as
one purged of certain social categories—shopkeepers, foremen, and piecework clerks—who had
become known as quintessential Fascists due to the way Fascism interwove itself with local power.
Marxist doctrine played a relatively minor role in shaping their expectations. Despite being rather
mundane in its motivations, this migration was misconstrued as subversive, catalyzing Cold War
divisions. Ultimately, the project offers a new, bottom-up approach to early Cold War history,
exploring how ordinary people understood, navigated, and shaped this critical period.
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Note on Placenames
This dissertation focuses on a region that had long served as a crossroads of the Germanic,
Slavic, and Italian worlds. The territories and settlements discussed in the work’s pages have been
home to a range of ethnic groups that speak a variety of languages, and these territories and
settlements have regularly changed hands during the past centuries. As a result, most go by
multiple names, dependent upon the language (and politics) of the speaker(s) in question. In cases
where a region or settlement has multiple placenames, this dissertation most often uses the Italian
name. It does so not to suggest that Italians have a more legitimate claim to these territories, but
rather because these were the names used by the (mostly) Italian-speaking subjects of study. Thus,
this study uses “Fiume” instead of “Rijeka” (Croatian), “Reka” (Slovenian), or “Sankt Veit am
Flaum” (German). Similarly, it uses “Monfalcone” instead of “Tržič” (Slovenian) or “Falkenberg”
(German); “Trieste” instead of “Trst” (Slovenian, Croatian) or “Triest” (German); and “Pola”
instead of “Pula” (Croatian).
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Introduction
There are others – besides those of Pola – there are others who go away, or who
cannot wait to go away: those of Monfalcone. They too have home and family, they have
possessions and memories in the town and in the nearby villages, they have tombs of their
dead. And they are ready to leave everything. 1

With these words, printed on 17 January 1947, Trieste’s Communist daily drew attention
to a wave of Italians from the nearby shipbuilding town of Monfalcone 2 who were quitting their
jobs, packing their bags, and moving to start new lives in Tito’s New Yugoslavia. That very day,
as the ink dried on Il Lavoratore’s pages, a further sixty-seven workers chose to quit and depart
for the other side of the Iron Curtain, among them Silvio D. and Marcelliano C.3 The former was
the type one might expect to be eager to make such a leap. He was a longtime operative of Italy’s
underground Communist Party whom the Fascist regime had arrested and tried in the mid-1930s
for subversive activity before releasing him under strict terms of surveillance. 4 But Marcelliano
was different. Working in the same shipyard as Silvio, he had risen to a position as a skilled
machine operator over the course of a thirty-year career, during which he married, fathered a child,
and seemingly steered clear of subversive politics – or at least he never garnered the suspicion of
the Fascist police. Nevertheless, on the same day as Silvio, Marcelliano quit his job to move his
entire family across the Iron Curtain, “lured,” in the words of police, “by the proposals and rumors
of prosperity and wellbeing he would find in Yugoslavia.”5 These were early stirrings of what
would become a mass migration of thousands of Monfalcone residents (monfalconesi) to
Yugoslavia, and Il Lavoratore did what it could to make sure the happening was well-known.

“E questi perchè se ne vanno?” Il Lavoratore, 17 January 1947.
Monfalcone sits just northwest of Trieste at the northernmost point of the Adriatic Sea.
3
Unsigned, “Elenco degli operai licenziati spontaneamente dall’1 gennaio al 29 gennaio 1947,” 5 February 1947,
NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9189, f 11304/115/308
4
ACS, MI, DGPS, CPC, b 1820, f 119741; Silvio D[x], “Anketni List - Questionario,” 1946, AS 1815/9/107.
5
Comm. di PS-Monfalcone, “C[x] Marcelliano fu E[x],” (N. 9027), 27 August 1948, ASG, Questura 1948, b 3, f 458.
The police of the Italian Republic also determined that Marcelliano had never engaged in any “antinational activity.”
1
2

1

The mobility of Silvio, Marcelliano, and the other Monfalconese emigrants was significant
for Il Lavoratore for the exact reason it appears so striking today: it ran counter to the prevailing
migratory currents that spanned the European continent in the first postwar and Cold War years.
Though these years were marked by an unprecedented mobility of peoples – POWs, orphans, camp
survivors, and expelled ethnic minorities were all on the move – rarely did individuals or groups
chose to go east.6 Limited mainly to repatriating DPs and POWs and isolated Communist fugitives
seeking refuge beyond the Iron Curtain, the eastward trickle paled in comparison to the westward
flood of those seeking to escape the Communist world, as a result of which it has been completely
overshadowed by westward movement in both historiography and the popular imagination. 7
Yet if the monfalconesi’s migration diverged strikingly from trends of continental scope,
it was regional circumstances and regional movements that most concerned Il Lavoratore. Indeed,
the cataclysm of world war had thrown Monfalcone and the often-contested Italo-Yugoslav
borderlands into chaos. During the war, the Yugoslav Partisan forces of Josip Broz (Tito) had
announced Yugoslavia’s intention to annex Italian territory up to the Isonzo River, and even a

6

Idith Zertal, From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1998); Michael Robert Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002); Anna Marta Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet
Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Tara Zahra,
The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2011); Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970 (New
York: Cambridge, University Press, 2012).
7
On the passage of Italian Communists into Czechoslovakia, see Giuseppe Fiori, Uomini ex: lo strano destino di un
Gruppo di comunist italiani (Turin: Einaudi, 1993); Philip Cooke, “Red Spring: Italian Political Emigration to
Czechoslovakia,” The Journal of Modern History 84, no. 4 (2012): 861-96. For general studies of postwar migration
that do not discuss West-East migration outside the scope of the categories mentioned, see Klaus Bade, Migration in
European History (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Rainer Ohlinger and Karen Schönwaelder (eds), European
Encounters: Migrants, Migration, and European Societies since 1945 (Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2003). There are a select few studies of migration from Western countries to the Soviet Union in the interwar
years, but they lack the Cold War implications. Tim Tzouliadis, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s
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Mickenberg, American Girls in Red Russia: Chasing the Soviet Dream (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 2017).
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year-and-a-half after war’s end, the location of the Italo-Yugosalv border remained an open
question. From war’s end through the printing of Il Lavoratore’s article, the territory stretching
from Monfalcone in the northwest through the Istrian Peninsula in the southeast had hung in the
balance between the two powers, much of it administered by an Anglo-American occupying force.
In the diplomatic battle that ensued, called the “Trieste Question” after the region’s capital city,
the claimant states made their cases using the Wilsonian language of ethno-demographics and
nation-states – that is, citing the presence of Italian- or Slavic-speaking populations – which gave
the impression that this was a continuation of longstanding nationalist struggles over an ethnicallymixed borderland. But the states’ competing ideologies and the involvement in the conflict of the
United States and the Soviet Union on behalf of Italy and Yugoslavia respectively also gave the
struggle an inflection as the “first battle of the Cold War.”8
With the stakes of border-drawing so high, borderland residents across the zone had taken
to the streets, demonstrating in favor of one side or the other and often returning home bloodied
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after clashes with their opponents. The territorial question became the overriding framework for
the zone’s politics, and the population, intent on being participants as well as prizes, fractured into
opposing camps that favored Italian sovereignty, Yugoslav sovereignty, or regional autonomy.
Despite attempts by some political actors to elide national and political identities in pursuit of
political gain – to forge derogatory categories such as “Slavo-Communists” or label all Italians
who supported an Italian Trieste as Fascists – the coalitions that emerged were tremendously
complex, ethnicity being just one, often minor consideration in a participant’s alignment with a
given faction. 9 Such was the case with Silvio and Marcelliano: they were “red” Italians who had
privileged politics over ethnicity and gone into the streets to try to bring Yugoslavia to their town.
For a year-and-a-half, Il Lavoratore had provided commentary on this struggle, attempting
to shift the Yugoslav border westward, but recently that game had come to an end and a new one
had begun. As diplomats announced the placement of the border, borderland residents to both east
and west felt their homes fell on the wrong side of the line. This was true for Silvio, Marcelliano,
and thousands of other monfalconesi, who, finding their town slotted to return to Italy, made
preparations to depart. But such was also the case for hundreds of thousands of ethnic Italians from
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eastern-Adriatic towns like Pola (Pula) whose homes were destined for Yugoslavia. By the time
of Il Lavoratore’s article, the postwar flight from the eastern Adriatic of over 250,000 ethnic
Italians was well underway. Their flight, which has been intensely scrutinized by historians in
recent decades and which dominates contemporary Italians’ understanding of postwar migration,
had already assumed the Biblically-inflected name of the exodus (esodo).10
It was this westward movement that concerned Il Lavoratore, and it was because of it that
Silvio and Marcelliano mattered. As one part of Europe’s postwar “disentanglement of
populations,” the esodo, with its images of Italians abandoning everything to escape Titoist
horrors, gave rise to accusations that Yugoslavia was ethnically cleansing its new lands.11 The
eastward movement of monfalconesi stood in stark contrast, belying such claims. Soon termed the
counter-exodus (controesodo), their movement was a voluntary re-entanglement of populations.
It afforded Il Lavoratore a counternarrative – an opportunity to transform the flight of easternAdriatic “exiles” (esuli) from a question of ethnic cleansing into one of politics. Those who fled,
the paper labelled as Fascists and reactionaries whose nationalism clashed irreconcilably with the
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progressive society being built upon the ruins of Fascist empire; progressive Italians from the
militant Silvio to the unremarkable Marcelliano, Yugoslavia welcomed with open arms.
If the Monfalconese migration was useful propaganda for Il Lavoratore, it is equally useful
for the historian. The fact is, as hundreds of thousands of Italians fled westward from Yugoslavia
and the Communist world, thousands travelled on the same rails, roads, and paths in the opposite
direction. Whether a longtime militant like Silvio or simply an “ordinary” Italian “lured” across
the border like Marcelliano, each migrant made the choice to depart. Moreover, each migrant’s
choice came as Monfalcone passed through the watershed transitions between Fascism and postFascism, occupation and liberation, World War and Cold War. Exploring how and why migrants
made this choice affords new insights on each of these transitions. For all their differences, these
migrants had three things in common: all had shared the experience of twenty years of Fascist
dictatorship, all (or most) had sought to prevent their town from returning to Italy after 1945 and
instead advocated for Yugoslavia, and all were conscious that the jump across the Italo-Yugoslav
border was a jump toward something called “socialism.” Because of this, the story of Monfalcone
and the “psychosis of departure” that gripped the town in 1947 does more than just provide new
perspectives on postwar mobility. 12 As a focal point to study the relationship between the quotidian
experience of Fascism and the formation of radical visions for the post-Fascist future, it can also
address hitherto unanswered questions about the legacies of dictatorship, the formation of popular
ideology, and the origins of the Cold War in the Italo-Yugoslav borderlands and beyond.

A participant used this term in his memoirs. Mario Tonzar, La valigia e l’idea. Memorie di Mario Tonzar, ed.
Alessandro Morena (Ronchi dei Legionari: Consorzio Culturale del Monfalconese, 2006), 104.
12
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Monfalcone between Fascism and Cold War
Despite the striking phenomenon of mass West-East movement, Monfalcone has not
received the attention one might expect. Within the Anglophone world, the town, its residents’
participation in the Italo-Yugolav territorial struggle, and the consequent migration are virtually
unknown. Nearly all English-language literature related to the Trieste Question focuses on Trieste
proper, and historians have made only passing reference to the controesodo in works otherwise
concerned with the esodo or inter-Communist Party relations. 13 In Italian, Slovenian, and Croatian
circles, historians have paid greater attention to both the historical experience of Monfalcone
through the early twentieth century and the controesodo emanating from that town. Scholars like
Galliano Fogar and Nevenka Troha have long recognized Monfalcone as a stronghold first of
Communist-led anti-Fascist organization and then of the region’s pro-Yugoslav movement, though
the former’s study concludes with the Second World War and the latter’s overlooks the
experiences of monfalconesi that generated and resulted from pro-Yugoslav activity in favor of the
outcomes of the politics of “Italo-Slavic fraternity” on a regional level. 14 Only recently have
regionally-minded historians begun to explore the social experience of Monfalcone between
Fascism and the postwar years, most often relying on oral testimonies, which they have sought to
gather before the memories of participants are lost to oblivion.15 Though these works are important
efforts to reach beyond standard political-diplomatic narratives of Monfalcone’s twentieth century,
they tend to reveal more about the memory of events than historical events themselves.
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With this renewed focus on the Monfalconese, scholars have dedicated substantial attention
to exploring the controesodo. From the first major publication, scholars have been interested in
defining the contexts from which monfalconesi departed – the administrative, economic, and
political conditions of the town – and especially the degree to which the departures were motivated
by either economic necessity or an ideological commitment to “constructing socialism.”16 A
notable shortcoming of this approach, however, was the failure to interrogate what “constructing
socialism” or even “socialism” meant for monfalconesi. It was assumed that monfalconesi
envisioned socialism through the same lens as the Yugoslav Communist Party that ruled their
destination country – that of Marxism-Leninism. Though subsequent works have weighed in on
the motivations for emigration, often bringing oral-historical methods to bear on the question and
even situating this movement of people in a longer perspective that accounts for the town’s antiFascist and left-wing credentials, they too have largely operated within the same framework. They
fruitfully incorporated ordinary participants’ voices in their narratives and highlighted additional
motivating factors such as migrants’ fear of reprisals for pro-Yugoslav activities and their
exhaustion and disillusionment after years of fighting on behalf of Yugoslavia, but they also failed
to interrogate the meaning of “socialism” for monfalconesi and its relationship to Fascist-era
experiences.17 Moreover, no single study brought to bear the entirety of available archival evidence
on the topic. Often left untouched were critical AMG holdings that lay across the Atlantic and
Communist Party sources located in Slovenia. 18
At the same time certain scholars were writing histories of monfalconesi departing to

16

This is a critical tension that runs through the essays in Puppini (ed), Il mosaico giuliano. Representative of
explanations involving the poles of “constructing socialism” and “economic necessity” are the essays by Puppini and
Mellinato respectively.
17
Andrea Berrini, Noi siamo la classe operaio: i duemila di Monfalcone (Milan: Baldani Castoldi Dalai, 2004); Di
Gianantonio et al, L’immaginario imprigionato; Cernigoi, Scelte politiche e identità nazionale.
18
An exception to this is Di Gianantonio et al, L’immaginario imprigionato, which uses some archival evidence,
particularly from Slovenian archives, even if still relies primarily on oral testimonies.

8

“construct socialism,” others turned their attention to the disappointing experiences of
monfalconesi once they arrived in Yugoslavia. Key to their studies was the critical Cominform
Resolution of 1948, after which many monfalconesi, caught up in the Tito-Stalin Split, ended up
in Tito’s gulag on the island of Goli Otok, tormented by their former comrades for real or alleged
“Cominformism.”19 Perhaps because the end-point was suffering, the visions that drove
monfalconesi to emigrate have not been considered by these scholars either. Thus, at present, the
two dominant themes of the Italian-language literature on the controesodo are “constructing
socialism” and “Goli Otok” – hope and suffering – though the latter looms larger in the picture.
This is unfortunate, because, as Julia Mickenberg points out in her study of “American girls in Red
Russia,” the focus on disenchantment “clouds our ability to understand the enchantment itself: the
real depth of interest, hope, and fascination” with the host country and the alternate world being
imagined.20 In the case of the monfalconesi, it clouds not only the motivations for their departure
– a useful avenue of inquiry in itself for understanding the Cold War – but also the complex origins
of these motivations, particularly as they relate to the town’s experiences with twenty years of
Fascist dictatorship.
The study of monfalconesi’s mid-century experience has the potential to contribute to
several ongoing historiographical discussions, often with implications far beyond Venezia Giulia.
First, it provides an opportunity to extend research on the relationship between political and ethnic
identities in a borderland context. Recent research suggests that for many residents of the Julian
borderland, which existed within the multiethnic space of the Habsburg Empire until the Great
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War and within the Italo-Yugoslav borderland thereafter, ethnic identity was situational and
performative. Rather than possessing a single, immutable ethnic “identity,” residents possessed a
cross-cultural toolkit that allowed them to put forward a particular “identification” given prevailing
circumstances. 21 Though this flexibility was not unlimited – the region’s ethnic identities hardened
somewhat in the late nineteenth century as a result of regional labor migration, 22 the arrival of
teachers and priests from Italy proper and the wider Habsburg Empire,23 the gradual partitioning
of organizational life along ethnic lines, 24 and the emergence of nationalist discourses among
professional, intellectual, and (Italian) state circles 25 – Habsburg imperial subjects developed
complex loyalties in which civic loyalty to the crown often coexisted with “Italian,” “Slavic,”
“Croatian,” or “Slovenian” identities. 26 Many even questioned the desirability of Wilsonian nationstates and ethno-national sovereignty, proposing alternatives in times of upheaval. 27 An analysis
of Monfalcone builds upon this line of research. With the addition of the Cold-War dynamic after
1945 and the absence of a fixed border – indeed, the opportunity to try to shift the border – each
political action undertaken by a monfalconese reflected his or her prioritization of ethnic, political,

Vanni D’Alessio, “Istrians, Identifications and the Habsburg Legacy: Perspectives on Identities in Istria,” Acta
Histriae 14, no. 1 (2006), 24-26. For example, economic elites of various backgrounds often adopted cultural
Italianness, thus blurring the line between class and ethnic identities and giving class-based politics an ethnic
inflection. Maura Hametz, Making Trieste Italian: 1918-1954 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2005), 112-24; Glenda
Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in TwentiethCentury (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 44.
22
Silvano Benvenuti, “La nascità del cantiere di Monfalcone e le prime lotte operaie (1908-1910),” Il Territorio 4
(1980), 26-27.
23
Vanni D’Alessio, “From Central Europe to the Northern Adriatic: Habsburg Citizens between Italians and Croats
in Istria,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 13, no. 2 (2008): 247-250; Il cuore conteso: il nazionalismo in una
comunità multietnica: l’Istria asburgica (Naples: Filema, 2003).
24
D’Alessio, “From Central Europe to the Northern Adriatic,” 250-253.
25
Hametz, Making Trieste Italian, 106; D’Alessio, “From Central Europe to the Northern Adriatic,” 247-50.
26
For example, Hametz suggests that the nationalism that came to permeate professional and intellectual circles of
Trieste was largely absent from the commercial elites, many of whom adopted a cultural Italianness, while still
intermixing with other groups and seeing their economic interests as tied to Habsburg rule of Trieste. Hametz, Making
Trieste Italian, 104-111; Sluga, The Problem of Trieste, 14, 18-20.
27
Regarding the rejection of the Wilsonian conception of sovereignty, Sluga point out that in the immediate wake of
the Great War, many Triestine socialists (both Italian and Slavic) sought the creation of an independent multinational
Republic of Venezia Giulia or even Soviet Republic of Venezia Giulia. Ibid., 41-42.
21

10

and other concerns. If the response of Trieste’s residents to these strains have been well-examined,
the responses of monfalconesi were different, shaped by the distinct composition of the town and
the town’s more direct path back to the Italian state. 28
Second, the study of Monfalcone can shed light on Italy’s complex experiences of
Resistance and liberation from Fascism. Since Claudio Pavone’s monumental Civil War (1991),
historians have increasingly understood the Italian Resistance not only as a patriotic war against
the German occupiers of 1943-45, but also a civil and class war that divided Italians among
themselves. In an attempt to re-assert the value and morality of Resistance, Pavone focused on the
subjective standpoint of the Resistance fighter – why he or she chose to fight and how he or she
defined “just” violence, for example – rather than the activities of political parties in Resistance or
the fighters’ military failures and successes. 29 This line of inquiry revealed profound differences
between the political hopes of rank-and-file fighters and the strategically-devised political lines of
parties positioning for postwar power. It acknowledged the gap between the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) line and the hopes of many of the revolution-minded combatants in the Communistaffiliated Garibaldi Brigades, which led the PCI to work to reign in calls for revolution and
“spontaneous leftism.”30
Working within this framework, subsequent scholars have developed the notion of the
“long liberation.” They have suggested that Italy’s liberation is best understood not as an event
happening in late April of 1945, but rather as a process that continued to play out for years after
the guns stopped firing, as different factions of the civil and class wars sought to realize their
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understandings of justice and their desired transformations in the country. In the schema of Mirco
Dondi, Italy passed from the spontaneous and cathartic killing of Fascists during the
“insurrectional” period (April-May 1945) to a wave of “inertial violence” as the ambiguities and
limits of transformation became apparent (spring-summer 1945), and finally to a period of
“residual” class violence as Italian radicals, frustrated by the failures to purge Fascism from
society, engaged in violence against the supposed class allies of Fascism in an effort to spark
revolution (fall 1945-fall 1946).31 Related to the focus on the “long liberation” have been studies
concerned with “Fascist continuities” across 1945, which most often focus on issues of limited
punishment of Fascists by the courts and the continuity of state institutions and personnel – that
is, on the perceived limits of transformation that in turn inspired acts of postwar violence. 32
Though these studies have probed the choice to participate in armed Resistance, the
morality of Resistance violence, and the reverberations of the Resistance in the postwar, they have
certain shortcomings. On the one hand, the framework of overlapping patriotic, civil, and class
wars does not fit neatly with the Julian borderlands, where, due to the proximity of Tito’s Partisans,
pro-Yugoslavism emerged as a uniquely Julian way of fighting the class war against the “armed
bourgeoisie” and the civil war against native Fascists.33 Perhaps more importantly, existing studies
have failed to sketch in concrete detail the specific, heterogenous, and unrealized visions for postFascist society held by rank-and-file participants, particularly those with ties to the Communist
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partisan forces (garibaldini). Though Pavone hints at the ill-defined ways in which some partisans
used the term “Communism,” including usage that was more or less synonymous with
“intransigently anti-Fascist,” he did not pursue the implications of this ambiguity for the postwar.34
In light of this elision, it appears that studies focused on the continuity of state institutions and the
acquittal of Fascist cardholders in postwar trials have missed a critical counterpart to objective
continuities in personnel and institutions, namely continuities of experiences subjectively
associated with Fascism, if not inherently or exclusively Fascist. A close study of Monfalcone can
thus nuance and further develop the expansive literature on Italy’s Resistance, Fascist continuities,
and long liberation, providing a clearer picture of how ordinary Italians envisioned post-Fascist
society and how giuliani experienced a distinct strain of “long liberation” that ended with many
pursuing liberation with their feet.
Finally, the study of monfalconesi between Fascism and emigration contributes in two
ways to debates about the nature and origins of the Cold War. First, it answers the call issued by
Geoff Eley to explore the inchoate and unarticulated hopes that made the immediate postwar years
so politically dynamic, as well as the suggestion of Martin Conway that historians pay greater
attention popular aspirations as they existed outside the formal organizations of unions and
“working-class” political parties. 35 If Sarah Morgan is correct that Italy’s long liberation played
out “between civil war and Cold War,” then examining the Monfalconese experience affords a
greater understanding not only of how ordinary Italians conceptualized the anti-Fascist struggle,
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but also of the complex relationship between anti-Fascism, Communist theoretical training, and
support for the Communist powers as the world polarized into two camps. 36 As historians
increasingly write about the role of (typically) state-directed cultural production in the “cultural
Cold War”37 and the ways in which the Soviet Union generated a mythical self-representation
through the hosting of foreign intellectuals, politicians, and other important figures, 38 the study of
the monfalconesi returns the focus to unorganized, ordinary people and their understanding of the
struggle. As participants in the struggle who quite deliberately chose to pursue life in Communist
Yugoslavia, a close examination of their aspirations affords an opportunity to explain how such
ordinary people viewed the Communist world in 1945 – including the distinctions they drew (if
any) between the countries that composed the Communist world – before they possessed the
benefit of hindsight.39 A study of the motivations of monfalconesi illuminates the degree to which
the myth-making around the Communist world bore fruit, under which circumstances and after
which experiences people found official cultural production compelling, and the centrality (or not)
of Communist ideology to the ways in which ordinary people lined up in the struggle.
A focus on the Monfalconese migration can also contribute to the decades-long debate on
the origins of the Cold War, which, through successive stages of orthodoxy, revisionism, and post-
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revisionism, has consistently focused on the policymakers at the centers of power at the expense
of considering the impact of ordinary people on the ground. 40 In these debates – and particularly
the early stages – focus was squarely on Washington and Moscow, with the Cold War understood
as a conflict that was imposed upon Europe from without by the two superpowers, which bore
varying degrees of fault. In the past four decades, and especially after the Cold War’s end,
historians have increasingly shifted away from the bipolar imposition model and from what
Federico Romero, drawing upon a phrase of Odd Arne Westad, has called a “‘relentlessly UScentered’ reductionism.”41 Instead, they have taken a more multilateral approaching, granting
power to various European and extra-European nations to influence the conflict and even
manipulate it to their own ends. The historiography of Italy in the Cold War has been no
exception. 42 Notable work highlighted Italy as a crucial early battleground, particularly in the
leadup to the first postwar election in 1948, stressing both the genuine fears within some US circles
that the election would end in civil war and the ability of Alcide De Gasperi and Italian Christian
Democracy to instrumentalize these fears for party gain. 43 Subsequent work even made the
compelling case that it was in Italy in 1947-48 that the United States developed the methods and
structures of “political warfare” that would define US policy for the rest of that conflict, its selfattributed successes in stopping a Communist accession to power in Italy justifying containment
and turning the US into “a legend in its own mind.”44 This new historiography of Italy in the Cold
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War shifted the focus of Cold War origins southward, away from Germany, where the Berlin crisis
of 1948-49 was (and to a degree still is) often defined as the moment the Cold War crystallized
into an enduring conflict.45 Still, their analyses remained in the realm of high politics, the subjects
being diplomats, politicians, and military leaders.
A focus upon the Monfalconese migration both reinforces the critical role of Italy in global
Cold War polarization and affords new perspectives on the range and type of actors critical to that
process. Historians have little acknowledged the common man or woman as an actor capable of
having a causative role in the origins story of the Cold War, and the Monfalconese migration is no
exception. Because Italy’s Cold War studies programs are so steeped in the national tradition of
the “history of treaties,” there remains a disconnect between regional histories of the controesodo
and national histories of Italy in the Cold War. 46 The former, due to their regionalist perspective
and privileging of oral over archival sources, treat the phenomenon as something occurring within
the Cold War, but having no bearing upon the Cold War. The latter overlook the controesodo
altogether. I seek to bridge this gap and elucidate the connections between the Monfalconese
migration and Cold War polarization on a national and even global scale – to show the
monfalconesi’s role in the definition of what Romero calls the “structure and grammar” of the Cold
War. 47 To do so requires a methodological approach distinct from those that have previously been
applied to the controesodo.
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New Methods and New Findings
In telling the story of the monfalconesi between Fascism and Cold War, I draw on the two
methodological schools of Italian microhistory (microstoria) and German everyday history
(Alltagsgeschichte). Whereas microhistory restricts the scope of analysis to generate new
understandings about relations, processes, and phenomena that are impossible to detect at a higher
plane, everyday history seeks to understand how structures and transformations of global
importance are constituted within the processes and spaces of everyday life. 48 As Alf Lüdtke, the
pioneer of everyday history suggests, everyday history seeks to avoid “rais[ing] fundamental
secular changes to a level detached from human agents, occurring behind their backs, as it were,”
and instead to “demonstrate how social impositions or stimuli are perceived and processed as
interests and needs, anxieties and hopes; indeed, how they are generated in the very process.” 49 In
doing so, it restores autonomy and potency to the activity of “ordinary people.”
Though studies applying this methodological combination to Fascist-era and postwar Italy
have been scarce,50 historians of the Cold War Germanies have applied it to great effect,
transcending the “imposition” and high-political approaches to Cold War origins and showing the
centrality of everyday concerns to peoples’ strategies of navigating the first postwar years. Paul
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Steege’s work on Cold War Berlin, for example, has suggested that ordinary Berliners played a
key role in transforming that contested city into one of the first Cold War battlefields, particularly
when they routed the SED from municipal power in 1946 – two years before the critical blockade
– largely because the Soviet-aligned party proposed to revise the supply and rationing system in a
way that defied popular aspirations. 51 Similar disciples of everyday history have stressed the
critical role of East and West Germans in pushing forward the creation of the intra-German Iron
Curtain, largely as a response to everyday concerns as mundane as distaste for cross-border
beggars. 52 Such studies reveal the tremendous potential of everyday history and microhistory to
improve our understanding of how the Cold War came to be as it was.
From these studies and from the work of a second generation of largely American everyday
historians, I borrow key methodological practices, among them a strong emphasis on serial
experiences and actions taking place in specific places of quotidian life. By focusing on repeated
actions in such places – here the factory workshop and the marketplace – the everyday historian
shows how the individual constructs structure and meaning on a wider level, the mundane and
unexceptional often playing a key role. This focus allows the everyday historian to “integrate the
micro and the macro, cause and consequence,” and thus to interrogate “the very distinction
between our analytic categories of micro- and macrohistory, structure and agency.” 53 To capture
the combination of serial interaction and archetypicality that characterize the spaces so fruitful
investigated by the everyday historian, I use the term “lived spaces.”
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A focus on “lived spaces” affords the opportunity to examine not only how ordinary people
participated in the constitution of key social and economic structures that shaped their world, but
also the key mental structures and ideologies through which they understood the world around
them. As recent everyday histories have shown, it was in spaces like marketplaces that twentiethcentury Europeans often conceptualized and defined the limits of “community.” In fact, if
communities such as nations are “imagined,” then it is in lived spaces like the marketplace that
“imagined communities are constituted–or dismantled.”54 It follows that encounters between
individuals in lived spaces are not just (or not always just) encounters between individuals. Rather
they are encounters during which participants bump up against and perceive the structures,
systems, and groups that bind them, mediated by interaction with specific individuals. Such
encounters are thus opportunities for the generation of social imaginaries based on the perception
of grievance and antagonism, or cooperation and harmony. In this process, individuals come to
contemplate and define justice and injustice, as well as the desirability of the inclusion and
exclusion of particular social categories in society. And in conceptualizing justice versus injustice,
inclusion versus exclusion, they posit a reshaping of the world and formulate new social
imaginaries and political ideologies.
In the specific case of Fascist-era and postwar Monfalcone, this approach affords the
opportunity to better understand how ordinary monfalconesi thought about the rather ambiguous
term “Fascism,” understood not just as a political party or state, but also as a constellation of
individuals with whom the subject has repeated social interaction and the sum of these serial
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experiences.55 It affords a better understanding of the complex ways in which monfalconesi
perceived and attributed culpability for the regime and the ways in which they reacted to the
persistent physical presence of individuals who served as mental stand-ins for the wider system of
“Fascism” both during the Resistance and after war’s end. 56 Moreover, it enables an exploration
of the continuities between Fascism and postwar that goes beyond a focus on Fascist cardholders
and instead focuses on continuities of subjective experience. These mental processes and
experiential continuities were inextricably bound to how monfalconesi thought of “socialism” and
how they engaged in politics from Resistance through emigration.
A central difficulty in implementing this method in the study of Monfalcone is finding
sources. This is difficult not only because ordinary monfalconesi lived their lives without regard
for the future historian’s needs, but also because the town changed hands five times during the
period under study, scattering the existing source material throughout several different countries.
Extant sources fall into three basic categories. First, press sources form a particularly important
font for this study. Articles in the Triestine Communist daily Il Lavoratore indicate the rhetorical
strategies by which the regional Communist Party attempted to win over monfalconesi.
Second, ego documents – those letters, testimonies, journals, and other sources in which
the narrator’s subjective “I” comes through clearly – reveal monfalconesi’s subjective experiences
of everyday Fascism. Though these documents provide the clearest picture of how monfalconesi
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understood Fascism, they are regrettably few in number. The single largest holding of pertinent
ego-documents comes from a series of interviews collected by the Italian Communist functionary
Alfredo Bonelli. 57 These interviews, undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s and held at the
IRSML-FVG, are far from contemporaneous indications of monfalconesi’s perception, and they
run the risk of distorting the past given that Bonelli’s purpose was to compile information about
the Titoist persecution of Italians in Yugoslavia after the Cominform Resolution. Nevertheless, by
rooting the subjective perspectives presented in such interviews within the verifiable everyday
conditions of life as revealed in contemporaneous documentary sources, it is possible to limit
distortions and to understand the controesodo on the participants’ own terms.
The final and most voluminous category of sources are traditional archival documents.
These records, drawn from twelve archives across the United States, Italy, and Slovenia, fall into
four subcategories: (1) local administrative reports from the Fascist era and the period of AngloAmerican military occupation; (2) district-level and workshop-level reports by the region’s
Communist Parties, both during the Italian period and the years of Yugoslav organizational
domination from 1944 to 1947; (3) central state reports from Italy’s police and diplomatic offices
and from the Allied occupation forces and intelligence services; and (4) the provincial police’s
individual surveillance files on migrants for the year 1948.58 The first two subcategories enable
the reconstruction of both the living conditions and actions of monfalconesi down to the level of
minutia. The last two are essential for uncovering the interrelation between the actions of
monfalconesi and those of actors in the halls of power, while the final category also enables the
reconstruction of migrants’ social and familial networks to an unprecedented degree.
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Yet even with this array of sources, the problem persists that there are not sufficient egodocuments to support a microanalytical everyday history of Monfalcone in and of themselves. As
a result, I have had to read archival documents for veiled “ego” indications. Particularly fruitful
have been local Communist Party reports, which have survived with remarkable thoroughness.59
Most often written by workers with limited political training, these sources can themselves to some
degree reveal the subjective perspective of the Monfalconese worker. More significantly, a reader
who ascends to district-level report finds repeated reference to instances of worker “errors,”
“deviations,” and other transgressions, in which the author describes in detail the action or
discussions that provoked criticism. In these misunderstandings and disagreements, the “ego” of
Monfalconese worker shows through. Even if filtered through the writing of the critical comrade,
such moments afford contemporaneous evidence of monfalconesi’s subjectivity, enabling an
analysis of how monfalconesi thought of Fascism, socialism, and events unfolding around them. 60
What becomes clear from reading sources in this way is that the pro-Yugoslav struggle and
the subsequent Monfalconese migration were above all motivated by a desire to escape “everyday”
Fascism in the postwar era. Part one of this two-part study examines the processes by which this
hope emerged and its impact on Monfalcone before the period of mass departures. The first three
chapters trace the formation of monfalconesi hopes for postwar society during the Fascist era
period and their coalescence into a Monfalconese conception of socialism. Chapter one focuses on
the Fascist years. It examines how Fascism and Fascists imbricated themselves in Monfalconese
society and how this led workers to conceptualize certain social categories – particularly the
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shopkeeper and piecework clerk – as fundamentally unredeemable and quintessentially “Fascist,”
regardless of an individual’s actual politics. Chapter two elucidates how this experiential baggage
informed the actions of monfalconesi during the last two years of the Second World War, during
which the fall of Mussolini, the descent of Italy into civil war, and Yugoslav annexationist
ambitions presented monfalconesi with a wide range of opportunities to envision post-Fascist
society and to pursue radical transformation. It traces the emergence of a local pro-Yugoslav
faction tied closely to the Communist Resistance and the abortive efforts to remake society during
the month of Yugoslav rule that followed Axis defeat but preceded the establishment of AngloAmerican military governance. Set during the period of Anglo-American occupation, the third
chapter details the coalescence of a “myth of Yugoslavia” that sustained Monfalcone’s proYugoslav movement by mobilizing popular frustrations with everyday Fascism and casting Tito’s
Yugoslavia as a foil to stagnant Monfalcone.
The final two chapters of part one turn to the postwar territorial struggle in Monfalcone.
They trace the rise and then defeat of a pro-Yugoslav faction whose members were above all
concerned with purging local society of “everyday” Fascism, but for whom Yugoslav annexation
seemed the easiest path toward that end. Chapter four examines monfalconesi’s concrete and often
mutually irreconcilable efforts simultaneously to remake local society in the first year of Allied
occupation and to advocate for Yugoslav annexation. It suggests that much of the pro-Yugoslav
fervor resulted from the AMG’s inability or unwillingness to address monfalconesi’s grievances
about everyday Fascism in the marketplace and workplace, which fueled accusations that the AMG
was allowing or even encouraging the persistence of Fascism. The pro-Yugoslav push climaxed
in the summer of 1946 with a failed general strike, after which the movement fell into disarray and
disillusionment. Chapter five traces the denouement that followed this defeat and subsequent news
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in late 1946 that Monfalcone would return to Italy. It suggests that, as the pro-Yugoslav movement
dissolved and the hopes for radical local transformation disappeared, monfalconesi began to look
for a way out – a way to liberate themselves from everyday Fascism by other means.
Many found emigration to be the only path forward. Part two turns concretely to the
controesodo, viewing it as just one outcome of a long battle over the nature of postwar Monfalcone.
Chapter six details the controesodo as a multi-staged phenomenon. It pays special attention to how
and why monfalconesi made their choices to depart and interrogates the relationship between
“political” and “apolitical” migration. Chapter seven then examines the experiences of
Monfalconese migrants once they arrived in Yugoslavia. It suggests that, as Yugoslavia lurched
toward its socialist transition under Communist Party guidance, state policy generated market- and
workplace hardships that not only clashed with monfalconesi’s hopes for socialism, but also
replicated their idea of “everyday” Fascism. This drove a trickle of monfalconesi to return home
after just a short stay, which became a flood following the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948. Yet in
returning home, monfalconesi played an important role in polarizing Italian politics into Cold War
camps, and the final chapter explores the impact of monfalconesi on the Cold War. The mobility
of ordinary monfalconesi was misconstrued as part of a global Communist plot to prepare for
armed Communist takeovers in Greece and Italy, which spurred political polarization in Italy,
helped Italian anti-Communists pull Italy under the US containment umbrella, and drove the Italian
state to begin constructing a rigid bordering apparatus on its eastern border – an Italian Iron Curtain
– in an effort to pen perceived Communists within the West.
Because I aim to conduct an intense microstudy of Monfalcone’s pro-Yugoslav population,
there are two limitations in scope of which readers should be aware from the outset. First, not all
monfalconesi and not all parts of Monfalcone’s political spectrum receive equal space and
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consideration. I have written a necessarily subjective history. I give preference to the perspective
of one subset of the population, albeit a large one. Second, I make no claim that the findings of
this microhistorical study apply universally to all other areas of Italy, let alone to Europe more
broadly. As the literature on “border Fascism” (fascismo di confine) suggests, Fascism took on a
unique inflection in Italy’s northeastern borderlands, which in turn shaped how it manifested itself
in everyday life. 61 Given variations in economic, social, political, and historical conditions across
the peninsula, this means that much of the Monfalconese experience may be area-specific.
Even if that is the case, this dissertation traces a process of ideological formation and of
coming to terms with dictatorship that likely occurred elsewhere, if reflecting local specificities.
This process is an important one for understanding how ordinary people lived and acted through
the twentieth century, and the project suggests that historians must readjust or replace the lenses
through which they have traditionally viewed key historical moments. It suggests the need to
rethink the meaning of “Fascist continuities” that persisted across 1945 and to consider such
continuities from a subjective as well as objective standpoint. It also suggests a need to decenter
narratives of the early Cold War in more than one respect. From an ideological perspective, greater
attention must be paid to the diversity of political thought even within the portion of the population
that aligned itself with the Soviet Union and its allies. In Monfalcone, Marxism-Leninism (or
Marxism more generally) played only a minor role in the ordinary person’s thinking about
socialism during the first postwar years. The Monfalconese “encounter” with Marxist-Leninist
Yugoslavia and even with those few native militants well-versed in official theory resembles the
encounter of various Third-World socialists with Marxist-Leninist states during the postwar years,
as when Tanzanian exchange students trained in the African socialist tradition of ujamaa arrived
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in the DDR, wrestling with the contradictions between their own beliefs and the scientific
socialism of the host country.62
Beyond ideological decentering, the story of the Monfalconese migration helps decenter
narratives of Cold War origins from the geographical and social perspective. As the Monfalconese
case makes clear, ordinary people had tremendous power to affect actors in the central halls of
power, particularly if they resided at the peripheries of the state. Far from being imposed upon
ordinary people such as monfalconesi, the Cold War was just as much provoked by them. The
mobility of monfalconesi and the consequences of this mobility suggests that greater emphasis
must be placed on the Mediterranean theater of the early Cold War as a point of tension and
escalation. The movement of unruly monfalconesi played no small contribution to the emergence
and spread in Italy and other Western countries of the notion of fundamental interconnectedness
of the Mediterranean countries’ fates and thus too of the need for universal containment.
But before the monfalconesi like Silvio and Marcelliano made their migration and did their
part to usher in the Cold War order, they first passed through twenty years of Fascism. It was
during these years that the seeds were planted for their eventual choice to side with Tito.
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Part I: Monfalcone on the Border
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Chapter 1: Fascism and Its Discontents
The shipyard is like a sun that shines light on the entire zone. In large part, the entire zone
depends politically on the life of the shipyard.1
– “Lorenzo,” Communist militant in Monfalcone’s anti-Fascist Resistance, 1943.

On the afternoon of 19 September 1938, Benito Mussolini climbed a platform bedecked
with fasces and Italian tricolors to face a crowd of over ten-thousand workers and deliver a speech
that glorified labor and reinforced the notion that workers were contributing to Fascism’s historic
mission of restoring Italy to its rightful place on the world stage. Though the content of this speech
may not have been noteworthy, the location certainly was. The Duce delivered his speech at one
of Italy’s largest industrial sites and one of the most important for his regime’s ongoing war
preparations: the Monfalcone shipyard and aeronautical works. The workers had recently finished
setting the keels of two new submarines, and Mussolini had arrived to laud their contribution to
bolstering Italy’s martial power in the skies and the sea.2 Fittingly, then, the platform from which
he spoke consisted of an airplane body fused with the conning tower of a submarine (Figure 1).
Yet more striking than the content or reception of the speech is the contrast between the setting of
this Fascist spectacle and the qualities of this same space as recently as the turn of the twentieth
century. Just three decades before, the space had been untamed coastal plain on the outskirts of an
insignificant fishing village founded by the Romans in the era of the Republic. By 1938, however,
after three decades of industrialization, this formerly forgettable settlement had become the social,
political, and industrial hub of a new territorial unit stretching from the Isonzo River in the west
to the Timavo River in the east, to which it gave the name the Municipality of Monfalcone, or
“Monfalconese” (Figure 2), and Mussolini believed the Monfalconese to be worthy of a visit.
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With industrialization came major social transformation and the transformation of the
Monfalconese into a stronghold of left-wing radicalism, which, though superficially contained by
thirteen years of Fascist dictatorship, continued to simmer beneath the surface even at the time of
Mussolini’s visit. In the years following Mussolini’s speech, these simmering tensions would
erupt, unleashing resentments built up over the eighteen years between the foundation of
Monfalconese Fascism and the Duce’s visit to the shipyard. Wartime mobilization, foreign
occupation, and bitter civil war would shape popular expectations for postwar society. To
understand the hopes of monfalconesi in the postwar years, it is necessary to understand the
formative years of the municipality and the way that Fascism functioned in local society. These
decades were ones of repeated social, economic, and political convulsions, and, as the anonymous
anti-Fascist militant “Lorenzo” made clear, at the heart of it all was the shipyard.
The Late Habsburg Years and the Birth of the Cantiere Navale Triestino (CNT)
The Monfalconese municipality was born in the early twentieth century due to a
combination of geographical fortune and historical circumstance. Geographically, Monfalcone is
situated in the narrow strip of flat land between the Adriatic Sea and the pre-Alpine limestone
plateau known as the Carso. It thus sits along the easiest land route for transit between cities like
Venice and Udine to its west and Trieste to its southeast. As such, it became a vital transit node as
the Habsburgs, then the rulers of much of Venezia Giulia, connected these cities by rail in the
second half of the nineteenth century. With such infrastructural projects, Monfalcone was
integrated into the regional economy at the precise historical moment at which steam power was
turning naval technology on its head, causing a transportation revolution and a scramble by
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European states to outfit their navies with ever-larger warships. 3 The Habsburgs and their subjects
were no exceptions to these trends and, thanks to the activity of major shipping firms like that of
the Cosulich brothers, the major Habsburg port of Trieste boomed, becoming one of the world’s
most active and splendorous port cities. 4 In this context, the monarchy’s interest in expanding its
naval and maritime capacity and the self-interest of the Cosuliches converged. The latter, utilizing
Habsburg subsidies for new shipbuilding ventures, decided to take a step toward vertical
integration, founding the Triestine Naval Shipyards (Cantiere Navale Triestino, CNT) in 1908. 5
Despite being headquartered in Trieste, the CNT chose Monfalcone as the site of its new
shipyard, as it was well-connected by rail but not yet a major urban area. At that time, the nearby
area consisted of two relatively distinct parts. The largest settlement was Monfalcone, abutting the
Adriatic Sea, which was surrounded to the northwest by an inner arc of smaller communes that
included Ronchi dei Legionari and Staranzano, as well as their hamlets (frazioni) of Selz,
Vermegliano, Dobbia, and Begliano. This area had begun the first steps of light industrialization
but was also reliant on fishing and artisanal activities. Surrounding these central settlements was a
distinct outer arc of agro-artisanal villages, which, excepting landlocked Doberdò del Lago,
followed the southwesterly flow of the Isonzo River from the Alps to the Adriatic Sea and included
Sagrado, Fogliano-Redipuglia, San Pier d’Isonzo, Turriaco, Pieris, and San Canzian d’Isonzo. 6
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In the final years before the Great War, the new shipyard expanded rapidly, as did the
population of the Monfalconese’s inner arc of communes. In a six-year period, the population of
Monfalcone nearly tripled, rising from roughly 5000 (1907) to some 14,000 (1913) and bringing
with it clear social strains and political transformation. At first, much of the growth was not
centered in historic Monfalcone itself, but rather in the nearby factory-town of Panzano, created
according to “garden city” norms with the dual paternalistic purposes of controlling the workforce
and assuring a career-long commitment from skilled workers (Figure 3). Within a few years,
however, the new Viale San Marco connected Monfalcone and Panzano and the two slowly fused.7
With the creation of the new shipyard and the growth of both Monfalcone and Panzano,
the Monfalconese began to form as an industrial center, the local social fabric woven increasingly
in accordance with the shipyard’s demands. The Cosuliches hired skilled workers from the
shipyards of nearby Trieste and Muggia and drew in both Slovenian-speaking artisans of the
nearby Carso and Italian-speaking artisans from the villages on the nearby plains. Moreover, the
shipyard dragged even the outlying villages through this transformation, as agrarian families −
even those from the communes right along the Isonzo River − increasingly responded to rent crises
and land shortages by sending their sons to work in the shipyard. To these locals, management
added skilled workers and technicians from England and from the Habsburgs’ Germanic and
Bohemian lands, as well as unskilled laborers from the Italian Mezzogiorno.8 By 1914, the CNT
employed 2500 workers and a truly multiethnic workforce was in embryo.9 Joining it were smaller,
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but not insignificant workforces in other ventures, primarily the Adria Werke chemical plant (later
Solvay), the Luzzatto vegetable oil plant, the Cotonificio Triestino cotton mill, and the Ditte
Passero, a plant for the manufacture of food tins. 10
With industrialization and the influx of workers from England, Italy, and the Habsburgs
lands there arrived in the Monfalconese a host of new political ideas and the first stirrings of labor
agitation. Unskilled workers tended to embrace anarchism and quickly adopted spontaneous
striking. The shipyard’s first political strike, in October 1909, came in protest of the execution of
the anarchist Francisco Ferrer in Spain. By contrast, skilled workers − especially the metallurgical
group headed by Giovanni Fontanot of Muggia − tended to prefer socialism and a strategy of
cautious bargaining, befitting their indispensability to the firm and their greater social and
organizational coherence. Though the socialists launched a campaign in the early 1910s to build a
unified workers’ movement and overcome tensions between unskilled anarchists and skilled
socialists, such efforts bore few fruits in the first decade of the shipyard’s existence.11
But along with new political ideas, industrialization and the arrival of migrant workers also
spurred new ways of thinking about ethnicity among native monfalconesi. Such workers arrived
in a territory that straddled the blurry boundary between the Slavic (especially Slovenian) and
Italian worlds. Though it is impossible to draw a distinct ethnic boundary, not least of all because
to do so would defy the realities of many borderland residents’ social lives and self-conception,
those residing in Monfalcone proper and the villages of the more populous western half of the zone
largely spoke a variant of the Venetian dialect of Italian, while Slovenian became more common
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in the northern and eastern villages, including in the overwhelmingly Slovenian village of Doberdò
del Lago.12 Yet even among those who spoke the Venetian dialect, not all identified exclusively
as “Italian.” Many instead considered themselves a sort of hybrid people called bisiachi. In fact,
due to a long history of exchange with both Carsic Slovenes coming to visit Monfalcone’s market
− Tržič, the Slovenian name for Monfalcone, means just that − and inhabitants of the Slovenianmajority communes abutting the Adriatic Sea southeast of Monfalcone, the local dialect bore many
Slovenian influences and many monfalconesi bore Slovenian surnames. 13
The formation of the shipyard wrenched many monfalconesi from this localized world and
incorporated them more fully into the world of nationalist discourses and identities. Migrant
workers from the Mezzogiorno often arrived with nationalist convictions, 14 and even ethnically
Italian workers from Trieste and Muggia brought the language of ethnic difference with them.
They arrived from cities steeped in nationalist discourses and in which even leftist politics often
operated with the presumption of distinct, if cooperative nationalities (as with Austro-Marxism).
Moreover, the arrival of workers from distant lands created opportunities for cross-ethnic
interactions that highlighted difference. While many monfalconesi continued to view themselves
as ethnically hybrid or to display “national indifference” into the 1910s, others began to consider
themselves more exclusively Italian, distinct from Slovenes. Not always did this translate into anti-
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Habsburg sentiment or aggressive Italian nationalism, but questions of collective identity were on
many monfalconesi’s minds when, in the sixth year of the CNT’s life, Europe went to war.15
The Arrival of the Italian “Motherland:” Postwar Upheaval and Local Fascism
When the Great War came to Monfalcone in summer 1915, it had a devastating effect.
Monfalcone sat squarely on the front line. The Habsburg trench line ran right up to the train station
on the eastern edge of town, and the first months of fighting effectively demolished the CNT. This
destruction would provide the Cosuliches with the long-term benefit of a fresh start in the interwar
years by allowing them to reorganize the shipyard and equip it with the most modern tooling,
though for the duration of the war the destruction led to great suffering.16
But the most drastic outcome of the Great War for Monfalcone was that it brought the town
back into its supposed Italian “motherland,” which garnered a range of local reactions. On the one
hand, Monfalcone had long been part of the “unredeemed” lands after which Italian irredentists
pined. Italian nationalists and irredentists had a foothold in the Monfalconese, and such individuals
celebrated the eastward thrust of Italy’s border with an annual communal parade.17 On the other
hand, ardent irredentism appears to have been a minority opinion, and nationalist sentiment was
less pronounced than in nearby Gorizia and Trieste. The composition of local society lent itself to
socialist and anarchist politics of an internationalist type, and even among those monfalconesi who
viewed their bisiachi identity as reinforcing rather than challenging their belonging to the Italian
nation, many greeted Italy with apathy or ambivalence. 18
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For nationalists and for Italy − both Liberal and later Fascist Italy − ambiguity and
indifference on the border were a threat, especially when the issue was the mixing of Italians with
supposedly inferior Slavs in vital contested territories. Italian nationalists had long claimed that
the Habsburg Empire had made an effort to “Slavify” the city and its surroundings to undercut
Italian claims on Trieste, and the Italian state continued to propagate this idea after the war.19
Though the first Italian census in the area revealed (or, perhaps, asserted) that the Monfalconese
had largely escaped the feared “Slavicization” − there were 30,667 “Italians” compared to just
1616 Slovenes − the state recognized that realities and sentiments on the ground were not as clearcut as these politically expedient statistics suggested.20 Thus, in the years after annexation the
Italian state initiated a program of “Italianization,” seen as part of a wider process of generating a
healthy national body through “human reclamation” (bonifica umana).21 The state Italianized
Julian place-names, overriding locally and regionally significant names with “national” referents.
It closed Slavic- and German-language schools and replaced local teachers with those who could
be trusted to teach a new, nationalist curriculum. Over time − and particularly after the rise and
consolidation of Fascism − it pursued the Italianization of Slavic, German, and other surnames. 22
“Borderlands,” in The Politics of Everyday Life in Fascist Italy, eds. Arthurs, Ebner, and Ferris, op. cit., 166. Silvano
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19
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In this context, monfalconesi often experienced the arrival of Italy not as national
liberation, but rather as a form of cultural oppression. Thus, when one longtime leftist militant
reflected on the arrival of Italy, he insisted that “no one is unfamiliar with the hostility with which
Italy has always viewed us, from the Redemption onwards…. [I]n the end, [the working class]
experienced almost solely persecution, not the least of which was for ethno-linguistic reasons, and
it therefore saw the so-called ‘motherland’ filtered through the uniforms of the carabinieri, the
policemen, and the Fascists, a motherland, which, in effect, has always considered us second- or
third-class Italians.”23 And he was not wrong. Nearly two decades after Italy’s arrival, the public
security commissar in Monfalcone would lament that “there exists a true and proper Chinese wall
that seems eternally to divide the Old Italy from the Redeemed Lands,” the locals exhibiting an
“utter and silent hostility toward all that which is of the Old Kingdom.” 24
But the most important reason that many monfalconesi looked upon Italian annexation with
regret − certainly a contributing factor to the hostility (or indifference) described in the preceding
quotation − was that the arrival of Italy brought violent political repression, particularly of the left.
From the moment that an Italian military administration arrived in the region in 1918 through the
transition to a civilian administration in mid-1920, military administrators decried the unreliability
and subversiveness of the local population. They warned that the whole area was populated with
“Slav irredentists” and “Bolshevik subversives” and often elided left-wing radicalism and Slavic
ethnicity in a way that “Slavicized” radicalism and placed Italian leftists beyond the pale of the
national community. In those years, industrial and agricultural workers entered their local CGIL
or Federterra branch in droves and the old socialists transferred into the Italian Socialist Party
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(Partito socialista italiano, PSI) almost immediately embracing a maximalist rhetoric that ran
counter to the national leadership’s strategic hesitancy. Though local anarchist, Catholic, and
Republican parties soon emerged, they were dwarfed by the PSI. Only in the fishing village of
Grado did any of these parties muster a serious challenge, but even there the Republicans managed
only a strong opposition. In the absence of viable nationalist parties that might provide an electoral
vindication of the Italian annexation, the state responded with direct crackdowns on any agitation
perceived as anti-Italian or social-revolutionary. 25
And there were many agitations during the aptly named Red Biennium (biennio rosso).
Inspired by the recent Bolshevik Revolution and seeing their membership totals balloon in parallel
with postwar unemployment and inflation, Socialist26 and labor organizations began to agitate in
the fields and the factories. In the fields, the new Friuli-Venezia Giulia branch of Federterra sought
above all to revise existing mezzadria (sharecropping) contracts so that sharecroppers kept 90% of
the harvest, as opposed to half. The drama climaxed in mid-1920 when 7000 sharecroppers
marched on Cervignano to free their leader, who had been jailed for threatening landlords with
land seizures.27 In the factories, the situation was equally volatile, as workers demanded that
employers recognize the CGIL’s authority to negotiate collective contracts and organize the
election of internal commissions to govern internal shop procedures (Figure 4). The Cosuliches,
like most of the region’s industrialists, refused to bend, fearing the implications of yielding even
the slightest bit of ground to this rising “Bolshevism.” Instead, they blacklisted Socialist militants
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and syndical organizers, to which workers responded by hanging portraits of Lenin on the walls. 28
Mirroring the actions of industrialists throughout Italy, the Cosulich brothers then began
aligning themselves with the nascent Fascist movement, seeing this as the only way to reassert
control over a restive workforce. In June 1920, the brothers and much of the shipyard’s top
management lent support to Francesco Giunta who, having just founded the Triestine fascio,
oversaw the formation of a Monfalcone branch (Figure 5).29 Among the management figures who
supported Monfalconese Fascism were Federico Martinoli, simultaneously the shipyard’s hiring
director and the head of the Panzano action squad, and the Nationalist Antonio Colummi, head of
the firm’s Control Office and second-in-command within the communal administration. These
two, working with the leadership of the Monfalcone fascio, including its head Aurelio Barbettani,
and the head of the Monfalcone city action squad Nicola Bruni, increasingly hired squadristi and
anti-leftist workers from the Old Provinces, placing them in positions as team leaders and company
guards specifically to counterbalance the Socialists and Communists. 30 Moreover, from the
moment of the fascio’s foundation, the Monfalcone squadristi engaged in punitive expeditions,
attacking Socialists, syndical organizers, Federterra representatives, and Slovenian cultural and
political figures. Though the firm’s support of and use of Fascism sparked an extended strike in
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late August and early September of 1920, the strike failed to change these hiring policies. 31
Thus, a clear opposition formed between Socialists (and soon Communists) on one side
and the Fascists, industrialists, and forces of order on the other.32 The climax came in 1921 in the
form of two deadly clashes in the CNT. The first occurred on 11 February when a group of leftists
gathered in the workshops to hear speeches condemning Fascist attacks on the headquarters of leftwing organizations. Certain Fascist workers intervened, stirring up the leftist crowd, which then
proceeded to march to the central shipyard offices to attack Fascist and philo-Fascist clerks. Events
devolved into an all-out brawl, with the Fascist workers aided by the other members of the
Monfalcone fascio, factory guards, and the carabinieri. Under unclear circumstances, some shots
were fired. The leftists soon fled, unable to withstand the onslaught. For the remainder of the day,
the carabinieri struggled to keep order in the town as squadristi from the Monfalcone fascio, aided
by truckloads of Triestine Fascists, terrorized the dispersed workers. By day’s end, the Fascists
had killed one, seriously injured five, beaten countless others, and sacked the local labor
headquarters.33 Seven months later, a September strike of the CNT metalworkers ended in violent
clashes in which Triestine Fascists killed two workers. 34
With this wave of violence, the Socialist and Communist Parties soon found themselves in
retreat. From the fall of 1921 to the fall of 1922, the Fascists continued their offensive, increasingly
imbricated within the shipyard workforce. In October 1922, many of these Fascists would march
on Rome, leaving as thugs and returning with a mandate to transform their repressive actions into
a durable system of social control and Italianization, supported by their new prime minister, Benito
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Mussolini. As in the rest of Italy, in the Monfalconese the March on Rome was followed by the
slow erosion of democratic pluralism. Between 1922 and 1923, the Socialists and Communists of
Monfalcone, though still possessing the legal right to organize, were forced to enter a semiclandestine state due to a two-pronged offensive from the squadristi and the local industrialists.
The former continued their punitive missions, and the latter continued to blacklist radical activists
and give hiring preference to Fascists. Anti-Fascist militants and unions found themselves
outmatched. Union bargaining power was undercut by a continual influx of job-seeking youths
from the outlying agrarian communes, as well as strongly nationalist and/or pro-Fascist workers
from Puglia, Calabria, and Sicily, recruited now not just to fill the shipyard’s labor needs, but also
to further simultaneously the regime’s ends of “Italianization” and anti-leftist repression.35 By the
time Mussolini declared the dictatorship in 1925, the leftist parties were in crisis and the much
smaller moderate parties were under attack.
Yet repressive actions, yielding temporary successes, also sowed the seeds of future
problems for Fascism and the Italian state. Increasingly equating “Italy” with “Fascism” and
looking nostalgically upon Habsburg era, many monfalconesi brought their children and
grandchildren up on a steady diet of anti-Fascist and anti-nationalist teachings, setting the stage
for a surge in national indifference or even outright hostility to the Italian state (if not “Italianness”
more broadly) among those youths who would come of age during the early 1940s. As one member
of this generation would later reflect, “nationalist sentiment was not felt in these parts. This is
because there had been Fascism and thus there had always been a bit of anti-Italian feeling. This
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sentiment was inside us, the elders had always deplored Italy and mourned Austria.” 36
Everyday Fascism and Everyday “Fascists” in Monfalcone’s Shipyard
The biennio rosso, the March on Rome, and the proclamation of the Fascist dictatorship
were exceptional moments that soon gave way to two decades of Fascist rule. It is thus of critical
importance to understand how Fascism operated in the Monfalconese not just in its spectacular
form − in street violence and political display − but also in its mundane and quotidian form. The
existence of the ostensibly totalitarian and extraordinary dictatorship did not preclude “ordinary
life” from continuing contemporaneously, even if the former had notable impacts on the latter. As
everyday life continued to unfold, there were ample opportunities for monfalconesi to develop
subjective understandings of “Fascism” and “Fascists,” based on their quotidian experiences in the
zone’s lived spaces, chief among them the workplace. In fact, most monfalconesi had their most
regular and sustained interaction with perceived “points of contact” with the Fascist regime on the
workshop floor. Monfalcone’s workers lived through two decades of Fascism’s attempts to solidify
its control in the workplace through a capillary penetration of workplace hierarchies and to increase
productivity through the implementation of “modernizing” reforms. The terms “Fascism” and
“Fascists” took on meanings well beyond the PNF’s regime and membership. Such
transformations combined to frustrate deeply workers’ personal ambitions, leading to the blurring
of the distinction between grievances with industrial-capitalist practices and grievances with
Fascism, antagonisms with superiors often understood as antagonism with Fascism and the failure
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to find material or spiritual fulfillment understood as a failure of Fascism.
This mental assimilation resulted in large part from changes in how the shipyard organized
and deployed labor during the ventennio, which for workers translated into changes in the everyday
experience of labor. In the first years of the CNT’s existence, the workforce was organized
primarily into subcontracted work teams (squadre) headed by a skilled, experienced team leader
(caposquadra or mistro) and consisting of anywhere from three to thirty additional workers. teams
performing more specialized tasks like riveting tended to be smaller, while larger teams were of
less specialized labor such as the “iron carpenters” responsible for carrying the large sheets of
metal from the tracing room or the various parts workshops to one of the seven grand mountings
where workers operated various winches to hold these sheets in place and affix them with either
nails (pre-1914) or rivets (post-1914).37 A notable feature of this system was the autonomy granted
to each team. In fact, the CNT’s top management took a hands-off approach, announcing deadlines
for the setting of the keel, the launching of the ship, and other key stages of production, but leaving
the details to the shipyard head and the inspectors (later called workshop heads) who oversaw the
teams. In this system, each team leader was responsible for devising the specific work methods
and tasks for his team members, as well as for selecting workers to hire. Additionally, apart from
a few categories of workers (i.e. riveters) who had fixed piece-rates, teams – or rather team leaders
– generally had the power to negotiate directly with management for his team’s contract in wage
or piece rates.38
This system, which held team leaders as intermediaries between management and workers,
had a localizing effect on the dynamics of work relations. On the one hand, relations between team
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leaders and workers could become quite tense, as team leaders were the primary force imposing
discipline on the teams and worker pay depended on the ability of the team head to negotiate and
to organize effectively. At times, work-related tensions combined with political tensions between
Socialist team leaders and anarchist unskilled workers to fuel assaults on malicious team leaders.
On the other hand, effective team leaders could negotiate favorable contracts and organize work
in such as a way that team members had a degree of autonomy and pride. In the years immediately
preceding the Great War, the general dynamics within teams had tended to improve as team heads
increasingly reached out to unskilled team members to bring them into the Socialist network.39
With the rise of Fascism, however, a system of Fascist capillary penetration of the
workplace emerged to reinvest work processes with political antagonism. Constructed through the
cooperation of CNT managers like Federico Martinoli and Antonio Colummi with Fascist
strongmen like Aurelio Barbettani, this network consisted in part of factory guards and paid
informants among the workers.40 But it also consisted of an ever-larger percentage of the workteam leaders and workshop heads. As the worker Livio Borsi recalls, “the squadristi, for the most
part, were bosses and clerks, or warehouse operators and the like. That is, they had jobs in which
they didn’t labor.”41 As such, the terms “bosses” and “Fascists” became increasingly coterminous,
and resentment rose as workers perceived squadristi to be rewarded with positions requiring little
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effort. Though anti-Fascist team leaders remained to serve as the Communist Party’s principle
recruiters among apprentices, an increasingly large body of Fascist team leaders and workshop
heads emerged, blurring the boundary between workplace discipline and political oppression. 42
Such was the case with the worker Ferruccio Levi, who, shortly after liberation, submitted
a personal statement to the Communist Party enumerating the crimes of Fascism in the workplace,
and particularly those of his boss, Francesco Biasini, nicknamed “The Terror.” Levi, a selfidentified hothead, had been fired from his post as an Electromechanical Department warehouse
organizer for insubordination in early 1931 and had endured over three years of punitive demotion
to unskilled labor.43 When he returned to his original post, he came under Biasini’s authority, and
the two repeatedly had altercations caused, in Levi’s view, by Biasini’s attempt to “reign as a
sovereign in the shipyard.” One day, after a quarrel with a minor boss, Levi was called before his
superiors, including Biasini. According to Levi, they informed him that he would be pardoned for
his offence, given his status as head of family, but that this was his final chance. Levi then
explained his situation and that he needed his job to support his large family, to which Biasini
responded that he himself “had two families to maintain.” Though Levi became enraged, he
immediately recognized this as an attempt by his Fascist boss to provoke him into an act for which
he could be fired. Instead of taking the bait, Levi thought of his family, remained silent, and kept
his job. Notably, in assessing the situation, Levi casts this minor personal victory not just as a
victory against a cruel and authoritarian superior, but as a victory against Fascism itself. 44
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The Fascistization of the workplace hierarchy was part the regime’s and managers’ efforts
to maintain control over the workers and their labor as Monfalcone shipyard rapidly expanded.
From a pre-WWI high of roughly 2800, by 1927 the workforce had grown to over 7300. Many
were employed in new railcar, electromechanical, and aeronautical workshops that the Cosuliches
had constructed to reduce the CNT’s vulnerability to cyclical fluctuations in shipbuilding
contracts.45 This figure would shrink to fewer than 5000 during the Great Depression, but by 1936
it rebounded and surpassed pre-Depression levels.46 Moreover, Fascistization ran in parallel to a
wider regime push to subordinate organized labor to the needs of the state and to marginalize the
national syndicalist strain of Fascism led by Edmondo Rossoni. This process began with the
passing of the Rocco Syndical Laws of 1926, which transformed Rossoni’s two-million-strong
General Confederation of Syndicate Corporations (the “Fascist Syndicates”) into the sole legal
organization representing Italian labor and subordinated it to Mussolini’s Interior Ministry. It
ended two years later when Mussolini dismissed the labor-oriented Rossoni and created the
corporative state, disaggregating Rossoni’s confederation into industry-specific organizations and
critically hamstringing organized labor.47
A decisive moment in the Fascistization of the shipyard – and one that had a critical impact
on the everyday experience of labor – came with the state’s acquisition of the firm in 1933. In that
year, unwilling to leave a vital firm under private ownership in the context of Depression, Italy’s
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Industrial Reconstruction Institute (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, IRI) purchased
majority control of what by then was known as the United Shipyards of the Adriatic (Cantieri
Riuniti dell’Adriatico, CRDA), a shipbuilding conglomerate led by the Cosuliches, in which
Monfalcone was the largest worksite. With the nationalization of the CRDA, the Cosuliches
remained members of the management council and retained de facto managerial control over their
Monfalcone “fief,” but the presidency was given to none other than Francesco Giunta. 48
Once the CRDA was under IRI control, Monfalcone emerged as a testing-ground for
regime-backed workplace “modernization” efforts and thus as one of the few firms in Fascist Italy
in which the principles of scientific management received rigorous application.49 The most notable
change, initiated by private management some years before but truly perfected only after the state
acquired control of the firm, involved the transformation and extension of the piecework system,
in which piecework shifted from a system of work-team autonomy to one of restrictions upon and
regulation of workers and work-team leaders. 50 As the firm reported to President Giunta that year,
“we have dedicated particular attention to the organization of the Piecework Office and we have
verified that these are organized, or are on the way to being organized, according to modern norms
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and ideas.” By “modern norms,” the firm meant that each department of the CRDA had its own
Piecework Office “for the calculation of the time required by the different processes.” 51 As one
worker recalls, upon the arrival of the Taylor system, “everything was subjected to the
stopwatch.”52 Under the direction of the wider Works Office (Ufficio lavori), piecework clerks
calculated the hypothetical productivity that could be achieved by the ideal work team and, from
this, the piece rates were devised to force workers to a continual, rapid work pace. The Works
Office assumed unilateral power to determine piece rates, standardized rates within each
department, increased the importance of piecework relative to wage pay, and began to issue both
rigid workshop-level timelines for construction (instruzioni esecutive) and detailed production
guidelines that precisely laid out the increasingly subdivided, simplified, and regulated tasks that
workers performed (ordini di officina). The firm offered piecework contracts in increasingly short
durations, which allowed it to reduce rates whenever it devised newer, more productive methods.53
These reforms marked a death knell for the independent “craftsman” within the CRDA
and, in large part, frustrated many workers, whose professional ambitions often involved climbing
the skill hierarchy. The autonomous work-team leader disappeared, and with it the autonomy that
work teams had possessed to determine how they would meet production quotas.54 Piecework and
the accompanying rationalization of production spurred a shift in workforce composition away
from high levels of specialized workers to a workforce that consisted, in large part, of workers of
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a low or medium technical qualification. 55 It became a tool for accelerating work rhythms to a
frenetic pace, but also for controlling how teams operated down to the minutia of the productive
process. As Galliano Fogar has asserted, “the old figure of the work-team leader was swept away
and in its place grew up the piecework directors [cottimisti],” with piecework becoming “a true
and proper instrument of repression.”56 As one former clerk recalls, the Works Office was “most
severe with the workers.”57 Soon some sixty percent of workhours were performed as piecework
and the results were shocking.58 In its ruthless drive toward efficiency, the Works Office
transformed the CRDA-Monfalcone into Italy’s most efficient shipyard and reduced work hours
by two-thirds.59
For workers subjected to these changes, it was easy to find individuals to blame, and they
were almost always Fascists. First among them was the former squadrista chief Federico
Martinoli, who emerged as the principal architect of the new system and, from 1937, the acting
director of the Monfalcone shipyard. 60 In the realm of more everyday contact, however, workers
cast blame upon the ranks of the expanded clerical staff (impiegatizia), the members of which were
required to have close political ties with the regime. By the IRI years, the CRDA required that
clerks applying to work at the CRDA present a PNF party card before receiving consideration, and
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the results were staggering.61 Of the 671 clerks employed at the Monfalcone site in 1936, some
480 (71.5%) were Fascists (including two former heads of the Monfalcone fascio and three
members of its Directorate) and nearly one in ten was an active member of the Fascist Militia
(MVSN).62 Though many of these clerks certainly were Fascists by necessity (some even had antiFascist pasts), many were true adherents.63 Among the latter appear to have been the majority of
the piecework clerks, often drawn from the ranks of Martinoli’s and Bruni’s old squadristi
underlings.64 Because of how Fascism interwove itself with local society, it was the very same
squadristi who the decade prior had imposed the dictatorship with the force of their truncheons
who later arrived in the workshops to impose a new labor system with the force of their
stopwatches and ordini di officina. This system, characterized by de-skilling, standardization,
regimentation, and pace increases, was understood as essentially “Fascist” because of its
implementation during the Fascist period by Fascist believers.
The Fascistization of CRDA clerkdom was reinforced by the fact that the cultural life of
the clerical personnel was closely bound up with local Fascism. For example, the clerks’ cultural
circle (the Circolo impiegati) was housed within the Casa del Fascio. As the construction surveyor
(geometra) Spartaco Romano would reflect, it was possible to attend the circle without joining the
fascio, as he did, but the very act of frequenting this establishment tarnished his reputation. Despite
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having anti-Fascist sympathies and belonging to a longtime Socialist family – his father was a
close friend of Giovanni Fontanot and a key voice of local intewar Socialism – Romano felt himself
distrusted by the bulk of anti-Fascist workers due to his attendance at the circle. And his perception
was borne out by the fact that, despite immediately joining the anti-Fascist Resistance in
September 1943, Romano was put on trial in absentia by a group of partisans for ties with Fascism,
the sole evidence being his frequenting of the circle. Only the intervention of his cousin, the
esteemed Communist militant Vinicio Fontanot (son of Giovanni), secured his absolution.65
The trial of Spartaco Romano reflected worker tendencies to blame middle managers and
clerks for workplace “Fascism” and to conflate clerks with Fascists. In fact, such associations
became so strong in the minds of many workers that they were often applied to clerks and
workshop heads who fell within the anti-Fascist camp. Illustrating this tendency is a postwar
encounter between the CRDA mechanic and Communist partisan, Raffaele B. and a man named
Tortona, the former secretary for the head of a lathe workshop. As Tortona recounted, during an
encounter between the two in 1946, Raffaele, who had spent over a year in Fascist prisons before
the regime’s collapse in 1943, learned of Tortona’s occupation and had an “eruption like a volcano,
offending [him] in the most humiliating way, saying that all the gabibi [a slur for Southern Italians]
are ruffians, spies, and so on.” When Tortona insisted he had always been a “good, sincere
comrade,” having become a clerk only because his small stature made him unfit for physical labor,
Raffaele shouted that “all the gabibi should be destroyed” and that it was necessary “to burn all
the towns of the South.” As Tortona tried to argue that there were reliable comrades among the
clerks, Raffaele responded that “it’s one percent and even these are Fascists. Yesterday they
shouted ‘Viva the Duce,’ today they shout ‘Viva Communism,’ tomorrow they will shout for
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another party.” Hearing that Tortona was a clerk – and possibly also hearing a Southern accent,
though Tortona never specifies his birthplace – triggered in Raffaele an associational triad of clerkFascist-Southerner. Tortona’s personal history and current politics meant nothing, as he was, in
Raffaele’s mind, guilty of Fascism by association with the clerical category. 66
Notably, the workers of the Monfalcone CRDA immediately and continually protested the
piecework system from the moment of its implementation, often referring to it as the Fascist
“whip” of the workers. In fact, immediately in after its implementation in 1933, workers had
elected a delegation to protest the change to the Fascist Syndicates and to try to raise piece-rates,
but nothing came of the protest.67 That same year, formal complaints over piecework filed with
the Fascist Syndicates more than quintupled, despite a substantial drop in the workforce. 68
Throughout the next decade, workers unsuccessfully pushed back against this system, viewing it
as a tool to transform them into unskilled beasts of burden. As the worker Sergio Parenzan would
later reflect, even when he entered the shipyard as an apprentice in 1940, the system provoked
serious discontent. Despite being apprenticed to a “good worker” named Centazzo, Parenzan and
the apprentices regularly clashed with Centazzo over piecework, particularly the fact that Centazzo
“didn’t have enough courage to protest piecework and therefore the pace always increased and we
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had to get to work to try to earn any money.” 69 Ferruccio Levi, the abovementioned worker
tormented by his boss, “The Terror,” indicated that piecework not only oppressed the workers, but
helped the bosses to line their pockets: “I too was part of the mass of the so-called REGIA, that is
‘expenses,’ that, if they are a bit too high, diminish the commission due to the managers,
administrators, bosses, etc. etc. And it will always happen this way if, in the future, special
privileges are granted to these masters, which cause harm to the mass both of workers and of small
clerks [piccoli impiegati] who work with conscience and good will like the other categories of
pieceworkers and petty clerks [impiegati inferiori].” Though Levi was more generous than many
of his contemporaries toward the “petty clerks” – seemingly the white-collar staff integrated into
the workshops, not the managerial clerks isolated in distinct offices – his belief in a fundamental
irreconcilability between the interests of “pieceworkers” and self-serving Fascist bosses shines
through.70
Anti-Fascism in Monfalcone: The 1930s
The inability of workers to mount any real challenge to the new piecework system stemmed
from the fact that they lacked any political or labor organizations through which they could overtly
resist the Fascist regime. The Fascist state followed the proclamation of the dictatorship with an
extensive campaign to shatter organized opposition and, by 1930, the defeat of the anti-Fascist
political parties was complete. The bulk of the Fascists’ repressive campaign targeted the

Alessandro Morena, “Intervista a Sergio Parenzan,” 1000hrs, 30 May 2001, performed at CGIL headquarters in
Monfalcone, held at the CCM.
70
The connection with Fascism should be remembered here, too, as Levi quite explicitly labels his statement as a
testimony of Fascist abuses in the CRDA. Ferruccio Levi, “Dichiarazione,” op cit. In a few select cases both before
and after liberation, workers indicated that they supported piecework. For example, Spartaco Colussi recounted that,
as an exceptionally strong man, he performed his job as an unloader at well-above-average rates and each day took
home a week’s pay. Alessandro Morena, “Intervista a Spartaco Colussi,” 1600hrs, 11 January 2001, held at the CCM.
Colussi was anything but a friend of the regime, eventually becoming a partisan and Communist Party member.
Alessandro Morena, “Il Monfalconese tra guerra e lungo dopoguerra: L’importanza delle fonti orali,” in Il mosaico
giuliano, eds. Altieri and Puppini, op. cit., 128-29.
69

52

Communist Party of Italy (Partito comunista d’Italia, PCdI), which had been pushed deep
underground by 1934, its top leadership either arrested or fled into exile, often to the USSR.71 As
part of this campaign, in 1930-31, the Fascist security apparatus identified and destroyed the
leadership of Communist Federation of Trieste, which had formerly given direction to the
Communists of the Monfalconese. Though this crackdown left the Monfalconese militants in
complete disorder and isolated from the Party’s center, Monfalcone’s Communists responded with
rapid local reconstruction, facilitated by resentments over workplace reforms, a general expansion
of the workforce, and growing economic hardship from the Great Depression.72
In this context, local PCdI militants took the initiative in launching a new recruitment wave,
setting the local Party on a trajectory that ran in striking contrast to that of the Party on a national
scale. By 1934, the local Party had grown to over 200 members, accounting for nearly 8% of the
total 2591 Communist militants in Italy, despite the Monfalconese being home to just a fraction of
one percent of the nation’s population. 73 Moreover, this network assumed a leading role in the reformation of a regional committee, linking the committees of Udine, Gorizia, and Monfalcone and
reestablishing contact with the Party’s leadership in exile, though in practice the Monfalconese
Party was less a single, tightly-bound organization and more a collection of somewhat autonomous
groups.74 Among those who rose to positions of leadership in these groups were many who would
contribute greatly to the postwar pro-Yugoslav movement. In the early 1930s, for example,
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Ruggero Bersa (Calvo),75 a sector committee head in his early twenties, began working with
longtime militants to link various cells in Monfalcone proper to those in the shipyard.
Simultaneously, a separate group existed in the CRDA, organized by Armidio, Licio, and Vinicio
Fontanot, the three sons of Giovanni. Separate still was the Communist Youth (Gioventù
Comunista) which, under the leadership of Otto Ferlettich (Ferletti) and others, organized a parallel
cell structure to the Party and pursued the long-term infiltration of the PNF, the police, and the
military with undercover “Red premilitaries” (premilitari rossi). To safeguard these groups, each
was kept isolated from the others, though all were in contact with a four-man federal committee.76
As these groups grew, however, so too did the risk of discovery. In 1932, OVRA, the secret
police, began to infiltrate Communist organizations in the Monfalconese and the wider region and,
in mid-1934, it managed to crack the local organization. The police carried out a wave of arrests,
including some 107 individuals in total, among them the entire federal committee, most of the
PCdI sector heads (including Bersa), much of the leadership of the Communist Youth, and the
militant Silvio D. The regime tried the group before the Special Tribunal and most spent multiple
years in prison or confino.77 Importantly, however, the Fontanot group and many low-level
militants escaped arrest. In the second half of the 1930s, these individuals cautiously reestablished
connections between cells, recruited new members, and escalated the anti-Fascist leaflet campaign.
Still, the Party was hesitant to confront the regime directly. It orchestrated the clandestine passage
of militants to Spain, where they could fight against the Nationalists in the ongoing civil war (1936-
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39), but within Italy the concern remained long-term preparation.78 The regime remained firmly in
place and the task at hand was simple: organize, infiltrate, and wait.79
Marketplace “Fascists:” Shopkeepers and Black-Marketeers in Peace and War
And so, in the late 1930s, the Communists of the Monfalconese dutifully prepared and
waited, unaware that the war looming on the horizon would radically transform their political
opportunities and resistance. When news came in August 1939 of the shocking MolotovRibbentrop Pact, the local leadership made every effort to assure that local militants complied with
the Comintern’s truce with Nazi Germany. Particularly important in this regard was Ruggero
Bersa, who, having returned from confino in 1938, slowly and cautiously reintegrated into the local
Party network. Bersa assured his disconcerted comrades that “Germany remained enemy number
one” and that this was merely a tactical truce. 80 Bersa’s leadership would not last long, however,
as he was caught up in a new wave of preventive arrests in the Monfalconese around the time of
Mussolini’s June 1940 declaration of Italian “cobelligerency” in the Second World War.81 For the
wider body of workers, Italy’s entry into the war brought about a radical decline of their material
conditions of life, an explosion of long-simmering resentments centered in the “lived space” of the
marketplace, and the conceptualization of the local shopkeeper as a quintessential “Fascist.”
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That Fascism and marketplace exploitation would become so closely intertwined in the
popular mind is somewhat curious, as early Fascists, including Mussolini himself, had been at the
forefront of the popular attacks on merchants and shopkeepers in the years immediately after the
Great War. Many had vilified such categories as parasitic exploiters and hoarders who used
wartime scarcity to profit at the ordinary Italian’s expense. 82 Moreover, when faced with popular
agitation over the high cost of living in the 1920s, the Fascist regime had continued to assign blame
to “parasitic” commercial middlemen. It even introduced limited price controls on basic foodstuffs,
compelled retailers to indicate clearly prices of all goods (that is, it outlawed price-negotiation),
restricted the number of commercial licenses with the hopes of reducing retail overhead costs and
thus prices, and briefly flirted with programs to introduce “modern” forms of commerce such as
department and chain stores and PNF-controlled cooperatives. 83
Such measures did not offset the reality that it was at the marketplace that ordinary Italians
felt the burden of Fascism most heavily. Such was the result of the Battle for Wheat. From its
beginning in 1925, this regime initiative aimed to promote self-sufficiency in food production, but,
paired with consumer austerity, it translated into the lived experience of high food prices and
hunger, particularly among the working poor.84 And the sacrifices demanded by Fascism only
increased as the regime pursued its goals of expansion. Following the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935,
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Italy exported an increasingly large share of its agricultural produce in order to feed the Italian
colonists settled in Africa and to exchange for industrial products with its new German ally. 85
Thus, despite significant efforts to transform consumer austerity into a Fascist virtue and to
supplant what the Fascist Minister of Corporations called the commercial “parasites and
speculators” with a state-directed system of food collection, storage, and distribution, the
marketplace became a primary location in which Italians bore the onerous costs of Fascist policies
and where popular resentments toward Fascism came into focus.86
Beyond this, the marketplace also served as a location in which low-level Fascists
manipulated the levers of local power to serve their self-interest, particularly through various forms
of wartime black-marketeering and “hoarding.” In this context, everyday marketplace experiences
made clear the asymmetrical power relations between seller and purchaser and created
opportunities for purchasers to associate the existing commercial system with “Fascism” and its
practitioners as “Fascists.”87 As the war progressed, this asymmetry became not only more
profound, but also increasingly apparent to ordinary Italians.
Central to this process were both the wartime aggravation of conditions of material scarcity
and the creation of many institutions and regulations originally designed to alleviate consumer
hardship, especially the regime’s rationing and price-control systems. Even before Italy entered
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the war in June 1940, the regime had begun rationing sugar, and following Mussolini’s declaration
of war, it extended the system of compulsory deliveries and rationing to edible oils and fats. 88
Shortly thereafter, the regime established price controls that by 1942 applied to breads, fats, oils,
cheeses, and meats, if not to most vegetables or fruits.89 The system consisted of three interlocking
processes, each controlled by a different body. First was a state-directed supply system operated
at a provincial level by the various Provincial Provisioning Section (Sezione Provinciale
dell’Alimentazione, SEPRAL) bodies. Second, ration cards were issued by communal Rationing
Offices, with consumers expected to file monthly goods reservations with local merchants, who
then requested goods in the appropriate amount from SEPRAL. Finally, the local Annonarial
Police were tasked with monitoring the actual exchange of goods at the point of sale to assure
merchant compliance with rationing and price-fixing.
From the outset, however, this system functioned poorly, with vendors, farmers, butchers,
and others seeking instead to exploit conditions of shortage and profit from ever-higher black
market prices. 90 As profit-rates from the black market increased, price-controlled goods simply
disappeared from market stands and already by 1941 over half of the nation’s grain yield was sold
on the black market, and only 47% reaching the public storages.91 Thus, from mid-1941, the regime
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continually reworked the system, drastically increasing penalties for violations − including the
death penalty for the now-political crime of “economic treason,” or speculation − and, more
importantly, increasingly shifting responsibility for overseeing the nation’s commerce into the
hands of the PNF. Included in the latter was the placement of the Fascist federale of each province
on the advisory committee for SEPRAL and the federali’s responsibilities to investigate violations
of rationing and price norms. In the Monfalconese, for example, provincial PNF secretary Giulio
Dall’Ora was first to investigate rumors that local fishermen were skirting price-controls by selling
their catches not at the Monfalcone market, but rather on nearby beaches at Duino and Sistiana. 92
Yet, by appropriating ever more responsibility for market enforcement, the PNF sowed the
seeds of its own de-legitimization. On the one hand, every negative market experience could now
be associated with and blamed upon the Party, allowing these experiences to be viewed as living
“Fascism.” In this regard, the regime’s decision to institute a bread ration in October 1941 was a
watershed moment, destroying the last pillars of support for the regime. 93 But even Fascist efforts
to control prices could backfire, particularly due to their uneven application in different parts of
the country. In 1943 the Ronchi fascio reported that “when the Party confronted the grave problem
of the supervision of prices, the decision made a good impression; but the continual [price]
increases, even if sanctioned by the bulletins, produces a sense of disillusionment,” as did the
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regime’s failure to extend price controls and rationing to eggs, legumes, and potatoes as it had
done in some of the larger urban centers. 94 On the other hand, as the Party assumed a greater role
in stamping out the black market at the provincial level, members of the Party at the local level −
particularly merchants and shopkeepers − used their authority to exploit rather than eliminate the
black market.95 Such Fascists imbricated themselves within the structures of local power and in
the offices tasked with implementing the system, turning them to their own advantage.
No case is more illustrative of this point than that of the wood and coal merchant Giovanni
Linossi. In addition to being a prominent member of the local fascio, Linossi had managed by the
early 1940s to secure positions as head of the local Rationing Office and of the Vigili Urbani (local
police, which included the Annonarial Police), essentially holding all offices that were responsible
for disciplining local markets. With these powers in hand, Linossi began using them to personal
ends, falsifying ration cards and seemingly working with friendly (Fascist) merchants to secure
the registration of purchases with these cards under false or duplicated names. Particularly
egregious in the winter months of early 1942 was his use of his position as head of the Vigili
Urbani to distribute unevenly a shipment of coal arriving from Yugoslavia, keeping the highestquality (and thus pricier) coal for himself, which he sold at tremendous profit out of a shop
nominally under his mother’s management. Linossi left behind only “dust” (polvere) for
consumers to purchase through other merchants and regularly threatened to use his powers as head
of the rationing office to withhold ration distributions from residents unless they purchased goods
in his mother’s shop. By April 1943, in response to growing popular discontent and Party
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frustration over Linossi’s “absolute lack of discipline,” he would find himself expelled from the
PNF.96 A year later, after Linossi had left town, suspended from his offices, the carabinieri sought
to ban his return. His schemes to line his pockets had left him “hated by the entire population” and
thus a threat to public order.97
But Linossi was far from the only local Fascist or merchant to become embroiled in these
schemes. That same year, a butcher from Ronchi was expelled from the PNF for the contravention
the ration laws for meat and bone sales and the head of the Guardie Municipali (Municipal Guard)
of nearby Grado was expelled for black-marketing and corruption involving the fish trade.98
Simultaneously, a Monfalcone merchant who in 1936 had been expelled from the PNF was caught
again attempting to use his Fascist contacts to sell 36.38 hectoliters of black-market wine. For a
decade before his expulsion, this man had sat on the Communal Commission for Commercial
Licenses, using his power to carve out a protected commercial position for his shop before
eventually being chewed up and spit out in a factional struggle of the local Party. 99 In doing so, he
had subverted the central Party’s efforts to protect consumers from commercial “parasites.” He
utilized the institution that was intended to reduce the number of retailers (restricting licenses) and
thereby reduce commercial mark-ups instead to further his own personal ends.100 Identified by the
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regional Party boss as a “merchant without scruples and profoundly dishonest,” he received an
“exemplary” punishment in an attempt to clear the Party from guilt by association. 101 Significantly,
in each of these cases, a local Fascist used his power and PNF contacts to gain what the state, the
populace, and even the PNF leadership deemed to be an unfair commercial advantage. In none did
these schemes remain hidden from the public eye.
For many ordinary people, then, it became difficult to distinguish between shortages caused
by Fascist corruption, those caused by bureaucratic incompetence, and those arising from
circumstance (war, the difficulties posed to agriculture and transport by Italy’s natural geography,
etc.). Italians, monfalconesi included, began to elide wartime shortage and Fascist corruption,
believing that perhaps behind the closed doors of the local Fascist headquarters awaited stores of
cheese, meat, and fresh fruits. 102 Shortly after liberation, a group of Monfalcone’s ambulant
vendors would complain that during the ventennio the local market commission had served as an
in-club for exploiters, the commissar a “component of the fascio [who] robbed and trafficked for
the benefit of the Fascists, removing the mouthful of milk from the poor people from our children,
wasting it by giving it to his associates.”103 In contrast to the self-aggrandizing activities of
particular Fascists, by early 1943 the fasci of the Monfalconese were almost universally reporting
that, even if the war was won and the regime survived, the population expected a system of greater
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“social justice” in the postwar years, particularly regarding markets and “just” prices. 104
Monfalconese Anti-Fascists between Italy and Yugoslavia
By 1943, resentments over everyday Fascism in workplace and marketplace had become
particularly acute, but the war also brought a radically expanded range of opportunities for antiFascist action. Though Italy’s declaration of war was a key moment for the nation, for
monfalconesi it was the Axis invasions of Yugoslavia (April 1941) and the USSR (June 1941) that
marked the true watershed. The first saw the collapse of the Yugoslav state, the establishment of
brutal Axis occupation or puppet regimes, and the first stirrings of Yugoslav resistance
movements.105 The second freed Communist militants in the Monfalconese, Yugoslavia, and
elsewhere from the Comintern’s awkward truce with Hitler.
With Operation Barbarossa, Tito’s Partisan movement emerged, and with it the expansion
of anti-Fascist possibilities. Following Barbarossa, the Slovenian Communist Party (Komunistička
partija Slovenije, KPS), part of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije,
KPJ), emerged as the driving force behind a multi-party Slovenian Liberation Front (Osvobodilna
fronta, OF).106 Shortly after the invasion of the USSR, KPS head Edvard Kardelj called the OF
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into active struggle against the forces occupying Yugoslavia, proclaiming the intention to unite all
Slovenes, including those of the Primorska (Slovenian Littoral) – an area whose western boundary
roughly overlaps with that of Italian Venezia Giulia – in a liberated state. The OF claimed even
the Italian-majority coastal settlements of the region, which in the OF mind naturally gravitated
toward their rural Slovenian “hinterland.” Most often, claims involved all territory east of the
Isonzo River, making the Monfalconese the westernmost extent of the Primorska. 107
The OF stance complicated PCdI-KPS relations, in addition to opening new opportunities
for anti-Fascist activities for the Communists of the Monfalconese. Though the PCdI had long
accepted the idea of Slovenian annexation of the Slovene-majority areas of Venezia Giulia, the
issue of Italian-majority areas like the Monfalconese and Trieste had never been resolved.
Moreover, the PCdI’s acceptance of many Slovenian claims had been paired with the assumption
that the party would be the organizational pole for this struggle among both Slovenes and Italians
living within Italian borders. From late 1941, however, the KPS initiated a campaign of
institutional conquest of the PCdI in Venezia Giulia. Kardelj exchanged a series of letters with
Umberto Massola (Quinto), a member of the PCdI Central Committee, in which he requested that
all members of the PCdI in Trieste Province, including those of the Monfalconese, pass into the
KPS and aid in the Slovenian liberation struggle. Massola immediately rejected this proposal,
suggesting that the PCdI was slowly laying the groundwork for a mass movement to overthrow
Mussolini’s regime entirely, which, in the grand scheme of things, was a more important task than
merely breaking off a chunk of the dictatorship’s territory. 108
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Despite this PCdI refusal, the KPS leadership decided to push forward with the formation
of KPS and OF cells in Venezia Giulia. According to Rudi Uršič (Rodolfo Ursini), a primary KPS
organizer in the Primorska, the KPS sent its representative Oskar Kovačič to Monfalcone, where
together with local Slovenes he began to establish KPS cells and an OF committee for the
Monfalconese. Though the initial reception was cool, Uršič suggests that by mid-1942, the KPS
and OF had gained a foothold among the radical workers in the shipyard, even if the militants of
the outlying villages remained more distant. Particularly fruitful was a secret meeting in Trieste in
the fall of 1942, during which members of the Bersa group, bolstered by a new class of militants
that included the young Valerio Beltrame (Ario), met with OF representatives and decided to assist
in creating local committees. Within a couple of weeks Beltrame and three other monfalconesi
were caught up in a wave of arrests in Trieste Province, but not before they had established the
skeleton of a local OF network.109 Though the OF in the Monfalconese would remain marginal
until the final two years of the war, the Fascist regime’s inability to resolve problems of food
shortage, inflation, unreliable rations, and black-marketeering, as well as its relentless push to
hasten work rhythms and “militarize” work discipline, made the Monfalconese increasingly
fruitful ground for OF recruitment, particularly as the workforce ballooned to over 11,000 by
1943.110
More broadly, the longtime strains of everyday Fascism and the aggravating context of the
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war made monfalconesi more willing to speak against the regime, even if only in spaces thought
to be safe. By 1943, as Italian defeat loomed more and more clearly on the horizon, regime forces
noted a marked increase in defeatist and anti-Fascist “grumbling” in the Monfalconese, a
phenomenon distinct from the overtly anti-Fascist leafletting of the PCdI and OF. 111 The 1943
reports for the local fasci provide insight into this growing discontent. In Monfalcone, the fascio
reported that, though the political situation was “good” in the historic town center, the CRDA
workers were not yet “sufficiently oriented and catechized,” instead tending to skip Party rallies
and even to participate in cautious counter-demonstrations.112 In nearby Ronchi, the situation was
worse: “it is much polluted both on the part of elements who frequent the shipyard and by the
Slavism of nearby Doberdò del Lago.” This was particularly the case among the youth, who had a
greater tendency than others to participate in negative “murmurings and discussions about the men
and actions of the Regime.” In sum, the fascio concluded that, “the educative activity of Fascism
has been and remains superficial.” 113
As war conditions continued to deteriorate for residents of the Monfalconese and as Axis
war effort flagged, many monfalconesi began to consider direct action against the regime. When
the workers of Turin, Milan, and other northern Italian cities engaged in the strikes of March 1943,
the monfalconesi considered joining them, but decided against it given the exceptional disciplinary
regime already imposed on the region as part of the anti-OF campaign. 114 Unable to engage in such
a strike, some of the boldest anti-Fascists decided to join their Slovenian comrades in armed

The PCdI continued to drop leaflets with phrases such as “Sabotage the Fascist War!,” “Long live the Rebels!,”
“Down with the Duce!,” and “We will lose the war!” S Ten Comandante Sedita (CC RR-Monfalcone), “Segnalazione”
(N. 6/13), 4 April 1943; and Capo Delegazione Mitrani (Ministero della Produzione Bellica), “Scritta sovversiva –
Cantieri Navali di Monfalcone (Aus A)” (N. 1832/R-TR), 8 July 1943, both in AST, Pref-Gab 1923-52, b 452 f 06.
112
Fascio di Monfalcone, “Comune di Monfalcone,” Undated (Early 1943), AST, Pref-Gab 1923-52, b 456, unmarked
tan folder.
113
Fascio di Ronchi dei Legionari, “Comune di Ronchi dei Legionari,” Undated (Early 1943), op. cit.
114
This disciplinary system by 1942 already included strict curfews and the rather arbitrary deportation of suspected
subversives. Fogar, L’antifascismo operaio monfalconese, 280-85.
111

66

struggle. That same March, Vinicio Fontanot, having avoided the waves of arrests that had swept
up many of his closest collaborators, began negotiating with the KPS leaders in Trieste to send
Monfalconese youths to train as guerrillas with the OF in the Slovenian interior, with the goal of
them returning home and further disseminating this training. Though Fontanot’s initiative had the
support of the Party secretary in Trieste, it soon stalled when central leadership learned of and
rejected the plan. 115
The Fascist security apparatus stepped up its efforts to uncover the Communist and OF
networks of the Monfalconese in early July. It targeted individuals like the young Renato Rigonat,
whose brother Desiderio the regime had recently unmasked as a PCdI infiltrator within the PNF
and Italian Army. In this context, many monfalconesi became restive. After watching the Fascist
police search Renato’s home for weapons and throw him into a Triestine prison, some ten militants,
Fontanot among them, took up arms and joined the OF. Thus, even before the collapse of
Mussolini’s regime, the partisan war had come to the Monfalconese. 116 For participants in this
struggle, as well as the wider body of monfalconesi, the past and continuing experience of everyday
Fascism would play a major role in shaping how they conceptualized their armed resistance and
how they imagined the postwar society for which they fought, their range of options shaped by
their indeterminate position, straddling Italy and Yugoslavia.
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Chapter 2: Civil War and Visions of a New World
Fascism did not die with the death of Hitler and Mussolini, just as it was not born from
them.… Fascism has been defeated but not entirely. It has left heirs. They mask themselves
in various forms, in various ways, lurking always in the shadows. When they come into the
light they take different shapes. If one doesn’t want to fall prey, one must be careful to cut
out their roots to the very bottom! … It is necessary to unmask the remnants of Fascism.”1
– From a Communist-aligned broadsheet in Monfalcone, 11 January 1946.

This call to action was printed some thirty months after Vinicio Fontanot and his small
band of monfalconesi partisans departed to join the OF in early July 1943. Much had happened in
the interim, but the fundamental idea that undergirded this call − the idea that “Fascism” was not
merely the Duce or even the body of PNF cardholders, but rather something more amorphous −
was well entrenched in their thinking when they made the choice to take up arms. After living
twenty years of everyday Fascism, these and other Monfalconese anti-Fascists understood Fascism
to be the Duce and PNF plus certain reviled social categories and resented social interactions.
Fascism was something as mundane as dealing with an exploitative shopkeeper or working for a
domineering boss in a mindless and thoroughly routinized job. As such, it was something that
could be extirpated only through social and political revolution and the reshaping of society’s
dominant values, without which, even if the dictatorship was toppled, the Fascist threat would
reconstitute itself in a “masked” form.
When Fontanot and his band set off in early July, the prospects of bringing such a
revolution to the Monfalconese seemed a fantasy − but then, suddenly, it did not. Just a few weeks
after their departure, news reached Monfalcone that Mussolini had been toppled and that it was
not his longtime Communist enemies who were responsible. Rather, shortly after the Allied
landing in Sicily, the Duce’s former allies removed him from power in a palace coup, attempting

1
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to save their own skins. When the news of Mussolini’s fall reached Monfalcone the next morning,
there was genuine euphoria. For monfalconesi, apart from a now small number genuinely invested
in the Fascist Party, Mussolini’s fall on 25 July 1943 was a sublime moment in which the people
suddenly regained power after being kept in a state of political infancy by twenty years of
dictatorship. It was a moment in which everything suddenly seemed possible, even those hopes
which had been mere pipedreams earlier that month. 2
25 July: The Fall of Fascism, the “Hunt for Fascists,” and Business as Usual
In Monfalcone, spontaneous demonstrations erupted, centered around the proud display of
the banned color red. Accompanying them was a non-lethal “hunt for Fascists” (caccia al fascista),
in which violence was more symbolic than life-threatening. According to Mario Tonzar, a shipyard
worker and future Communist militant, he and others went immediately to the CRDA director to
demand a celebratory work-stoppage. The director obliged and Tonzar recalls that “someone from
Turriaco who had the Italian flag, had rolled up the green and the white in such a way that only
the red of the flag was seen and it was put at the head of the procession.” 3 Similarly, Spartaco
Romano, whose Socialist father had long opposed the Fascists, “spontaneously went to shout in
the streets among the crowd. Those who remained in the shipyards began to dye the Fascists red
with minium [a red mineral] and to force them to flee.” 4 Others gathered around the shipyard’s
internal train, which brought the clerks and managers from their distant and comfortable housing
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to the worksite, bombarding these quintessential “Fascists” with stones as they arrived for work. 5
Yet the collapse of Mussolini’s regime meant far less immediate change than was at first
assumed. The new royal government of Marshal Pietro Badoglio was no more democratic, nor less
anti-Communist than the Fascist government that had proceeded it. Moreover, the war was still
on, and at least for the time being, Italy remained an Axis power. In such contexts, there was a
limit to how much agitation the forces of order would accept. These forces willingly accepted a
period of primarily symbolic purging but expected this to be brief and only moderately violent.
They did little to stop workers from physically expelling Fascists, and especially squadristi, from
the CRDA. In fact, Admiral Rizzo, who had replaced Giunta as CRDA president, immediately
suspended all squadristi employed by the firm. 6 However, when events threatened to go further,
as they did by the evening of 26 July, Badoglio’s government stepped in. On that day, workers
formed a processional column, marching and issuing demands for Italy’s immediate surrender and
the restoration of democratic liberties. (Figure 6). When the increasingly bold workers, already
having sacked Monfalcone’s GIL headquarters, set off toward the fascio, the Carabinieri feared
events were slipping out of control. To disperse the workers, they shot into the crowd and threw a
grenade, which killed one worker and wounded fifteen more.7 That same evening in Turriaco some
200 workers assaulted the fascio headquarters, striking Fascist symbols from the façade. Before
they could break into the building, however, the local Carabinieri intervened, throwing a
“warning” grenade, which had the desired effect.8
Admiral Rizzo wasted no time in responding to the disorders, ordering the arrest of 200
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individuals with subversive “precedents” and sending some 200 policemen and Carabinieri and
500 soldiers to restore order to Monfalcone on the morning of 27 July, particularly inside the
CRDA. Accompanying the soldiers were four prominently displayed ambulances, meant to send
the message that these forces had orders to fire. 9 Despite this warning, a column of over 400
workers gathered to march through the shipyard, shouting anti-war phrases, seeking out remaining
Fascists, and even beating isolated policemen. 10 When workers continued to strike and
demonstrate, now protesting the presence of soldiers in the workplace, Rizzo responded with a
“show of force.” He ordered troops to fire into the crowds, wounding seven, one fatally.11 The
following afternoon, when a crowd gathered outside the CRDA gate in protest, the forces of order
again opened fire, wounding another. In the face of such violence, most workers simply gave up
on demands for democratic liberties and returned to work. As Spartaco Romano would later reflect:
“Then, with Badoglio’s government, I re-entered the shipyard.”12 The abruptness of his comments
reflects, in many ways, the abruptness with which the euphoria of Mussolini’s fall soon passed.
Yet business as usual was no longer acceptable for many monfalconesi − and not only for
those few KPS- and OF-loyal militants who had attempted to bring the town’s residents into their
struggle for Yugoslav annexation. While the KPS again unsuccessfully attempted to convince the
PCdI to pass its Julian militants into the ranks of the KPS, independently-minded PCdI militants
formed a clandestine “city committee” that would provide political leadership for Monfalcone in
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the case of a power vacuum, attempting also to form an independent syndicate, headed by a factory
committee within the CRDA. 13 Perhaps most ominously, in a poster dated 28 July and spread
throughout the town (including posted to carabinieri headquarters), local Communists, no doubt
enraged by the recent bloodletting, called for the overthrow of the Badoglio regime and the violent
elimination of the Fascists. Addressed to Italian soldiers, the poster indicated that
[t]he Italian people rise to fight against the new, bloody governors of Italy – against
Badoglio – Badoglio now has power in the most important Italian cities, in the heart of the
Italian liberation movement: Turin, Milan, Bologna, Florence, and elsewhere.
…
The Communist Party of Italy has given birth to the INF. In this there are five parties united,
among them the PCI and the Catholic party. At Turin the press has communicated the
proclamation of the INF; in this proclamation it invited the Italian people to fight against
Badoglio and the other remnants of Fascism….
…
Italian workers, citizens, and soldiers, go into the streets and demand immediate peace, the
expulsion of the Germans, and liberty….
Kill the hated Fascists and policemen. 14

Yet despite the seething resentments felt by such a large number of monfalconesi and the open call
for revolutionary action, nothing of the sort was carried out in Monfalcone. A small trickle of
Slovenian and Italian-speaking Communist youth continued to flow into the OF military forces,
and workers increasingly contemplated what it might mean to be truly done with Fascism, but
clandestine preparation remained the party line for the PCdI.
8 September 1943 and the Explosion of Armed Resistance:
A spark would be necessary to transform the poster’s calls for revolution into a reality, and
that spark came on 8 September, when Italy had made peace with the Allies. Having long suspected
that the Badoglio government was negotiating with the Allies, the Germans had devised a plan to
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invade and occupy Italy in such a scenario. Included in the plan was the direct annexation of
Venezia Giulia to the Reich under the name Adriatic Littoral (Adriatisches Küstenland), as this
was vital transit territory linking German operations in Italy and the Balkans with the Reich itself. 15
It was the German decision to execute this plan after 8 September that provided the necessary
spark. In one of the most striking instances of the Italian Resistance, the workers of the
Monfalconese rose immediately to meet them. When word arrived that the Germans were
advancing southward through Gorizia Province, 700-900 monfalconesi, primarily workers from
the CRDA (many still wearing their blue work outfits), gathered to form a partisan brigade, calling
themselves the Proletarian Brigade (Brigata Proletaria). PCdI militants formed these ill-trained
hundreds into three battalions, scrambling to find weapons with which to equip them. The workers
marched into the hills on 10 September and by month’s end, some hundred lay dead, the Brigade
shattered by the seasoned Wehrmacht in the so-called Battle of Gorizia. The remainder struggled
to return home without being detected by the Germans, now the occupiers of their town. 16
Though the decision of the monfalconesi to confront the Wehrmacht in September 1943
may seem like a fool’s errand which could (and did) only end in disaster, the willingness of so
many to risk their lives in this venture was indicative of a broad and intense sentiment that the
moment was ripe for a fundamental restructuring of society − but one that could only happen if
the Germans were kept out. What is notable about the Monfalconese in the nineteen months of
German occupation was that, even after this defeat, its residents continued to resist with markedly
atypical intensity. Though a comprehensive examination of the activity of Monfalconese’s
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partisans is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should be noted that, even after the Proletarian
Brigade was dispersed, its members, joined by a continual flow of recruits primarily from the
CRDA, formed the cores of two additional primarily Monfalconese partisan brigades (Figure 7).17
Moreover, it was the CRDA pipefitter (tubista) Mario Fantini (Sasso) who served as longtime
commandant of the largest partisan unit of the Italian Resistance, the Garibaldi Division-Natisone
(Divisione Garibaldi-Natisone), with many monfalconesi by his side (Figure 8).18
The armed struggle to expel the Germans received wide popular support in the district.
Undergirding these district’s partisan brigades was a wide range of support institutions dedicated
to the maintenance of communications, to the creation, collection, or requisition of supplies, and
to the transport of supplies to the partisans in the field. Most notable in this regard was the
“Montes” Intendency (Intendenza “Montes”), named after its founder Silvio Marcuzzi (Montes),
which oversaw the monthly gathering, requisitioning, and manufacturing of tens of metric tons of
supplies.19 Within the shipyards, workers of the Communist-directed Workers’ Unity (Unità
operaia) − often reactivated cells of outlawed anti-Fascist organizations − performed various
sabotage and pro-partisan theft operations, at times in concert with sympathetic warehouse
operators and managers. By December 1944, this organization would claim 6000 adherents in
Monfalcone alone, and over the course of 1943-45, some 503 employees of the CRDA-
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Monfalcone would die either as partisans in the field or in anti-partisan crackdowns. 20 In the words
of one militant, the shipyard served as a “sun that shines light on the entire zone.” 21
Violence and Civil War in Monfalcone: Fascists and the Gruppo d’Azione Patriotica (GAP)
The Resistance was a struggle to expel the Germans, but also a civil war experienced as
intense and bitter conflict at the local level, and the Monfalconese was one of its bloodier theaters.22
The intensity of the Monfalconese’s civil war resulted from many factors. Critical among them
were the zone’s location in contested territory and the nature of the contesting parties (especially
the Yugoslav Communists), which drove many locals into collaboration with the Germans, as well
as the fact that the Allies extensively bombed the CRDA beginning in April 1944, intensifying
resentment for those deemed responsible for starting the war.23 Finally, Fascist repressive actions
against OF partisans and their civilian supporters began in Venezia Giulia earlier than elsewhere
in Italy (and Axis control persisted longer), driving a cyclical escalation of violence that reached
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frightening heights by 1945. 24
But the most important factor that played into the intensity of the Resistance in the
Monfalconese was the strength of the Communist organs, and particularly of the Patriotic Action
Group (Gruppo d’azione patriotica, GAP). This organization had started to take shape during the
late-July “hunt for Fascists,” consisting of roughly fifty men divided into small tactical squads
suited for urban partisan activities. When the newly-renamed Italian Communist Party (Partito
comunista italiano, PCI) embraced armed resistance after 8 September, the unit took off, gaining
a significant boost when Vinicio Fontanot (Petronio) took command that December. Under
Fontanot, the GAP engaged in various activities including seizing German supplies and performing
sabotage actions, the most notable among them a daring raid on the Ronchi airport on the night of
4/5 February 1944, in which it destroyed three of the thirty Axis warplanes stationed there. 25
Fontanot would build the Monfalcone GAP into one of the most feared organizations of the Italian
Resistance, its field of activity stretching from the outskirts of Trieste all the way to the lower
Friulan plain, often in cooperation with the GAP’s Slovenian counterpart, the VDV, and Tito’s
secret police, the Department for People’s Protection (Odjeljenje za zaštitu narodna, OZNA). 26
But the GAP’s primary purpose was far bloodier than sabotage. Shortly after the Germans
arrived and restored Mussolini to power, now as a head of the new Republican Fascist Party
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(Partito fascista repubblicano, PFR), the GAP began a campaign to “liquidate” spies and
individuals who had played or continued to play important roles in Monfalconese Fascism. This
included prominent squadristi, former heads of the district’s fasci, and those belonging to the PFR
and its paramilitary bodies. The first murder that can reasonably be attributed to the GAP occurred
on 8 December 1943, when individuals identified as “partisans” by a PCI militant murdered a local
squadrista named Falchi, attempting at the same time “to bring the Fascist secretary [of
Monfalcone] to justice,” but managing only to wound him. 27 A month later, on 9 January 1944,
the squadrista Ferraro Pasquale was murdered. Immediately after, Prefect Coceani indicated to the
carabinieri that both murders followed a pattern and resembled “preordained executions.” In both,
the task was entrusted to “young cyclists, those with knowledge of the place, who quickly, after
committing the misdeed, are able to escape with the bicycles.” The triggermen, without doubt,
were drawn from among “the Communists and suspected partisan element.” 28
In the sixteen months of civil war that followed, the GAP would continue this offensive,
becoming particularly bold after March 1944, following the militarization and mobilization of all
Triestine squadristi within the National Republican Guard (Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana,
GNR).29 A cyclical escalation of violence followed, with the GNR and PFR members arresting
and torturing those suspected of connections to the partisans, as well as performing arbitrary and
widespread searches of the homes of suspected anti-Fascists.30 Indicative of this trend are the
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experiences of Fontanot’s cousin, Spartaco Romano. According to Romano, after fighting with the
Proletarian Brigade in the Battle of Gorizia, he returned to Monfalcone, but did not go home or
back to work for fear of being arrested; instead he hid in the home of his father-in-law, a butcher.
One day in the summer of 1944, out of the blue, a group of PFR members pulled up to the house
to search him out, but Romano managed to escape thanks to a neighbor’s warning. The Fascists
then rummaged through the house, raiding the meat cellars and carrying away two butchered
animals, which they claimed were destined for the partisans. The most significant element of
Romano’s recollections, however, comes when he indicates that he knew well one of the men
involved in the search. This man, Quinto, was “one of the Fascists who, in 1922, the Shipyard
Direction had imported from the South to keep an eye on the Monfalcone workers. Quinto thus
knew my father as one of those Socialists who were well-respected. That same day, Quinto was
killed by gappisti in front of the cemetery.”31
This campaign climaxed in mid-1944, when the GAP began targeting current and former
fascio heads. On 15 May alone, it kidnapped a former head of the Ronchi fascio, executed the
current political commissar of that fascio, and seriously wounded one of the district’s most
notorious squadristi, who survived to identify one of his attackers as “Fontanot.” 32 In response to
this wave of attacks, which at times involved attacks on entire families, forces sympathetic to Salò,
as well as SS and Wehrmacht soldiers, scoured the district on the night of 23 May, arresting 68
known Communists, “all individually identified as political commissars, components of on-the-
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ground partisan police groups, and couriers.” 33 Yet the attacks continued and a GNR report from
late June noted that “the Monfalconese remains always the nerve center for Communist agitation,
which leads to frequent acts of terrorism.” 34 The GAP itself reported the “liquidation” of five more
enemies in July. 35 Though assessing the number of those killed by the Monfalcone GAP is very
difficult − few GAP reports have survived − the figure was almost certainly well above 100. 36
Whatever the figure, as a member of the Communist-aligned Commission for the Anti-Fascist
Struggle would reflect frankly a year after war’s end, with the GAP campaign, all the “great
criminal exponents [of local Fascism] have been eliminated during the liberation struggle.” 37
Resistance as Local Revolution: The Struggle against Everyday Fascism:
But from its very beginnings, resistance in both the Monfalconese and wider Italy was far
more than just an armed struggle to expel the German occupiers or an effort to “liquidate” the “big
fish” among the cardholding Fascists. For many rank-and-file partisans of the left, if not all the
political parties that claimed to represent them, it was also a revolutionary war. For them, 8
September unleashed a wide range of seething resentments and opened a wide range of potential
activities for social transformation.38 The initiation of this seemingly decisive phase of the struggle
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against the Germans and local Fascists led to increasing contemplation of the potential form of
post-Fascist society. Yet little work has been done to explore how the visions and pursuit of various
facets of the Resistance struggle was shaped by the everyday experiences of Fascism. 39 In fact, the
ways in which monfalconesi had come to think about “Fascism” and “Fascists” during twenty
years of everyday Fascism had a significant impact on how they conceptualized Resistance and
liberation, just as the harsh conditions of everyday life during this struggle exacerbated existing
tendencies to apply the term “Fascist” flexibly to entire social categories. 40
In the workshops, the general frustration with the nature of labor and the more specific
piecework question became increasingly significant as the Fascist regime crumbled. Even before
the regime’s collapse, a steady reduction of piece-rates during the war years had forced a hastening
of work rhythms to frenetic and increasingly unsafe paces until, in October 1941, a major accident
in the Shipbuilding Department left nine workers dead. An internal investigation revealing that
fault lay with the department head for driving the workers at such an accelerated pace.41 The
tendency to speed work continued through 1943 and thus in December 1943, after the collapse of
the regime, the CRDA workers of Monfalcone elected a delegation (all Communists), sending it
to present a four-part list of demands to management, one of which was the “elimination of labor
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by piecework, where currently such a system eats into the average earnings of the laborers.”42
Management avoided the demands. It claimed the workers needed to file complaints via the Fascist
Syndicates, recently reconstituted by the German occupiers. According to one Communist
militant’s interpretation, management “hid itself behind the German bayonets.”43
This focus on the piecework system is significant. The abolition of piecework – a
revolution against the clerks and a revolution of daily experience of “Fascist” labor – had emerged
as a central component of the local, popular conception of the Resistance after 8 September. Yet
this vision of Resistance, bearing a concreteness and significance for workers that equaled that of
expelling the German occupiers, clashed with the centrally-sanctioned strategies of the Communist
Party.44 In fact, the PCI-Trieste soon issued a formal rebuke of the monfalconesi, whom it accused
of engaging in supposedly narrow economic negotiations while they should have been preparing
for armed insurrection during an “acutely revolutionary situation.” 45
Despite the rebuke, workers continued to demand the abolition of piecework and to engage
in an increasingly intense propaganda campaign against the bosses and clerks.46 The month after,
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the CLN of Monfalcone (likely Communist militants acting in the CLN’s name) clandestinely put
up posters in the CRDA addressed to the “directors, engineers, head technicians, office heads, head
workers, [and] clerks,” which exhorted them to sabotage the Nazi-Fascist war and to avoid at all
costs “obstructing the demands of the workers” or betraying resisters. It concluded that these
groups “HAVE ALL BEEN WARNED” and, alluding to the recent foibe killings, claimed that
those who failed to obey would “bitterly regret it. The events of Istria show!”47 In December 1944,
as the Communists and the OF were preparing for the moment of liberation, the local Communist
Party secretary ordered the creation of “a Commission composed of the craftsmen of the greatest
establishments,” which would address, among other things, the continual popular demand for the
abolition of piecework in its entirety. 48 For many workers and partisans, including the pipefitterturned-partisan-commander Mario Fantini, there was simply no question of going back to an
unreformed workplace, only the prospect of creating a work environment in which he felt free and
independent, no longer subjected to the whistle of the workshop siren. 49
Yet the abolition of piecework and the remaking of work life were not the only reform
issues grafted onto local notions of Resistance and liberation. Another involved a reworking of the
marketplace experience, fueled by longstanding resentments toward shopkeepers and the fact that
conditions went from poor to dire as Monfalcone plunged into civil war. In fact, in line with worker
demands throughout wider Italy, the CRDA delegation’s fourth and final demand to management
in December 1943 had been that the firm take an increasingly active role to “help [the workers] by

CLN-Monfalcone, “DIRIGENTI, INGEGNERI, CAPITECNICI, CAPI UFFICI, CAPI OPERAI, IMPIEGATI…,”
February 1944, AST, Pref Gab 1923-52, b 482, f 064, sf 064 Manifestini sovversini. On the foibe killings, see footnote
97.
48
Dušan (Com. pol.-III Zona, PCI-Monfalcone), Unnumbered Circolare “A tutti i comitati politici di settore,” 18
December 1944, AS 1570, b 9, f Circolari.
49
Thus, though the CRDA was legally obligated to rehire Fantini to his old position after the war, Fantini refused the
job, instead starting a construction cooperative with many of his fellow partisans. Patat, Mario Fantini “Sasso”, 17482.
47

82

every means for the improvement of the alimentary situation.” 50 The workers, in short, proposed
an increased effort to bypass local merchants and shopkeepers on the questions of supply, using
their collective purchasing power and the firm’s weight to do so.
Such hopes were bound up intimately with the “Fascist” egoism of shopkeepers, which had
existed even in the prewar years, but intensified with the dire problems of food shortage, blackmarketeering, and black-market inflation connected to the war.51 Interestingly, the Germans had
immediately recognized such problems when they arrived in Monfalcone in September 1943.
Shortly after their arrival, German officials reported on the need to establish a system of “just
prices,” as well as an efficient enforcement system. They established price commissions and fixed
prices, outlawed hoarding and profiteering, established a rationing system and a state monopoly
over the exchange of essential goods, and created a network of informants that afforded them a
window into the black market. Still, such measures never succeeded in resolving the problem. 52
Within this framework, the CRDA bent to worker demands for the expansion of internal shops and
the sale of staple goods below fixed prices. However, the German regulatory regime and supply
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and transport shortages prevented such shops from meeting worker expectations.53
Instead, conditions continued to deteriorate. By the summer of 1944, though rationed
foodstuffs still arrived in the town somewhat regularly, clothing and specialty foods were
completely absent, as were price-controlled goods like fish. The shortage in locally-produced
goods occurred because sellers could easily sell their goods at higher prices on Trieste’s lucrative
black market or in the less-well-monitored markets of outlying communes, which had lost their
primary mechanism of market discipline with the collapse of the PNF. By mid-1944, cooking oils
sold on the black market at L1000 per liter, or sixty-six times the official fixed price of L15.10.54
By fall, the last fruits and vegetables disappeared from the market and even the rationed foodstuffs
arrived very irregularly.55 By March 1945, only “laughable” quantities of rationed goods reached
the markets, and starving town-dwellers began to venture into the countryside to steal food from
the fields or purchase from farmers at “absurd prices.”56
Scarcity created ever-greater opportunities for black-marketeers, particularly in the
outlying communes, as well as an increasing likelihood of tense market interactions. At times, this
led to hostility between the urbanites and the peasants, the former accusing the latter of “starving
the people” for profit.57 But most often the ire fell upon merchants and shopkeepers − and
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particularly those who were Fascists well-known for having used and continuing to use their Party
connections for personal gain. Accusation sheets compiled by the OF committee for the village of
San Canzian d’Isonzo in the immediate post-liberation months, which are exceptionally detailed
relative to those of the other communes of the Monfalconese, reveal at least four vendors who
were deeply reviled for being both Fascists and black-marketeers. One of these, Oreste G., was
identified as the commune’s PNF secretary until 8 September, during which time he was “a
practitioner of the black market in grand style. Yesterday a miserable merchant and today a great
capitalist. Starver of the people.” 58 Another was noted as a squadrista from 1922, who, though
then “a miserable worker,” had “began to practice commerce; today he is a millionaire, living off
the blood of the poor” through the black market.59 Thus Resistance-era “shopping” − if one can
use that term to capture the complex amalgam of licit and elicit market exchange, direct barter,
and theft by which monfalconesi attempted to survive − was a continuation and also an
intensification of the difficult experiences captured in prewar market interactions with Fascists like
Giovanni Linossi. Not only did repeated negative interactions with black-marketeers and profiteers
spur many monfalconesi to view merchants and vendors as quintessential “Fascists,” but also to
consider the freeing of the workers from dependency upon such “Fascist” individuals as integral
to liberation. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, local Communist leaders noted in December 1944 that
workers’ formerly imprecise demand for increased CRDA involvement in securing provisions had
concretized into a demand for “the institution of internal shops on the part of the [industrial] firms,
which will be managed by commissions elected from among the very workers.”60 They demanded
CLN-San Canzian d’Isonzo (OF), “Elenco di tutte le persone che hanno collaborato con l’occupatore…,” 7 October
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a new form of commerce freed from “Fascist” egoism, over which they would have direct control.
The Rise of Yugoslav Annexationism and Early Visions of Tito’s Yugoslavia
In the context of intensified everyday antagonisms and civil war, monfalconesi began to
consider their range of options for resistance, leading an increasingly large portion of even the
Italian-speaking population to embrace Yugoslav annexation. However, this was a slow and
convoluted process, closely tied to the shifting political and military situation of the region in the
wake of 8 September. In the short term, the PCI’s embrace of outright armed struggle after 8
September had hurled both Slovenes and Italians of the Littoral into unprecedented degrees of
resistance. 61 In the longer term, the return of veteran PCI militants like Luigi Frausin, Natale
Kolarič, and Lino Zocchi from confino led to a strengthening of the PCI organization in Trieste
Province and, perhaps unexpectedly, a sudden increase in tensions between the KPS and PCI.
The cause of these tensions was the emerging “Trieste Question” and the political quandary
it posed for the PCI given the latter’s efforts to transform itself into a mass democratic party
recognized as part of an anti-Fascist unity coalition. The PCI had pursued this strategy, known as
the Salerno Turn (Svolta di Salerno), from the moment that general secretary Palmiro Togliatti
returned to liberated Italy from the Soviet Union in April 1944. The strategy, supported by Stalin
himself, aimed not just to defeat the Axis as quickly as possible, but also to establish the legitimacy
and mass appeal of the PCI for the postwar period.62 For the new PCI, the Trieste Question became
a major liability. The annexationist stance of the KPS and KPJ regarding the Primorska reflected
badly on the PCI in the eyes of many Italians and allowed it to be labeled “anti-national,”
61
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threatening both the anti-Fascist unity coalition and the Party’s postwar electoral appeal. The best
solution that the PCI could come up with was to accept Slovenian claims to Slovene-majority
areas, while also asserting the cultural Italianness (italianità) of cities like Trieste and Monfalcone
and requesting that discussions of the territorial fate of these cities be tabled until after the war.
Within the narrower realm of Julian politics, navigating this dilemma became an
impossible task for PCI Federation secretary Luigi Frausin, who had assumed that post after
returning from confino in late 1943. Every compromise with the KPS led to a negative response
of many of the parties of the Trieste National Liberation Committee (Comitato di liberazione
nazionale, CLN), particularly those parties such as the Christian Democrats (Democrazia cristiana,
DC) and Actionists (Partito d’Azione, PdA), who maintained Italy’s territorial integrity as central
to their platform. By contrast, compromise with the CLN would enrage the KPS and expose
Frausin to accusations of Italian nationalism and “bourgeois” sentiments. 63
Frausin ultimately pursued a policy that more closely aligned him with the CLN than the
KPS, a decision which had a profound impact on the political situation in Monfalcone. Though
certain monfalconesi had cooperated with the OF and KPS from 1941 to 1943, at the time of
Frausin’s return, these militants were almost all still organized in the PCI and organizationally
subordinate to Trieste.64 When Frausin arrived in Trieste, he immediately set out to reestablish PCI
control over the monfalconesi − and particularly over a group led by Ferdinando Marega, a
principal organizer of the Proletarian Brigade, who in September 1943 had already accepted the
idea of Yugoslav annexation of the Monfalconese. In the last months of 1943, Frausin issued
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Marega an official rebuke and sent his agent Natale Kolarič to assist Ruggero Bersa, recently
returned from confino, in shoring up the district’s organizational structure.65
Yet if the winter of 1943/44 saw the Communists of the Monfalconese suddenly returned
to the PCI-Trieste’s orbit, the spring of 1944 brought another drastic shift. In April, the Soviets
parachuted the veteran PCI militant Vincenzo Bianco (Vittorio) into Yugoslavia to serve as a
liaison between Tito and Togliatti. Bianco soon urged Togliatti to approve a temporary Yugoslav
occupation, if not annexation, of Trieste and Venezia Giulia. Togliatti took this advice, which
isolated Frausin and his PCI Federation within Trieste’s CLN. 66 More significantly, in May,
unknown individuals denounced Kolarič to the Germans, who captured and executed him, again
severing the monfalconesi from the Trieste Federation.67 This afforded the KPS a window not just
to organize distinct KPS cells, as Rudi Uršič done from late 1943, but also to appropriate the
existing PCI network. Immediately after Kolarič’s arrest, the KPS sent its own agent, Rodolfo
Lenardič (Dušan), to take control of this network as district secretary. 68 Three months later, Frausin
himself was betrayed to the Germans and arrested. Without Frausin, the PCI members of Trieste
too fell increasingly under the sway of the KPS and were soon expelled from the CLN. 69
In this context, the pro-annexationist stance came to dominate the regional and local
Communist Party directive committees, coming to a head in October 1944. As Bersa later
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recounted, after Lenardič arrived in Monfalcone, he slowly pushed the Yugoslav annexationist line
upon the district committee, demoting individuals like Otto Ferlettich, who expressed
disagreement.70 As a result, the Monfalcone PCI’s district committee, including Bersa, Angelo
Comar, Ottone Zanolla, and, begrudgingly, Ferlettich, officially embraced the pro-Yugoslav
solution that month, leading to a fission of the Monfalcone CLN, particularly when various
Socialists and members of the “bourgeois” parties rejected the decision. 71 At the same time, the
mass organizations of the Triestine Communists, calling themselves the “Antifascist Committees
for the Annexation of Trieste to Yugoslavia,” issued a statement in the name of the masses:
The mass organizations of the Italian people of Trieste, by way of its own representatives,
gathered to discuss the various current political problems determined by the new political
situation and particularly in regards to the problem of the future fate of the city of Trieste,
[…] expressed the desire, with certainty, that Trieste become part of the new, great,
democratic, and federative Yugoslavia, vanguard of democratic liberty and an example for
all the oppressed peoples, in which we have all the guarantees of a better political,
economic, and social future for the city of Trieste, for the certain and guaranteed advantage
and wellbeing of the Italian portion.72

Given a lack of documentation, the precise details of PCI-Monfalcone’s October
declaration are unclear, and it is impossible to assess accurately the support the solution had among
the wider population at that moment. It is unknown, for example, if its authors had accepted their
district’s annexation as part of Slovenia or if they had accepted the other increasingly popular
variant of the annexationist line, namely that much of Venezia Giulia become an autonomous
Italian-majority “Seventh Federative Republic” within the wider Yugoslav federation. 73 It is clear
that for many monfalconesi, only the latter was acceptable. For example, the unidentified militant
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“Marco,” who wrote to the PCI’s leadership in August, criticizing the annexationist claims of
Slovenia and stressing that “the comrades of our organization […] see nothing other than the red
flag” and “they think only about a soviet republic.” 74 The Italian Communist partisan (garibaldino)
Giuseppe Lorenzon, would describe the choice in similar terms at a much later date:
We saw immediately that the Italian situation was not clear: Fascism returned [in liberated
Italy]. It was necessary to unite [with Yugoslavia] in order not to lose the gains of the war,
to make sure that the reaction didn’t defeat us.... The great mass of combatants inevitably
therefore favored the Seventh Federative Republic. Union with Yugoslavia was not pursued
in order to become Slovenian or Yugoslav, but only for socialism.75

For such individuals, the Seventh Federative was preferable to Slovenian annexation, but even this
moderated version of Yugoslav claims did not receive the universal support of the district’s
Communists. For example, one garibaldino of the Triestine Assault Brigade wrote to the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of liberation. He criticized that the district committee had
“adhered [to the annexationist line] without difficulty (because it is composed of simple and weak
people),” but indicated that, in his estimation, the wider populace rejected this. 76
From October 1944, then, both Communist Parties present in Venezia Giulia, if not the
entire rank-and-file of the PCI, began pushing the notion of Yugoslav annexation. By mid-October,
with the PCI-Trieste in disarray and disconnected from the Party’s center, Togliatti acquiesced to
the passage of all garibaldini operating east of the Isonzo under direct Yugoslav command, which
was followed in November by the merging of existing PCI and KPS structures in Venezia Giulia
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into a jointly directed organization. 77 Both in the Italian-language partisan press (Il corriere
partigiano) and the clandestine Communist press (Il nostro avvenire and Il Lavoratore) initiated a
campaign to popularize the notion of Yugoslav annexation, though always under the two
conditions that (1) this occur under the formula of the Seventh Federative, not Slovenian
annexation; and (2) the Italian-majority areas be given the chance to approve their annexation by
a vote.78 In the Monfalconese, by February 1945 the district committee had committed itself to this
campaign, though there remained telling differences in approach. Lenardič (Dušan) emphasized
the creation of portraits of Tito and other Yugoslav trinkets − that is, nationalist trappings − while
Bersa argued that emphasis be placed on the internationalist, workers’ appeal of Yugoslavia,
namely that Yugoslavia was a surrogate for the Soviet Union and a country in which the expansive
local vision of Resistance could be realized. 79
It was among the partisans, however, many of whom moved back and forth between their
units in the mountains and the district itself, that this campaign to popularize Tito’s Yugoslavia
was pushed most forcefully. To reach such individuals, the Yugoslav forces, in concert with certain
regional PCI leaders, created a Political Office for the Garibaldi units operating under Yugoslav
command. In addition to organizing the printing of the clandestine pro-Yugoslav press, this office
disseminated copies of Tito’s speeches among the partisans and increasingly transformed the
Garibaldi unit’s “Political Hours” − the daily time in which garibaldini received political education
from their political commissars − into discussions of the merits of Tito’s new state. 80
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In these lessons and through the press, partisans learned that Tito’s Yugoslavia was in a
unique position to bring prosperity and fulfillment to working people precisely because of the
ongoing war. Propagandists stressed that the Axis occupation had marked a fundamental rupture
in Yugoslav history. It had precipitated the complete collapse of the old state and social order,
forced the Yugoslav peoples to unite in a life-or-death struggle against fascism, and thus paved the
way for the construction of a fundamentally new society based on fraternal, multinational
cooperation.81 It was due to these conditions that the Yugoslavs were to be emulated. They realized
that the struggle would be over “only when every trace of fascist imperialism has been completely
eliminated from the purged continent and when true democracy is definitively affirmed
everywhere,”82 which meant an uncompromising struggle against “the more or less masked
residues of fascism, which will try everywhere to reappear in new forms.” 83
With these ideas increasingly circulating within the ranks of the monfalconesi partisans
and undoubtedly making their way home through word-of-mouth and other means of transition,
the stakes of liberation became increasingly clear. In fact, shortly before war’s end, the issue was
cast in Cold-War terms, partisan commissars impressing upon their comrades that the European
continent was in the process of bifurcation. They asserted that, in one camp, “the demo-plutocratic
influence of the Anglo-Americans will dominate, with their capitalist and imperialist traditions,”
while “from the other camp is already spreading and taking shape the new democratic-popularprogressive-irradiant ideal of the Soviet lands.” They indicated that Venezia Giulia fell directly
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along the emerging fault line between “the Europe of yesterday and that of tomorrow” and insisted
that for both Italian and Slovenian giuliani the choice between the two was clear:
The light shining out from the East has already borne new fruits among several
European peoples. First, among all the Yugoslav people there has been formed the first
organic-democratic-popular-progressive state, with the abolition of national conflicts, with
the principles of true liberty desired by all peoples, guaranteeing and respecting individual
nationalities with their rights to language and flag, culture and art, with principles of
equality and the possibility of improvement for all social classes, with the right to life and
work for all.84

These ideas were at the core of what would emerge as an expansive and deeply-entrenched
myth of Yugoslavia in the coming years. This myth, with its close linkages of Yugoslavia with
social revolution, helps explain why, as the war drew closer to an end and the prospects of
Yugoslav annexation increased, the Monfalconese fell into an ever-bloodier state of civil war. For
the Communists and the workers who took an expansive view of Resistance, Tito’s successes
served as a source of inspiration for increasingly bold action at home. For anti-Fascist Italians of
strong national sentiments − even those who shared transformative goals of Resistance −
navigating these years became exceedingly difficult, as they were caught between a rock (the Axis
occupation) and a hard place (the threat of Yugoslav Communist annexation).
1 May 1945: Liberation or Occupation?
In the final months of the war, as the front lines approached Monfalcone, monfalconesi of
all stripes eagerly awaited news of the advance of the Anglo-Americans from the west and the
Yugoslavs from the east. Excepting the few diehard Fascists who had refused to flee, most of the
population looked forward to the moment of liberation, though often with drastically different and
even shifting hopes. Monfalconesi heard rumors about the failures of concrete reforms in liberated
Italy and news of Titoist triumphs to their southeast, making it increasingly easy for workers to
Commissario I Battaglione, Brigata Triestina, “Venezia Giulia - Jugoslavia” (N. 230), Undated (Spring 1945),
IRSML-FVG, Fondo Jaksetich, b 9, f 74.
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view liberation by the Yugoslavs as more likely to bring about the concrete, local changes they
hoped to realize and thus an increasingly large share of the town’s workers lined up behind the
pro-Yugoslav cause. At the same time, the emergence of an increasingly strong faction in favor of
Yugoslav annexationism accelerated a political realignment in the town that had been ongoing
since October 1944, shifting the dominant point of division from that between Fascists and antiFascists to that between pro-Italians and pro-Yugoslavs.
Beginning in the winter of 1944/45, the Communists, believing Tito’s forces would arrive
first, began making plans to assume control of the town, including directing all aspects of postliberation economic, social, and cultural life. 85 As early as December 1944, Lenardič had given
the order to begin organizing the Difesa Popolare (Popular Defense), a partisan police force
divided into five- or six-member squads, consisting of the most disciplined members of the AntiFascist Youth Front. These squads, under the command of Spartaco Padovan (Diego), would have
the dual tasks of supporting the GAP in eliminating spies and initiating the struggle against
“Fascist” merchants and black-marketeers.86 At the same time, Lenardič ordered the eight-man
Central Committee of Worker’s Unity to centralize the command structure of its committees,
which were to serve as the basis for Party management of the CRDA and which had 6000 local
adherents.87 Yet, as workers increasingly lined up behind the pro-Yugoslavs and the Communist
leadership of the local Resistance, debates emerged within leadership circles as to the degree and
rate at which their popular vision of liberation could be realized.
In March 1945, with the organizations preparing for liberation, members of the Central
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Committee of Workers’ Unity debated what should be done with the district’s merchants and
shopkeepers and the technical staff of the CRDA. Indicative of the radical strain of the local
Resistance – one to which many workers subscribed – are the comments of one unidentified
“Comrade ?” who noted that something had to be done to stop commercial interests “from
strangling the workers” but that “there is little to do because they are animated by an egoistic spirit
without equal.” His rather grim conclusion was that “they are worthy only of being shot.” With
respect to the CRDA clerks, “Comrade ?” was equally uncompromising. Labeling them as “people
too compromised with Fascism first and with the Germans today,” with whom workers should
refuse “even the possibility of any compromise,” he suggested they be subjected to a “true purge.”
However, with an eye to stability, productivity, and order, one of the district’s leading
Communists, Comrade Flinn, retorted that this “Comrade ?” must have learned nothing from the
experience of the Soviet anti-expert campaign during the First Five-Year Plan, in which the Soviets
“liquidated” the experts to their own harm. Instead, Flinn suggested that “today it is premature to
chase them from their posts.” He proposed instead that the Communists ought to consider them
“industrial patrimony, which must be conserved just like the machines.” 88 In this viewpoint,
undoubtedly informed by an awareness of Yugoslavia’s weak economy and its vulnerability along
the fault line of a bifurcating Europe, the state’s geopolitical interests received priority over local
transformation, all strata of the workforce treated as human capital at the disposal of the
developmental state.
Thus, some two months before liberation, the debate over how to deal with the social
categories associated with everyday Fascism, later called the “remnants of Fascism,” was already
underway. Though there was something of an emerging consensus among the town’s workers as
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to which social categories required extirpation as “remnants of Fascism,” there was not yet a clear
plan as to how to achieve this, nor agreement among the Communist leadership as to the tactics
and strategy they should employ to make good on this vision of Resistance and liberation, while
also protecting Yugoslavia’s interests. Rather, mirroring wider Italian trends, Party leadership
exerted a limiting influence on more expansive popular approaches to liberation. 89 The focus at
the top remained on organization and the immediate task of expelling the Germans, seizing power,
and maintaining order, as indicated when Workers’ Unity’s Central Committee reported later in
March that “all the committees are prepared to control the entirety of the masses in order to assume
[power] immediately after the collapse of the shipyard’s Direction, and to keep it at full activity.” 90
The decisive moment, then, came on the night of 30 April and morning of 1 May. Some
weeks prior, the district PCI had issued a general mobilization order for all able-bodied youth to
go into the mountains and prepare for the final battle, its organizers staying behind to prepare the
remaining workers for an uprising. 91 On 30 April, following the German command’s rejection of
a Communist surrender ultimatum − the Germans preferred to surrender to the Western Allies −
units of the Difesa Popolare and armed workers led by PCI militants began arresting isolated
German soldier and Fascists, even sacking the German barracks on the Viale San Marco. With the
coming of the morning light, the DP seized the train station and other vital points, and the GAP,
outfitted with motor vehicles and machineguns, descended from the hills, flanked to the north by

In Italy, Togliatti and the PCI condemned radical workers’ violence against bosses-qua-Fascists. Immediately
following liberation, he spoke at the congress of the PCI-Turin and condemned as a “grave error” the removal of
bosses “simply because they are disliked by the masses” and not because of clear collaborationist or Fascist crimes.
Pavone, A Civil War, 198, 422-23.
90
Segretario (CC-UO), “Riunione C.U.O. di Fabbrica,” 28 March 1945, op. cit.
91
Renato A[x] (PCI-Monfalcone), “Relazione della riunione della cellula del 30/3/945,” 4 April 1945, AS 1570, b 13,
f 9; Unione dei Lavoratori della Pesca-Monfalcone, “Relazione del movimento del periodo di mobilitazione,” 6 May
1945, AS 1570, b 11, f 7, sf 12.
89

96

the Ivan Granikova Brigade of the Yugoslav Army. 92 As the gappista Riccardo Giacuzzo recounts,
the town was in revolt by the time he arrived and soon these combined forces pushed the Germans
entirely out of Monfalcone. The GAP disarmed the German garrisons, while the Yugoslavs
continued through Ronchi, pushing the Germans back over the Isonzo. By the time the Western
Allied vanguard arrived in the late afternoon, they found “an already-liberated Monfalcone,” with
celebrations and speeches underway in the central piazza (Figure 9).93 By the evening, the town
was adorned with Italian and Yugoslav red-starred flags and upon the façade of the Town Hall,
the liberating forces had erected a giant red star (Figure 10).94
The monfalconesi exiting their homes that afternoon and evening had mixed reactions.
While those tainted by Fascist ties hunkered down, the anti- and non-Fascists of the Monfalconese
emerged in possession of a range of hopes and political beliefs, not all Communist and proYugoslav. For some, the sight of ragged and dirty Partisan forces in the town was frightening, a
sign of hierarchy subverted and the victory of the primitive over the cultured. 95 According to the
primary pro-Italian account of liberation, a report sent from the Italian CLN of Monfalcone to the
CLNAI, others still were “stunned by the truly unexpected appearance of the Yugoslav flags.” 96
Though the report’s implication that the arriving Partisans sprung the annexationist question upon
an unsuspecting population is doubtful − Axis propaganda had used the Yugoslav annexationist
threat as a boogeyman to mobilize local support and the report itself contains indications that the
population knew the stakes − not all monfalconesi had come to terms with the contest. Even many
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left-leaning monfalconesi were ambivalent toward Yugoslav annexation, among them Spartaco
Romano and Alberto Clemente. It was the pro-Italian Communist Romano who, emerging from
his home to find that the Yugoslavs had planted Yugoslav flags in front of the Town Hall, put up
a red-starred Italian tricolor alongside them. 97 Similarly, the young, pro-Italian Clemente, a
Turriaco resident from a Socialist family, recalls a sense of disappointment about the nationalistic
displays of the Yugoslavs and the fact that, when he arrived the Monfalcone piazza on 1 May, he
found Yugoslav red-starred tricolors in far greater numbers than their Italian counterparts. But for
such individuals, the uneasiness caused by the presence of Yugoslav flags was mitigated by or
stood alongside a tremendous hope that 1 May marked an opportunity to create a new world. For
such individuals, hope often overshadowed unease in this initial period, not least of all because, in
Clemente’s words, the zone’s history within the Habsburg Empire led monfalconesi to understand
the prospect of leaving Italy behind “in a different, less dramatic way.”98
If many monfalconesi experienced 1 May as a celebratory moment, others saw it as the
beginning of a second occupation, with Yugoslav conquerors replacing the Germans. This was
especially the case for staunch anti-Communists and Italian nationalists, even if not of a Fascist
variety. According to the Italian CLN, when such individuals began displaying Italian tricolors
without the red star, “groups of Yugoslav Partisans, entering violently into the residences, quickly
tore them apart.” For them, the new reality set in on 2 May during a gathering in the town square
headed by the president of the OF Liberation Committee, Dr. Viglione. In his speech, Viglione
praised the Yugoslavs as liberators and asked if the crowd desired to join Tito’s Yugoslavia, to
which “the response, affirmative but weak, came from small groups of partisans who had the Tito
flag and posters praising him.” According to the report, when Viglione suggested the popular will
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be made clear to the Allies and asked again if the crowd wanted Yugoslavia, the “great majority”
neither cheered, nor applauded and one woman who shouted “no” was immediately taken away
by “a heavily armed Tito supporter.”99 For these individuals, the arrival of the Yugoslavs was a
nightmare. As the small, now-underground pro-Italian CLN would state in an appeal to the
CLNAI, the town was “profoundly pained by having fallen under a regime of anti-democratic
coercion more demagogic than that of Fascist terrorism.”100
May 1945: An Attempt to Remake the World
It is impossible to know with certainty the percentage of monfalconesi who welcomed the
Yugoslavs and those who rejected them at the moment of liberation. In fact, many with mixed
feelings only chose a side because of post-liberation experiences. What is clear, however, is that
the cessation of the fighting broadened what one monfalconese would reflectively term the
“horizons of hope.”101 After twenty years of Fascism and two of civil war, liberation by the
Yugoslavs made it seem likely that a thoroughgoing social transformation was not only possible,
but imminent.102
Carrying out this social revolution after 1 May was a complex and overlapping network of
Yugoslav military forces and local OF-aligned institutions that had formerly operated
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clandestinely, staffed mostly by Communist militants, sympathetic workers, and a handful of
“progressive” clerks. Immediately after the Yugoslavs’ arrival, such institutions stepped out of the
shadows, with the OF organizing the election of a fourteen-person pro-Yugoslav administrative
committee, the District Committee of National Liberation (CDLN), 103 which soon pledged loyalty
to Tito and announced the district’s adhesion to Yugoslavia. 104 Meanwhile, in the factories, the
committees of the 6000-strong Workers’ Unity stepped up to direct and control the workplaces. 105
Yet for most workers and low-level Communist militants, more important than the creation
of formal pro-Yugoslav institutions of “popular power” (potere popolare) was the transformation
of their everyday experiences. Monfalconesi who joined the institutions of “popular power” often
did so with the goal of establishing a just government rather than taking a stance on the territorial
question. Danilo Verginella, a garibaldino who joined the DP, believed that “popular power”
meant government in which “honest people” seized the levers of control from “the usurpers from
before.” Though he (initially) rejected Yugoslav annexation, becoming the object of his comrades’
ridicule, his belief that the Yugoslavs were “honest people” drove him into cooperation. For such
individuals, the dreams of local transformation could be realized only if there was a purge of the
“remnants of Fascism” (resti del fascismo) − Verginella’s “usurpers” − from the town.106 Though
the GAP campaign had eliminated most of the “big fish” of local Fascism, the pressing question
in May was what should be done about the small-fish cardholders, the minor squadristi, and those
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associated with “Fascism” due to their various “anti-popular” activities.
As early as March, the PCI had compiled a list of 260 such individuals. 107 In May, the
Yugoslavs and their local allies began carrying out the first stages of the purge seen as central to
their Resistance. This purge, which in its wider Julian manifestation has been well-trodden in the
historiography and which continued even after Anglo-American forces arrived in the town on the
afternoon of liberation day, served the dual purposes of preparing the territory for annexation and
effecting local social revolution.108 In the few cases of surviving major local Fascists, the GAP and
DP searched for these figures in the days after liberation, often executing those they found. 109 But
they also carried out a large wave of arrests and deportations, the arrestees accused of various
forms of “reactionarism and black-marketeering.”110 In this moment of transformative chaos,
orders for such arrests came variably from the Yugoslav military command, the CDLN, or OZNA,
and the experience was highly dependent upon one’s social position.
In the factories, both workers and the Party immediately began their revolution against the
clerks, the latter using the Difesa Popolare as its principal arm. In the Solvay, for example, a factory
committee was established, headed by the DP officer, Antonio Farinea (Josko). When the
workforce returned on 7 May, Farinea immediately ordered five clerks arrested and brought to the
company mess hall, where each was “invited to exculpate himself in front of the workers,” roughly
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500 in number. Before the clerks could speak, Farinea impressed the gravity of the situation upon
the crowd, shouting that “before you all stand five individuals whom you must judge” and leaving
no doubt that, in his mind, the only suitable punishment was for them to pay with their lives. For
some time, workers hurled accusations at these clerks, after which the latter sought to defend
themselves. The DP released one man immediately upon learning that he had never been a Fascist
and receiving the endorsement of various workers with whom he was on friendly terms. The other
four were found guilty. Two had been early squadristi who had then had long careers in the offices
of the firm. The other two, though never Fascist cardholders, committed unspecified “Fascist”
actions. Though there is little information on the first of these, the second, notably a clerk in the
Solvay’s Piecework Office, was accused of having refused to give a bike tire to a partisan who had
come asking for one and thus of hindering the popular cause. After the crowd rendered its “guilty”
verdicts, the four were taken to the local jail. The two squadristi were later deported to Yugoslavia,
never to be heard from again. 111 Such was the first stage of the revolution against the clerkdom in
the Solvay.
These were four of several hundred monfalconesi arrested that May, of whom some threehundred were deported to the east. Most were sent to Trieste or nearby Yugoslav-controlled cities
such as Aidussina (Ajdovščina), Vipacco (Vipava), and Postumia (Postojna), where they remained
for roughly ten days before being released, though some 50 never returned.112 Not all arrestees
were deported. Many languished in the local jail, including a large number of the district’s clerks
and shopkeepers. May 1945 was a dangerous time for such individuals, and they could expect little
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sympathy. 113 Townspeople called for harsh punishments, pressuring the Yugoslav authorities to
act. As one Communist militant noted, “the masses do not wish that we be bloodthirsty, but rather
just avengers; thus, to eliminate the malcontent, [the detainees’] deportation to the New Yugoslavia
of Tito for reconstruction [forced labor] would be opportune.”114
Within the CRDA, the situation was equally confused when workers returned on 3 May.115
There the UO and Party cell structures headed by Renato A. had not yet resolved the tension
between the workers’ impulse to purge and the state’s need for stability. 116 On the one hand, some
degree of power, including that to oversee purges, passed into the hands of a series of three UO
factory committees. From the beginning these committees made their central demands the removal
of large numbers of resented managerial elements and the complete suppression of the Piecework
Offices. 117 On the other, the committees’ OF and wider Yugoslav superiors saw the resumption of
production in the CRDA (and other Julian firms) as critical to Yugoslavia’s reconstruction needs,
even placing orders for tens of ships by the end of the month. 118 As a result, the Yugoslav military
leadership in Trieste soon gathered Triestine industrialists to assure them Yugoslavia would
respect private property, unless owners were liable to expropriation under the Partisans’ 1942 law
for the punishment of war criminals and collaborators.119
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While this tension remained unresolved in theory, in practice the actions of the firm’s
clerks, technicians, and managers made it superfluous during the first two weeks after liberation. 120
A large share of such individuals simply refused to show at work, fearing for their safety, which
resulted in a complete breakdown in both productivity and order within the shipyard. According
to the major syndical organizer Vittorio Cernigoi (Gip), “in the Shipyard the masses degenerated,
indulging in acts that were inconsistent with the moment.” By May 15, Communist leadership and
Yugoslav military command felt compelled to issue a “recall of the Bosses,” who were given “the
authority necessary to reestablish order inside the Shipyard.” Realizing that this would incense
many workers, the Party insisted that these individuals would have authority only regarding strictly
technical matters and not the power to discipline “unruly workers.” But, the result was the same:
the purge was put on hold.121 On a regional level, this policy was approved by the Communist
leadership. Ernesto Radich informed his subordinates that even those who had earned “the hatred
and resentment of the working masses, both for reasons of politics and for reasons of work,” would
be purged only if a replacement was available. That said, he promised a future in which the “bosses,
piecework officials, clerks, office heads, inspectors … would be superfluous.” 122
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The worker backlash was immediate. Workers began “calling loudly for a purge” and for
the abolition of piecework, while also attacking low-level bosses, particularly the Southerners who
had long received favoritism in promotions and who were associated most closely in locals’ minds
with the imported system of Fascist politics and labor.123 The Party leadership scrambled in the
following days to find a way to manage this discontent, dispatching trusted organizers like Ottone
Zanolla and Volmaro Buttignon to speak to workers in the most radical workshops, including those
of Shipbuilding Department. These emissaries stressed that undesirable elements would be purged
over time through selective layoffs, but the workers resisted such efforts at placation. 124 Instead,
workers from Seventh Workshop of the Shipbuilding Department sent a complaint to the Party to
express discontent that “squadristi and similar dangerous elements circulate and still occupy their
previous posts in the Establishment.” Such “enemies of the people” had at first been arrested, but
then released, which led workers to wonder, “Are there no laws to punish the oppressors of the
people? Now that legally we can pass judgment in our full right, why are these individuals left to
circulate, undermining our cleansing propaganda?”125 At the same time, Zanolla and Buttignon
urged workers to accept the maintenance of piecework until the lira had stabilized, but many
workers and Communist militants refused to accept this. In one particularly heated meeting, an
electric welder named Lucio railed against piecework, calling the system the “ruination of the
worker” and stating that, for his craft specifically, it was deadly. It had driven workers to such
paces that they had inhaled poisonous fumes and “many workers have become sick and truly tens
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have died.” Despite Buttignon’s vague promise that “this was under the old regime” and that
piecework would be different under a regime of popular power, a Party report concluded flatly that
“the masses did not intend to work by piecework, but they promised to work conscientiously for
reconstruction.”126 As a result of worker intransigence, by the end of May, the Yugoslavs conceded
that piecework be “completely abolished,” even if the bosses had returned. 127
Yet for most monfalconesi, the desire to achieve workplace reforms took a back seat to a
much more pressing and immediate need: the fulfillment of their basic sustenance needs. The
CDLN thus made the grave problem of provisioning its central focus in its first weeks of
administration. On the one hand, this was a concrete necessity to prevent starvation and the supply
of food was linked quite concretely to assuring the short-term approval of the population. On the
other, because conditions of shortage had become linked in the popular mind to a thoroughly “antipopular” and “Fascist” commercial system, the long-term resolution of the supply problem was
assumed to be proof of the extirpation of the “remnants of Fascism.” As one member of the
Monfalcone OF’s AgitProp section indicated that month, putting this association into words, “one
of the principal problems that our governing bodies currently seek to resolve is that of provisioning.
The Nazi-Fascist reaction, having been defeated in the political field and in that of the military,
has yet to be defeated in the economic field.”128
Tasked with meeting this challenge was the CDLN’s Provisioning Section (Sezione
Approvvigionamento), little more than the Montes Intendancy (Intendenza Montes) now working
in conditions of legality. 129 Immediately, the Provisioning Section and the wider CDLN set to work
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to prevent starvation, ordering all mills to grind continually 85% pure wheat flour, implementing
a price system on fish that incentivized the gathering of high volumes of lower-quality fish,
confiscating and distributing goods from notoriously Fascist families, using various forms of
persuasive and coercive pressure to secure livestock and other food products from the district’s
farmers, implementing extreme punishments for black-marketeering, and posting DP members to
all shops to assure compliance with pricing and rationing norms. 130 These policies played into
popular expectations for the economy − namely that the state take an increasing role in mediating
exchange and eradicating the black market − which had been fundamentally conditioned by
experiences under Fascism. The workers were particularly quick to demand the expansion of the
ration and price-control regime. For example, when an unrationed “batch of eggs” went to market
in Panzano in mid-May, the population demanded the local OF committee ensure that “occurrences
of the type never happen again.” 131 Similarly, there seems to have been significant support for the
decisions of the CRDA Factory Committee to appropriate and run the firm’s internal shops,
supplied now by the OF. 132 Though the precise mechanisms and forms of state control had not yet
been articulated, the basic idea of state-mediated exchange had broad support.
Yet for all the efforts of the CDLN to resolve provisioning and price difficulties in the
Monfalconese, the task was often too great. In part, this was due to the natural difficulties caused
by Monfalcone’s geographical position, as, according to the CDLN, few merchants voluntarily
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sold to Monfalcone when higher prices could be had in Trieste. Moreover, in communes like
Turriaco, the requisitioning and distribution of goods among the citizenry was extremely popular,
but the quantities were so small that provisioning remained a “complete debacle.” 133 Thus the
CDLN ordered that goods be purchased from Triestine and Friulan wholesalers (grossisti) and
stored in a central warehouse.134 Nevertheless, by the end of May, the CDLN distributed just 200g
of bread every other day, supplemented with alternating distributions of cornmeal and monthly
distributions of rice, flour, oil, rice, and other goods. Fresh produce remained absent.135
Meanwhile, with many of the district’s shopkeepers and merchants sitting in jail cells awaiting
punishment for their “antipopular” and “Fascist” activities, the mechanisms for distribution that
had existed under SEPRAL and later the German occupation had been partially dismantled.
Thus, in the first month of the pro-Yugoslavs’ attempt to remake the world and eliminate
the “remnants of Fascism,” the committees achieved very uneven results, limited by inescapable
limits on resources, the impossibilities of reforming longstanding institutions and social practices
overnight, and the Yugoslavs’ own organizational necessity for order and productivity in the
district. Nevertheless, among many pro-Yugoslav workers there persisted a hope that things would
get better, particularly under a regime of popular power − and what news arrived from the rest of
liberated Italy certainly reminded monfalconesi that things could be worse.
In this, the experiences of the young worker Mario F. are instructive. Mario, a member of
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the Difesa Popolare and the Turriaco OF committee, had recently arrived home from Tarcento
(Udine Province, Italy), where he had fought as a garibaldino until late April. In late May,
however, after liberation, he was sent back to Tarcento on Communist Party business. What he
saw shocked him. He walked through the city and saw Italian tricolors waving, adorned not with
the red star, but rather the crest of the Savoy monarchy that had acquiesced to Mussolini’s power
grab in 1922 and lent legitimacy to his regime. As he wore his red neckerchief around town, he
received suspicious and hostile glances from locals, undoubtedly because the latter saw him as a
traitor to the nation rather than, as he saw himself, a proponent of progressive Italians and
Yugoslavs joining in fraternal struggle to achieve the fullest liberation possible. Even worse than
the looks, Mario witnessed “a Fascist in uniform with the emblems of the March on Rome” walk
freely and defiantly in the streets. All he could do was ask himself in disbelief, “is this liberation?”
Had the question not been rhetorical, the answer undoubtedly would have been “no.” The Italians
of the Old Provinces appeared mired in their nationalist, monarchist, and Fascist ways, their
identities so closely tied to belonging to Italy that they could not see that Italy was little changed
since the Duce’s demise. Fatigued and disillusioned from his short stay in Italy, Mario started his
journey home. Only upon reaching the Isonzo did he feel revitalized. Passing over the river and
arriving in Monfalcone, “it seemed to me that I breathed a new air. It was the air of the New
Yugoslavia.”136
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Chapter 3: The Myth of Yugoslavia: Visions of Utopia in a Town Straddling Two Worlds
A new Europe is arising from the ruins of the old Europe…. New governments form, which
have the task of guaranteeing to the peoples [of Europe] those democratic liberties which
they have acquired in their struggle against the occupier…. [D]evelopments in the various
states will depend upon the degree to which individual peoples succeed in eliminating the
more or less masked residues of fascism, which resurface everywhere in new forms. There
is a place where, by contrast, a new state is already at work and a truly modern democracy
has already been established, based on entirely new principles, that has nothing in common
with the political forms now so rightly hated by these exhausted peoples: it is Yugoslavia. 1
– From the clandestine Communist newspaper Il nostro avvenire, 31 October 1944.

When Mario F. crossed the Isonzo and caught his breath of fresh air, he returned to a
Monfalconese that was now part of Tito’s New Yugoslavia. Individuals like Mario had
conceptualized the Resistance from its very beginning as not just liberation, but also as a
fundamental transformation in daily lived experiences. To their great excitement, the Yugoslavs
had arrived before the Anglo-Americans, their radical faction of the Resistance ascendant. The
Yugoslav forces and their local allies had brought a Yugoslav-aligned committee to power and
had begun to take concrete steps to address the gravest concerns of the suffering population. Thus,
even though hardship still gripped the Monfalconese after a month of Yugoslav rule, Mario had
great faith that all problems would soon be solved. With power in the hands of “the people,” it
seemed the only possible outcome. But Mario’s faith in the imminent improvements to his and his
neighbors’ daily lives − his sense of breathing freely, even though the conditions of everyday life
remained nearly as dire as in the months before liberation − was built upon more than just his trust
that his faction of pro-Yugoslavs would be able administrators, wielding power effectively for the
broadest possible good; it also resulted from a mythic vision of Tito and Yugoslavia, which had
emerged during the last months of the war thanks to the work of pro-Yugoslav propagandists.2
Bruno P., “Nuova Jugoslavia,” Il nostro avvenire, N. 1, Anno 1, 31 October 1944, op. cit.
Historians of postwar Monfalcone and Venezia Giulia have acknowledged this myth and its mobilizing power but
have not carefully analyzed it. See Anna Di Gianantonio’s preface to Tonzar, La valigia e l’idea; Gombač,
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Unfortunately for Mario, however, his hopes for radical transformation soon crashed
headfirst into the realities of postwar geopolitics. Just forty-three days after their arrival, the
Yugoslavs abruptly withdrew from the Monfalconese, replaced by an Anglo-American military
administration. With Mario and his comrades left in shock, Monfalcone’s air once again seemed
fouled by the stench of “Fascism.”
The Allied Military Government and the Dismantling of “Popular Power”
Though a shock for those on the ground, the Yugoslav withdrawal had followed a series of
tense negotiations between the Soviet-backed Yugoslavs and the Anglo-Americans. It represented
just a small part of a much larger Yugoslav withdrawal from northern and western Venezia Giulia,
which, since early May, had been under a sort of dual occupation. On 9 June, having lost the
backing of Stalin for their most aggressive claims, the Yugoslavs conceded the temporary partition
of the region into two zones of military administration that would exist until the formalization of
a peace treaty. Dividing these two zones was the Morgan Line, which curled eastward from the
Adriatic coastline just south of Muggia, around Trieste city, turning northwards and passing east
of Sesana and Gorizia before following the Isonzo River into the Alps (Figure 11). Territories to
the south and east were to be administered by the Yugoslavs (Zone B). Those to the north and west
(and the enclave port of Pola) became Zone A, administered by an Anglo-American Allied Military
Government (AMG) and headed by a Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) responsible directly to
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the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediterranean (SACMED). 3
The coming of the AMG had an immediate impact on the ability of Mario F. and
likeminded monfalconesi to realize their transformative goals, though not on their calls for such a
transformation. At one of several rallies held by OF supporters immediately after the withdrawal,
the veteran Communist Angelo Comar warned against abandoning the transformative struggle. He
stressed that “Fascism still exists, some social classes exist that try to take away the fruits of our
bloody [Resistance] struggle,” claiming that all who wave the Italian tricolor with the Savoyard
crest are Fascists. To lively applause, Comar concluded, “we will tell the Allied government that
these are sympathizers with Fascism and that they refused to participate in the struggle and that
they stayed comfortable in their plush armchairs while we and our brothers sacrificed their own
lives to chase out Nazi-Fascism…. We must chase all these reactionaries away like poisonous
snakes.”4 Two weeks later, the Communist daily Il Lavoratore issued a similar call to action:
To purge and to reconstruct are two words that today have politically the same
meaning: to realize the first is indispensable for the practical realization of the second….
One defeats gangrene with amputation, and if the surgical intervention is not
prompt and radical, the illness persists and spreads to all the parts of the afflicted body….
Fascism is the social gangrene that has poisoned our existence for more than twenty years,
and it has dragged us into the mortal crisis of the war, and as gangrene it will be treated. 5

For the AMG, which was in theory to be an “impartial” caretaker government managing
lands whose territorial fate was undecided, such calls posed grave threats.6 They ran counter to the
general political-economic vision that informed Anglo-American policymaking and also to the
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Anglo-Americans’ concrete goal of claiming Trieste for the anti-Communist world and turning it
into a bulwark against a westward advance of Communism. Because the OF calls for an extensive
purge threatened to destroy the social bases of the region’s pro-Italian movement, a large portion
of which the AMG hoped to coopt in its geopolitical game, “impartiality” was, from the beginning,
far more a legitimizing discourse than an accurate description of AMG policy.
In fact, from a very early date, the AMG’s civil affairs officers (CAOs) for the district −
first Major J. Reid and then Major J. Kitson-Harris − moved against the OF councils in some of
the earliest Cold War battles. On the one hand, they nurtured anti-Communist and pro-Italian
political parties, overseeing the creation of local chapters of the Actionists, Christian Democrats,
and Socialists (leftist, but pro-Italian) by mid-July. 7 On the other, they systematically undermined
the OF administration and moved to dismantle the organs of “popular power.” Included in the
latter was an order given to the CDLN to disband the Difesa Popolare, the primary organization
involved in policing the black market and the arm for leading the social revolution envisioned by
many monfalconesi. Though the CDLN at first refused, when the AMG threatened to arrest the
DP’s members, it complied.8 Following the dissolution of the DP, the AMG disbanded the
Yugoslav People’s Courts (Tribunali del Popolo) charged with trying and purging former Fascists
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Soon after arrival, Reid met with the two secretaries of the CDLN, asking them if they would be willing to follow
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MONFALCONE…,” 30 June 1945; and Maj. F. Cozens (CAO Monfalcone), “Weekly Report for the District of
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and arrested regional figures tied to the pro-Yugoslav Trieste Liberation Council and Il
Lavoratore.9 Finally, in mid-August it ordered the dissolution of the CDLN itself which, having
received both an invitation from the AMG to participate as a minority party in a multiparty council
and orders from Ljubljana to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy, begrudging accepted Ljubljana’s
orders after “animated discussion.” The CDLN thus paved the way to its own marginalization. 10
The result was that the OF, enabled by the AMG’s scarce knowledge of its organizations,
returned to clandestine action and shadow administration, while throughout the zone the struggle
to root out the “remnants of Fascism” ground to a halt. Even the push to purge cardholding Fascists
slowed to a glacial pace, with SCAO Alfred Bowman ordering that all purge cases tried in the
People’s Courts be subject to AMG review.11 For those hoping that liberation would bring about
a rapid and radical purge of “Fascists” and the accompanying social transformation, the closing of
this brief chapter of “popular power” was a disaster. They experienced it as a sudden narrowing of
the “horizons of hope” that had been so radically broadened in May.
Borders, Demonstrations, and Myths
Despite this blow, the Belgrade Agreement, which laid out the terms of the Yugoslav
withdrawal in early June, did not leave the pro-Yugoslavs entirely devoid of hope. Though the
power to decide the territorial fate of Venezia Giulia rested with the Council of Foreign Ministers,
in this era of the Atlantic Charter and language of self-determination, there remained the hope that
Tito might one day return. In the minds of pro-Yugoslavs, the organization of public
demonstrations and lobbying campaigns − the demonstration to a global audience of an irrefutable
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On this process in the wider Zone A and especially Trieste, see Novak, Trieste, 219-33.
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“popular” will for Yugoslav annexation − remained a viable strategy through which to bring
Yugoslavia back to the Monfalconese. 12 Yet securing and sustaining mass participation sufficient
to give an impression of unanimity required a powerful mobilizing impetus. Even in the
Monfalconese, with its history of radicalism and activism, war fatigue and the difficulties of daily
life dampened appetites for mass mobilization. Thus, the leadership of the pro-Yugoslav
movement pushed ahead forcefully with the elaboration of a myth of Yugoslavia. 13 The myth was
a story of Yugoslavia’s past, a description of its present, and a projection of its future. In some
respects tethered firmly to “reality” and in others not, it gave narrative form to the values and
“utopian social daydreaming” of much of the Monfalconese population. 14 Investing Yugoslavia
with those values, it inspired monfalconesi to mobilize for Yugoslav annexation.15
Already in embryo during the war, fostered through partisans’ “Political Hours,” the
clandestine press, and word-of-mouth, myth-building became increasingly important with
liberation and the emergence of the territorial contest. With liberation, myth-builders enjoyed a
greater opportunity to pursue their ends, despite AMG opposition. 16 Moreover, with liberation,
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monfalconesi could more readily listen to pro-Yugoslav radio stations such as Radio Belgrade
(from late 1944) and Radio Trieste (May-June 1945), just as they could read the Communist press
in the form of the licensed (though continually harassed) Triestine daily Il Lavoratore and local
broadsheets (giornali murali) posted in Monfalconese workplaces.17 But perhaps most
importantly, the pro-Yugoslavs fostered this myth by word-of-mouth, relying on AgitProp
militants with ties to the Communist Party and OF-loyal organizations to spread mythical thinking
during their everyday lives, as they shopped, ate, worked, and enjoyed their leisure time.
Through these and other means, the pro-Yugoslav forces of the Monfalconese and the
wider Julian Region began immediately in 1945 to craft a myth of Tito’s new Yugoslavia. This
myth had a great deal of nuance. Its propagators made use of the flexibility with which
monfalconesi had come to think of the terms “Fascism” to sell a Yugoslav alternative, tailoring the
myth to the intended audience just as Titoist propagandists within Yugoslavia tailored their
representations of the regime to respond to the aspirations of Yugoslavia’s predominantly peasant
society.18 In Monfalcone, the myth operated on two levels. The first might be called the “national”
level, concerning grand ideological aspects of the New Yugoslavia, such as its reformed nationality

Il Lavoratore’s history in Trieste went back to the time of Habsburg-era Austro-Marxism. Suppressed in the Fascist
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from 18th August to 14th September 1946,” 14 September 1946; AIS- Trieste, “Activities Report for the Month of
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relations and its radically new economic system. However, undergirding and drawing upon this
national myth was also a second myth, the “personal” or “everyday” myth, tailored to respond to
daily experiences in the lived spaces of the workplace, the street, and, significantly, the
marketplace. Though certain historians and commentators have tended to view mundane
considerations arising in such lived spaces as existing outside the realm of idealism and myth −
perhaps even opposed to it − in fact the myth of Yugoslavia was very much about the mundane,
the myths of the mundane and the ideal drawing upon and reinforcing one another. 19
Though the myth and its dual aspect developed in a shifting context, this chapter provides
a largely synchronic analysis of the myth as it existed in the first three postwar years, and the next
ties this myth to the concrete, diachronic struggle for local reform. In the end, the myth both served
as the inspiration for the pro-Yugoslav struggle and influenced how theoretically unprepared
monfalconesi thought of socialism and Communism. It served as a critical “foil” against which
they compared their own community and their efforts at radical postwar reconstruction.
The Origins Story: A New Yugoslavia for the New Europe
Of the two levels of myth, the national myth was the first to emerge, having its origins in
wartime propaganda. Central to it was the notion that Yugoslavia was part of the Soviet world,
often termed the “New Europe.” The garibaldini had recognized even before liberation that the
world was bifurcating into two camps, the Anglo-American camp of the old “demo-plutocratic”
Europe and that inspired by “the new democratic-popular-progressive-irradiant ideal of the Soviet

Andrea Berrini juxtaposes Monfalconese migrants’ mythic hope for living and working within an ill-defined
socialist economy with mundane concerns like finding a regular paycheck. This understanding of the impact of the
mundane concerns seems mistaken because, as will be seen, the successful resolution of “mundane” concerns like a
regular paycheck was often a central criterion to which workers held a socialist economy. Berrini, Noi siamo la classe
operaia, ch. 25.
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lands.”20 Following liberation, pro-Yugoslavs pushed this idea among the population, establishing
Yugoslavia as the closest ally of the USSR. In early May, the PCI’s AgitProp division made much
of the recent Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Militants emphasized the
“reciprocal aid and collaboration” between the two countries that placed Yugoslavia alongside the
USSR as “one of the pillars of the New Europe of tomorrow in the free democratic development
of humanity.”21 Within Communist circles, militants cast Yugoslavia as having assumed the
mantel of revolutionary progress from the Soviet Union. They claimed that “Russia has passed all
its work on to Yugoslavia” and that “it is up to the latter to bring the struggle for the institution of
popular power to Europe,” just as Mao was doing in Asia. 22
By stressing these ties, pro-Yugoslavs aimed to tap into an older tradition of mythologizing
about the Soviet Union that had preceded the war but intensified during it.23 Though it took
different forms in different national and class contexts, there had developed in the interwar years
a multifaceted myth of the USSR among Soviet sympathizers the world over, which had common
emphases. Chief among the Soviet Union’s virtues were its attainment of social justice and an
unprecedented social cohesion that resulted; the ability of Soviet citizens to maximize their human
potential rather than exist as mere beasts of burden; the regime’s triumph over Russia’s inherited
backwardness and its rapid modernization of economic and social practices; the benevolence and
simplicity of its leaders; and the transformation of formerly oppressive institutions such as prisons
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into sites of rehabilitation and the creation of the Soviet “new man.”24 Cast as a dutiful partner of
the USSR, Yugoslavia inherited the qualities associated with the Soviet Union.
Yet the emphasis on Yugoslavia’s friendship with the USSR did not mean the reduction of
Yugoslavia to a copy of the Bolshevik regime. Instead, mythmakers pushing the pro-Yugoslav
cause honed an origins story that distinguished the Yugoslav regime from the USSR and attributed
to it unique characteristics. Central to this story was the invasion and occupation during the Second
World War, which, militants insisted, had served as a fundamental rupture in Yugoslav history due
to the complete collapse of the prewar social and political orders of Yugoslavia. 25 On the one hand,
the collapse brought the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, a pitiless and rapacious Axis
occupation, and widespread misery and death. On the other, this collapse and the accompanying
misery had been an unexpectedly positive development. It provided the context from which to
create a fundamentally new state, freed entirely from the burdens of a historical inheritance, and it
also had catalyzed a fundamental transformation of the Yugoslav peoples’ nature. Indeed, Eligio
Simsig, a Communist militant who attended the PCRG Party School to train in propaganda, wrote
in his school notebook the origins story of the New Yugoslavia that he and others would spread
throughout the Monfalconese.26 His lesson notes stressed that during the war Tito’s new “popular
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powers”
were constituted not only in liberated territory, but even in that of the enemy…. It
is clear that the people did not want to have any trace of the old regime. The
P[opular] P[owers] were the expression of the new State that was being created in
the struggle…. The people’s activity was part of the Liberation Army’s activity.
The characteristic was that the People constituted its own power and that the people
made sacrifices. With its blood it created these powers. Thus, a new State was being
forged, formed from the small P[opular] P[owers] often in the villages, rising from
the ruins of the old institutions. 27
In short, the war had caused the collapse of the Old Yugoslavia and widespread misery; the
people’s misery and suffering forced their participation in a base struggle for survival during which
they experienced a moral regeneration; and from these morally regenerated peoples a
fundamentally new state emerged, constructed on bottom-up support from the most local level. 28
In keeping with the themes of rupture and novelty, pro-Yugoslav propagandists emphasized the
regime’s uncompromising purge of remnants of the old regime, most notably with a dramatic
narration of the capture and trial of the Chetnik leader, Draža Mihailović. 29
This origins story played on longstanding ideas of regenerative and purifying suffering,
casting the Yugoslav nations as martyred and reborn nations par excellence. Intentionally
downplaying all but the most extreme of collaborationist activities in occupied Yugoslavia, Il
Lavoratore and street-level propagandists stressed the near-unanimous upsurge of popular action
against the occupiers, stressing that, as a result of these experiences, the nations of Yugoslavia
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became a single “community of suffering.” 30 In fact, when the Yugoslav Partisans had arrived in
Monfalcone in May 1945, they quickly became known to pro-Yugoslavs as the “silent army,” in
reference to their shoelessness. In contrast to the Anglo-Americans, whose boots could be heard
at every step, the eerie silence of marching Partisans, not to mention the gauntness and dirtiness
of their bodies, reinforced the notion that the Yugoslav nations had suffered more than all others. 31
Combined with the fact that Tito’s Partisan movement had emerged victorious in liberation against
seemingly insurmountable odds, this reinforced a sense that the Yugoslav nations had a moral
superiority and that they had garnered strength from adopting the values of the mountains. 32
Such portrayals − particularly that of the morally regenerated Partisan fighter − appealed
greatly to monfalconesi, who often imagined their own Resistance as having a similar regenerative
result and who hoped their struggle had purchased them an entry-ticket to participate in the
Yugoslavs’ project, even if in a position of deference to the superior Titoists. The idea that
garibaldini in particular and monfalconesi in general had won a place within the community of
suffering was reinforced by Yugoslav radio, which welcomed them into the community; 33 and also
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supported by many locals. If borderland residents possessed tools that allowed them to put forward
a Slovenian “identification,” they chose not to use them. 34 Two weeks before the Yugoslav
withdrawal, the veteran Communist Angelo Comar made this clear. Speaking at Turriaco to an
eager crowd of OF supporters, Comar explained that neither he, nor those gathered denied being
Italian. Instead, he affirmed the Italianness of monfalconesi, clarifying that “we want to live united
with those peoples who, from a social point of view, have surpassed us and already for a time have
been teaching us the just path to follow. The Italians and the Slovenes have lived together, have
suffered. Why divide them today, when they are both free?” The crowd agreed, greeting Comar’s
words with “frenetic” applause. 35
Three Pillars of the National Myth of the New Yugoslavia
Beyond feeding into rather abstract ideas about the Yugoslav nations’ moral regeneration
through suffering and struggle, the theme of rupture also served as a starting point for more
concrete discussions about the new values, institutional structures, and programs of Tito’s state. A
seminal article in Il Lavoratore’s first post-liberation issue sketched three basic features of the
New Yugoslavia that distinguished it from the Old, laying the basis for a national myth that would
be elaborated in the coming years. The article defined the New Yugoslavia by: (1) the spiritual
unity of the nations of Yugoslavia and its concrete expression in their parity of rights and influence
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within the New Yugoslav state; (2) the perfect democratic structures of the country, providing a
true democracy in which “the people” had a say (and which, according to later additions, was fully
reconcilable with individual freedom); and (3) the rapid advancement of Yugoslav society into
what would eventually be termed the “radiant future” (luminoso avvenire), defined by material
prosperity and the full flourishing of the human subject. 36
The Unity and Equality of Nations within Yugoslavia
These three pillars would be developed and elaborated in the coming years. The first − the
notion of the moral unity and institutional equality of nations within Yugoslavia − drew heavily
on the “brotherhood and unity” themes simultaneously developing within Yugoslavia. 37 It emerged
quickly as a means by which pro-Yugoslavs differentiated the New Yugoslavia from the Old and
generally took two forms. The first was that which emphasized values, mobilizing the “community
of suffering” idea to explain how the Yugoslav nations’ had superseded completely old nationalist
hatreds. While acknowledging that the collapse of bourgeois society played a role in the
disappearance of nationalist antagonisms − a theme that drew upon facets of the myth of the USSR
that explained such hatreds as an outcome of class exploitation38 − pro-Yugoslavs propagandists
added to this by stressing that each of the Yugoslav nations had participated fully in the armed
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liberation struggle, overcoming the internecine nationality conflicts that had so typified the Old
Yugoslavia through this collective struggle and the consequent revolution in dominant values. 39
As the future emigrant Silvano Cosolo wrote in his memoirs, revealing the lingering persistence
of this idea, “at war’s end, the victorious Partisan movement could show in its ranks the combatants
and leaders of every ethnicity and every religion, such that it facilitated the rapid dissipation of
hatreds and of religious and ethnic rancor that had arisen during the conflict.” 40
Running alongside this emphasis on values were institutionally-oriented explanations for
the perfection of nationality relations within the New Yugoslavia. Such explanations focused on
the new constitution of Tito’s Yugoslavia, drafted and promulgated in the winter of 1945/46, and
its move toward federalism. Pro-Yugoslavs emphasized that the wartime collapse of the Serbdominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the sudden popular uprising behind Tito allowed for the
creation of a constitution in which no compromises had to be made with the old-regime exploiters
and through which no single nation attempted to impose itself upon the others. Represented as a
natural institutional enshrinement of the new Yugoslav values, 41 the constitution, Il Lavoratore
proclaimed, allowed each nation to be a “master in its own house,” guaranteeing through its federal
structure “the most complete national independence for single ethnic groups, paired with an
equally absolute parity of rights.”42 In the Monfalconese, activists stressed that “the struggle
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undertaken in common has created the conditions for a mature understanding between peoples, for
an effective equality, for a national independence that is, in fact, not contradictory with the
existence of a federation.” The liberation struggle had effectively resolved the “problem of
autonomy and centralism” both by giving rise to a state of federated, autonomous constituent
republics and by morally unifying the peoples so that this very autonomy was superfluous. 43
If these two points paralleled Yugoslav self-representation under the “brotherhood and
unity” theme, the image of the new country’s nationality relations presented to monfalconesi
differed from that propagated in Yugoslavia. Within Yugoslavia, “brotherhood and unity” meant
a unity of Yugoslav nations; to monfalconesi it was presented as a unity of nations within
Yugoslavia. The former emphasized that shared values and a common ethnic background served
as coequal bases for Yugoslav unity, whereas in Monfalcone, there was a singular emphasis on the
political and experiential origins of this unity, ethnicity discarded.44 Emphasis on the autonomy of
constituent republics played directly into the aspirations of Italian pro-Yugoslavs, whose visions
of their union with Yugoslavia involved the creation of an Italian-majority Seventh Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia with equal autonomy. Edvard Kardelj and other Yugoslav politicians
regularly emphasized that this would be the case, 45 and supporting the claim were various signs of
Yugoslav goodwill, from mysterious gifts of food sent to hungry Italians46 to the commemoration
of Italian partisans fallen in the fight to liberate Yugoslavia 47 and the propagandization of the full
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participation of Italian organizations in the construction of the country’s new culture.48 ProYugoslav propagandists assured their audiences that the Italians of the Primorska had earned a
right to their own autonomous republic through their sacrifices in the liberation struggle.
“True Democracy” and Individual Freedom
If the first pillar of the national myth involved the perfect relations between the nations of
Yugoslavia, the second involved the perfect relationship between state and citizen, namely the
ability of Tito’s regime to deliver a genuinely “popular” democracy that balanced the pursuit of
the collective interest with the protection of individual rights. In common representation, the
oppressive, centralized state of the Karađorđević dynasty had given way to a bottom-up,
decentralized democracy formed of a union of suffering villages. The “false democracy” of the
Karađorđević state − a bourgeois-parliamentary democracy that served only the narrow interests
of the ruling class − contrasted with Tito’s “true democracy,” which, formed by the people to meet
their basic survival needs in war and continuing to serve the interests of the broadest and most
vulnerable swath of Yugoslav society in peacetime, possessed the broadest possible mandate. 49
Although there were persistent undertones recognizing that the formal mechanism of voting did
not determine whether a system was “democratic” or not, there was also a strong propagandistic
emphasis on the massive electoral victory of Tito’s Popular Front forces in the first postwar
election and the ability of formerly disenfranchised groups such as women and the youth to cast
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their votes for Tito.50 In the end, however, the Titoist formulation of “true democracy,” like the
Stalinist understanding of “democratic centralism,” was pliable enough to include even a
popularly-oriented dictatorship, justified by Tito’s supposedly crushing electoral victory and his
dedication to using the power of the state to benefit of the oppressed.
Yet if Titoist self-representation was laced with contradictions regarding precisely where
the power to select leaders and shape policy rested, less contradictory were Yugoslav
propagandists’ claims that Yugoslav “true democracy” did not mean a loss of individualism. In
fact, the New Yugoslavia was known as a country granting a wide range of individual freedoms,
with the new state said to guarantee to the citizen the freedoms of conscience and religion, the
separation of church and state, the freedoms of the press, speech, and assembly, and a panoply of
others.51 Indeed, a focal-point of myth-builders – particularly as they attempted to reach out to the
Monfalconese’s “petty and middle bourgeoisie…, influenced as they are by religious beliefs” –
was the complete freedom of the individual to determine and practice his or her religion without
interference from other communities of believers or from the state, which would serve neither as
a proponent of a particular religion, nor an obstacle to the practice of religion. 52
Very early in the postwar era, then, apparent tensions emerged between the idea of
Yugoslav “true democracy,” so closely tied to the Communist collectivist ethos and the exercise
of socially transformative power, and the simultaneous emphasis on decentralized power and the
constitutional guarantee of spiritual and intellectual individualism. But this tension was more
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apparent than real. It was resolved, as were other tensions within the myth, with reference to
Yugoslavia’s origins story: individual rights existed, but had become superfluous given that the
exploiters had been chased out and that the victorious Yugoslav peoples had experienced a
profound moral regeneration and unification through their struggle. 53 Even if individuals had this
full range of rights at their disposal, including the right to speak out against the government, the
liberation struggle had created a core of shared values and a common vision of the future that made
such rights unnecessary. 54 Such was the joy of participating in a “true democracy.”
Building the “Radiant Future”
The most expansive pillar of the national myth was that which declared the strikingly
successes of Tito’s regime in launching Yugoslav society toward the “radiant future” (avvenire
luminoso).55 This pillar was built upon a core component of the myth of the Soviet Union, which
had long been said to be rapidly ushering in modernity in formerly backwards parts of Europe.
Informed by the idea that “true democracy” involved not just the attainment of the vote or negative
freedoms but also a radically expanded panoply of positive freedoms, this view held that the Soviet
Union was pulling the world toward a modernity characterized by material abundance, the
realization of the human subject’s true creative potential, and attainment of unprecedented
happiness and personal fulfillment.56 In the postwar years, Tito’s Yugoslavia assumed the role of
flanking power in this endeavor, supporting the Soviet drive toward that luminous future.
One of the first themes of Yugoslavia’s march into the radiant future was the emphasis on
its rapid reconstruction in the wake of the most destructive war in human history. In the immediate
“I popoli jugoslavi chiamati a discutere la nuova Costitutzione,” Il Lavoratore, 7 December 1945.
Of course, this logic justified political repression of opponents. All those who criticized Tito’s government could
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postwar months, Il Lavoratore detailed the fantastic reconstructive efforts of the workers in Fiume
(Rijeka), who voluntarily gave an extra hour of labor each day to remove rubble from the bombed
factories, or organized voluntary “Days of Reconstruction.”57 It stressed that, though the original
estimate of time before Yugoslav industries returned to productive labor had been six months, by
October the Kraljevica Shipyards in Spalato (Split) had been “brought back to efficiency” and had
recently launched the first ship constructed entirely in the postwar period, four months ahead of
schedule.58 The same had been achieved also in Fiume, and “he who returns… after being absent
for just a few days is amazed at the progress made in the field of reconstruction,” including noting
new ships under construction at the Third of May Shipyards. 59 These images contrasted with the
mostly idle shipyards of Monfalcone, where a lack of contracts and the presence of rubble hindered
the return to productive labor. Throughout 1946, the comparison of rapid reconstruction in
Yugoslavia with the stagnation of Monfalcone became a central feature of pro-Yugoslav
propaganda, including efforts to transport workers to an imagined industrious shipyard using sights
and sounds: “It is enough to pass nearby the Quarnaro Shipyard [of Fiume], in front of the Torpedo
Factory, to hear the hammers beating and the machines pulsing; they sing a hymn, that of labor.”60
But Yugoslavia’s radiant economic future meant more than just rapid reconstruction; there
also emerged a vision of a rapidly transforming economy, which drew on Marxist-Leninist
terminology and emphasized the role of newly collectivized state and cooperative sectors in
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marginalizing and then eradicating privately owned production. As Edvard Kardelj insisted in a
speech disseminated by Monfalcone’s AgitProp activists, “the state and cooperative sectors of our
economic life, these are the primary supports through which our democratic power in the economy
will be maintained.”61 Such claims were largely compatible with the myth of the USSR and its
economic transition, though there existed notable differences of emphasis. Whereas visions of the
Soviets’ radiant economic future most often focused on production in massive state-owned
factories like the Magnitogorsk steelworks, Yugoslav propagandists instead accorded greater
importance to the cooperative sector, supported but not owned by the state.62 In fact, in a speech
given at a congress of Zone A Communist militants in December 1945, a key speaker stressed that
a combined offensive by state-owned industries and state-supported cooperatives would force
private industry to its knees, but it was cooperatives that received the greatest attention:
the cooperatives allow the population to elevate its social position without supporting
capital, with only the help of the state. Such a fact will contribute greatly to the
development of progress and the improvement of the social conditions of all the masses….
Only tied to the state can the cooperatives develop their work. The state is obligated
to protect both the interests of the workers and peasants and also that of the remaining
laboring masses, a fact which signifies a radical change in the economic and social structure
of the country. 63

Those interested in the topic could learn that Tito’s state facilitated cooperatives’ purchasing of
raw materials, granted them credit for the purchase of capital-intensive machinery, and organized
courses to disseminate knowledge of cutting-edge productive methods. The availability of such
resources and their deployment through large-scale state and cooperative ventures were to lead to
a drastic increase in productivity, which would in turn allow workers in their collectivity to
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challenge the competitive advantage of large capital, driving the private sector to ruin.64
The cooperative economy also served the New Yugoslavia’s perceived efforts to balance
and harmonize the interests of the country’s productive classes. As monfalconesi leaders stressed
in their discussions on the new constitution, “the cooperativistic form [of production] is the most
powerful and most effective means to draw the peasantry in particular into the general framework
of production.”65 Despite being a primarily industrial district with a largely proletarian population,
monfalconesi were intensely interested in the New Yugoslavia’s push for far-reaching agrarian
reform and the creation of institutions to balance their own interests with those of their future
agrarian compatriots. District militants emphasized the seizure of some half-million hectares of
land from large landholders (those owning over 45 hectares) by the end of 1945 and its
redistribution in the form of (1) privately owned plots given to landless individuals and, more
importantly, (2) cooperatively-owned agricultural ventures, with the most modern agricultural
sciences brought to bear in both cases to improve productivity. 66 The importance of this “drawingin” through cooperative integration, as Il Lavoratore and others emphasized, was that the state
could intervene and more effectively manage prices and distribution, balancing the interests of the
country’s productive classes, eliminating exploitation, and, most importantly, creating the
economic bases for fraternal cooperation and unity across regional and urban-rural divides.67
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If the fostering of a cooperative sector was conceived as a means of fostering class harmony
and increasing efficiency through aggregation, then the initially less-emphasized state sector was
seen as a realm in which the state could take an even more active role in the form of outright
direction. Informing the conceptualization of both was the idea that the state was radically
increasing its role in rationally planning the country’s economic development. Running as a
constant thread through the myth of the Yugoslav economy was the underlying assumption that a
rationally-planned economy was systemically superior to a free-market system, capable not only
of delivering greater economic growth, but also a more stable path to growth. Il Lavoratore
stressed that, in the world of free markets, “the crisis of capitalism is demonstrated by the
persistence of economic precariousness,” for which “one fruitlessly seeks to find a remedy.” By
contrast, in those countries with directed and planned economies, “’crisis’ has no meaning. It is an
empty word and a thing of the past that is already forgotten or nearly so.” 68 Particularly important
to this line of thought were the Five Year Plans – the example of central direction and planning
par excellence – which had been central to Soviet industrialization and which became a major
topic of discussion for pro-Yugoslav militants. As Ruggero Bersa stressed before the plenary
meeting of the pro-Yugoslav liberation councils in late 1946, the rational planning of the Five Year
Plans had spared the Eastern Bloc countries the postwar economic volatility that had so crippled
Italy. 69 Playing on preexisting distinctions between the “two worlds” of capitalism and socialism,
Bersa and others associated the former with the triad of rationality-planning-stability and the latter
with that of impulse-spontaneity-chaos. Thus, when Tito announced Yugoslavia’s own Five Year
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Plan in January 1947, pro-Yugoslavs looked eagerly to the east, expecting increased productivity,
greater stability, planned growth, and a more equitable distribution of the products of Yugoslavs’
labor.70
Alongside grand economic transformation, the myth of Yugoslavia’s radiant future also
forecasted that the new regime would maximize its citizens’ human potential through a panoply of
state-sponsored programs of cultural and social modernity. Il Lavoratore represented Tito’s regime
as actively conquering the darkness of night by orchestrating a massive electrification campaign
in rural Yugoslavia, 71 while also directing “Week of Hygiene” campaigns in which emissaries of
modernity (including physicians) visited rural residents to teach feminine, domestic, and food
hygiene. 72 Moreover, the regime demonstrated its commitment to minority development through
campaigns to “liquidate illiteracy,” particularly among the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, and
others for whom illiteracy was the “gravest consequence of a long national oppression.” And
beyond just counteracting decades or centuries of minority oppression, such initiatives also “ha[d]
the purpose of realizing the motto: ‘culture for the people’.” 73 All the while, the regime achieved
such modernizing advances – including industrialization – without the accompanying effects of
physical enervation and atrophy that had been so present in the European mind for well over a half
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century.74 Rather, Yugoslavia remained a place of strong, salubrious bodies. Its citizens remained
in touch with nature, and anemic Italian children returned from summer camps in Croatia and
Slovenia with sturdier bodies accompanying reinvigorated spirits. 75
Finally, Yugoslavia’s advance into its radiant future promised an expansion of freedoms
that would maximize human happiness and fulfillment. Though far from the only sphere of life in
which this was to be achieved, a prominent focus was on the new family life and the resolution of
the question of women’s rights. Many monfalconesi viewed the New Yugoslavia as a country in
which families – especially families that deviated from the restrictive norms of Catholic Italy –
could find acceptance and legal recognition that would pave the way to happiness. Particular
emphasis was placed here on Yugoslavia’s abolition of the category of “illegitimate” children and
its implementation of liberal divorce laws, which, in Italy, kept individuals in unhappy marriages
and had clear legal ramifications for the members and children of couples involving separated-butmarried individuals. 76 The collapse of the old order was also seen to have facilitated the liberation
of women more broadly. Propagandists stressed that “new types of women, capable in productive
labor” had emerged in the USSR with a “complete parity of rights” to men; they emphasized that
the same was true for Yugoslavia, as the Yugoslav Constitution guaranteed equal pay for equal
work (Article 34) and paid maternity leave (Article 24). 77 As mythbuilders stressed, the New
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Yugoslavia was just the second country in the world to introduce this new social legislation
granting paid maternity leave and even paid annual vacations for workers, behind only the USSR. 78
Such measures showcased the new regime’s commitment to sweeping away the remnants of the
Old Yugoslavia’s oppressive familial culture and building a new one conducive to happiness,
fulfillment, and love.
The Cult of Tito
Unifying all facets of this national myth was the leadership cult surrounding Marshal Tito,
cast as a leader allied but not subservient to his Soviet counterpart.79 Indeed, though there were
key similarities between the cults of Stalin and Tito, both leaders cast as selfless, simple, and
modest men who sought and wielded power only for others’ benefit, there were also considerable
differences. Most significantly, the Tito cult drew more directly on his partisan past.80 Il
Lavoratore cast Tito as both a common member the Yugoslav community of suffering and its
historic leader, stressing his exceptional military genius, his seemingly messianic arrival at the
precise moment of the Yugoslavs’ greatest need, and his choice to bear all the “risks and dangers,
toils and sacrifices” of the common Partisan fighter.81 Tito was a personification of what the New
Yugoslavia had become through the course of the hard liberation struggle. Born to a Croatian

“Il vecchio e il nuovo,” Il Lavoratore, 22 July 1946.
Hence the partisan song “Rosso levante e ponente,” popular among Julian garibaldini, ended with a stanza that cast
the two as coequal leaders. After several stanzas stressing that only the red flag and its followers could overthrow the
fascists, it concludes: “People, rise up in arms / Tito shows us the way / People, rush to arms / behind Comrade
STALIN!” Lyrics to “Rosso levante e ponente,” AS 1570, b 11, f 8, sf Za arhivo. On the Tito cult in Yugoslavia, see
James Gow, “The People’s Prince - Tito and Tito’s Yugoslavia: Legitimation, Legend, and Linchpin,” in State-Society
Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-1992, eds Melissa Bokovoy, Jill Irvine, and Carol Lilly (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997): 35-60.
80
Hollander, Political Pilgrims, 167-73; Diggins, “Limping after Reality,” 290-92.
81
On his seemingly messianic arrival and his willingness to suffer, see “Tito,” Il Lavoratore, 22 October 1945. At the
same time, Il Lavoratore stressed his long suffering for the Yugoslav Communist movement, drawing attention to his
stoic resolve during his 1928 trial for subversive activities. “Nel XXV anniversario della ‘Borba,’”” Il Lavoratore, 20
February 1947. On his military importance, see “Onorificenza sovietica al compagno Tito,” Il Lavoratore, 8 June
1945.
78
79

135

father and a Slovenian mother, he was a living embodiment of Yugoslav multinationalism. 82 Yet,
as a simple, gifted mechanic, he had risen to become a head of state. He embodied the workingclass’s seizure of power and the overturning of social hierarchies following the rupture of 1941.83
All of this – his modest origins and modest lifestyle, his tireless self-sacrifice, his decisive action,
his military genius, and his dedication to both the national liberation of his people and the social
liberation of the oppressed classes – made for a comparison that resonated deeply with the Italians
of the Monfalconese: Tito was the “Garibaldi of the twentieth century.” 84
Hoping and Propagandizing in the Monfalconese
The national myth of Yugoslavia became firmly entrenched in the thinking of many
monfalconesi in the time before and immediately after liberation. The exact content of word-ofmouth dissemination of this myth cannot be known, but the extent to which the pro-Yugoslav
organizations dedicated themselves to propagating this myth can. Though the myth-building
process would continue for years after liberation, discussions reached their apex in the winter of
1945/46 when Tito’s regime first drafted and then promulgated its new constitution. In this context,
at a December meeting of the Communist Party leadership in Zone A, Rudi Uršič and others
impressed upon Party comrades that Yugoslavia must be valorized “among all strata of the
population” through discussions hosted by the Party’s mass organizations. Militants were to
disseminate copies of the constitution in pamphlet form; Il Lavoratore was to print a running
analytical series on the constitution’s most novel aspects in order to reinforce these discussions. 85
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In the Monfalconese, pro-Yugoslav militants committed themselves wholly to this
endeavor. The Communist Party organized study groups for the constitution to train supporters
who would then lead wider discussions “in the shipyard, in the workplaces, during moments of
rest, in the countryside, on the street, etc.,”86 and in the last third of December 1945 alone, the
district’s pro-Yugoslav organizations held 108 meetings to discuss the Yugoslav constitution and
life in Yugoslavia. 87 According to internal Party reports, the reception among the attendees was
quite favorable, and eager individuals even began discussing whether Tito might consider
changing the name of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of People’s
Republics to reflect the inclusion of Italians in the federal state. Topics such as agrarian reform,
the institutional framework of federation, the functioning of the administrative organs of popular
power, and the transition to a new socio-economic order generated a great deal of excitement. The
myth had become so widely believed and so compelling that the Party noted that certain attendees
wondered aloud why the new constitution remained partially flexible toward private property
given the (perceived) state of affairs. It was, in fact, certain members of the Communist Party
rather than the wider masses who had a more measured outlook, largely because they were better
informed. The Party report on these December meetings tellingly concluded that “the masses in
general see poorly the true situation in [Yugoslavia], and they consider it a country where socialism
is already existing and where there no longer exist antagonistic classes.” 88
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The Personal Myth
When monfalconesi thought about the utopia to the east, wrongly perceiving it to be “a
country where socialism is already existing,” they thought not only about nationality relations,
participatory possibilities, and the marvelous potential of a planned economy; they also envisioned
the transformation of quotidian social relations in lived spaces and thus the experience of everyday
life. Running alongside the national myth – most often reinforcing it, but at times making notable
deviations – was thus another plane of myth regarding the New Yugoslavia, which might be termed
the personal myth. In reframing the national and historic in terms of the local and the quotidian,
this myth responded more directly to the pressing concerns of monfalconesi and did so in such a
way that made use of their flexible understand of “Fascist” and “Fascism” to dovetail popular but
doctrinally undefined hopes for a purge of the remnants of the past regime with visions of a
“Communist” utopia. This plane of the myth, though understudied, eventually came to dominate
representations of Yugoslavia, even overshadowing the national myth. Particularly critical to this
process were hundreds of articles and several running series that Il Lavoratore printed on the
eastern utopia, most often in the form of letters received from Italian workers on work exchange
in Yugoslav cities or recently returned from tours and travels throughout the country.89
The Personal Myth: Shopping and the Marketplace
The first facet of the personal myth began to take shape in the last months of 1945 in the
context of the lean winter of 1945/46. This facet of the myth held, quite simply, that in Yugoslavia
food was readily available, ordinary workers had the power to purchase abundant and varied food,
89
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and they did not have to deal with economic “Fascists” like greedy shopkeepers. This emphasis on
the bountiful, equitable marketplace was more than an appeal to empty stomachs; it represented
Yugoslavia’s commercial system as fundamentally transformed and played into an increasingly
entrenched idea among monfalconesi, derived from their everyday experiences of Fascism and
war, that it was a central moral obligation of the state to assure that exchange did not become a
realm of exploitation or self-aggrandizement. This portion of the myth nested neatly within the
national myth’s emphasis on Yugoslavia’s new morality and its economic renovation, though it
always found concrete expression with reference to everyday shopping and eating practices.
Yet even if the practical content of this myth remained largely stable across time, the same
cannot be said about the explanations of why Yugoslavia had been so singularly successful in
creating a system of marketplace justice. In its first iterations, this facet of the myth tended to
emphasize the role of the Titoist state in crushing economic “Fascists” and directly distributing
goods at “just” prices. In the earliest days of liberation, Radio Trieste broadcasted news of the
Yugoslav campaign against Triestine “profiteers” and those involved in black-marketeering and
speculation, even asking the public to help “unmask” such enemies who inflated prices. 90
Throughout the winter of 1945/46, pro-Yugoslav propagandists, including writers for Il
Lavoratore, proclaimed the complete eradication of the black market in Yugoslavia and the fact
that there “everything is distributed justly among the population.” 91 Among many of Monfalcone’s
pro-Yugoslavs, the elimination of the black market in Yugoslavia was taken as a reality already
by October 1945, when Ruggero Bersa urged monfalconesi to take the Yugoslavs’ successful
repressive campaign against the “free market” (used interchangeably with “black market”) as an
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example in their own struggle.92 In these earliest representations, Tito’s regime had filled the void
left by the repressed private commercial system by organizing the compulsory requisitioning of
the necessary products from the peasants and undertaking the direct distribution of these goods
through a comprehensive rationing system. 93 According to a December 1945 AgitProp piece
entitled “The New Political Economy of Yugoslavia,” this state sector was the most important
sector in the exchange of foodstuffs: “All state commerce is regulated through the ‘national
warehouse,’ which has branches in all of Yugoslavia…. The sale of cereals such as wheat, barley,
and rye is the monopoly of the state. In this manner, bread is assured for all the working people,
thus eliminating, in this field, any speculation.”94
Perhaps more important for ordinary monfalconesi than how the system worked were the
concrete results of this system of just exchange. The paper repeatedly printed lists detailing the
availability and prices of rationed goods, with special emphasis placed on goods long unavailable
to monfalconesi, especially shoes, meat, and coffee. One such article recounted the rations of an
anonymous (perhaps fictitious) Italian working in an engine-assembly workshop near Spalato:
Our daily ration of food per person, which is passed out at the cafeteria, consists of the
following: 250 grams of meat, 40 grams of fat, 30 grams of sugar, 20 grams of powdered
milk, 10 grams of coffee, 340 grams of white flour, 60 of dark flour, 120 grams of white
pasta. Beyond this, which one eats at the cafeteria, we receive in the workplace at 9:30 in
the morning 200 grams of bread and 80 grams of prosciutto or bacon or cheese. For all
this we pay 15 dinars per day.95

Availability and affordability of a wide range of goods – much wider than those given the so-called
“political price” under Fascism and, as will be seen, the AMG – was thus a manifestation of
Yugoslav marketplace justice. Moreover, the combination of black-market repression, rapid
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reconstruction, and producer dedication was said to have yielded such successes that already from
November of 1945 the state had removed certain finished goods (cigarettes, bricks, etc.) from the
ration lists, to be followed by a wider range of goods (presumably including foods) soon after. 96
Though the emphasis on requisitioning and rationing did not entirely disappear, 97 it was
gradually supplanted by an emphasis on state-sanctioned cooperatives as the basis of the bountiful
Yugoslav marketplace. Such a transition was fully in line with the national myth’s emphasis on
the role of such cooperatives in transforming Yugoslav economy by increasing productivity and
facilitating collective ownership. It merely added to this a focus on the cooperatives’ role in
transforming the consumer’s experience. In one important Il Lavoratore article, a correspondent
reported on a conversation he had with an unnamed Italian living in Ljubljana, the latter explaining
that in Yugoslavia, the commercial intermediaries had been cut out, with peasants’ cooperatives
selling directly to consumers’ cooperatives in the towns and hiring only a single shipper to deliver
the exchanged goods. This system guaranteed to the peasants (and the shipper) a “just earning,”
but also assured a just price to the urban consumer, who was now protected by the state and by the
collective purchasing power of the urban working class. By contrast,
those who lose are the speculators, the parasites, the adventurers. But for such people there is
effectively no place in Tito’s Yugoslavia.
Thus at Ljubljana we have not seen a trace of the black market, we have not seen
prosciutto and salami at exorbitant prices in the shop windows. But at the simple cafeteria
where we ate there was a little piece of pork in the window, also for the worker. 98

Throughout 1946, Il Lavoratore reiterated these claims. In September, it stressed that “the rapid
and regular distribution of products” has become “a criterion of justice” in the New Yugoslavia;
thanks to the state-supported cooperatives, “at the markets and in the shops order has been
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introduced, reducing the number of those who want to raise prices” and causing the price of foods
in Zagreb to fall by an average of 58.28% over the first half of 1946: 68.18% for flour, 60% for
green peas, 72.22% for potatoes, 42.31% for pork, and 55.55% for cheese. 99
Such ideas were pushed not only in the press, but also by pro-Yugoslav militants in the
street. Militants emphasized the central role of such cooperatives in reshaping the Yugoslav
shopping experience. In his journal, Eligio Simsig noted that cooperatives served the purpose that
“comm[erce] is eliminated.” When widespread and supported by the state,
they eliminate the merchant and retail commerce; the merchants are eliminated and thus a
greater possibility between city and countryside and improvement [e quindi più possibilità
fra città e campagna e miglioramento]…. [The cooperatives] constitute a symbiotic cycle
between the workers and the peasants and are the basis not only for the existence but for
the construction of soc[ialism]. The coop[eratives] are the regulator of prices of goods.
With the normalization of prices based on the state sector. The state continues its activity
putting itself at the service of the consumers’ cooperatives whose goods cost less… passing
[goods on] directly, coop[eratives] will have prices lower than those of the private sector.100

In short, what had emerged was a particular social imaginary for the New Yugoslavia in which the
quintessential “Fascist” shopkeeper (and the larger merchant) had been liquidated. This imaginary
promised an end to all those exploitative and tension-ridden interactions which had characterized
the interactions between working-class monfalconesi and the district’s shopkeepers in the decades
before and was a perfect location for the dovetailing of more orthodox Marxist analyses of
commercial exploitation with less doctrinally-defined popular resentments toward the district’s
body of shopkeepers. Moreover, the heavy emphasis on consumer cooperatives in Monfalcone
illustrates clearly how the myth of Yugoslavia was tailored to fit the expectations of monfalconesi,
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as the theme received less attention in the work of Yugoslav propagandists within Yugoslavia. 101
A sense of the historic significance and everyday-transformative impact of the transition
to cooperative commerce can be gleaned from the handbooks of various local cooperatives which,
though not Yugoslav, certainly reflect how monfalconesi thought about the cooperative shopping
experience generally. Important in this regard is an employee handbook for the large consumers’
cooperative based in Trieste, the Workers’ Cooperatives of Trieste, Istria, and Friuli (Cooperative
operaie di Trieste, Istria e Friuli, CO). With great awareness of how worker fascination with
cooperation went beyond price concerns and also included hopes for an essential transformation
of the seller-customer relationship, the handbook urged that cooperative shop attendants
be aware that, in the current era, consumer cooperation is viewed as a form of distribution
destined for a grand future…. The shop is the part of the company in immediate contact
with the public, from which contact it can garner favorable or unfavorable impressions
regarding the same cooperation. It is the duty of the manager to contribute with his work
to the growth of the esteem that the Cooperative Operaie deserve, animated in this action
by the pride of belonging to an institution that transforms the egoism of classical commerce
into solidarity and cooperativistic mutuality of the consumers.102

The handbook provided a blueprint for the perfect consumer experience, stressing that cooperative
shop attendants, no longer with a vested interest in profits, should clearly mark prices and sell only
at set prices, preventing the heated haggling and shopkeeper gouging that had so long typified
commerce in the Monfalconese black and other markets, facilitated by the shopkeeper’s
stranglehold over vital goods. Moreover, attendants were to avoid the old shopkeeper tricks of
overweighing with rigged weights or double packaging, instead assuring that the customer was
never cheated in any way. Finally, they were to treat all customers equally in a “cordial, affable,
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considerate, and above all serious” way, eschewing preferential treatment of friends and political
allies and refraining from discussing any contentious or potentially upsetting topics. 103 This was
the vision that monfalconesi had of the daily experience of cooperative commerce.
To convince monfalconesi that this new system of exchange and shopping was already in
place in Yugoslavia, pro-Yugoslav propagandists adopted the practice of sending delegations of
sympathetic monfalconesi on tightly-controlled tours of the New Yugoslavia, to be shown the
wonders of Tito’s regime.104 In one tour, a delegation of monfalconesi who would later go to Paris
to urge the Council of Foreign Ministers to give the Monfalconese to Yugoslavia arrived in
Ljubljana to witness the great strides made in physical reconstruction and the transformations
underway in the Slovenia. Greeting the delegation was a crowd of Slovenes, who applauded the
delegates and threw flowers at their feet as they marched through Ljubljana with their red-starred
Italian tricolor. Particularly important for this delegation was a visit to a textile factory at the
nearby town of Kranj, during which they discussed life in Tito’s new “progressive democracy”
with the factory’s workers. There the delegation learned that “a day of work is sufficient to eat for
an entire week. The black market is unknown, while the rationing of goods of primary necessity
like bread, oil, sugar is gradually being eliminated. For whoever works, the rations are most
abundant.” Summarizing their visit, the delegation reported that it had “given us a clearer vision
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of that which is sought after in our imagination, confirming for us the reality that wherever popular
power exists, there is: BREAD, PEACE, WORK, AND LIBERTY.”105 These were the conditions
of the market in Tito’s new society without shopkeepers: no dealing with ration cards, no
negotiating prices from a hopelessly weak position with self-serving “Fascist” shopkeepers, and
no threat of the perpetual hunger with which most monfalconesi had suffered for years.
The Personal Myth: Work and the Workplace
But, as the Monfalconese delegation’s conclusions make clear, the marketplace was not
the only lived space that pro-Yugoslavs believed to be radically transformed by the advent of Tito’s
regime. The same delegation also gave its (undetailed) impression that in the Kranj textile factory
there had been a thoroughgoing reform of labor processes, noting that, “when the flag of the
workers flies in the factories, when the managers are those same workers safeguarding their own
interests, labor is not a burden to bear, but a conscious striving for the wellbeing of all.” Though
the delegation report provided no concrete description of what had been reformed and how, any
monfalconese seeking answers to such questions could look to Il Lavoratore or elsewhere for
abundant information. 106 In the critical summer months of 1946, a second pillar of the personal
myth of Yugoslavia began to emerge: that regarding work experiences and the ability of workers
to realize their individual career ambitions within the workplace.107
This pillar of the personal myth, like that of the radically transformed marketplace,
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interacted with components of the national myth – especially the themes of rational planning and
rapid industrialization – but aimed to personalize them with reference to everyday experience and
aspirations. In the second half of 1946 and then with an even increased vigor following the
announcement of Yugoslavia’s own Five Year Plan, propagators of the myth promoted the
Yugoslav economy not through abstract concepts such as “planning” or “stability,” but rather with
an increasingly sensitive reference to the ways in which such properties translated into concrete
improvements in life experiences, such as the ability to find work.108 Pro-Yugoslavs emphasized
the superiority of rational planning not just in production and distribution – creating more goods
and a more just distribution of goods than ever before – but also in the state’s deployment of human
capital. Running parallel to the national myth of planning and plenty was the potential to interpret
this through a personal or familial lens. For semi-skilled and skilled workers, rational planning
meant freedom from fear of job loss (or deskilling). There was a clear “nesting” of individual
interests and the personal myth within the wider national myth of Communist economics. 109 With
this deep faith in rational planning in mind, a shipyard worker writing for Duemila, the proYugoslav broadsheet for young CRDA workers, asked rhetorically the mass of precariously
employed youth in mid-1946: “Who knows why in Italy there are layoffs and unemployment while
in Yugoslavia manpower is sought after?” 110 For many youth, the answer was Yugoslav planning.
As the pro-Yugoslav shipyard worker Sergio Parenzan remarked while reflecting on his decision
to fight for Yugoslav annexation, it was widely said that with Yugoslavia’s arrival “everyone will
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have work, everyone can live well.”111
But the ability to find a job was not the only point of emphasis. From the announcement of
Yugoslavia’s Five Year Plan, propagandists began to link economic planning and modernization
not just to full employment, but to the possibility of finding a fulfilling job that required a degree
of skill and provided a degree of worker autonomy – conditions that workers felt they had lost
under Fascism, and particularly under the piecework system that transformed them into mere
beasts of burden. Of course, well before Tito’s Yugoslavia existed, the myth of the USSR had held
that the Communist system allowed the full realization of “positive freedoms,” including the
blossoming of the productive and creative self. 112 Il Lavoratore did much to reinforce this idea and
extend it to discussions of Yugoslavia, running articles that differentiated between the so-called
“automatic-worker” (operaio-automatico) of the Fordist assembly line and “master-worker”
(operaio-padrone) of the USSR and the world of “progressive democracy.” While the former was
nothing more than a “slave to the machine” or foreman, the latter were empowered producers who
analyzed work plans and provided criticism when such plans could be improved. Of course, “to
elaborate a counter-plan, to raise production, he needs to have a technical understanding. And it is
for this that the workshops are transformed into true technical schools.” 113 In short, workers in the
world of “progressive democracy” were free of the rigid control of foremen and there were
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abundant opportunities to reverse the longstanding trend of deskilling and the centralization of
decision-making and instead to climb the hierarchy of skill, impact decision-making, and find
fulfillment through labor. This tenet of the personal myth, focused on the experiential nature of
work, thus bumped up uncomfortably against certain aspects of the national myth. It privileged the
creation of a liberating work experience over the consumption opportunities provided by mass
production, breaking from the “Fordism” that often permeated early Soviet self-representation.114
According to myth-makers, the broad shift to a new work culture in the Communist world
converged with two features more unique to Yugoslavia to create supposedly unrivaled potential
for that country to provide workers with an atmosphere in which they could realize their ambitions
for specialization and hierarchy-climbing. First, Il Lavoratore stressed that there had been a
thorough political purge of the country’s worksites and regularly ran articles detailing the purge of
specific workplaces, including Istrian and Dalmatian shipyards. In one particularly significant
case, the paper reported that the two major industrial sites of Fiume, the Third of May Shipyard
and Torpedo Factory, had not just had their Fascist directors chased out, but also those “hidden
collaborators” who had been placed in positions of social control and maintained due to “the tacit
connivance of the elements of the management.”115 In fact, the idea that all “Fascist” style bosses
had been purged from Yugoslav workplaces was so well entrenched that the young Silvano Cosolo,
who later emigrated to Yugoslavia, was shocked when he arrived in Sarajevo to find that an “old
regime” boss still ruled in the tobacco factory, managing in a way that was domineering, harsh,
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and entirely indifferent to worker conditions. 116 Second, the paper emphasized that the rapid
modernization of the Yugoslav economy generated a voracious appetite for skilled labor. It
detailed the rapid recruitment of unskilled Yugoslav workers into technical schools to enable the
successful completion of the electrification campaign and the Five Year Plan. The latter was
estimated to require some 400,000 more skilled workers by 1951 than existed in Yugoslavia in
1947, including a total of 90,000 “technical cadres.”117
By 1947, Yugoslavia’s industrial sites were seen as virgin land, devoid of their politicallycompromised leadership and seeking a new vanguard of skilled workers and directors.118
According to this view, all workers in Yugoslavia had a chance to rise, the unskilled becoming
skilled and the skilled becoming work-team leaders or plant managers. In one account, a visitor to
the Slovenian town of Jesenice reported on an encounter he had with a Monfalcone native named
Aldo, who had relocated there some time before and who informed him of an abundance of
technical schools that train all those “who wish to specialize.” 119 After another pro-Yugoslav
delegation visited Ljubljana and Belgrade in April 1947, the delegates reported that there was great
state investment in apprenticeships, with apprentices working six hours per day and having two
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hours of state-funded professional school afterwards. Thus, “according to one’s capacity and one’s
will, one can become a technician or even engineer without putting strain on one’s parents.” 120
At times, such articles implicitly or even explicitly made use of old, but retooled notions
of Slavic inferiority vis-à-vis Italians, representing the latter as a more “advanced” proletarian
nation than the largely agrarian Yugoslavs, capable not just of sharing their expertise, but also
quickly climbing the workplace hierarchy. According to a reprinted letter received from a Triestine
worker employed in the Spalato shipyards, Istrian and Triestine Italians “are today the chief
engineers [in Yugoslav industries], and [who] enjoy a notable authority derived from their
professional capacity.”121 Such visions of Yugoslavia were reinforced by the reality that a handful
of the most capable chief engineers (capitecnici) had been headhunted away from the CRDA by
the Fiume shipyard in the winter of 1946/47 so that they could begin “instructing the new labor
force in Yugoslavia in the naval industry.” 122
Ultimately, monfalconesi viewed Yugoslavia’s worksites in slightly paradoxical terms. On
the one hand, they were locations in which each worker worked with autonomy and was free of
the politically adversarial foreman – and his principal “whip” of piecework – resulting in a
pacification of workplace relations. On the other, they were often viewed as the perfect location to
realize one’s career ambitions, formulated within the logic of longstanding workplace hierarchies
rather than a radically new vision of workplace organization. 123 As will be seen, the emergence of
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this portion of the myth coincided with mass layoffs, the reduction of many workers to unskilled
and undignified public works jobs, and a near-complete closing of apprenticeship programs. For
individuals caught up in such traumas, the appeal of Communism in the workplace was not
necessarily that it promised a socialization of the means of production or a chance to become the
next Stakhanovite hero. It could be as simple as its uncompromising approach to the extirpation
of “enemies of the people” from the workplace and its consequent affording of the possibility for
secure employment and upwards mobility. Both dovetailed neatly with the concrete everyday
needs of monfalconesi in the postwar and their hopes for a purge of particularly harsh bosses.
Fiume: A Perfect Communist Community
In constructing the myth of Yugoslavia, Il Lavoratore did not merely discuss life in the
country broadly; it also developed myths about particular localities, the most important of which
was the port-city of Fiume. This city had been contested territory between Italy and Yugoslavia
before its annexation to Italy in 1924 and had served thereafter as a focal-point of Fascist mythmaking. Given Fascist propaganda needs, Mussolini’s regime had provided Fiume with economic
concessions, including free-port status and direct subsidies to its shipyard. These measures were
to alleviate the harmful effects of the border on the economy.124 More importantly, they would
provide the basis of favorable press coverage that would show the positive impact of Fascist rule
on daily life and marshal support for further irredentist conquests. Given its centrality to Fascist
self-representation and tremendous similarities with Monfalcone, Fiume served as a natural
counterimage to Monfalcone for Yugoslav propagandists. 125 Thus the Fascist-era myth of Fiume
Hierarchy: Skill, Working-Class Culture, and the State in Early Socialist Hungary,” The Journal of Modern History
74, no. 4 (2002): 737-769.
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was appropriated and reformulated, Fiume made central to the myth of the New Yugoslavia.
This reformulation began immediately after liberation, when Il Lavoratore placed Fiume
front-and-center as a symbol of the Communist world’s rapid reconstruction and revival. The
fiumani of Il Lavoratore’s pages were, in standard Communist parlance, “Stakhanovites” and
“shock workers” who gave voluntary labor in glorious “Reconstruction Days,” thus allowing the
city rapidly to put the war behind it and to resume productive (as opposed to reconstructive)
labor.126 Though early representations were limited to such questions of reconstruction, beginning
in winter, new themes began to emerge. By reducing the scope of analysis to the local – especially
to a well-known city closely tied to Fascism – the paper was able to unite the national myth with
the personal myth through such themes and make both increasingly tangible to readers.
The first of these themes – the emphasis on culture and dignity – fits clearly within the
wider pillar of creating a “radiant future” that expanded the opportunities of ordinary people. In
contrast to Fascism’s infamous educational reforms of 1923 (the Gentile Reforms), which had
established career tracks for Italian youths based largely on class and denied “culture” to workingclass families, Il Lavoratore depicted Fiume as a city where workers had a range of opportunities
to become educated and “cultured.” In December 1945, the paper celebrated the inauguration of
the People’s University in Fiume as an effort to “elevate the level of the masses in all fields and
spread knowledge in an integral form, pruning away [sfrondandolo] all veils in which Fascism
wrapped [education] to make it a political instrument.”127 Moreover, in keeping with the broader
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theme of eradicating illiteracy, it touted local campaigns to teach reading and writing skills to the
working poor. Completely overlooked – or perhaps dismissed as motivated by a desire to create a
more exploitable population – was the fact that the Fascist regime too had striven with great
success to eliminate illiteracy in Italy. 128 In the New Yugoslavia the literacy campaign was
somehow different. It was motivated by the belief that even workers “have a right to be able to
learn to read and write; they are humans and are not, as they have been considered until now, mere
beasts of burden.”129 Through these and other programs provided in Fiume – art schools, popular
theater, courses in languages, science, and math – workers developed a full sense of their own
dignity and could achieve a personal elevation, which they had been denied under Fascism. 130
At the same time, the paper portrayed Fiume as a fundamentally pacified, purified, and
self-governing community – a microcosmic representation of the unified Yugoslav community of
suffering and the exact opposite of a Monfalcone that was ruled from above and wracked by
violence and discord even after war’s end. The image of a pacified, purified, and empowered
“people” of Fiume was directly related to the idea of the spontaneous surge of support in that city
for the “anti-Fascist” organizations during the Resistance, which was said to have carried over
unfettered from that struggle into the construction of local popular power loyal to Tito. Il
Lavoratore readers learned of the structures of popular power in the city, including the local
government of the People’s Civic Committee (Comitato popolare cittadino), staffed by former

128

Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini: Totalitarianism in the Twentieth Century, 4th ed. (Malden, MA and
Oxford, England: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 125.
129
“Vita fiumana,” Il Lavoratore, 28 February 1946.
130
This facet of the myth of Fiume (and wider Yugoslavia) has remained quite durable, perhaps because it was based
in part in reality. It is a point of emphasis in the recollections of the monfalconese emigrant Giuseppe Franti, discussed
further in chapter 7. Alfredo Bonelli, “Prima intervista con il monfalconese Franti Giuseppe,” 27 March 1980, IRSML,
Fondo Cominform, b 99, f 1. For further examples of emphasis on this type of cultural elevation, see “Dove veramente
si lavora,” Il Lavoratore, 13 December 1945; “180 rappresentazioni del Teatro popolare di Fiume,” Il Lavoratore, 30
June 1947.

153

workers and exercising power through their People’s Tribunal, police, and militia. 131 Beyond this,
articles described the social and administrative functions of the city’s pro-Yugoslav mass
organization, including the oversight of food and clothing supply and consumers’ cooperatives at
the sector level and direction of urban hygiene campaigns, gate and roof repair, and street clearing
at the street level. 132 With power in its hands, claimed Il Lavoratore, the people were free to purge
their community of local Fascists and philo-Fascists, a process culminating in a gathering of Fiume
“anti-Fascists” outside the city’s Palazzo Adria in March 1946, during which there was cathartic
burning of “straw puppets that represented Fascism and reaction and a purse filled with the money
of the businessmen who lived on the shoulders of the people.” 133 Ultimately, the paper suggested,
all the exploiters who had imposed themselves on the productive system of the community had
fled or been expelled, resulting in an absolute solidarity of the remaining individuals, the “true
fiumani,” who lived in perfect communion without privileges. 134
Finally, Fiume was represented as a city in which Italo-Slavic fraternity had sunk deep
roots and in which the community had overcome the nationalist antagonisms fanned by Fascism.
Propagandists developed this theme most profoundly through coverage of the construction and
inauguration in October 1946 of a footbridge across the River Eneo, which reversed the twentytwo-year partition between the Italian-majority Fiume and its Croatian-majority suburb of Sussak
that had begun with the fixing of the Italo-Yugoslav border in 1924.135 Tito’s regime’s
inauguration of a major footbridge crossing this river became a symbol of transcending the Fascist
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past and restoring wholeness to a community unjustly divided by Mussolini’s regime. The linkage
of Fiume to Sussak and thus to Croatia welcomed Italian-speakers into the Yugoslav community
of nations, an action reinforced by Tito’s widely-reported visit to the bridge the day after its
inauguration.136 The event had such a great impact on monfalconesi that many, like Renato
Rigonat, who had already emigrated to Yugoslavia at that time and was involved in constructing
parts for the bridge. In his memoirs, Rigonat proudly recalls his contribution, claiming some
seventy years later that the bridge “represented the brotherhood of the Italo-Yugoslav peoples.”137
Myth, Manipulation, and “Contextual Redefinition”
Within months of liberation, utopian thinking about Yugoslavia had become widespread
in the Monfalconese and it continued to spread as monfalconesi engaged in postwar political and
territorial struggles. Though former pro-Yugoslavs who reflect upon the period often claim to have
been ignorant of Yugoslav conditions (“we knew nothing” and Yugoslavia was “all a guess”), the
simultaneous tendency of these same monfalconesi to recall being inundated with pro-Yugoslav
militants’ talk of Yugoslavia and the Seventh Federative Republic bely such claims. 138 The latter
claims, though more accurate than the former, have their own problems. They capture the fact that
the pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese knew both confidently and falsely about Tito’s Yugoslavia
rather than knowing nothing, but they often carry implicit accusations of manipulation undertaken
by the Communist Party and its capillary organs – of an intentional, rigidly controlled, and
perfectly implemented process of pulling the wool over the masses’ eyes.
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An understanding of the myth of Yugoslavia that characterizes it purely as a product of
manipulation by a single political party is inadequate and incomplete. Such a characterization
ignores the critical role that ordinary monfalconesi played in accepting, repeating, and thus
solidifying this myth in the postwar years, not to mention the fact that the myth of Yugoslavia,
more than just reflecting a fascination with real events happening beyond the Morgan Line, was
also (even chiefly) the means by which monfalconesi contemplated alternate visions of society,
painting a picture of Yugoslavia as a way to work through these contemplations and to generate
motivation for local struggles. As Anna Di Gianantonio and her colleagues assert, mythic thinking
is best understood as “an intrinsic need of those who consider it possible to modify the power
relations in which they live.” 139 The Monfalconese process of myth-making fits Paul Hollander’s
model of estrangement and affirmation. In his study of the myth of the USSR, he suggests that
“social criticism must rest on a vision of alternatives” and “estrangement from one’s society
invariably precedes or accompanies the projection of hope and affirmation upon other ones.” 140 In
Hollander’s analysis, an intimate familiarity with social ills at home created an estrangement
among Western intellectuals from their own society. This manifested in a reinforcing cycle of
criticizing the home society and projecting positive attributes onto the Soviet Union, even if this
required a willful ignorance about certain aspects of Soviet society.
After twenty years of Fascism, monfalconesi were fundamentally estranged. In May 1945,
from the sudden convergence of estrangement and hope emerged a society ripe for mythical
thinking. Moreover, as time passed and the hopes of achieving a radical transformation of local
society were dashed, this cycle of mythical thinking intensified. By the time the delegations of
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monfalconesi began to arrive in Yugoslavia there had emerged the basis for what Hollander has
termed “contextual redefinition.” Observers selectively perceived and ultimately redefined the
significance of negative conditions observed in a supposedly utopian society, reframing them to
reinforce a positive view of the desired utopia.141 Monfalconesi thus remained quiet or explained
away negative characteristics of Yugoslav society. For example, the shoelessness of the Yugoslav
Partisans who walked Monfalcone’s streets in May 1945 was taken as a mark not of their poverty,
but instead of their virtue and self-sacrifice.
In the coming years, the myth of Yugoslavia would have a great impact on the postwar
political struggle, inspiring participants, shaping and responding to the ways in which they thought
about Communism, and influencing the ways in which they tried to navigate daily life as their
district hung in limbo between two worlds. 142 In some cases, faith in Tito’s Yugoslavia became so
durable and so deeply felt that proponents even disbelieved what they saw with their own eyes.
Though not a monfalconese, an instructive case is that of Maria Casali. An organizer of proYugoslav women in nearby Trieste, Casali recalled that she sometimes visited Zone B in the
postwar years, during which time she got the impression that
the situation in Yugoslavia was somewhat confused, but I was aware that the gravity of the
situation was derived from the disasters of the war. I was convinced that Yugoslavia, under
the leadership of the USSR, would succeed in reconstruction and construct socialism. I
remember that at a meeting held at Capodistria the people complained about sour bread
and compared it with the white bread that was eaten at Trieste; I encouraged them in this
way: there will come a day when you will have white bread and we the sour bread. 143
141
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Chapter 4: Fascist Continuities: Everyday “Fascism” and the Struggle for Change in
Contested Monfalcone
Yugoslavia was not what interested us. We wanted only to be done with Italy. We believed
that this would resolve the social problems. This was the point. We wanted to resolve, from
an international and internationalist point of view, daily problems. The secession was not
seen in the traditional [nationalist] manner, but rather one said: ‘here and now we have the
possibility to go and make socialism and everyone will have work, everyone can live well.’ 1
– Testimony of the monfalconese, Sergio Parenzan.

As tens of thousands of monfalconesi saw things in the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia’s
bloody war of liberation had ended with a triumph of “popular power” and with the Yugoslav
people following the fearless Tito down the path toward a radiant future. In Monfalcone, the people
had given their blood and tears to free themselves from the oppressive Fascist regime but had then
been denied the right to forge a radiant future of their own.
For those monfalconesi who viewed radical social transformation and the revolutionizing
of everyday life as primary goals of Resistance, the substitution of the AMG for Yugoslav rule
was a disaster. Sergio Parenzan, who for over a year had heard news from liberated Italy suggesting
that the Anglo-Americans had a strictly military understanding of Resistance, saw the arrival of
the AMG as an obstacle to rather than culmination of the local Resistance. Its dismantling of the
institutions of “popular power” marked an end to what Enrico Cernigoi has termed “the period of
potential dreams.”2 This perception was not unique to the Monfalconese; throughout the Italian
peninsula, and especially in the north, the arriving Anglo-Americans had done their best to check
and deconstruct revolutionary partisan governments that had seized control of local affairs upon
the collapse of Axis power.3 What was unique about the Monfalconese was a persistent hope that
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the social-revolutionary ambitions of the Resistance could be realized: that Tito would return with
the signing of a peace treaty and remake Venezia Giulia as Yugoslavia’s Seventh Federative
Republic.
The arrival of the AMG accelerated efforts to construct a myth of Yugoslavia, and it also
spurred a political realignment across Zone A. Completing a transformation that had begun in late
1944 with the fission of the region’s CLNs, the primary axis of conflict shifted from that between
Fascists and anti-Fascists to that between pro-Italians and pro-Yugoslavs. In the Monfalconese,
which had fewer Slovenes than the areas around Gorizia and Trieste, this split manifested in a
tenuous coalition of pro-Italians, motivated by varying mixtures of anti-Communism and
nationalism (chauvinist or not), squaring off against a more homogenous pro-Yugoslav faction.
The latter, though containing a handful of nationalist Slovenes, consisted largely of Italianspeaking workers. Within months of war’s end, this division had generated not only vehemently
opposed political blocs, but also a clear bifurcation of Monfalcone’s associational life, with a range
of parallel unions, cultural clubs, partisan associations, women’s groups, and youth groups
emerging, each standing on one side of the territorial question (Appendix B).4
The term “pro-Yugoslav” generally differentiates the majority strain among radical
workers from a smaller strain of left-radicals who supported both revolution and continued
belonging to Italy, but it is something of a misnomer. Like Sergio Parenzan, most Italian-speakers
who struggled on behalf of Yugoslavia did not do so for pro-Yugoslav sentiment, but rather because
Yugoslav annexation was seen as a means to resolve everyday grievances.5 Temporarily occupied
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by the AMG and facing the possibility of a permanent return to Italy, the town’s pro-Yugoslav
struggle reflected a hope that, once its aims were realized, they would facilitate the more important
struggle to root out the “remnants of Fascism.”
And Fascist remnants were key. Though the pro-Yugoslavs threw their weight behind the
campaign for Yugoslav annexation, they did not suspend their struggle against everyday “Fascist”
neighbors. There existed a concurrent push for radical transformations in the here-and-now, which
the AMG blocked at every turn, due variably to anti-Communism, a cynical desire to protect the
social bases of the pro-Italian faction, and a belief that such transformations were impossibilities.
As everyday life under the AMG remained qualitatively similar to that under Fascism in key ways,
there emerged ideas of “Fascist” continuities that not only fueled resentment toward the AMG, but
also provided pro-Yugoslav myth-makers with an image against which they could construct their
vision of Tito’s utopia. This was the context in which 16,000 monfalconesi became members in
the Italo-Slovenian Anti-Fascist Union (Unione antifascista italo-slovena, UAIS), the mass
political organization tied to the Communist Party. From its foundation in June 1945, the Union’s
program had been both to secure Yugoslav annexation and to purge Fascist remnants.6 Its name
signaled its aims to equate pro-Yugoslav and anti-Fascist sentiments – to claim Yugoslavia as the
sole country in which this transformation would occur and to label as “Fascists” all those who
opposed Yugoslavia. 7 The name was a portent of the bitterness with which the coming struggle
would be fought and the degree to which it would be shaped by notions of Fascist continuities.
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AMG Market Policy and the Persistence of “Fascist” Commerce
The harsh reality of persistent material shortage and the resultant frustrations over
marketplace experiences catalyzed the social and political polarization that soon swelled the ranks
of Monfalcone’s UAIS.8 With the coming of the AMG, very little improved in the market and
rationing system from an experiential standpoint, and in some respects, conditions deteriorated. In
the short term, there was a resurgence of the black market, particularly in the scarcely-patrolled
outlying communes. At least in pro-Yugoslavs’ estimation, this resulted from the dissolution of
the DP. As one OF committee member reported from San Canzian d’Isonzo, there “the black
market had been eradicated; but from the moment of the disarmament of the Dif[esa] Pop[olare]
the practitioners of such a market are resuming it in grand style.” 9 In the longer term, the AMG
created what it called a “disease and unrest” ration, but this was far from a comprehensive effort
to resolve the supply and price problem. The ration consisted only of 200 daily grams of bread and
monthly allocations of one kilo of pasta, 400 grams of peas or beans, 125 grams of sugar, 100
grams of salt, and 200 grams of canned meat, the last of which the AMG cut by late July 1945.10
In the field of pricing, the AMG set affordable prices for rationed goods but refrained on both
ideological and practical reasons from setting prices for non-rationed goods like meats, vegetables,
fruits, cloth, shoes, and items like razors and shaving cream, so the strict ration economy continued
to be only one part of a system of exchange that also included semi-controlled and uncontrolled
goods.11 Thus, the AMG system not only ignored repeated consumer demands for expanded
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11
Only in July 1947, for example, would the AMG implement price controls for shoes and clothing. SCAO Economics
8

161

marketplace protections, but also unraveled protections put in place under past administrations. 12
As a result, marketgoers regularly confronted exorbitant prices, which in turn sparked
marketplace conflicts. As late as September 1946, the marketgoer could find butter sold at L1000
per kilo on the free market, which was well over two days’ pay for a mechanical fitter at the CRDA,
who took home just L420 daily even if he had a wife and child.13 Both the legal free and illicit
black markets which ran alongside the ration economy were largely inaccessible to working-class
families. In addition, workers lacked barterable products, closing avenues of direct barter.14
Combined with the unreliability of the supply of rationed goods (even through 1947),15 the
perpetual failure of worker earnings to keep pace with postwar inflation, 16 and the widespread
black-marketeering of both rationed goods and non-rationed goods,17 this meant that the
marketplace remained a site of major political contention. Many monfalconesi believed that
marketplace “Fascism” remained intact.
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The Communist press exploited these tensions and criticized the failure of the AMG to
clear the “exploiters,” (sfruttatori), “sharks” (strozzini), and “hoarders” (accaparratori) out of the
local markets.18 According to Il Lavoratore, the persistent “antisociality” (antisocialità) of such
individuals was not surprising, as they had either been Fascists or had profited from collaborating
with Fascism, but had not been driven out of the region upon liberation.19 It stressed that there was
no place in Julian society for such individuals, because war and Resistance had “opened a new
period in the life of humankind, a period that affirms the solidarity of all the honest people, as there
is no longer a place for slave-drivers, for exploiters.”20
At times, these grievances boiled over into confrontation between market-goers and
“Fascist” merchants and between market-goers and the AMG, the latter occurring because
monfalconesi saw the AMG as responsible for protecting marketplace “Fascism.” The first such
incident took place on 21 July 1945. The night prior, the CDLN, which ever since the AMG’s
arrival had organized the at-loss sale of foodstuffs to “serv[e] as an example to all the local
merchants,” declared certain “just” prices of goods for the entire Monfalconese, despite lacking
authority to do so.21 When market-goers attempted to purchase goods at these low prices (called
“uneconomic” by the AMG), sellers refused and confrontations ensued. 22 Market-goers demanded
the extension of the price control system (especially to meats, milk, vegetables, and cooking oils)
and the elimination of the resale of rationed goods. CAO Cozens, the reporting AMG officer,
conceded the demands “were fully justified.” Still, the AMG responded to the disorders by posting

For these terms, see respectively “Problemi attuali,” Il Lavoratore, 11 July 1945; “Necessità del controlle dei
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military police to storefronts and stalls to assure the resumption of commerce. The crowd,
originally “perhaps a thousand strong,” grew throughout the day and became increasingly raucous
in both the central piazza and the nearby marketplace. 23 According to Cozens, at times Allied MPs
were “almost torn from their vehicles whilst crossing the square” and the crowd “appeared to be
about to tear the place down.” Faced with a delegation demanding the abolition of this
discriminatory economy and the implementation of a commerce of “justice,” Cozens bent to
popular demands, ordering a distribution of available goods at no charge, with the AMG footing
the bill. 24
The disturbance in Monfalcone had a ripple effect, instantly sparking a series of similarly
riotous demonstrations throughout the zone. Women, as the primary marketgoers, played a key
role. Though Communist Party leaders had decided after the Monfalcone disturbance that it was
“necessary that we convince the women to accept a truce” regarding the problems of prices and
market purges, the Party and its mass women’s organization had spent much effort organizing the
campaign “against the free market [and] for the increase of rationed goods” and the women would
not cease their agitation.25 On 23 July, in the outlying commune of Pieris, a crowd of 2000 gathered
at the Pieris train station, drawn by “rumors that on that train [from Venice to Trieste] there were
many goods that were to supply the free market and fill the coffers of the sharks at Trieste.” The
crowd stopped and boarded the train and began unloading the cargo before machinegun-wielding
British MPs intervened to restore order. According to Communist Party reports, the women
became belligerent and “pushed themselves against the soldiers and called them Fascists and
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starvers of the people, and shouted that they were the cause of everything that was happening,
because they had ordered the free market and removed the controls the [OF] committees had on
the prices of goods.”26 After stopping this so-called “train of the black-marketeers,” the workers
and women pillaged the towns shops and made known, in the words of a British officer, that “if
we [the AMG] can’t break the Black-Market, they ca [sic], and will by force.”27 As proof, the
following day a crowd of women engaged in aggressive demonstration outside the shop of the
merchant Barella at San Canzian d’Isonzo. Participants claimed he displayed goods at blackmarket prices and demanded the goods be confiscated and distributed. In this case, too, the English
intervened, met with accusations that, as armed protectors of free-market exchange, they were
“worse than Fascists” and “starvers of the people.”28 During these and later riots, demonstrators
assumed a sharply anti-Anglo-American tone, shouting “Death to the Allies!” despite repeated
Party efforts to prevent such direct confrontation. 29
The form of these riots, including both the tendency to view shopkeepers as a class as
“sharks” and attempts to seize goods for distribution at “just” prices, in many ways resembles the
cost-of-living riots that gripped Italy in 1919 in the wake of the Great War. 30 Yet a striking novelty
of these later incidents is the tendency of these ordinary protesters − many of whom the Party
explicitly indicated were not organized into the PCI or even a UAIS affiliate − to link marketplace
exploitation with Fascism, even transferring the label “Fascist” from those engaged in market
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exchange to the wider set of actors facilitating the free market.31 In the thinking of a large number
of monfalconesi, “Fascist” meanings had been grafted on to any sort of free-market exchange.
In the following months, as AMG provisioning, pricing, and rationing policies continued
to meet only partially the needs of monfalconesi, the pro-Yugoslav press reinforced associations
between the ongoing hardship and the loss of Yugoslav administration.32 The AMG had responded
to the July food riots with an attempt to control the prices of meat in the Monfalconese, setting
prices at L90-120 per kilo. However, this simply caused meat to disappear from markets. Udinese
smugglers who had formerly supplied the Monfalconese instead smuggled their goods to Trieste,
where, in the absence of such controls, meat sold for L280-L350 per kilo.33 In this context, Il
Lavoratore launched a full assault against the “free market,” attempting to harness popular
resentments. As with demonstrators on the ground, it demanded an extension of the price-control
system, and criticized the very notion of a “free market,” emphasizing that this market allowed
commercial “sharks” (strozzini) to exploit urbanites’ inescapable dependency upon them for food
and concluding bitterly that “one cannot say ‘free market’ speaking of commerce exercised by
sharks.”34 Two days later, it criticized the AMG for perpetuating the Fascist system of setting a
“political price” on bread and goods of the first necessity, while allowing the prices of other goods
to run up unchecked.35 In October, the paper cast the failure to sweep the “hoarders”
(accaparratori) out of the markets as a failure of the Resistance, stressing that the problem was
the speculators, who still wish to live like some months ago, that is before the Liberation.
Today these speculators live and prosper freely, because there is no organ that acts
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in a repressive manner against them. 36

Chaos and Shared Power in the CRDA
Though food was certainly the most pressing problem for monfalconesi in the first months
after liberation, the same could not be said for the AMG. The AMG sought political stability and
the containment of Yugoslavia’s expansionist ambitions above all else, and in Monfalcone this
required restoring stability and productivity to the war-damaged shipyard and breaking the proYugoslav organs’ strength therein.37 Immediately upon the AMG’s arrival, Major J. Reid indicated
that the situation within the CRDA was not what the AMG hoped. The few contracts could not
keep all 5000 employees working constantly and thus “a not inconsiderable number of hours are
spent in listening to political speeches or taking part in political discussions.” Moreover, the
factory guards and management appeared “quite powerless to control the workers, the work or
anything else,” and many managers worked “in constant fear of being molested and even shot .”38
Thus, from an early date, the AMG focused its attention on taming the restive workforce.
Yet as the AMG successfully dismantled “popular power” outside the shipyard in the late
summer of 1945, it had far less success within the CRDA. Although the pro-Yugoslav Factory
Committee was not all-powerful, during these months it simply “discharge[d] and employ[ed] men
without reference to the management” and established internal purge commissions that claimed
authority to remove even the highest directors of the firm. 39 One militant reflected that the
committee had “the capacity and the power to decide on some things that could affect the
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shipyard’s activity. There was the capacity and the power to affect even those who represented the
Direction.”40 In other words, the workers – or at least the committee – had achieved a degree of
self-management and power-sharing. A full two months after the AMG’s arrival, AMG officials
observing the state of affairs in the CRDA and the Solvay warned that “some drastic action, either
by the nomination by A.M.G. of a representative Workers’ Committee [i.e. one including proItalians and anti-Communists], or the taking over of the firms is required.”41 Later that month, the
AMG created a special Labor Office in Monfalcone to “come to the assistance of the plants,”
reassert managerial control, and restore a semblance of productivity where the pro-Yugoslav forces
had left “Chaos.”42
Despite the pro-Yugoslavs’ newfound power in the CRDA, as time passed, management
began to reassert itself, and old questions re-emerged, including that of piecework. In July, with
AMG support, the CRDA reintroduced piecework into contracts for the CRDA-Monfalcone’s
shipbuilding workshops, shortly thereafter extending it to the Electromechanical Workshops. 43
Certainly, the power of the pro-Yugoslav Factory Committee within the yards led to a decrease in
piecework’s use as a tool of oppression and exploitation, as well as the real possibility of violence
against abusive piecework enforcers. As the worker Sergio Parenzan reflected, in the last months
of 1945 “the work pace was quite mild. The bosses who before had been arrogant, later stayed
quiet because they were afraid.” 44 However, it did not have sufficient power to stop unilaterally
the restoration of this “Fascist” form of labor. In this context, workers and Party organizers began
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to call again for the suppression of piecework. On 22 August 1945, Vittorio Cernigoi spoke before
a crowd of workers, making such a demand and calling for a new system in which “the contracts
will be drawn up by the workers of the very workshop and passed for the signature of the workshop
head,” allowing the workers to become “self-disciplining.” Cernigoi’s speech, perhaps the clearest
articulation of a plan to reorganize the work process to date, suggests a desire to return to the
organization of the factory to pre-Fascist forms and was met, at least in the Communist Party’s
estimation, with the “spontaneous approval of the totality of those present.”45
However, as months passed with no substantial improvement in the standard of living, no
official recognition of the SU’s elected “management councils,” and instead the reconsolidation
of the hated piecework system, cracks began to show in this consensus. 46 Some workers began to
strike for piece-rate increases, seeking short-term amelioration in lieu of a complete overturning
of the system. 47 In response, the Party – both in Monfalcone and Trieste – attempted to shore up
worker discipline and assure the struggle was against piecework in its entirety, not just rates, with
additional earnings to come through hourly wage increases. As one member of the Communist
Party’s CRDA cell commented, “piecework… is the whip of the worker and is that which serves
the master to increase production and, naturally, then to lay off [workers] and thereby to create
new miseries. Therefore, we must propagandize among the masses the absolute necessity to
abolish piecework, to do his duty as a worker not to put back in place the abovementioned whip.” 48
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New “Communists” and a New Communist Party
The bifurcation of the Monfalconese into clearly delineated political and organizational
camps was well under way by the time the Communist Party was having these discussions over
piecework. As a longtime militant and a principal Communist speechmaker in the CRDA, Cernigoi
himself had taken on a leadership role with the zone’s new pro-Yugoslav union, the Unitary
Syndicates (Sindacati Unici, SU), which, funded by Belgrade, had emerged as the peacetime
successor to the wartime Workers’ Unity. In the markets, orchestrating the concurrent campaign
for “just” commerce was the women’s affiliate of the UAIS, the UDAIS.
But coordinating the activities of these pro-Yugoslav organizations, as well as several
others, was the Communist Party, which had undergone substantial restructuring in the months
after liberation. That summer, the PCI functionary Giacomo Pellegrini had negotiated with the
KPS and KPJ to realize the creation of a “unified, largely autonomous Communist Party” in
Venezia Giulia, stretching over both Zones A and B and including all Communists irrespective of
nationality. 49 He did so largely to free the PCI from the discomforts of the “Trieste Question.” The
PCI hoped this arrangement would allow it to avoid directly condoning or rejecting Yugoslavia’s
annexation of Venezia Giulia, and the KPS accepted the move upon the condition that it have a
predominant role in the new party, including a Yugoslav majority on the Directive Committee.
Implicit in the agreement from the PCI’s perspective was the assurance that the new PCRG would
navigate the Trieste Question cautiously so as not to undermine the PCI’s electoral prospects.50
In the first half of August, the PCI and KPS gave birth to the new, Trieste-based Communist
Party of the Julian Region (Partito comunista della regione giulia, PCRG), and Monfalcone
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emerged immediately as a party stronghold. Within the Monfalconese, the new PCRG consisted
of roughly 200 full members (effettivi) in the CRDA and perhaps another hundred in the
communes, flanked by several hundred candidates (candidati) and sympathizers (simpatizzanti)
working toward promotion to full membership. Perhaps most importantly, between war’s end and
August, amid food riots, struggles over the workplace, and frustration over the AMG’s undoing of
“popular power,” a further 2000 submitted applications for membership.51 By year’s end,
membership had ballooned to over 2200, of whom nearly 1550 were sympathizers. 52
The explosion of PCRG membership in the last half of 1945 had two major effects on the
zone’s politics. First, it changed radically the nature of the local Communist Party. Coupled with
the long-term Fascist-era ban on socialist and communist texts, the explosion created a mass of
rank-and-file militants who lacked significant theoretical knowledge of Marxism or Leninism.
Even the most cursory glance at the PCRG party applications reveals that those seeking entry into
the Party often were not familiar with even the rudiments of Marxist theory. In response to the
application’s question asking if the applicant knew such theory, answers such as “I don’t know it,”
“no,” and “very little” greatly outnumbered those that indicated some knowledge. Even in the latter
case, the knowledge was most often limited to having read a few pamphlets or a Short Course.53
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This was especially the case for youth, who had spent their whole lives in an Italy subject to Fascist
restrictions on the press. 54 Certainly, this state of affairs was not unprecedented or exceptional
when compared to Italy. In the Old Provinces, participants in a century-old subculture of
sovversivismo (subversivism) had been broadly “red” without obediently following a single
political party or even learning the party’s guiding theory, and during the Fascist and war years,
many had gravitated to the PCI (and USSR) because it appeared the sole effective pole of
opposition.55 Yet the point remains: the lion’s share of PCRG members, though calling themselves
Communists, approached “Communism” with ideas and assumptions than differed from those of
Party leaders, largely lacking the latter’s Marxist theoretical lens. 56
A second effect of Party growth was that it became a solid, yet covert control mechanism
for the entire array of institutions involved in the pro-Yugoslav struggle. Each of its committees −
from the district down to the village level − possessed a liaison for the various mass organizations
such as the UAIS, UDAIS, SU, and others. The PCRG placed these liaisons in key positions within
their mass organs, forbidding them from revealing themselves as Communist militants. This
afforded the Party a degree of control over the movement. These individuals served on the
frontlines of constructing the myth of Yugoslavia and strove to funnel the wide range of popular
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discontents into the pro-Yugoslav cause, though doing so was not easy. 57
The PCRG’s control over the workers’ mass organizations became especially important
when, in late September, the PCRG’s Central Committee shocked the PCI and announced the new
party’s unqualified support for Yugoslav annexation. Pellegrini noted the pushback among a
handful of outspoken Italian Communists in the centers of Muggia, Monfalcone, Gorizia, and
Trieste and urged leaders in both Trieste and Rome to find a more fitting solution to avoid creating
a schism among the “progressives” of the region. 58 In the months that followed, the PCI failed in
its efforts to convince the PCRG to backtrack.59 Taking orders from Ljubljana and Belgrade, the
PCRG remained staunchly annexationist, and schism ensued. In early 1946, a splinter group of
pro-Italian Communists created the Italian Communist Party of Venezia Giulia (PCIVG), which
rejected the PCRG’s pro-Yugoslav stance and which the PCI in Rome refused to recognize. 60
Seeking to mitigate the electoral harm of the PCRG’s declaration, the PCI responded by
proclaiming the italianità of Trieste and established an Information Office in that city. The PCI
thus aimed to change PCRG policy and undercut annexationism, but it created no party structure
in Zone A that might serve as an organized alternative to the PCRG and the PCIVG. With this,
Julian Communism had splintered into three strains − a state of affairs that would persist until the
end of the AMG. 61 In the Monfalconese, however, the vast majority of workers and Communists
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remained with the PCRG. For individuals like Sergio Parenzan, who himself would become a
PCRG candidate, the choice was easy: fighting in the pro-Yugoslav movement offered the best
chance to resolve the problems of everyday life. 62
Taming the CRDA and the Frustration of Anti-Fascist Purges
According to Parenzan’s recollection, “everyone [in the CRDA] was with the Communist
Party of the Julian Region while, from the point of view of the syndicates, everyone was with the
Unitary Syndicates.” Though overstated, Parenzan’s memory of the situation in the CRDA in the
early AMG period holds a kernel of truth: the shipyard was the heart of the pro-Yugoslav
movement in the Monfalconese and thus of PCRG and SU membership. As a result, the proYugoslav institutions within the CRDA, and particularly the SU Factory Committee, became
primary targets for the AMG in its sustained efforts to destroy this movement.
The AMG worked aggressively to undermine the SU, first and foremost by collaborating
with pro-Italian forces (including CRDA management) to nurture an alternate, pro-Italian and antiCommunist union. This union, the Julian Syndicates (Sindacati Giuliani, SG), arrived in the
Monfalconese from its launching-point in Trieste by the last months of 1945.63 Under the principle
of syndical choice, the AMG protected the SG branch established in Monfalcone, and the CRDA’s
Direction, as it reconsolidated some of its authority in the workshops, gave hiring preference to
SG members over those of the SU.64 From the moment of its inception, Ruggero Bersa, who had
emerged as the head of the PCRG in the Monfalconese, thus commented that it was clear that the
SG had “some ‘secret’ agreements with the direction of the shipyard and that they are more or less
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in the pockets of the reaction.” 65 Though the SG membership was in reality more complex than
mere “reactionaries,” consisting of a mix of people from former Fascists to pro-Italian Socialists
and unemployed pro-Yugoslav workers driven into its arms by desperation, it did exactly what the
AMG hoped, particularly after it received the official recognition of the Italian General
Confederation of Labor (CGIL) in January 1946: it divided the workforce and organized those
(comparatively few) individuals willing to challenge the SU’s hold over the CRDA. 66
Along with injecting a high degree of political animosity into the workshops, syndical
fission had the unintended consequences of forcing the SU to become an entirely “political”
syndicate, which in turn had a dramatic impact on the ordinary worker. In particular, it undermined
the leverage the SU could bring to bear in labor struggles and forced the SU to subordinate the
push for workplace transformation to the two-pronged political struggle of (1) abolishing the SG
entirely; and (2) securing Yugoslav annexation of the region. 67 As such, the SU quickly
subordinated the push to (re)abolish piecework to the exploitation of piecework frustration for
political gain. When SU leaders met in early 1946 for discussions prior to a period of collective
bargaining, the principal concern regarding piecework had suddenly become devising impossibly
large demands for piece-rate increases. In doing so, the SU hoped to force the Direction to bear
the stigma of having rejected worker demands and the SG to bear the stigma of having proposed
lesser revisions.68 The proposal that emerged accepted piecework as fact, ending any discussion
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of fundamentally restructuring work life. 69 As Giacomo Pellegrini noted in January 1946, the SU’s
politicization – and particularly its subordination of the push for workplace reforms to the demands
of the territorial question – isolated many “progressives” of the Monfalconese and elsewhere, for
whom concrete reforms had been and remained the primary objective. 70
In this context, the employees of the CRDA and of the Monfalconese’s other firms began
to line up behind one of these unions, with the political polarization largely (but not perfectly)
reflecting divisions within the workplace hierarchy. While workers of all skill levels tended to
favor the SU and the pro-Yugoslav organizations, the clerks and workshop heads overwhelming
joined the pro-Italian SG. Even in the winter of 1945/46, when pro-Yugoslav violence was quite
common, the enrollment figures for clerks, workshop heads, and directors in the SU and UAIS
remained shockingly low, only one-third joining the former and one-eighth the latter. By
comparison, eight in ten workers and team leaders belonged to the UAIS by December 1945.71
Given its pro-Italian stance and the high number of clerks among its members, the SG quickly
became the union of “Fascists” in the minds of many workers. As a militant named Semini would
later comment during an SU assembly, in his mind “the clerks enrolled in the SG are ex-Fascists
without exception.”72 For most workers, to be a clerk was to be pro-Italian and with the SG; to be
pro-Italian and with the SG was to endorse the existing “Fascist” system of labor. Though this
claim was objectively overstated, it is true that many leaders of the pro-Italian cause – including
the violent wing of the movement – were former Fascists (sometimes Fascists-turned-Actionists)
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who were clerks and workshop heads in the CRDA, as was Umberto M., a Piecework Office clerk
in the Electromechanical Department.73 PCRG attempts to convince workers that a portion of these
clerks might be broken off and welcomed into the UAIS bore little fruit. 74
With these tensions at the fore, a principal question that emerged was who would control
the purging of the worksites. Though the SU had continued to assert its own authority in directing
purges into the winter of 1945/46, insisting that it should even have the authority to remove
directors in firms with over 10 employees, the AMG did not accept this. Instead, the previous fall,
it had ordered the suspension of existing purge commissions and the retrial of cases that had passed
through the pro-Yugoslav judicial and syndical bodies. 75 Almost immediately, the AMG and its
courts (especially the appellate courts) had begun overturning existing verdicts and sentences, both
in high-profile trials of war criminals and collaborationists and those of workplace purges. From
late 1945 through 1946, a flood of purged foremen and bosses returned to work, often provoking
spontaneous strikes and violence. Thus, when the director of the CRDA’s railcar workshop,
Giovanni Giurissa, returned to work after the AMG found him to have “always conducted himself
in a fit and proper manner,” workers forcibly ejected him, refusing his readmittance. 76 For proYugoslavs, the restoration of these individuals – not to mention the hiring of former Fascists from
outside of the Monfalconese 77 – appeared an AMG-sanctioned attempt to break the pro-Yugoslav
network by restoring workplace “Fascism.” Only in extreme cases, such as the March-on-Rome
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participant Manlio Bigalia, did the AMG intervene to block the rehiring of such individuals. 78
The pro-Yugoslav organs were quick to criticize the failures of AMG purges and to point
out the return of “Fascists” to positions of authority in the workplace. Throughout the first half of
1946, the walls of the CRDA and other firms were plastered with broadsheets mocking AMG
purges.79 Yet a closer look at why purging failed in the CRDA reveals a much more complex reality
than the AMG simply turning a blind eye to Fascism. In reality, workers had a rather elastic view
of “Fascism,” and they themselves failed to perform the necessary tasks to provide the AMG with
sufficient evidence. Though occurring slightly later, the case of the foreman Vidotto demonstrates
how workers (especially pieceworkers) often associated domineering foremen with Fascism.
When Vidotto returned to the CRDA in March 1947 to oversee the riveters there, 150 riveters
engaged in a sit-down strike. Later AMG investigations revealed that “apparently the foreman
made them work hard [in the past], and after the workers had enjoyed much freedom due to politics
in the last eighteen months, this particular foreman’s return to work came as a rude shock to the
gallant riveters.”80 While the AMG dismissed this, asserting Vidotto’s blamelessness regarding
Fascism, the riveters insisted the question was one of purging – of dealing with Fascism. 81 Because
of this elasticity, already by January 1946, the pro-Yugoslav CRDA broadsheets felt compelled to
publish articles exhorting workers to fill out the formal statements (dichiarazioni) required by the
AMG as evidence for the purging of specific individuals. Workers simply were not doing so to the
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degree required.82 The PCRG instructed its militants to stop workers from issuing “collective
denunciations,” which, since they dealt with entire strata of the workforce rather than particular
individuals, had no juridical value in AMG courts. 83 This seems to be the meaning of Lt. Col.
Smuts’s February statement that workers throughout the CRDA were demanding not just a
“political epuration” – a purge of Fascist cardholders – but a “moral epuration,” most likely
referring to those having committed “Fascistic” actions or displayed “Fascist” tendencies. 84
As worker discontent continued to grow due to the rehiring of formerly purged employees
and the reconsolidation of the labor system inherited from the ventennio, the issue of purging
became more pressing. Behind closed doors, certain PCRG members debated the value of a
“direct” purge, with low-level militants often suggesting, as one Pieris militant did in February,
that the “workers who know the elements to purge should purge them by themselves, without
waiting for the consent of the factory committees or of other higher organs.”85 And many workers
agreed. That April, during a Party meeting, the liaison for the workers’ quarter of Panzano reported
the chilling fact that many in his neighborhood, seeing the “scandalous attitude of the authorities
regarding the Fascists,” supported “the methods of summary justice to eliminate the Fascists once
and for all.” However, the Party’s agent from Trieste quickly silenced talk of unsanctioned purging
and summary executions, deeming this an unviable strategy under AMG rule. 86 The fact remained,
however, that by early 1946 many workers believed the remaking of the workplace to be worth
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the spilling of blood.
A Spring of Tension, 1946
These debates over purges and summary justice took place amid an escalation of political
tensions in the spring of 1946. In March, the UN Border Commission arrived in Venezia Giulia,
foregrounding the territorial question once again. A product of the first peace conference in
September 1945, the commission was tasked with studying the ethnic composition of the region
and reporting to the foreign ministers who would serve as the ultimate arbiters of Monfalcone’s
fate. At that conference, the foreign ministers had decided a detailed ethnic survey was necessary
before drawing the border, and the Anglo-Americans were particularly intent on this.87 The most
effective way to keep Trieste out of Yugoslav – that is, Communist – hands was to reduce the
border question to one of ethnicity and make the case for the italianità of Trieste.88 For both proYugoslavs and pro-Italians, the Commission visit seemed a prime opportunity to sway the foreign
ministers’ minds through mass politics. Thus, the stage was set for a tense spring.
In the first months of 1946, the pro-Yugoslavs had begun preparing for this visit, clashing
regularly with the AMG in the process. By January, the AMG noted that extensive pro-Yugoslav
graffiti had popped up overnight, these illicit writings often calling for Yugoslav annexation,
claiming an aversion for Italy, and enumerating the local partisan who had given their lives fighting
with Tito’s forces.89 By February, the UAIS, on PCRG orders, had begun to construct celebratory
arches praising Tito and Yugoslavia, which quickly became targets of both AMG and wider proItalian destruction.90 In protest, the pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese held unauthorized
87
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demonstrations and marches, including a mid-February march that, in open defiance of AMG law,
surpassed 5000 participants and was too large for the AMG to attempt to disperse. 91
The commission thus arrived in Trieste with tensions on the rise locally, mirroring the rise
in tensions internationally. Winston Churchill had just defined Trieste as an endpoint of the
emerging Iron Curtain, and in this context, the Commission’s arrival immediately kindled
resentment that suffused pro-Yugoslav circles. In Servola, a Slovene-majority neighborhood of
Trieste, the AMG’s police force, the VGPC, clashed with Slovenes who had illegally hung a
Yugoslav flag from a neighborhood church. The clash ended with the police opening fire, killing
two and wounding seventeen.92 This “Servola Incident,” sparked a brief general strike, as well as
massive pro-Yugoslav demonstrations and marches in Trieste. The participants numbered in the
tens of thousands, often brawling with pro-Italian counter-demonstrations. 93
In the Monfalconese, too, the incident turned slow-burning resentments into a full-fledged
conflagration. Monfalcone’s pro-Yugoslavs briefly went on strike, but, more importantly, they
also took to the streets and piazza, continuing to demonstrate through the last day of March, with
tens arrested for assaulting either members of the VGPC or the participants in small, pro-Italian
counter-demonstrations. 94 The PCRG added fuel to the fire when it circulated a commentary on
Stalin’s rebuttal of Churchill, reminding monfalconesi that they stood on the fault line where “the
forces of revolution and reaction converge and face off.” 95 The March tensions climaxed with a
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mass rally in Monfalcone in favor of Italo-Slavic fraternity and Yugoslav annexation, estimated
(likely over-optimistically) at 20,000 participants by the PCRG. 96 Though tempers cooled over the
Servola Incident in April, the response showed that popular frustrations with the AMG’s treatment
of the “remnants of Fascism” and of local reform initiatives had generated an explosive situation.
Failed Reconstruction, Frustrated Ambitions, and Youth Departures
As tempers cooled over Servola, there emerged a new source of frustration: the failures of
AMG economic policy. Though the AMG’s range of action was limited by physical damage to
industrial plants, a shortage of industrial raw materials and fuel sources that lasted through winter
1946/47, and the difficulty of helping the CRDA secure contracts given the great uncertainty over
its territorial fate, the AMG generally failed to revive the Julian economy, subordinating the needs
of long-term reconstruction to the short-term management of public order.97 In fact, one of the first
economic policies of the AMG had been to block layoffs in July 1945 to prevent political
radicalization. Yet persistent economic difficulties left many firms in precarious financial
circumstances, especially those forced to retain employees while having few contracts. 98 Among
the worst affected was the CRDA, which in 1945 regularly threatened the AMG with insolvency. 99
As the tension between managing unemployment and the threat of major bankruptcies
reached a breaking point in early 1946, the AMG felt compelled to devise a new labor policy.
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Under tremendous pressure from the CRDA and other Julian firms, the AMG issued Order 106,
lifting the ban on layoffs, allowing the CRDA to lay off a fifth of its workforce, and attempting to
absorb the mass of soon-to-be jobless in temporary AMG public works projects.100 In the
Monfalconese, the effects were devastating. Unemployment, which already affected 1000
residents in Monfalcone alone, rose by 50% in many villages, remaining in the high 20s throughout
the following year.101
Though the AMG’s public works programs soon provided work to a substantial number of
(but not all) unemployed monfalconesi, the very nature of the work soon became a problem. 102
These workers performed a variety of tasks including clearing debris from the CRDA, demolishing
air raid shelters, reforestation, and land reclamation. 103 In the largest of these projects, the
reclamation of the Punta Sdobba just west of Monfalcone, some 1000 skilled workers laid off from
the CRDA were to perform land reclamation labor.104 Though these projects provided workers
with the means to survive, they fell short of meeting worker aspirations for dignified, proud work.
It was employment that, for workers highly conscious of gradations of prestige and skill between
various crafts, represented a complete loss of meaningful labor, a culmination of the deskilling
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process so closely associated with Fascism. 105 The projects created a “restlessness” among these
“workers turned into farmhands.” 106 Thus, as top AMG officials pushed this policy, the
Monfalcone CAO, Maj. Kitson-Harris, realized a more drastic solution was necessary, as “the
unemployed craftsman is not content to use hands in digging holes in the ground to earn his daily
bread, when that task can be left to the unskilled labourer.”107
Particularly hard hit by these economic conditions were the youth. With the April layoffs,
many families compelled their young workers to cede their posts voluntarily in order to protect the
jobs of more experienced (and higher-paid) brothers and fathers. 108 This only exacerbated the
limitation of career opportunities that youth had faced since 1943, when the CRDA put a virtual
freeze on apprenticeship programs due to a surfeit of skilled labor.109
The effects were devastating, not only for this substratum of the workforce, but also for the
pro-Yugoslav organizations. Within a month of the layoffs, some 90% of garibaldini in the CRDA
lost their jobs, among them almost the entirety of the Antifascist Youth (UGARG) and Communist
Youth (GC) leadership.110 Moreover, certain youth began to leave the SU and sign up for the SG,
hoping that the SG’s closer ties to the CRDA management would secure them re-employment.111
But beyond these organizational concerns, such developments were dangerous in the PCRG’s eyes
because the mass of unemployed youth became both increasingly aggressive and radical in their
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approach and, simultaneously, more difficult to control. Just two months after the layoffs began,
Bersa indicated that the situation had reached a near-crisis point, having become
notably aggravated because of the layoffs and the economic maneuvers of the Direction of
the CRDA. Similar reactionary maneuvers have provoked a noisy discontent, such that, if
the P[arty] does not exercise a strong hold over the masses… could lead to violent actions.
Only with the direct intervention of the P[arty] has it managed to avoid some serious
trouble. The youthful masses hardest hit by the layoffs were disposed to a thorough assault
on the Direction of the shipyard and against the little Julian Camera [the SG]. They wanted
to overthrow everything and in this they were supported by all the masses hit by the layoffs,
not to mention by the extremist element, which goes into raptures when it comes to inciting
others to action.112

As the PCRG’s hold over the mass of unemployed youth waned, many young monfalconesi
sought to solve their job problems with their feet, most often looking to Tito’s Yugoslavia. One
was Renato Rigonat, who had entered the CRDA workforce in 1938 at the age of fourteen, quickly
gaining the designation of qualified worker in his capacity as a mechanical fitter (aggiustatore
meccanico). Following the Special Tribunal’s conviction of his older brother, Desiderio, for
Communist infiltration of the military in 1941, the Fascists of Monfalcone severely beat Renato,
inspiring him to join Monfalcone’s Communist network, initiated by his mistro, Luciano Gratton.
In his early twenties, Renato became a key participant in the “Montes” Intendency and, after
liberation, a chief pro-Yugoslav orator. In mid-March 1946, however, his family received news
that either he or his father would be laid off effective 1 April. Renato immediately ceded his
position. For two weeks he searched for work, but, failing to find another job before 1 April, he
made a sudden departure. He left on the day of his termination in hope of finding work at the
Fiume shipyard, and two days later, alone in the city so valorized in the myth of Yugoslavia,

PCRG-CDM, “XI relazione quindicinale sulla situazione politica del distretto,” 29 May 1946, b 8, f 2. Ottone
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[Yugoslavia],” diplayed an “autonomistic tendency.” PCRG-V Rione, “Relazione politica mensile,” 29 June 1946,
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Renato was hired as a machine miller (fresatore).113
Rigonat’s experiences were not atypical. When the teenager Silvano Cosolo returned home
to Pieris in 1945 after having spent what should have been his apprenticing years in a German
concentration camp, he found neither an apprenticeship, nor an unskilled labor position.
Unemployed and increasingly hounded by pro-Italians for his participation in the pro-Yugoslav
struggle, Cosolo departed for Yugoslavia in the summer of 1946. With the help of a local SU guide,
he crossed the forested border by foot, passing through Fiume before settling in Sarajevo, where
he found employment in a rail stock workshop.114
Between April and May, tens, if not hundreds of young monfalconesi made similar
decisions to depart, almost all of them unemployed and almost all single young men without wives
or children. 115 A large percentage had served as garibaldini and participated in the pro-Yugoslav
movement (often as PCRG militants) in the year between the war’s end and their departure.
Though a handful sought out Western European or South American destinations, 116 the vast
majority crossed into Yugoslavia to seek work in places that ranged from the nearby and culturallyfamiliar ports cities of Pola (Pula) and Fiume to the distant inland capitals of Sarajevo and
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Belgrade. Their departures resulted from the combination (in varying ratios) of commitment to the
Yugoslav Communist experiment, frustration with the PCRG’s failure to make good on the
perceived promises of the Resistance, a refusal to perform the unskilled (even debasing) labor
available through the AMG’s stopgap public works projects, and a desire to not burden alreadystressed family economies. As the CRDA implemented its workforce reduction plan that spring,
the departure of single, jobless men for Yugoslavia became a steady, if slow trickle.
For the PCRG, such departures were unacceptable, as they meant that gifted and trusted
militants like Rigonat were no longer at the disposal of the pro-Yugoslav cause. Luckily for the
Party, these departures coincided roughly with the announcement in Yugoslavia of an important
new initiative of the Tito regime: the Brčko-Banovići Youth Railway. Constructed entirely by
(Communist) Youth Labor Brigades from Yugoslavia and around the world, this railway was to
link coal-rich, but inaccessible stretches of eastern Bosnia to the budding Yugoslav industries in
Belgrade. The Youth Railway initiative offered to the Party a way to harness this disorganized
flow of youthful emigrants – to assure that this mass of unemployed youth, much of which was
increasingly alienated from the Party, remained enrolled in Party organizations and, equally
importantly, returned to continue the pro-Yugoslav fight after having given their labor.
The Party thus aggressively recruited unemployed youths for two-month shifts on railway
construction. Utilizing appeals ranging from the youth’s duty to be emissaries of Italo-Yugoslav
reconciliation to more concrete promises of work skill acquisition and five daily meals, militants
like Mario Tonzar of the Communist Youth recruited monfalconesi for labor and helped direct the
Brigades in action.117 In the end, the monfalconesi contributed substantially to the ranks of three

For each of these appeals, see, respectively “La ferrovia della gioventù,” Il Lavoratore, 18 June 1946 and “La
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different Youth Labor Brigades that worked on the Brčko-Banovići line. Internal reports of the
Antifascist Youth (UGARG) suggest that the number of volunteers on the Brčko-Banovići line
reached “hundreds” (a centinaia).118 Coupled with the somewhat disorganized flow of Rigonats
and Cosolos, the Youth Brigade participants comprised a community of hundreds of young, single,
jobless monfalconesi who arrived in Yugoslavia by the end of 1946, most often imagining their
stay as temporary.
The War of Cooperatives and the Politics of Shopping
Coinciding with the departure of these youth was an apparent mellowing of the political
situation in the Monfalconese in the final months of spring. Once the UN Border Commission left
and the initial tremors of the Servola Incident and April layoffs subsided, people turned their focus
back to the difficulties of everyday life. Even in the shipyard, the AMG noted an increase in
“sobriety,” so that “now the management are again at the helm, and their internal police are
exercising proper control.”119 However, this mellowing was more apparent then real. Instead, the
focal point of the struggle had merely shifted out of the streets and workshops and back into the
marketplace, where widespread frustration over the AMG’s policies toward food, rationing, and
prices had continued to serve as a source of popular mobilization.
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Sustaining popular frustration was the fact that neither the availability of unrationed foods,
nor the AMG’s ration policy had improved substantially since the food riots of summer 1945. In
fact, by spring 1946, the AMG had essentially given up on efforts to crack down on the black
market or even to check the massive inflation that plagued the legal free market. AMG officials
calculated that the average Zone A resident consumed 400 black- or free-market calories per day
and viewed this as an essential supplement to the 800-calorie daily ration, itself incapable of
sustaining human life over the long term. Even the AMG’s Chief Food Officer urged the AMG to
turn a blind eye to the phenomenon, suggesting that the tacit acceptance of the black market was
necessary from a “human point of view” and that most of the black-marketed goods originated in
Italy, anyways. 120 Such a solution to the food crisis inherently disadvantaged the poor, most of
whom, including the bulk of monfalconesi, could not afford these vital 400 daily calories from the
free market.121 Instead, they relied almost exclusively on the 800-calorie starvation ration, which
was notably smaller than rations in Germany, where by February 1946 even the lowest ration tier
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– that reserved for former Nazis – consisted of 1088 daily calories.122 Where they could,
monfalconesi scraped together a few supplemental calories, but doing so involved engaging with
black-marketeers or with seemingly extortionary shopkeepers who, in the eyes of workers,
continued the “Fascist” practice of exploiting crisis for their own enrichment.
Given these conditions and persistent marketplace agitation (if not rioting) through the turn
of 1946, the PCRG rightly viewed the redress of marketplace grievances as a primary means by
which it could mobilize pro-Yugoslav forces.123 Thus, while the pro-Yugoslav organizations had
engaged in an extended fight for increased and inflation-adjusted earnings, extended price controls,
and an increased state role in the provisioning of food, shoes, clothing, and other basic goods124 –
changes which the SU and the bulk of workers defined as criteria of an economy of “impartiality,
comprehension, and justice” 125 – they had also spent the fall of 1945 elaborating an alternative
vision of commerce that promised radically to improve workers’ ability to secure the goods they
needed to survive. This vision emerged most clearly in a November 1945 AgitProp piece, which
provided Party militants with their central talking points as they discussed marketplace grievances
with fellow townspeople as they shopped, worked, ate, drank, and went about everyday life. The
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piece observed that the reactionary AMG “does not move a finger to eradicate the black market
and the illicit earnings of the profiteers” and stressed the AMG’s partial free-market system merely
assured “the uncontrolled increase in prices that widens evermore the distance between these and
wages.” More importantly, it put forward a vision of exchange that dovetailed with widespread
worker frustration aimed at shopkeepers, implicitly postulating an alternative in which commerce
by individuals had given way to direct exchange between classes of producers. It called for action,
urging workers to join with the peasants, who had demonstrated their “notable anti-Fascism” by
“creat[ing] cooperatives to help themselves along with the workers.” In essence, the piece marked
the commencement of an offensive to restructure the town’s commercial system along cooperative
lines and to extirpate long-resented “remnants of Fascism.” 126
In the eyes of many monfalconesi, the dire conditions of everyday life lent credence to the
need for such transformations, though the struggle was not without historical antecedents. Neither
monfalconesi, nor giuliani generally were strangers to the idea of consumer cooperatives. 127 Before
the Great War, the Socialists of the region had helped found the Workers’ Cooperatives of Trieste,
Istria, and Friuli (CO), which it sought to use as a tool of class struggle. The cooperative had
enrolled many monfalconesi before Mussolini’s regime “Fascistized” it in 1935, selling much of
the stock to the region’s large banks and subordinating it to the Fascist Ministry of Corporations. 128
In the immediate postwar, after the de-Fascistization of the CO statutes, the PCRG had launched
a campaign to retake the cooperative, primarily by enrolling “progressives” and electing a
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favorable council, but this push failed even before the arrival of winter 1945/46. 129 Despite this
failure, over the course of the campaign the cooperative issue had revealed itself to be highly
popular in the Monfalconese, with likely over 2000 heads-of-household enrolling in the CO by the
time of defeat.130 It was precisely as this moment, then, that monfalconesi began looking for other
options to realize their cooperative vision and combat local shopkeepers.
By November 1945, the PCRG’s district leadership and the SU decided to try their hand at
forming a new consumer cooperative, the Laborers’ Consumer Cooperative of the Monfalconese
(Cooperativa di Consumo Lavoratori del Monfalconese, CCLM). 131 This cooperative was to be
independent of the CO, flanked by local agricultural cooperatives, including one in Staranzano. 132
Though the creation of the CCLM initially went unnoticed by the AMG, it soon became a key tool
for unifying the pro-Yugoslav movement. In its first months, the CCLM (and wider cooperative
push) became the subject of an intense propaganda and membership campaign, often merging with
efforts to construct the myth of Yugoslavia. 133 Local UAIS branches energetically disseminated
this vision to every street corner and factory workshop, urging workers to sign up for the CCLM
and presenting the replacement of private commerce with cooperatives as an essential part of the
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“struggle against the remnants of Fascism.” 134 Though there seems to be no surviving
documentation from the CCLM from which one might learn its membership figures, PCRG
sources suggest that large swaths of the population were receptive to the idea and that far more
monfalconesi joined the new cooperative than had joined the CO.135 This popularity led Ruggero
Bersa to describe the CCLM as a tool “of first-rate political importance” for the pro-Yugoslavs,136
asserting in late 1946 that “the greater part of the workers” had joined. 137
The significance of the CCLM was not lost on the zone’s pro-Italian faction, which
recognized immediately the cooperative’s role in mobilizing the pro-Yugoslavs. To counteract the
PCRG’s new tool, the pro-Italian SG quickly formed its own consumer cooperative, the Labor
Cooperative (Cooperativa del Lavoro, CL). Founded the very same month as the CCLM, this
cooperative aimed to sell basic goods at below-market costs “for the ends of Italian propaganda”
and to splinter the pro-Yugoslav movement. It received subsidies from Italian governments led by
Parri and De Gasperi, which even ordered all Italian prefects “to facilitate the transport of goods
acquired in the respective provinces to Trieste” and pressured producers and wholesalers “to
concede every possible aid” to this cooperative. 138 Many of the latter obliged, fearing for their
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businesses should Yugoslavia annex the Monfalconese. 139
What had emerged by late 1945, then, was a situation in which everyday shopping was
intensely politically charged. For many who joined the CCLM, their choice marked a commitment
to the fundamental reordering of commerce and of the shopping experiences that went with it;
those who joined the CL, by contrast, represented in pro-Yugoslavs’ minds the fragmentation and
enervation of this push. Thus, the PCRG responded to the CL challenge by propagandizing on
behalf of the CCLM in the streets and workshops. In a CRDA workshop, broadsheets decried the
CL as a “perfidious reactionary means” of those who, “not able to divide us in the political field,
try to subjugate us in the economic field.” It warned workers that “to adhere to the Julian
Syndicates means to prepare the ground for the rebirth of a new Fascism.” Such a seemingly
innocuous decision in fact would serve to welcome back
bitter tears of blood, bestial exploitation of the people, confinement, torture and death of
our best comrades…. To adhere to the Julian Syndicates means to sell yourself and your
family to the enemies of the people, to betray your own class for a fleeting well-being, for
a miserable dose of oil and fat at a better price: as Judas betrayed Christ for a small sum. 140

In the struggle between the cooperatives, it was the CCLM that clearly gained the upper hand.
However, driven by differing mixtures of desperation and pro-Italian sentiments, some 1500
monfalconesi enrolled in the CL, this membership holding steady through 1946.141
Though the campaign against the CL was relatively straightforward for the PCRG, the
broader politics of shopping were not, particularly because the defeat of the CL was less a concern
for most pro-Yugoslavs than the battle the CCLM would wage with the Monfalconese’s
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commercial middle class. This posed a problem for the PCRG. On the one hand, the Party viewed
the CCLM as a primary reason for workers to join the pro-Yugoslav movement; on the other, the
CCLM had the potential to generate a new host of enemies: the private shopkeepers. In fact, though
shopkeepers had emerged early as opponents of the pro-Yugoslav movement, they largely had
refrained from actively expressing this opposition. 142 As the PCRG understood it, shopkeepers and
other groupings of the middle classes (ceti medi) were “not all decidedly partaking in the [proItalian struggle” because “they have need of the people and are afraid of the people. They would
like Italy, but they do not put out flags and they do not make chauvinist manifestations for fear of
losing their clientele.” 143 As the CCLM’s growth emboldened workers bent on destroying private
(“Fascist”) commerce and concretely harmed shopkeeper’s material interests, it thus threatened to
transform shopkeepers’ passive opposition to the pro-Yugoslav movement into active opposition.
To prevent this, the PCRG carried out a two-pronged propaganda campaign in the first of
1946. This campaign aimed simultaneously (1) to convince the shopkeeper that the CCLM’s
primary target in its commercial war was the wholesaler (grossista), a target which the shopkeeper
allegedly shared;144 and (2) to minimize working-class consumers’ resentment toward shopkeepers
by explaining high prices in local shops as the result of wholesaler greed. 145 Despite extensive
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efforts, the campaign bore little fruit, and instead the rapid expansion of the CCLM caused
shopkeepers to abandon their feigned neutrality. 146 This became especially clear in the spring of
1946 when the CCLM began selling rationed goods, cutting in on shopkeepers’ most reliable
source of business and driving many to combat the cooperatives head-on.147
The conflict climaxed in June. Early that month, CAO Kitson-Harris indicated that once
again “the black market, or in a more genteel phraseology the ‘free market’,” had become “a cause
of serious political grievance” and that shopkeeper-consumer antagonism was again reaching a
boiling point. He warned that “the great temptation now flaunted before the people’s eyes of shop
windows amply laden with food at exorbitant prices” had driven a constant stream of wives and
mothers into his office demanding the suppression of black and free markets and an end to an
economy in which there was “one rule for the rich, and another for the poor.”148 It was shortly
thereafter, as both discontent with shopkeepers and support for radical alternatives continued to
grow that the former realized they needed to change tack to safeguard their long-term interests.
Thus, they gathered a substantial amount of capital − L2,000,000 by the PCRG’s estimate − with
the aim of engaging in a protracted price war with the CCLM, seeking to undercut its prices and
drive it out of operation. With this development, pro-Yugoslav workers were forced to decide
between remaining loyal to the idea of consumer cooperation at great personal cost or purchasing
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their basic goods at suddenly-reduced prices from the very shopkeepers they had long deemed
“Fascists.” According to PCRG reports, the members of the CCLM generally remained loyal to
the cooperative, but this commercial showdown led shopkeepers to more openly and hostilely
engage with pro-Yugoslavs during everyday interactions:
We have done everything that was humanly possible to reconcile the shopkeepers with the
laboring masses, but all our attempts and all our work have not achieved much… The
comportment of the near-totality of the merchants is hostile to the people (who want
Yugoslavia and popular power) and this feeling of theirs led them to mock those who wore
(and still wear) the red star on their chest.… This fact goes to show that the people are not
wrong if they do not want to use many of the shops of reactionaries.… All the shopkeepers,
save a few individuals, are members of the disreputable National League and make of their
shops shady centers of infamous anti-Slavic propaganda.149

Observing these antagonistic relations, which very well may have led to discriminatory treatment
of pro-Yugoslavs as they shopped,150 Ottone Zanolla, head of the PCRG in Ronchi, commented
that there existed a “profound abyss” between workers and shopkeepers. 151 Such resistance of
shopkeepers to cooperation only reinforced the idea that shopkeepers were participants in an
egoistic and “Fascist” form of commerce.
In addition to the divide between workers and shopkeepers, by mid-1946 there had also
emerged a gap between the PCRG strategy and popular visions. Party leaders noted critically that
low-level militants and UAIS supporters − and particularly the increasingly large body of
unemployed youth − had a certain “extremist” or “leftist” attitude in regards to shopkeepers,
clashing with them openly and harming the PCRG’s efforts to construct a broad pro-Yugoslav
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front.152 On the one hand, the PCRG’s strategy, which attempted to bring petty retailers into the
pro-Yugoslav alliance by displacing blame for commercial hardships onto the wholesalers,
contradicted popular hopes for post-Fascist commerce and clashed with the daily experiences of
ordinary monfalconesi, for whom the shopkeeper was the quotidian point of contact and the only
observable culprit behind skyrocketing prices. On the other, the CCLM simply lacked the
economic and political backing necessary to live up to popular expectations and fundamentally
transform the Monfalconese’s commerce. As shopkeepers purposefully deflated their prices in
June and as the SG offered select low-price goods subsidized by the Italian state, the PCRG
dedicated substantial effort to maintaining support for the CCLM and preparing workers for a
protracted struggle.153 By August, the CCLM’s funds began to fail and it was forced to reduce its
range of goods to simple food products.154 By late 1946, the push for a fundamental restructuring
of commerce in the Monfalconese had failed. The CCLM would continue to operate, but always
fighting a rearguard action, reduced to a shell of its former self. As the cooperative moderated its
ambitions, monfalconesi once again had to turn to the prohibitively expensive black and free
markets. They looked longingly to the east, asking why they should have to live without those
transformations which they knew had so radically improved Yugoslavs’ daily lives. In this, the
myth of Yugoslavia had outrun its utility, becoming a source of discord and disillusionment among

In January 1946, Bersa indicated that the Party was struggling to convince workers to abandon “the narrow field
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the faithful rather than one of inspiration.
Food, Exchange, and Popular Radicalism
But before the cooperative dream died entirely, a flash of violent protest in late June made
Kitson-Harris’s warning seem prophetic and lent credence to the notion that many monfalconesi
were enamored by the vision of the peasant-worker alliance and cooperativistic commerce.
Longstanding attempts by the sharecroppers (mezzadri) to renegotiate their contracts with their
landlords reached a boiling point, with sharecroppers demanding a 75-25 split and landlords,
backed by the AMG, insisting on the even split negotiated under the Fascist regime. 155 This type
of demand was not new − during the biennio rosso the sharecroppers had issued even more radical
demands for a 90-10 split − but by May and June 1946, a certain portion of the sharecroppers
backed by the PCRG and SU withheld their grain in pursuit of renegotiation. Their cause received
a propagandistic boost when AMG policemen confronted and allegedly mistreated two Turriaco
sharecroppers, before returning to arrest them days later.156
While allowing the pro-Yugoslav forces to cast AMG police as participating in a renewed
form of squadrismo, these events also sparked rage among workers at the AMG’s failure to address
marketplace grievances. On 24 June, a large crowd of workers gathered in the main piazza of
Monfalcone, demanding, in the words of the Monfalcone city CAO, “work, bread and houses” and
particularly upset about food availability and prices.157 A delegation of disgruntled sharecroppers,
having spoken to the CAO and been sent away with promises that their complaints would be
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transmitted to Trieste, joined them and returned to the piazza. It began to rile up the workers,
shouting “we are tired of promises!” and calling for the crowd to march on the AMG prison and
free the two arrested sharecroppers.158 The crowd of workers proved receptive, indicating that they
understood their own protests over food and prices to be consonant with that of the peasants to
keep their produce out of the hands of the large landholders and merchants. They formed into a
column, which advanced on the prison, broke down the external gate, and assaulted the inner doors.
Before the crowd could breach the doors, AMG police and Allied MPs arrived in armored cars and
intervened with a “liberal” use of their truncheons until the crowd was dispersed. Seven policemen
and an unknown number of demonstrators sustained injuried in the process.159
In the aftermath of this incident, the PCRG would have difficulty assessing the meaning of
the event, as well as its own standing with the wider population. Though the AMG assumed that
the PCRG had ordered the protest and proceeded to arrest known Party leaders, the reality was
very different. Ruggero Bersa took this as decisive proof that the workers had become conscious
of how their own fate was tied to “struggling for the rights of the peasants” and thus of their
conviction in the peasant-worker alliance closely tied to the cooperativistic vision. 160 Yet
comments of the UDAIS leader Nerina betray that the Party neither sanctioned, nor directed this
violence. Instead, Nerina, in concurrence with Ottone Zanolla, lamented that the willingness to
take direct action to resolve market grievances betrayed “a strong extremism among the masses”
and showed that the Party had much work to do to promote the cross-class, pro-Yugoslav unity
line.161 This riot − a major escalation in popular antagonism with the AMG − highlights the role
Valerio Beltrame (Ario) (AgitProp, PCRG-IV Rione), “Manifestazione a Monfalcone contro la disoccupazione e
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of continual hunger and marketplace resentments in pushing monfalconesi into spontaneous,
unsanctioned street activism that further unraveled the town’s social fabric.
The “Twelve Days Strike,” July 1946
Hunger was not the sole factor that heightened tensions as Monfalcone entered the hot
summer of 1946. Shortly after the UN Border Commission had departed from Venezia Giulia, the
fourth meeting of the foreign ministers had begun in Paris, the Anglo-Americans now armed with
the ammunition to prove (according to their ethnic calculus) that Trieste should not be Yugoslav.
After some discussion, the foreign ministers accepted a revised version of the French border
proposal, in which Italy would retain the urban centers of Monfalcone and Gorizia but lose the
hinterlands to the east. In addition, they announced a critical revision to the French proposal: the
coastal areas stretching from Duino in the north to Cittanova (Novigrad) in the south – an area
including Trieste city – would not be allocated to either claimant, but instead would become an
independent country called the Free Territory of Trieste (Figure 12).162
When word of this agreement reached the Monfalconese in late June, it satisfied very few.
Pro-Italians fumed at the allocation of Istria to Yugoslavia, while pro-Yugoslavs felt the ministers
had deliberately ignored their claims. For the pro-Yugoslavs, however, an opportunity to make
their dissatisfaction known came just days later in the form of an annual bike race, the Giro d’Italia,
which was to pass through Monfalcone on its way to Trieste. Viewing the race’s passage to Trieste
as an act of pro-Italian propaganda, a group of PCRG militants from Pieris, under orders from
Trieste, set out to stop the cyclists at the Isonzo. They spread nails and a chain-link fence along
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the road, temporarily stopping the race. As police intervened, they threw stones and fired pistols
at police and cyclists, eliciting return fire. When the dust settled, four cyclists had been wounded,
two policemen shot, several onlookers injured, the race stalled, and the attackers escaped.163
As news of the attack arrived in Trieste, followed closely by the Triestine team – the only
cyclists to continue the race – the city and then Zone A descended into chaos.164 The SG called a
protest strike against pro-Yugoslav violence, while bands of armed pro-Italians formed in Trieste
and began beating Slovenes and pro-Yugoslavs, as well as assaulting Slovenian schools, shops,
and cultural sites.165 For the pro-Yugoslavs, this violence smacked of a renewed squadrismo, and
thus the SU called its own general strike, which soon overshadowed that of the SG.166 Though the
SU quickly issued a set of economic demands to skirt AMG bans on political striking, the AMG
immediately (and correctly) interpreted the strike as political – as an attempt to embarrass the
AMG and impress upon the foreign ministers the strength of the pro-Yugoslav current.167 It
declared the strike illegal and issued an ultimatum to the strike committee leaders to call it off.
When the committee refused, the AMG arrested these leaders in Trieste, along with those it called
the “Big Five” of the Monfalconese pro-Yugoslav movement.168
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In the Monfalconese, the pro-Yugoslav organizations sank the entirety of their resources
into the strike, and participation in the strike was outstanding, in large part because workers
conceptualized the strike not just as a strike for Yugosalvia, but also as one against Fascism.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, participation was highly colored by the worker-clerk divide.
According to AMG figures, which tracked the strike only from its eighth day (8 July), on that day
the strike had a 73% success rate among workers (4756 of 6545), though only 18% of clerks stayed
home (184 of 1005).169 To maintain adhesion to the strike, the pro-Yugoslav organizations used
both the carrot and the stick. The UAIS and the CCLM orchestrated the free distribution of flour,
sugar, and fats to strikers as a “carrot,” much of it smuggled in from Zone B.170 Concurrently, the
UAIS formed enforcement squads, which patrolled the streets to turn back workers attempting to
get the industrial sites and performed home checks of SU enrollees.
Toward their “Fascist” enemies – the “scabs,” members of the SG, and members of the
pro-Italian political parties – these squads were often violent, patrolling the CRDA to beat and
threaten anyone they found on site and sometimes entering people’s homes to threaten them into
staying away. 171 A large proportion of each of these groups of perceived enemies were clerks, and
thus strike rhetoric took on a decidedly anti-clerk inflection, reinforcing the close relationship
between the associational nexus of clerks-piecework-Italy-Fascism. Particularly active in
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reinforcing this theme were workplace broadsheets, which, though tied to the PCRG, were written
by low-level militants, reflecting worker interpretations of the strike. In one such sheet, a worker
referring to himself as the “flea of the First [Naval] Department” reported the high turnout of SGloyal clerks from that department’s Piecework Office for work on the first day of the strike. The
author indicated that two of them, when confronted by certain “anti-Fascists” who asked them to
join the strike lest they be considered bolsterers of the Fascist system, retorted dismissively “then
we’re Fascists” and continued to work.172 In the same issue, the “flea” also attempted to link the
piecework clerks with the pro-Italian cause, mocking Umberto Zuccolin, the head of the pro-Italian
CLN and a clerk in the Labor Cost Office, as “comrade timekeeper Zuccolin.” The “flea,” after
reminding readers of how a select few good clerks in the Piecework Offices had helped workers
manipulate piecework reporting to aid the OF, also reminded them that Zuccolin, by contrast, had
“always wanted to be ‘informed’” of these activities even in a time when “no one wanted to be
‘informed.’” The article thus linked the pro-Italian movement to “Fascistic” forms of labor
organization and implied that Zuccolin had been a spy for management rather than a true antiFascist.173 In this context, clerks began rightly to fear for their physical safety.
At times, the strike spilled over from the workplace into the streets and marketplace. Such
was the case on 5 July, when, according to an internal strike committee report, a large mass of
monfalconesi gathered for an unauthorized demonstration in the central piazza, only to be
dispersed with the “most brutal methods” of the Anglo-American forces, including a “savage
charge” of club-swinging policemen and soldiers.174 The Strike Committee responded publicly by
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issuing a bulletin mocking the AMG’s “democracy” as little more than the Anglo-Americans
ruling with “an attitude of colonial master.”175 In a more immediate sense, various garibaldini and
youth present at the gathering shouted bitterly that this certainly was not the democracy they had
been promised, after which a group “detached themselves from the manifestation and quickly
lashed out against the businesses that still were open, manhandling the violators of the strike who
could be found there” until all shops were closed. 176 And this violence against shopkeepers was
not an isolated phenomenon. During the strike, low-level PCRG militants – particularly youth –
had repeatedly demanded that the Party authorize their formation into action squads, which were
to vandalize shops that remained open for business. However, the PCRG rejected this
“opportunism” and “extremism” as contrary to its cross-class unity line and leaders such as Bersa
and Comar began instead to consider a purge of such “extremists” from its own ranks. 177
Monfalcone and Zone A remained in this state of disorder for twelve days, but by 11 July,
the pro-Yugoslav leadership had realized the strike was unsustainable. On the one hand, the AMG
had arrested many key pro-Yugoslav organizers, and many ordinary pro-Yugoslavs had been
unsettled by violent confrontation with the forces of order. On the other, resources were running
low, and continuing the strike risked alienating desperate workers who needed these daily
earnings. 178 As a result, the Strike Committee announced that the strike would end at midnight of
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12 July, emphasizing that it had been successful in demonstrating the workers’ intolerance of both
the “remnants of Fascism” and the AMG’s seeming protection of these remnants. 179 Within Party
circles, Bersa promised that, though “the strike is suspended, the struggle against Fascism
continues.” Like the Strike Committee, he reiterated that the strike had succeeded in demonstrating
the popular will that Zone A go to Yugoslavia and reinvigorating the pro-Yugoslav movement.180
Of course, the fact that Bersa had to clarify that the strike was a success belied the fact that it had
accomplished little. It had failed to resolve workers’ workplace or marketplace grievances and
worsened the material conditions of its already-destitute participants.
In the Aftermath of the Strike: Violence and Disillusionment
Though the cessation of the strike on 12 July provided the AMG with a brief respite, the
lull was only temporary. The strike unleashed the antipathy between the strata of the workplace
hierarchy in the CRDA, the Solvay, and elsewhere, and when SU-loyal workers returned to work,
a violent aftershock played out on the shop floors. Though some SG loyalists had prepared for this
violence, forming their own action squads equipped with pistols and grenades, 181 UAIS action
squads perpetrated a wave of attacks against supposed “Fascist” scabs and clerks, which paralyzed
the firm. 182 In the Shipbuilding Department, where a shocking 38.2% of workers belonged to the
PCRG and 87.6% to the UAIS,183 returning pro-Yugoslavs hung six large Yugoslav and Italian
red-starred flags from the cranes and bloodied several of their SG-loyal coworkers during the first
hours of work. Pro-Yugoslavs of the aeronautical workshops did similarly, prompting police
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intervention. When police arrived, electrical department workers struck, depriving the worksite of
electricity and paralyzing production. By day’s end, pro-Yugoslavs had posted lists of scabs
throughout the CRDA, promising each a “just” punishment, and though management responded
by declaring a suspension of work, many workers refused to leave until late that evening. When
they returned the following day, the violence continued, and management declared a lockout.184
With the complete breakdown of order within the worksites, the AMG faced a difficult
situation. Its longstanding strategy of fostering the SG as an alternative to the SU had proven
insufficient, and it faced pressure from the SG and CRDA Direction to take a more active role in
breaking the pro-Yugoslavs. The Direction, for example, requested the stationing of troops in the
workshops, the banning of pro-Yugoslav broadsheets, the dissolution of the SU Factory
Committee and removal of its offices from the worksite, and the depoliticization of the worksite
by stripping away all political symbols. 185 For many AMG officers, however, this violence
provided the justification for a more aggressive and long-anticipated crackdown. According to
CAO Kitson-Harris, the lockout “amounted to the salient fact that the Management had decided
quite rightly to pass the ‘buck’ back to A.M.G.,” a maneuver that, “quite unofficially of course…,
may have been whispered into the Directors’ ears many months ago.”186
Thus, on 19 July, the AMG sent troops to restore order in the CRDA, placing it under
military occupation and granting full control to Lt. Col. Foden, the AMG’s Chief Industry and
Utilities Officer. SCAO Bowman granted Foden authority unilaterally to fire, remove, or arrest
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anyone found causing disorder in the worksite, as well as to strip the shipyard of the red-starred
flags and giant red stars that the SU workers had erected throughout the site. 187 Immediately upon
arrival of the soldiers, violence ceased, the SU committee “voluntarily” removing its symbols with
“no protest or ill-will shewn [sic].”188 Within a week, however, the shock had passed, and proYugoslavs began to restore their symbols throughout the CRDA. 189 On 24 July, a procession of
workers marched to the SU office and replaced the red flag that the AMG had removed from above
its entryway, while others replaced red-starred tricolors, even laying traps designed to serious
injure or kill those who might try to remove them. 190 Two days later, during the launching
ceremony for a completed ship, workers hung a red flag from the ship, leading the directors to
suspend the launching.191 Simultaneous with this resurgence of defiance – and against strong
warnings from both Foden and Trieste Area Commissioner Lt. Col. Smuts – top AMG officials
made preparations to demilitarize the shipyard and return it to civilian management. 192
The decision to demilitarize the shipyard so quickly, implemented on 31 July, proved a
disaster, and during the hot August that followed, the CRDA guards again proved incapable of
managing the site’s pro-Yugoslav forces. Throughout the month, pro-Yugoslavs held mass rallies
in the workshops with impunity, often drawing 3000 participants, and they faced little opposition
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in sacking the SG headquarters.193 Threatening posters reappeared, as did skulls-and-crossbones
printed menacingly on the timecards of pro-Italian workers and clerks, and the targets invariably
received beatings if they did not stay away from work. Though no reliable figures exist, it seems
that hundreds were beaten and tens hospitalized. One particularly unfortunate pro-Italian, the
Socialist and SG exponent Agostino Perin, died in the hospital from injuries suffered during an
ambush as he biked to work.194 Significantly, much of this violence, both in the CRDA and
elsewhere, fell upon clerks.195 Most notable was the beating of Umberto Zuccolin – the “comrade
timekeeper” previously derided in a CRDA broadsheet during the Twelve Days Strike. As head of
the pro-Italian CLN and a piecework clerk in the Labor Costs Office, Zuccolin was the perfect
target for pro-Yugoslavs who inextricably linked pro-Italianism, clerk status, and the “remnants of
Fascism,” and thus two workers beat him with sticks as he toured the aeronautical workshops on
23 August.196 Zuccolin’s active role in the pro-Italian CLN was not sufficient proof of antiFascism. Fascism was something amorphous, and Zuccolin, arriving in the workshop as “comrade
timekeeper,” was a remnant.
As a result of the August violence, the AMG came under a new wave of pressure to
remilitarize the CRDA and to extend the occupation to the Solvay. The SG threatened a strike of
“nearly all clerks” if their safety could not be guaranteed, while pro-Italian political figures pushed
the AMG to occupy both sites and CRDA management threatened another lockout if the AMG
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failed to intervene.197 The AMG thus ordered another occupation of the shipyard before month’s
end, but this time by the VGPC. It constructed a new VGPC station at the CRDA gate and
implemented a new ID card system aimed at eliminating “political transients” (UAIS squads).198
By the last day of the month, Kitson-Harris could report that police patrolled the “entirety” of the
CRDA, which he suggested become a “permanent fixture” of AMG occupation policy, as “a firm
political control in the shipyard must be the corner-stone of our administration in this area.”199
With these actions, violence declined, and the AMG set itself to the task of definitively
breaking the pro-Yugoslav organs. The AMG’s primary target was the SU Factory Committee,
which it had planned to dissolve during the occupation of late July before deciding not to publish
the drafted decree, fearing it would prompt another general strike. 200 In the wake of August, the
AMG, realizing it still operated from a position of weakness, again postponed this act, awaiting a
time in which the balance of forces had shifted drastically. 201 In the meantime, the CRDA
continued to push for the displacement of workers from the worksite to the public works projects
at Punta Sdobba and elsewhere, to which the SU now acceded, given rising unemployment rates. 202
During these last months of 1946, the SU sank all of its efforts into the struggle against the SG, at
times putting forward demands for raises in piecework rates, but failing to take on the system of
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piecework itself. 203 The result was the frustration of worker ambitions for a transformation of the
workplace and the creation of an ever-greater body of workers subjected to the humiliation of unor low-skilled labor, all of which occurred contemporaneously with the clear defeat of the proYugoslav cooperative in its struggle with Monfalconese shopkeepers.204
But it was not only the combined opposition of the AMG and the local pro-Italian forces
that caused many monfalconesi to lose heart. By mid-1946, the contradictions within the PCRG
and UAIS programs had become apparent and even clashed with popular aspirations to remake
local society. From the outset, the two most important points of the UAIS program had been to
fight for the annexation of Venezia Giulia to its “natural hinterland” of Yugoslavia and to achieve
the uncompromising “liquidation of the remnants of Fascism.” 205 Yet the strategies to achieve the
first − the creation of the broadest pro-Yugoslav coalition possible, including the shopkeeper and,
to a lesser extent, the clerk − could not be reconciled with popular expectations for the “liquidation
of the remnants of Fascism” in the marketplace and workplace. 206 As time passed and the worlddiplomatic balance of forces shifted decidedly in the pro-Italians’ favor, the PCRG doubled down
on its policy of fostering cross-class, pro-Yugoslav unity, while certain elements of the proYugoslav faction lost patience with the subordination of reform efforts to the territorial question.
By the fall of 1946, the most observant Party members would begin to correlate the Party’s failure
to achieve concrete reforms with a lessening of popular enthusiasm for its initiatives. In one
particularly telling meeting of the Ronchi communal committee, after one member suggested that
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the various shortcomings of the cooperatives were at least partly to blame for increasing popular
apathy, another cast the blame more widely. He stated simply that popular disengagement resulted
from “a lack of faith that [the people] have in their leaders, who for over a year have led them in
struggle and have not yet learned how to satisfy their demands.” 207 It seems likely that the “people”
to whom he referred were the same “extremists” demanding an uncompromising push for social
revolution – the same whom the PCRG hierarchs increasingly viewed as a liability.
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Chapter 5: The Loss of “Monfalcone antifascista:” Demonstrations, Dynamite, and
Disillusionment
Writings of all colors, but of a democratic tendency adorn the facades of homes, fences,
telephone poles, etc.… above Monfalcone, on the Rocca, an enormous red star with the
writing ‘W la RFPJ’ [Long live the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia] has appeared
as if by magic. The walls of the workshops are covered with writings. Red stars appear on
the most visible points. Others more colossal will yet appear.1
– Monfalcone UAIS report in anticipation of the UN Delegation visit, March 1946.

When the AMG ended the first occupation of the CRDA, the pro-Yugoslavs’ first response
was to restore the symbols of their movement, including the red flag above the SU offices and the
red-starred tricolors throughout the workshops. This pro-Yugoslav practice of symbolically
marking the Monfalconese’s physical space had begun in the first hours after liberation, when the
pro-Yugoslavs erected a giant red star on the façade of the town hall. It had then taken on an even
greater intensity in the spring of 1946 as monfalconesi awaited the arrival of the UN Border
Commission. From the walls of the humblest homes to those of iconic buildings such as
Monfalcone’s hilltop castle (the Rocca), the zone’s exposed surfaces came to bear the symbols of
the pro-Yugoslav cause (Figure 13). For much of 1946, monfalconesi drinking coffee in the central
piazza could view a giant red star and the phrase “we don’t want Italy here” on display from the
Rocca. Though periodically purged by the AMG, they always popped back up as the proYugoslavs sought to project their political desires as those of the entire zone (Figure 14).
Such markings and their removal were part of an ongoing battle to define the “true”
Monfalcone between pro-Yugoslavs and their myriad opponents. For the pro-Yugoslavs, it was
part of a wider strategy of developing an image of Monfalcone as a town that was unanimous in
its opposition to Fascism in all forms – and thus, according to its political calculus, in favor of
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Yugoslav annexation. For such individuals, the appearance of these symbols was, in the words of
the above-cited UAIS report, almost magical. It was an inevitable occurrence and one without a
subject. If there had to be a subject, it was a disembodied, collective subject – certainly not a
concrete collection of militants assigned the tasks of spreading pro-Yugoslav symbols and purging
symbols of the opposition, but rather “Monfalcone antifascista.”
Yet it was not only through physical marking that the pro-Yugoslavs fostered the idea of
“Monfalcone antifascista.” Quite often, it was fostered through Il Lavoratore, which discursively
“mapped” the politics of the town. Most illustrative of this tendency is the paper’s narration of a
28 March demonstration, which took place around the time of the Servola Incident and the UN
Delegation’s visit. On that day, some 10,000 pro-Yugoslavs were said to have come out to fill the
principal roads and crowd the piazza, singing partisan and popular songs and waving red-starred
tricolors. Opposing this massive formation was a much smaller group of pro-Italians huddling into
a corner of the square, of whom fifty were “beardless young students,” all shouting in favor of
Italy and able to do so only “under a formidable escort of Civil and Military Police.” As the rally
ended and night came, “the city echoe[d] with partisan songs, an imposing crowd with hundreds
of flags moving through the principle streets to blunt any action that revealed the existence of the
neo-Fascist reaction, while about five-hundred people [“neo-Fascists”], now rendered hysterical,
ran through the peripheral streets, protected by the darkness.” By juxtaposing the ability of the
pro-Yugoslavs to fill the central pizza in open daylight to that of the “neo-Fascists” (pro-Italians)
to exist only on the peripheries under the protection of police or nightfall, the paper reinforced its
claim that “Monfalcone antifascista pronounced yesterday evening to all the Fascists that its
popular will is unshakable.” There was one true Monfalcone, and it was indivisibly anti-Fascist.2
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Though the concept of a singular “Monfalcone antifascista” did not reflect an objective
political consensus, it had a clear impact. It provided a unifying myth for a large subsection of
monfalconesi and channeled broadly anti-Fascist popular sentiments into the pro-Yugoslav cause.
With the spaces of everyday life flooded with symbols of “Monfalcone antifascista,” proYugoslavs received regular reminders of the stakes of their struggle, namely that the conditions of
everyday life in those very lived spaces would be shaped entirely by the outcome of the territorial
struggle. But it also served to impose a silence and exclusion on all others. The ubiquity of proYugoslav symbols provided a daily reminder of the pro-Yugoslavs’ strength (real or projected) to
all monfalconesi who lined up with the pro-Italian cause, while the concept implicitly condemned
them as “Fascist.” At its most extreme, it removed any moral obligation the pro-Yugoslavs had to
hear the voices of their opponents and legitimized violence such as that of the Twelve Days Strike. 3
For over a year after liberation, this symbolic practice served its purpose. It created the
image of a politically indivisible zone and helped the pro-Yugoslavs maintain their primacy in the
piazza and public space despite strong AMG opposition. But with the coming of winter 1946/47,
major cracks began to show in the façade of “Monfalcone antifascista.” Frustration with the lack
of tangible change in the zone had reached a critical level, and the pro-Yugoslavs’ monopoly on
public space came under assault from multiple directions.
Confrontation and Conflict in the Wake of the Twelve Days Strike
By fall 1946, the pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese faced an increasingly uphill battle.
The faction remained committed to Yugoslav annexation, but the defeat of the Twelve Days Strike
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and the subsequent CRDA occupation effected a “hardening” of PCRG and UAIS tactics as it tried
to retain its dominance over the public space of Monfalcone. 4 Shortly after the AMG occupied the
CRDA, Branko Babič and the PCRG leadership in Trieste directed their Monfalconese comrades
to engage in “clear action against the AMG.”5 The PCRG-Monfalcone leadership in turn informed
its militants that, given the example of “the Fascism of the [pro-Italian] CLN that, supported by
the AMG, has passed entirely to the offensive in the decisive struggle, the PC[RG] too changes its
parliamentary line to the decisive struggle against Fascism.” 6 Rather than seeing the AMG as
simply facilitating the resurgence of Fascism through ignorance or incompetence, the proYugoslavs increasingly saw the AMG’s actions as intentional. As such, they threw out their former
approach of non-cooperation and unconfrontational protest – an approach that had never fully been
accepted by the wider body of followers – replacing it with one of more direct confrontation. The
AMG itself, rather than merely the “remnants of Fascism” it protected, was now the target.
Many pro-Yugoslav militants welcomed the shift, in part because they had long resented
PCRG hesitancy, but also because they had endured a wide range of abuses on behalf of the AMG’s
police force, the VGPC. Internal PCRG reports indicate various instances in which VGPC agents
arrested militants, beating them at police headquarters before releasing them without charges. 7 At
times, VGPC agents assaulted the headquarters of the UAIS and APG in acts comparable to Fascist
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squadrismo, beating those on guard duty. 8 As one former agent would later recount, the AMG
stringently vetted new police recruits to assure their anti-Communism. This agent, assigned to the
political branch of Monfalcone, was soon convinced that the majority of workers supported the
UAIS. They threw bolts at VGPC agents who entered the shipyard and once even shot at him on
the street. And since “the people were not messing around,” the VGPC did not mess around either:
When there were manifestations one had to remain attentive, above all in Trieste. They
came into the city with trucks. Most were Titoists from Monfalcone and its environs, but
there were also some Southerners, whom we always beat up. When we captured someone,
we brought him to the station. Because of this, I know that there weren’t only locals, but
also Sicilians, Friulans, Abruzzians. And I remember one whom the sergeant asked, ‘ah,
you’re Sicilian?’ The scrap of a boy responded ‘Yes’ and, since the sergeant was also
Sicilian, he treated him like a traitor and beat him down. We too pounded him because here
we saw them like enemies.9

In fact, from its inception, there were serious doubts about the VGPC’s impartiality, as the
new force was composed largely of Fascist-era officers and agents.10 In the rather euphemistic
language of an AMG intelligence officer, “the Allies were more or less compelled to build the new
V.G. Police Force around the trained officers remaining from the old Italian Public Safety bodies
and the Allied Police officers themselves realise that the system they have built up is for this reason
not as perfect as they would have liked,” particularly because many of these officers were Fascists
from the Mezzogiorno.11 Indicative of this reality was the placement of the VGPC’s Criminal
Investigative Division (CID) in the hands of Feliciano Ricciardelli, a longtime Fascist from
Avellino Province who had directed the political office of the Trieste Questura in the late
ventennio.12 During the German occupation, Ricciardelli had plotted against the Germans to help
Comp. S. B[x], “Al Partito comunista-Monfalcone,” 7 March 1946, AS 1570, b 9, f 6, sf Informazioni,
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10
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save the lives of Triestine Jews and, once discovered, was deported to Dachau, but he returned in
the postwar to direct the CID. Immediately upon appointment, he had written a top-secret letter to
the Italian Chief of Police, pledging that “the writer, the Functionaries, and the entirety of the
personnel, inspired by a highly patriotic sentiment, will work in every way possible to defend the
italianità of these lands in the supreme interest of the Patria.”13 Without doubt, the anti-Communist
and nationalist sentiments of Ricciardelli trickled down the ranks, with the result that the VGPC
was the only body of pro-Italians regularly willing to contest the pro-Yugoslavs’ control of
Monfalcone’s public space in the year after liberation.14
Despite this early and persistent VGPC opposition, the pro-Yugoslavs had been the masters
of public space in Monfalcone well into 1946, with few pro-Italians willing to organize political
meetings, let alone public demonstrations (Figures 15 and 16). As the pro-Yugoslav worker, Luigi
Pasqualini, would later recount, while at Trieste there was always organized opposition in response
to pro-Yugoslav demonstrations of 1945 and 1946, “at Monfalcone there was no opposition, at
least at the first moment. There were some against it, but not many.” In fact, Pasqualini recalls that
when speakers like Renato Rigonat drew large crowds to Monfalcone’s central piazza and made
speeches in favor of the Seventh Federative Republic, the Communist Party, and the syndicates, it
was the AMG rather than native pro-Italians that fight back: “They came in a truck and began to

3/1), 7 January 1944, ACS, MI, DGPS, A5G II Guerra, b 150, f 226, sf 2; Dir. Capo della Div. Personale di PS (MIDGPS), “Venezia Giulia - Informazioni” (N. 333/9186-I), 13 September 1946, ACS, MI, DGPS, Div AA GG RR
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13
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run around with manganelli until it all became a stampede. Those were the only opponents.”15
In this context, recently defeated in the Twelve Days Strike and facing the foreign
ministers’ decision to return the Monfalconese to Italy, the PCRG made it a point to reaffirm its
mastery of public space and to display the vitality of “Monfalcone antifascista.” Despite the “Big
Five” still languishing in AMG prison and senior militants like Angelo Comar having been sent to
Paris in a last-ditch effort to sway the foreign ministers, the UAIS orchestrated a mass
demonstration on 11 August 1946, which filled the Monfalcone piazza and involved calls for
Yugoslav annexation and the dissolution of the VGPC. The most important speech, that by the
PCRG militant Sergio Mori, reveals this increasingly confrontational language, as well as the turn
to viewing the AMG as conscious facilitators of a “new Fascism:”
How does one explain the birth of a new Fascism that functions, organized by the so-called
CLN [pro-Italian] and protected by elements of the Civil Police? We explain it with the
partiality of the AMG, with the leniency of its laws in the face of Fascists…. The masters,
those who have exploited us for 25 years, have been returned to their places of command
to continue to oppress us…. And it is precisely so, precisely because we have seen these
masters – the scraps of a defunct Fascist regime – struggle so that Italy returns here, that
we are fighting and will fight with all our strength not to allow this to happen. 16

Though Kitson-Harris dismissed the demonstration as “a miserable failure” of 3000 participants
lacking “vim and vigour,” the content of the speech and visual evidence suggests otherwise (Figure
17). Kitson-Harris’s own report indicated that the AIS had estimated a turnout of 14,000. 17
Though the August demonstration was imposing, it was two months later, on 1 October,
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that the PCRG’s new confrontational strategy would reach its apex. In the interim, the pro-Italian
faction had scored two major victories, one locally and one internationally. Locally, the communal
council had secured the AMG’s approval to refashion the toponymy of the town, replacing Fascistera street names with names drawn primarily from Roman antiquity and thus reinforcing the
town’s italianità.18 Internationally, in the last days of September, the UN’s Political Territorial
Commission officially adopted the foreign ministers’ July proposal regarding the Free Territory of
Trieste and the partitioning of Venezia Giulia, in effect sealing Monfalcone’s fate. 19 When news
arrived of this decision, an incensed Bersa called a meeting of the PCRG’s District Committee on
the morning of 1 October, deciding that the pro-Yugoslavs must “paralyze the Monfalconese for
four hours” in opposition to the “absurd decisions of Paris.” 20 Immediately, the SU issued a strike
order, which reached 80% efficiency in the CRDA and Solvay. 21 Moreover, the PCRG decided to
unleash a mass, unauthorized UAIS demonstration in the piazza with full political regalia, once
again defying AMG bans on unauthorized gatherings and political symbols. Most importantly,
during the meeting, Bersa addressed the question of the police, authorizing the use of violence
against them: “If the people are attacked by the C[ivil] P[olice], they will need to respond in kind.
The people are tired of suffering their bullying, which resembles Fascist methods too closely.” 22
Shortly before two in the afternoon, UAIS members obediently began to assemble in the
piazza. For twenty minutes, CAO Kitson-Harris waited in his office for a delegation to arrive,
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meanwhile witnessing from his window the arrival of individuals “carrying crudely enscribed [sic]
wooden posters” that “took an extremely dim view of returning themselves to the Italian State –
Republic or no Republic.” When none arrived, Kitson-Harris took decisive action:
The crowd had by now grown to possibly 3 thousand with many a stalwart standing on the
pavement giving vocal support to his more courageous comrades who were prancing about
shouting weird calls on the square itself. In order to avoid the stigma of these people
holding a [sic] unauthorized demonstration in Monfalcone and getting away with it without
intervention, it was with reluctance that the V.G. Police, numbering 50 men, and 1 officer,
and 20 men (military) were unleashed on the crowd to break up the party.
The Police of both denominations, then entered the arena at 1430 approx at the
double, swinging batons and blowing whistles in a glorious offensive ‘war cry’. At 1435
the piazza was clear except for bits of broken wooden tokens, odd bicicles [sic],
Communist flags and various types who, in their haste, had moved faster than their shoes
or sandals would allow, and returned to claim them. A few remained to argue the toss after
this offensive wave had passed, but the majority of the men were soon claimed by anxious
spouses who had come to claim their menfolk and take them home. 23

And thus, in a period of just five minutes, the attempt by the PCRG to make a direct challenge to
the AMG ended unceremoniously, both Communist militants and the wider body of UAIS
supporters dispersed with batons and scattered throughout the town. Shortly after the abortive
demonstration, unidentified individuals – almost certainly pro-Yugoslavs – fired a number of pistol
shots at patrolling policemen, but the pro-Yugoslavs managed very little physical resistance.
This was a decisive moment for the pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese. From 1 October,
the AMG “invariably disallowed” pro-Yugoslav manifestations. Moreover, it more engaged in a
more aggressive campaign to arrest key militants – including the just-released “Big Five” – forcing
many to flee to Zone B and thus depriving the pro-Yugoslav organizations of many gifted orators
and organizers. 24 From October, there began a steep decline in the pro-Yugoslavs’ public presence.
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A Change in Line: Union with the Free Territory
This decline was not solely the product of AMG and VGPC actions. It also resulted from
a simultaneous change in pro-Yugoslav strategies, which amplified long-developing frustrations
over the failures of the pro-Yugoslav organizations to deliver concrete change. In the wake of the
UN announcement and the disastrous October demonstration, the PCRG and UAIS in Monfalcone
suddenly modified their lines. While the PCRG and UAIS in Trieste and its immediate environs
quickly turned their attention to constructing a multi-party “anti-Fascist bloc” that could secure
influence over the statutes and government of the soon-to-be Free Territory of Trieste,25 the
Monfalcone branches announced in mid-October that their focus was now that Monfalcone not
return to Italy, but rather become part of the Free Territory. This would not only prevent
Monfalcone from returning to “reactionary” Italy, but also increase the strength of the
“progressive” faction within the Free Territory and pave the way for an electoral takeover there,
at which point the territorial question could be revisited. 26
The new line proved disastrous for the local PCRG and UAIS, and it served to spread
disillusionment and enervate the PCRG and UAIS. Immediately, Party leaders noted that the
faithful either failed to understand or openly rejected the new line, having become so enamored
with their mythical image of Yugoslavia that they could not conceive of a fight for a lesser solution.
In the villages, women were particularly bitter about the abandonment of the old line. 27 In the
CRDA, those who informed militants of the line noted that militants “were not enthusiastic about
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the new tactic…, the effect of a certain extremism and nothing else.” 28 Few saw the appeal of
fighting an uphill battle for annexation to the TLT, the only reward for which would be another
uphill battle to conquer political power. When the PCRG’s CRDA cell held a meeting at month’s
end to assess militants’ responses to the new line, it found that it was in former Party strongholds
that the new line had failed to take hold. In the Shipbuilding Department,
the comrades at first would not hear it and, in these cases, we have been forced to review
with them the rules of the P[arty] [that is, of Party discipline]. This department has always
been the department most in line with the Party because it is the most combative, but also
the most extremist. One cannot directly blame the comrades of this department if they do
not manage to throw off this certain extremism, the workers of this department having in
the past always been more exploited than any others.29

Within certain workshops of the Shipbuilding Department it would take three meetings before the
militants would even consider the new tactic. Within the Electromechanical Department, another
PCRG and UAIS stronghold, there was not the same open turmoil as in Shipbuilding. Party leaders
that many militants had begun to murmur about transferring to Yugoslavia, but there were many
“who are more conscious and who see the necessity of struggling forward without abandoning the
battlefield.” Across all departments, however, youth and garibaldini remained the most
problematic and “extremist” groups, which was no surprise. Their “extremism” had already led
many Youth Brigade volunteers simply to refuse to return to the Monfalconese after their service
– a trend strongly criticized by the local PCRG leaders. 30 As youth and garibaldini clung strongly
to Yugoslav annexationism, it proved necessary for Party leaders to “call them one by one to
explain to them all the particularities so that they are convinced.” 31 With the new line, the gap
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between Party and population had widened substantially.
If defeat in the Twelve Days Strike had marked the decisive turning point for the proYugoslavs of Trieste, the same was not the case in Monfalcone. 32 There, participation in mass proYugoslav rallies endured well beyond the July strike, only falling off after the violent defeat in the
Monfalcone piazza on 1 October and, more importantly, the pro-Yugoslav organizations’ sudden
and unpopular shift in political line. Whereas in Trieste the pro-Italian faction had claimed a public
presence since the first days after liberation, in Monfalcone it had remained dormant. Except for a
small contingent of nationalist students and Lega Nazionale (LN) members, who at times gathered
in the southwestern corner of the piazza and displayed Italian tricolors (often with the Savoyard
crest) under protection from the VGPC, pro-Italians had largely worked in the shadows during
these months, failing even to hold public celebrations in the wake of the October publication of
the Peace Treaty. 33 With the winter of 1946/47, this began to change.
The Arrival of the Esuli and the Re-Emergence of the Pro-Italian Faction, Winter 1946/47
The UN’s adoption of the foreign ministers’ proposal in October not only hastened the proYugoslavs’ shift to confrontation; it also bolstered the pro-Italian faction of the zone. It boosted
the confidence of many native pro-Italians, but more importantly it prompted another wave of
ethnic Italians to flee from eastern-Adriatic territories destined for Yugoslav annexation. As
monfalconesi became increasingly confrontational in their attempts to realize Yugoslav
annexation, the Italian state embraced the settlement of such “exiles” (esuli) in disputed border
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territories like the Monfalconese as a conscious political strategy. Just days after the official
publication of the Peace Treaty, Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs set as an urgent priority the
“spiritual, economic, and political normalization of the Lower Monfalconese, which suffers at
present the most acute aggravation of the Italo-Slavic racial struggle,” and proposed as a solution
the settlement of large numbers of esuli “to counterbalance the action of Slavic propaganda.”34
Even in its infancy, before the end of 1946, thousands of participants in this exodus had passed
through or settled in the territory administered by the AMG, of whom hundreds had settled in the
Monfalconese. 35
The settlement of esuli in the Monfalconese had a major political impact. Though the esuli
were an internally varied group – they included not just Fascists as pro-Yugoslavs often claimed,
but also Italian Socialists whose politics were leftist and pro-Italian – they were united in their
rejection of Yugoslavia. 36 Taken as a whole, however, their politics tended to be more than just
pro-Italian. They were also often virulently anti-Communist and nationalistic. Many held deep
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personal grievances toward Tito’s nascent regime, which motivated them to take immediate, often
violent action in opposing the pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese. Moreover, conditions of
scarcity in housing, food, and employment sharpened this antipathy and drove many esuli to
engage in pro-Italian activity as a way to demonstrate support for the Italian cause and secure
critical patrons in Rome, the AMG, the LN, and the CRDA Direction.37
Thus, the arriving esuli significantly altered the balance of political forces in the
Monfalconese, and especially in Monfalcone proper. Soon a neighborhood composed almost
exclusively of esuli arose to the south-southeast of Monfalcone’s train station on Via Romana,
creating an anti-Communist, Italian nationalist stronghold that could offset the “red
neighborhoods” to the north, west, and southwest of the historic center. 38 Moreover, esuli of the
political right often turned rather quickly to violence and intimidation as a means of political
struggle. As Sergio Parenzan would later recount, “with [the esuli] the trouble began. We were
already at the end of ’46…. At Monfalcone the nationalists won; at Ronchi and the surrounding
areas, no. At Monfalcone, a climate of violence was established. By contrast, these squads [of
esuli] were afraid to go outside of the city because the people had remained together.”39 A similar
sentiment is captured in the testimony of the Umberto Sanzin, a monarchist and pro-Italian
monfalconese who joined the DC at war’s end:
In the piazza, there were 10,000 Italians who praised Tito and 150 students who praised
Italy. If not for the Civil Police, [the pro-Yugoslavs] would have massacred us…. Then the
esuli arrived…. They did punitive expeditions, leaving with a truck and going to the
villages. They were very active, true action squads.
Furthermore, the esuli had poisoned blood…. They had lost everything and
therefore they were enraged. The fact that they arrived by the thousands caused a certain
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rebalancing of forces and ideas.40

Bolstered by the esuli, the pro-Italian faction slowly re-emerged. From failing to hold any
public celebrations when word arrived in fall 1946 that the UN had adopted the foreign ministers’
border proposal, the Action Party, Republican Party, and DC by 1947 held public meetings and
even initiated a series of processions that at times surpassed 1000 participants. 41 Moreover, the
arrival of what would soon be over a thousand esuli afforded the leaders of the SG and CRDA
Direction with a mass of politically trustworthy workers who could be substituted for those tied to
the SU, UAIS, and PCRG.42 In the winter of 1946/47, the struggle over resources between esuli
and native monfalconesi caused an acute sharpening in the social antagonism between these
groups, further poisoning a political atmosphere already made tense by the territorial question.
The “Psychosis of Violence,” September 1946-September 1947
The arrival of the esuli, together with the PCRG’s shift toward confrontation, initiated a
new period of the postwar territorial contest, marked by a decisive escalation of violence. This is
not to say that violence had not been a central characteristic of the struggle until late 1946 – the
pro-Yugoslavs had long used threats and beatings to maintain their primacy in the zone – but, with
the escalation of tensions in the winter of 1946/47, militants of both factions upped the ante, fists
and rods giving way to firearms and explosives as the weapons of choice.
The first hints of this escalation occurred in September. In that month, CAO Kitson-Harris
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noted that various high-profile pro-Italians of the area, almost all LN members, had “been
challenged, threathened [sic], and shot at with the obvious intent to kill them, sometimes in broad
daylight.” Particularly notable were an incident on 12 September, in which explosives rocked the
home of a leading Actionist strong-arm and CRDA piecework clerk Umberto M., who escaped
injury, and another two weeks later, in which the PSI and SG leader Gaetano Minervini was shot
three times in broad daylight while cycling past the Monfalcone cemetery. 43 After the October
demonstration, the pro-Yugoslavs extended their offensive to attacks on the police, with VGPC
agents regularly attacked with firearms and grenades. Most shockingly, in early November, an
unidentified pro-Yugoslav fired a Panzerfaust into the fully staffed Panzano station, causing
serious damage, though no injuries. The next morning, VGPC agents escalated the general
antagonism when they beat random shipyard workers in retaliation. 44
Despite the escalation of violence carried out by pro-Yugoslavs, this was not the most
striking development in October. In the assessment of CAO Kitson-Harris, that title belonged to
an “armed campaign of retribution” that began suddenly that month, in which pro-Italians brought
“machine guns and home-made bombs” to bear against their pro-Yugoslav opponents. The
perpetrators backed up this armed terror campaign with threats sent to prominent UAIS members
warning them of what could “reasonably be expected to happen to them if they continue to reside
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here.”45 Prominent pro-Yugoslavs found written threats in their mailboxes (Figure 18),46 primed
TNT charges left outside the doors of their homes, 47 and the printing of their names in the “Register
of Infamy” of the clandestine far-right paper, Rocca d’Italia.48 When they did not heed the warning
or were too slow to respond, then bombs flew. As Kitson-Harris reported, in October, “there has
hardly been a single night when firearms or bombs have not been used offensively against private
individuals’ house [sic], or some political HQs.” 49
The violence continued thereafter, and by the turn of the new year, Monfalcone had
descended again into a near civil war. The two opposing factions were gripped by what the Italian
CLN president, Umberto Zuccolini, termed a “psychosis of violence and consequent vendettas,”
violent members of each perpetrating acts that stood “in defiance of even the most basic democratic
standard.”50 In the leadup to the long-awaited Signing Day (10 February 1947), as pro-Italians felt
both emboldened locally and enraged over Italy’s loss of Istria and Dalmatia, the psychosis
deepened. In the last half of December, “revolutionary Italian types” carried out 31 bombings of
UAIS militants’ homes, sixteen on the weekend of 14-15 December alone.51 The assault continued
the following month, including the ignition on 26 January of a large explosive charge outside a
Panzano home housing six families, among them three mid-level leaders in the pro-Yugoslav
movement (Alberto D., Aldo V., and Emilio F.) and the partisan commandant Mario Fantini. The
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blast “lightly” injured a young girl inside and shattered eighty panes of glass, leaving the homes
frigidly cold.52 Despite UAIS efforts to form squads of “red guards” who would disarm suspect
individuals entering pro-Yugoslav neighborhoods,53 that February there were a further 38 attacks
against Communists and pro-Yugoslavs in the Monfalconese. Particularly malicious was an attack
on the former gappista and Ronchi resident, Vinicio Fontanot, whose home was the target not just
of a bomb, but also of machinegun fire, though everyone present escaped harm. 54 In the wake of
such attacks, Il Lavoratore decried that the pro-Italians were attempting to create an “atmosphere
of italianità using bombs, TNT, and threatening letters.”55
Despite these attacks occurring under cover of darkness, the perpetrators became known
rather quickly. In fact, by the turn of 1947, the AMG knew that the perpetrators involved a complex
nexus of individuals directed locally by extreme nationalists (often ex-Fascists) of the LN and proItalian ex-partisans of the PDA, often using Italian nationalist students and recently-arrived esuli
as muscle.56 The PDA group, headed by the Actionist partisan and CRDA worker Pietro
Dominutti, consisted of an odd mix of former-Fascists-turned-Actionists (Umberto M.), Fascistera “imported” Southerners with nationalist tendencies (Giuseppe I.), and even a former
garibaldino of the Natisone who rejected Yugoslav annexation and who became a leading postwar
PSI and API figure (Pietro G.).57 Cooperating with the Dominutti group were many ex-Fascists of
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the local LN headquarters (such as the president of the Ronchi branch, whose home was searched
in March 1947, revealing a submachine gun, 800 rounds of ammo, and 10 grenades), as well as a
range of nationalist students and esuli, the latter including some neo-Fascists such as the former
SS volunteer Giuseppe Milocchi. 58 According to former participants’ testimony, arms and bombs
flowed through the PDA headquarters, with the low-level muscle receiving a small bounty for each
bomb thrown.59 Finally, it is possible that Monfalcone’s pro-Italian terrorists had direct
connections to the Italian state or indirect connections mediated by pro-Italian paramilitary
formations such as the Divisione Gorizia of Gorizia Area or the Third Corps of Volunteers of
Liberty in Udine, the latter of which had an information office that, as of March 1947, “maintained,
and perhaps still maintains, the connection both with the Allies and with Monfalcone.” 60
Though the outlying limits of this organization are hazy, the motives that brought them all
together are clear. Though some have classed the terror campaign as an expression of “neo-Fascist”
vendettas against Resistance fighters, the real unifying motivation was the desire to protect Italian
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sovereignty over and the italianità of the area.61 For many, “italianità” was inflected with a parallel
meaning of “anti-Communism.” For some, the desire to protect Italian sovereignty was tied to a
deep-seeded sense of Italian racial superiority relative to Slavs, like that which drove Fascist-era
brutalities. Whatever the individual’s conception of italianità, beginning in late 1946, neo-Fascists
like Giuseppe Milocchi and former anti-Fascist partisans like Pietro Dominutti joined in a
temporary alliance to eradicate threats to Italian sovereignty in the region. As one participant in
the pro-Italian struggle later recalled, “the Italian faction was unified by the name Italy! Italy!
Italy! You were first an Italian and only afterwards a Christian Democrat, Liberal, Social
Democrat, or missino [neo-Fascist of the MSI].”62
In the first months of this terror campaign, the AMG neglected to prosecute these crimes
vigorously, almost certainly due to the campaign’s efficacy in sowing disorder among the proYugoslav organizations. As far back as October, Kitson-Harris reported with more than a hint of
satisfaction that “[t]he general reaction of the UAIS faction to this onslaught, has not been one
which may be said to have caused their dwindling followers to regain their former braggadocio.”
In fact, because of it, the “Big Five” had “decamped” from Monfalcone, fleeing with wives and
children into Zone B.63 Even two months into the campaign, the AMG merely warned both the
perpetrators and their known political supporters “through unofficial channels that these activities
had better cease or action would be taken accordingly.” 64
Compounding the AMG’s initial hesitancy to root out the perpetrators of such attacks was

Olivo, “Comunisti ed esuli istriani,” 71-72. For a work that attributes this terror campaign to “neo-Fascism,” see
Gombač, “Controesodo tra poteri popolare e GMA,” in Il mosaico giuliano, eds. Altieri and Puppini, op. cit. 57-58.
62
Olivo, “Comunisti ed esuli istriani,” 75.
63
CAO Kitson-Harris also rather darkly reported that “the cynic may assert that the solution to the problem may be
for either side to continue to eliminate its undesirable characters, but as public order must be maintained, the cynic’s
possible assertion cannot, unfortunately, prove the answer in this matter.” Maj. Kitson-Harris, “Monthly Report of
Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ Trieste Area,” 31 October 1946, op. cit.
64
Maj. Kitson-Harris, “Monthly Report of Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ Trieste Area, 31 December 1946,
op. cit.
61

232

the inability – or, more accurately, unwillingness – of many VGPC agents and officers to bring
perpetrators to justice. Ricciardelli himself had already indicated his willingness to subvert AMG
justice in pursuit of helping the Italian cause, and when the pro-Yugoslavs demanded in February
that the VGPC be dissolved due to its “manifest disinterest… in maintaining order” and for
“support[ing] the Fascist squads in their activities,” Kitson-Harris conceded that the force had been
“singularly unsuccessful in arresting many of the culprits.”65 Though VGPC officers themselves
always maintained that their failure to arrest suspects was due to a lack of evidence, it is telling
that the AMG decided to sack Ricciardelli and his closest associates in the VGPC’s CID less than
two weeks later, by which time the violence was spiraling out of control. 66
The removal of Ricciardelli did not rectify the partiality of the VGPC, nor did it stop the
pro-Yugoslavs from calling for a stronger AMG crackdown on those responsible for the attacks. 67
Though attacks nearly ceased in March and April, by mid-May both the businesses and homes of
pro-Yugoslavs again came under fire. A particularly large explosion rocked the home of the SU
organizer Volmaro Buttignon on the night of 15 May, resulting in thirty broken windowpanes,
severe damage to the doorway and terrace, and the destruction of much of the kitchen. 68 In no case
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did the VGPC make an arrest, and Kitson-Harris, who now saw this terror campaign as more of a
liability than a blessing, wrote the VGPC a scathing reminder that “if the police fail to obtain
bodies after one of these incidents, they have failed in their mission. Whether the body so obtained
is the correct and guilty one is, in the earlier stages of investigation, immaterial.” 69 Despite the fact
that the AMG thereafter ordered the VGPC to engage in night patrols to stop these attacks, attacks
continued through year’s end, and by early 1948, Il Lavoratore claimed that pro-Italian terrorists
had used 1100 grenades and explosive charges in their campaign of the two years prior.70
Though this campaign of violence was clearly disruptive for the victims on an individual
level, it is worth considering its effects on the community from the perspective of daily life.
Notable is a pattern to the attacks, in which those enduring multiple attacks tended to be individuals
who provided a source of social cohesion to the pro-Yugoslav community – those who ran taverns,
barbershops, and cultural associations frequented by pro-Yugoslavs. Two taverns in particular
became the sites of multiple bombings. The first, bombed four times between December 1946 and
May 1947, was the Hunter’s Tavern (Trattoria Al Cacciatore) on Via Ponziana, which was owned
by a pro-Yugoslav and managed by another. The second, run by the staunchly pro-Yugoslav Barbo
family, was situated in the Piazza Cavour.71 Similarly, pro-Italians struck repeatedly at the
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barbershop and home of the brothers Cesare and Alessandro Passudetti, both PCRG militants,
whose shop on the Corso del Popolo became a pro-Yugoslav haunt.72 As these attacks fell upon
the social nodes of the community, the Italian terror campaign not only threw the pro-Yugoslav
organizations into disorder by driving away key militants; it also deprived pro-Yugoslavs of those
spaces in which they tightened the community bonds that reinforced the perception of
“Monfalcone antifascista” and in which they articulated visions for the future. 73
The Disintegration of the Pro-Yugoslav Movement, Spring 1947
By early 1947, the Monfalconese’s pro-Yugoslav movement – or, rather, its pro-Free
Territory of Trieste movement – was in complete disarray. 74 Threatened with arrest and violent
attacks, many of its leaders had fled to Zone B or Yugoslavia, leaving its organizations without
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clear direction. Moreover, the signing of the Peace Treaty and the resurgence of the pro-Italian
faction – both in its terroristic and democratic forms – put the remaining militants in a hopeless
position. Unlike nearby Trieste, where the pro-Yugoslav struggle reconfigured itself as a struggle
by the pro-Yugoslavs to capture the soon-to-be Free Territory’s government and then reopen the
question of Yugoslav annexation, in Monfalcone, the prospects of annexation had simply
disappeared. Thus, throughout the spring of 1947, there was a significant institutional realignment
in the Monfalconese, as the formerly pro-Yugoslav organizations adapted to the new situation and
prepared for participation in the Italian political contest.
One by one, the pro-Yugoslav institutions of the Monfalconese disbanded. The first to go
was the SU. The CGIL’s formal recognition of the SG and the signing of the Peace Treaty left the
Monfalconese branch with little choice but to negotiate a fusion treaty with the SG. 75 Its
overwhelmingly Communist leadership pursued a settlement in which Communists would hold a
preponderance of influence within the united union, and by April the branch dissolved itself,
ordering its members to join the SG as individuals. 76 With this decision, the syndical movement
within the Monfalconese was once again institutionally unified, though the membership of the
united syndicate remained deeply divided, not least of all along the clerk-worker divide. As a
result, much of the former SU membership fell into apathy and inactivity. 77
While the negotiations for syndical fusion were nearing their conclusions, the leaders of
the PCRG too were attempting to adapt to the looming return of Italy, negotiating with PCI leaders
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who had been their near-enemies just months prior. In January, Giordano Pratolongo of the PCI’s
Information Office in Trieste met with the PCRG leadership for areas destined for Italy and sought
to convince them of the necessity of propagandizing in favor of the PCI and preparing for the
reconstitution of the PCI in that area. Though the leaders proved to be “fully in agreement,”
Pratolongo recognized that this process would be very difficult. The rank-and-file of the PCRG
was less willing to adapt to the new situation than longtime leaders, who had lived through many
sudden and shocking changes in the Party line during the Fascist era. Moreover, the postwar
territorial struggle had tainted the pro-Yugoslav militants in the eyes not just of anti-Communists,
but even of some PCI members with strong national sentiments. To solve this, Pratolongo
suggested that the Party carefully choose a new, untainted leadership core to head a reconstituted
Gorizia Federation, imported from outside of Gorizia. 78 By late April, the Monfalconese’s PCRG
organs had ceased to exist, replaced by sections of the PCI’s Gorizia Federation, headed by the
former partisan commandant Lino Zocchi (Ninci). 79 As the Federation prepared for its First
Conference that summer, questions remained as to whether it would be able to convince the other
parties that it was not, in the words of one worried PCI leader, a “fifth column of a foreign power,”
but rather a “national party not driven by an agenda regarding the definitiveness of the borders.”80
The distrust between many former PCRG militants and the PCI was slow to dissipate.
As the institutions that had previously channeled the pro-Yugoslav movement dissolved,
the pro-Yugoslavs of Monfalcone found themselves living in a town that was no longer the
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“Monfalcone antifascista” they had known during the first eighteen months after liberation. As the
pro-Yugoslavs’ ability to mark public space deteriorated, the symbols associated with the proYugoslav struggle receded from public view. Indicative of this trend was a commemorative plaque
that the UAIS and APG had constructed in the town’s central piazza, outfitted with a red star and
dedicated to the fallen in the Liberation Struggle (a tribute to the Slovenian Liberation Front).
Since war’s end, this plaque had served as the focal point of pro-Yugoslav demonstrations and
processions. It served as a physical location at which UAIS processions typically ended, and,
located in the central piazza, it made a symbolic claim as to the true “heart” of Monfalcone. Though
this plaque had stood undisturbed for over a year since war’s end, with the resurgence of the proItalian faction, it became a focal point of the symbolic war over the town. In November 1946, the
plaque had been “besmirched with a thick slime,” but it was in the wake of Signing Day that it was
most clearly targeted.81 On 24 February, a group of esuli, supported by various anti-Communist
members of Monfalcone’s API were dispersed by the VGPC when they attempted to cut the red
star from the plaque. That same night, they returned, removing the star and placing it in a sack
bearing the phrase “Tito died in MONFALCONE on the night of 24 February.” When news of this
iconoclasm reached the CRDA the next day, some 2500 workers engaged in a protest strike.82
Faced with the likelihood of repeated acts of vandalism, the APG elected to relocate the plaque
from the piazza to the garden in front of its own headquarters, where there was always a handful
of partisan guards on duty. 83 In doing so, the UAIS and APG conceded that their symbols were no
longer those of the town as a whole and that their control over the piazza had been broken.
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With the pro-Yugoslavs beating an increasingly disorganized retreat, the pro-Italians struck
directly at the heart of the pro-Yugoslav stronghold: the CRDA. From the moment of liberation,
this site had been marked with several massive, red, sheet-metal stars hung from cranes and the
firm’s water tower. With the coming of Signing Day, this symbolic supremacy came under assault.
In concert with the CRDA Direction, members of the SG entered the CRDA under cover of
darkness and cut the supports for these giant stars, sending them crashing to the factory floor. In
the place of the stars they left Italian tricolors, thus openly challenging the pro-Yugoslavs’ control
over what CAO Kitson-Harris termed the UAIS “Holy of Holies.”84 Though the UAIS and SU
restored the largest of the stars, in early April a group of pro-Italians again cut them down, this
time for good. The act sparked no notable protests or agitation, and thus when AMG officials met
in Trieste just days later, the Area Commissioner for Trieste Area noted with relief that this
certainly marked “the end of the ‘reign’ of the UAIS in Monfalcone Area.” 85 A week later, this
hope was confirmed when the pro-Yugoslavs of the Solvay voluntarily removed the giant red star
at that worksite when they learned that a group of esuli were planning to cut it down.86
The death knell for Monfalconese’s pro-Yugoslav movement came the following month,
with a major public order incident outside the UAIS headquarters. In the early evening of 24 May,
a group of esuli began to form outside the UAIS HQ near the intersection of the Corso del Popolo
and the Viale San Marco, shouting threats at UAIS members gathered there. The latter returned
the vitriol and a fifty-man scuffle ensued when the esuli moved to tear down the UAIS sign.
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SCAO Meeting Minutes, 14 April 1947, op. cit. As Anna Di Gianantonio and her colleagues have shown, in the
memory of the strongly pro-Italian, anti-Communist monfalconesi, it is this moment rather than the Twelve Days
Strike that marked the climax of the postwar territorial struggle, as this was the moment the town had been definitively
“rescued” from the grasps of Yugoslavia. Di Gianantonio et al., L’immaginario imprigionato, 156-57. Only in late
June did the AMG order the VGPC to vacate the shipyard, leaving internal security in the hands of private company
guards after ten months of occupation. Maj. Kitson-Harris, “Monthly Report of Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ
Trieste Area,” 30 June 1947, NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9188, f 11304/115/288.
86
Capt. Hill, “Monthly Report, Apr 1947,” 25 April, NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9186, f 11304/115/278.
84
85

239

Though the police soon arrived to end the original quarrel, in the interim, each side had called in
reinforcements and the police lost control of the situation. As esuli continued to flow to the
location, the UAIS ranks were swelled by groups of garibaldini (not all pro-Yugoslav) including
the Romano brothers, Ferruccio Barbo, and Mario Fantini. According to one pro-Italian observer,
the groups met and began punching one another. As police from a nearby Jeep disembarked near
the UAIS headquarter, “the rioters, instead of carrying on their fight, turned against the Police who
were attempting to clear out the crowd.”87 With the arrival of more police, the brawl escalated from
one pitting esuli against UAIS supporters to one that also involved a major confrontation between
the garibaldini and the VGPC. According to a (potentially sensationalized) police report, at various
points, police agents became isolated and had to be “rescued” from garibaldini who knocked them
to the ground and pummeled them without mercy. Only after an hour was order restored, with an
untold number of injuries and eleven arrests (six esuli and five garibaldini).88 The same pro-Italian
observer cited above would claim that “everybody is hoping – for peace’s sake – that A.MG. [sic]
would become – in time – strict as ever and more than ever” against the UAIS leaders, who “stir
up their followers against ALL which is not RED STARRED.”89 He would get his wish.
Immediately following the disturbance, the AMG expelled the UAIS from its HQ and, with the
local Communist Party no longer lending support to the organization, the UAIS collapsed. 90
Though only in mid-1947 did the UAIS close its doors, disillusionment had long reigned
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among the pro-Yugoslavs. Not only had their hopes for Resistance and liberation been frustrated,
but, in recent months, many had lost faith in their movement’s institutions. The image of
“Monfalcone antifascista” had been shattered by a resurgence of a pro-Italian factions that attacked
pro-Yugoslavs in their homes, destroyed the social nodes of community cohesion, broke the proYugoslav hold over the CRDA, and purged the town of pro-Yugoslav and pro-Communist
symbols. As one pro-Italian informant reported to the Italian police that July, “Monfalcone is
reassuming its Italian character.”91 As the pro-Yugoslav stranglehold over public space
deteriorated, individuals associated with Fascism – whether actual Fascists or simply members of
social categories associated with Fascism – again openly walked the streets. In May, a new chapter
of the neo-Fascist MSI opened its doors in Monfalcone. 92
Though disillusionment was widespread, pro-Yugoslav reactions to this disillusionment
varied. Many, like Ruggero Bersa, continued to fight for Communism at home. Bersa adapted to
the new context of the democratic political contest in Italy, become a key figure in the PCI’s
reconstituted Gorizia Federation. Others reacted quite differently. During the winter of 1946/47,
as the implementation of the Peace Treaty loomed ever-closer on the horizon, many had begun to
look for an escape-route, seeking a way to liberate themselves with their feet. The question for
those considering departure was, naturally, where should they go? For the overwhelming majority,
the choice was clear, and Tito’s New Yugoslavia possessed a near-irresistible magnetism.
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Part II: Monfalconesi on the Move
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Chapter 6: The Controesodo of 1946-47: Ideology, Ethnicity, and Necessity in the Choice to
Cross the Iron Curtain
Immediately laborers and their families began to depart, above all from the shipyard:
qualified workers, specialists, and technicians too. But laborers from other factories and
categories also left, peasants included. It seemed that our population had been taken by the
‘psychosis of departure.’ They abandoned jobs, homes, property, the land: and they
departed at once for Yugoslavia. The sacrifices were immense: but our people were
sustained by the ideal of socialism. 1
– Mario Tonzar, Communist organizer and emigrant.

On the morning of 4 February 1947, three Bandelli brothers arrived at the gates of the
CRDA. At 40 years old, Stanislao, was the oldest. Vittorio was two years younger, and the
youngest, Ladislao, was thirty-five. The three had likely walked together to work, as each lived on
the east side of town near the train station. If they did, they would have had much to talk about.
All three were pro-Yugoslav militants and had served on the frontlines of the political struggle that
had wracked the town in the twenty-one months since liberation. The two eldest, who worked
together in the fifth workshop of the CRDA’s Shipbuilding Department, had even headed their
workshop’s PCRG and UAIS cells. Whatever they discussed that winter morning, when they
arrived at the shipyard, they did not take their normal path to their normal workshops. Instead, they
headed to the personnel offices and announced that they were done working for the CRDA. They
had decided that they and their families would depart for Yugoslavia. 2
In reality, the Bandellis’ resignations might not have gone so smoothly. Upon arriving at
the personnel offices, they may have had to wait in line for some time. Though the personnel staff
certainly had been expecting at least a handful of workers to arrive to announce their intention to

Alfredo Bonelli, “Memorie del monfalconese Tonzar Mario,” 6 March 1978, IRSML, Fondo Cominform, b 99, f 8.
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depart, the forty-eight who made a showing on 4 February were nearly double the twenty-seven of
the day before. It was not their busiest day – sixty-seven had quit on 17 January – but it was the
greatest turnover in well over a week. That said, it is possible that the personnel offices were
expecting a rush. The pro-Yugoslav sentiments among the CRDA workers was well known and
signing day for the Peace Treaty was less than a week away. It was perhaps foreseeable that many
of these workers would be anxious to leave the Monfalconese before Italy returned. The Bandelli
brothers and most of the others who visited the personnel offices on 4 February felt this way, as
did most of the 510 others who had quit since the beginning of January. 3
Those who Left Before
Though the bulk of the monfalconesi who left for Yugoslavia, including the Bandelli
brothers, did so in 1947, a substantial number – at least several hundred – had preceded them in
the two years prior. As with the emigrants of 1947, those of 1945 and 1946 left in different waves,
with different motivations and different expectations. It is worth recalling the diversity of these
earlier migrants in terms of both motives and social profile. An understanding of these earlier
waves is necessary to comprehend fully why the 1947 migration wave played out the way it did.
The first three waves of emigrants have been discussed in previous chapters. The first were
twenty-seven members of the Monfalconese Difesa Popolare who refused to put down their guns,
instead electing to pass into Zone B still under arms, escorted by Anglo-American military forces.4
Little is definitively known about who they were, what drove them to this decision, or how long
they imagined they would remain in Yugoslavia. What evidence remains suggests that they were
revolution-minded Communists of the Monfalcone GAP, who sought to maintain their unit intact
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beyond Anglo-American reaches.5 The second wave consisted of hundreds of single, unemployed
young men who departed from Monfalcone after the April 1946 layoffs. Many had partisan pasts
or were involved in pro-Yugoslav organizations, though their means and methods of departure
varied widely, as did their level of skill. Some were skilled laborers who had given up their jobs
so that higher-paid family members might remain employed (Renato Rigonat), while others, like
Silvano Cosolo, entirely lacked industrial skills and saw no possibility for employment, let alone
apprenticing in Monfalcone.6 Third, there were a handful of pro-Yugoslav organizers,
propagandists, and militants who took refuge beyond the Morgan Line after the AMG issued arrest
warrants for their participation in illegal political activity. Most notable were the Monfalconese’s
“Big Five,” who had fled in the wake of the abortive 1 October demonstration, but there were also
several low-level militants on the lam, accused of assaulting VGPC officers or political murder
during the period of Yugoslav administration. 7 Thus already by fall 1946, hundreds of
monfalconesi had relocated to Yugoslavia for a range of reasons using a range of methods.
In fall 1946, however, as news sank in that Yugoslavia would not return, two new
emigratory streams emerged. The first was a group of head technicians (capi tecnici) from the
CRDA, headhunted by the Croatian branch of the SU for employment in Fiume’s newly-renamed
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Third of May Shipyard. Already by the winter of 1946/47, the SU of Trieste was responding to
such requests, asking the SU of Fiume to make guarantees that these technicians’ pensions would
be honored, that their children would receive a quality education, and that their living quarters
would be satisfactory and affordable. Though a small stream – the first request targeted only ten
individuals, of whom five are known to have accepted – this development was significant. It
marked a major shift in the nature of emigration. For the first time, the migrants were highly skilled
and securely employed heads of families. Moreover, their concerns about pensions and their
children’s education indicate a clear assumption of permanent residence rather than temporary
employment. But the recruitment of such technicians also indicated a shift in how the leadership
of pro-Yugoslav organizations in Trieste and Belgrade viewed the Monfalconese after receiving
news that the zone would remain Italian. It made clear that the Trieste and Belgrade leadership
now viewed the Monfalconese workforce not as a bastion of pro-Yugoslav sentiment for the
westward projection of Yugoslavia’s borders, but instead as a repository of labor upon which
labor-scarce Yugoslavia could draw. For this reason, the SU stressed the need to assure the positive
experience of these first recruits to assure that “other whole groups can be found like the first.” 8
A second and far more contentious new stream of emigrants involved the wider mass of
shipyard workers, who since September 1946 (and especially since the October 1946 change in
the UAIS line) had increasingly requested that the local SU find them jobs in Yugoslavia. 9 Such
requests followed upon the SU’s creation of an Unemployment Coordination Office (Ufficio
coordinatore disoccupati) in September 1946, which sought to balance the pro-Yugoslav
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organizations’ competing needs in Zone A, particularly with regard to labor and unemployment.
On the one hand, it was to coordinate welfare activities to support unemployed pro-Yugoslav
workers and keep them in place, so they could continue the territorial struggle; on the other, it
sought to funnel into Yugoslavia those workers intent on leaving, to meet Yugoslav labor needs. 10
The emergence of these two emigratory streams caused major tensions between the proYugoslav bodies of the Monfalconese. Already by the end of September, the Monfalconese PCRG
was trying to nip worker emigration in the bud. During a critical meeting of the Monfalconese
leadership on 24 September, the district’s organizational secretary, Fioravante B., had noted “a
continual influx of comrades with requests for Party statements to support them going to work in
Zone B or elsewhere.” Given his belief that this was an “abandonment of the struggle,” he
requested of the SU liaison, Attilio Battilana, that the SU “be more rigid in its issuance of
statements for going to work outside the zone.” Battilana pushed back. Though he agreed that the
Party should not indiscriminately honor such requests, he indicated that the PCRG’s regional
leadership in Trieste had already authorized the SU to help fulfill a request for 300-400 skilled
Monfalconese workers that had arrived from the Communist Party of Fiume. Though the meeting
concluded with agreement that “the Party reserves the right to issue statements only for those it
believes opportune or depending on circumstances,” it was clear that there were major
disagreements between Monfalcone and Trieste as to which requests were “opportune.” 11
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Such disagreements were not easily resolved. Four days later, at a conference of all the full
PCRG members of the Monfalconese, Ruggero Bersa responded to a question about these transfers
with an unambiguous statement that the Party had been forced to grant some requests due to
personal need, but that “the P[arty] will do everything possible to end this emigration and ensure
that comrades remain here to fight.” Moreover, to questions about Monfalconese youth who had
departed as members of the Youth Brigades and refused to return after their service ended, he
stressed that the leadership would “try within the limits of our abilities to make these youth
return.”12 What Bersa found, however, was that Battilana and the Monfalconese SU pushed
forward with recruitment, despite local PCRG objections. When Bersa travelled to Trieste to voice
opposition to both the recruitment itself and the SU’s perceived insubordination, he found Branko
Babič, Rudi Uršič, and others unwilling to shut off the tap, almost certainly due to orders
originating in Belgrade. Instead, they gave him an order: cooperate with the SU.13
Opening the Floodgates in Early 1947
With this order, the floodgates of emigration truly opened. Bersa returned to Monfalcone
and brought it before a hesitant district PCRG committee. Though prominent members like Otto
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Ferlettich spoke out against the idea, fearing that departures would hamstring Monfalconese
Communism, the committee ultimately accepted the orders for reasons of Party discipline. Thus,
in the first half of January, Bersa dutifully called a conference of pro-Yugoslav leaders at the UAIS
headquarters, informing them that their organizations should work to coordinate the transfer of
pro-Yugoslav workers to Yugoslavia, though with one important condition: high- and mid-level
Party members were to remain in place to protect the organizational integrity of the Party. 14 The
directive, in Bersa’s recollection, was “generally favorably received,” after which militants went
into the district’s worksites to issue the call for departure, propagandizing loudly enough that their
activity became a point of discussion on the pro-Italian Radio Venezia Giulia.15
When UAIS activists arrived in the workshops of the CRDA and Solvay, they found large
swaths of the workforce not only receptive to the idea of relocation, but eager to do so. In the
words of one SU official, enthusiastic workers “literally occupied the syndicate for the entire day”
following the announcement.16 It was in this context that scenes like this chapter’s introductory
vignette unfolded, the CRDA’s personnel office bombarded with resignations as workers jumped
at the chance to live the Yugoslav dream. Departures began immediately and, in the words of CAO
Hill, “almost every day [workers] leave Monfalcone in small groups of 25/30.” 17 The fervor was
such that Anglo-Americans predicted the phenomenon would turn into a large-scale population
transfer. Early AMG reports indicated that 1700 specialized workers would go to Pola alone, while
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CAO Kitson-Harris believed that the Yugoslavs were targeting 5000 recruits, especially skilled
welders, carpenters, and electricians of the CRDA. 18 The intelligence services of the AngloAmericans’ Central Mediterranean Force thought even bigger, believing that some 2000 CRDA
“specialists” and 400 “young workers” had already left the Monfalconese and that another 5000
would soon follow.19 Whatever the expectations, CAO Kitson-Harris made the wave of
resignations and departures the centerpiece of his January report on the district. 20
The readiness of monfalconesi to depart should not have been surprising, given that the
local PCRG had been struggling to check workers’ expressed desire to emigrate even before 1947,
but the popular response was so great that the question of migration immediately became a source
of contention between Communist Parties both within and outside the region. First to respond was
the PCI, whose representatives Giordano Pratolongo (head of the Information Office in Trieste)
and Lino Zocchi (head of the Udine Federation), were in Zone A laying the groundwork for the
post-treaty reconstitution of the PCI’s Gorizia Federation. As Bersa recalls, both leaders
immediately “more or less explicitly asked [the PCRG’s local leaders] to block the worker exodus
to Yugoslavia.”21 Despite claims by some historians that the PCI orchestrated the Monfalconese
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emigration, the opposite was, in fact, the case. 22
Most important in this regard were the efforts of Pratolongo, which he described in a
lengthy letter sent to Palmiro Togliatti on 14 January. According to Pratolongo, he had spoken
with the Monfalconese leaders at length shortly after the directive. He had impressed upon them
the political danger of “depriv[ing] a zone such as this of the most combative portion of the
working class, of all the Communists, of the cadres of our Party.” He had insisted that this was
particularly dangerous because the Monfalconese was to serve as “a barrier against reactionary
Fascist forces, maneuvers, and provocations in relation to the Free Territory of Trieste and from
this to Yugoslavia,” which would be impossible if the district lost its mass of radical workers.
Though the Monfalconese leadership had agreed on the political point, they concluded that
Yugoslavia’s reconstruction and Five-Year Plan took precedence over Italian political concerns.23
Despite the initial rebuttal of Pratolongo’s pleas, affairs within the local Party were not as
calm as they appeared. From the moment Bersa gave the directive to depart, it became apparent
that vital Party cadres were among the most eager to go and that they were prepared to disregard
the Party order to remain in place. In line with Kitson-Harris’s assessment, Bersa recalls that “some
70% of the Party members took the path of Yugoslavia.” 24 This display of indiscipline, combined
with the conflicting orders of the Italian and Yugoslav Parties and the certainty that Monfalcone

Arrigo Petacco, an anti-leftist journalist-historian, writes that “‘Operation Counter-Exodus,’ planned in absolute
secrecy, was the product of an agreement between the leaders of Yugoslav and Italian communism. Pietro Secchia,
the Vice-Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, personally arranged matters on the Italian side. The operation
involved the clandestine transfer to Yugoslavia of Italian volunteers, recruited from the shipyards of Monfalcone and
from factories in Gorizia, Trieste, and Friuli.” There is evidence that there was an effort to recruit Italian Communists
from elsewhere in Italy (including Friuli) to go to Yugoslavia, but the PCI’s response to the Monfalconese emigration
was the opposite. Petacco, A Tragedy Revealed, 125.
23
Giordano Pratolongo, Letter to Segretaria del PCI (Rome) (N. 0555), 14 January 1947, op. cit. Marco Puppini
deserves credit for uncovering this letter. Puppini, “Il ‘controesodo’ Monfalconese,” in Il mosaico giuliano, eds. Altieri
and Puppini, op. cit., 73-74.
24
Bersa recalls that district leaders “convened a second meeting of the UAIS in which we forcefully laid out the
problem of immediate stopping the departures.” Fogar, “Seconda parte dell’intervista registrata rilasciata da Ruggero
Bersa,” November 1981, op. cit; Maj. Kitson-Harris, “Monthly Report of Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ
Trieste Area,” 31 January 1947, op. cit.
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would soon return to Italy, provoked a schism within the local PCRG. A short time after the initial
announcement, a portion of the PCRG backtracked, cancelling the call for departures. The result
was severe disorientation. As Sergio Parenzan recounts, at the first UAIS meeting “an order of the
day was given: EVERYONE TO YUGOSLAVIA. After twenty-four hours, however, there was a
counter-order: NO ONE TO YUGOSLAVIA.” 25
The schism remained unresolved in the days and months that followed. Just days after
Pratolongo’s meeting with the Monfalconese leaders, the Yugoslav-controlled Il Lavoratore
responded with its 17 January article praising the self-sacrificing monfalconesi who were “ready
to leave everything” so they could help build Yugoslav socialism, departing with a “fever of
construction.” It reinforced key themes of the myth of Yugoslavia, including the idea of ItaloSlavic fraternity, the availability of skilled labor positions and training programs, and the fact that,
with the country now purged of speculators and economic disorder, workers could find their “daily
bread.”26 Implicitly, the article – along with several others published subsequently – urged more
monfalconesi to depart.27 On the other side, Togliatti and the PCI’s Central Committee worked to
convince monfalconesi to stay, even dispatching the esteemed partisan-politician Luigi Longo in

Parenzan’s testimony continues: “There had been a division in the leadership of the movement for and against the
exodus. The part that was for the Yugoslav solution wanted to bring the people to Yugoslavia. Another part, always
inside the movement, that was not pro-Italian but also not pro-Yugoslav, expressed a contrary desire…. There were
two spirits in our movement. Because if we all went away, who would remain?” Cernigoi, Scelte politiche e identità
nazionale, 272-73.
26
The article did also warn monfalconesi not to expect a “worldly paradise” in Yugoslavia, but it did so in such a way
that was reconcilable with the myth of Yugoslavia. The precise warning was this: “you will not find every amenity:
there is a just wage as agreed by the Sindacati, there is food, there will be a place to sleep, but each will need to made
do a bit on their own; it will not be easy, because the Country has suffered much from the war and Yugosalvia is not
a worldly paradise; it takes discipline.” “E questi perchè se ne vanno?,” Il Lavoratore, 17 January 1947.
27
Particularly significant were three articles published in 1947 that reported on the experiences of various
monfalconesi in Yugoslavia, emphasizing their perfect harmony with locals, their opportunities to participate in
cultural activities and advancement, the high pay and high sense of personal fulfillment gained through their skilled
positions leading Yugoslav industries, and the abundance of food in Yugoslavia. See the Il Lavoratore articles “A
Tuzla, centro minerario della Bosnia,” 26 Feburary 1947; “Lavoratori italiani in Jugoslavia,” 19 March 1947; “Una
lettera dalla Slovenia,” 11 August 1947. For an article that specifically aimed to juxtapose the controesodo to the
“Fascist” esodo for the purpose of rehabilitating Yugoslavia’s image, see “Seguaci di Goebbels,” Il Lavoratore, 1
February 1947.
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another attempt to dam the flow of emigrants. 28 Bersa himself, who for reasons of PCRG party
discipline had ordered the emigration in January, by the late spring of 1947 was speaking out
against emigration in his capacity as a member of the new PCI-Gorizia’s directive council. 29
With these contradictory messages coming from several directions, Tito and the myth of
Yugoslavia often won out among the workers. Despite the efforts of both central PCI figures and
respected local leaders to slow the emigration, monfalconesi continued to depart by the hundreds,
particularly as the signing of the Peace Treaty approached and passed in February. 30 The Bandelli
brothers made their decision to quit and transfer weeks after both Pratologno’s visit and Bersa’s
counter-directive. There too was Sante G., who, after twelve years doing hull-work as an iron
carpenter, resigned in favor of a new life in Fiume.31 By late February, Kitson-Harris indicated
that 700 CRDA workers and 42 Solvay workers had resigned. 32 From the outset, this emigratory
wave was qualitatively different than waves prior. For the first time, large number of highly skilled
and economically secure workers flanked the efflux of unemployed monfalconesi, many of them
heads of families.33 Moreover, for the first time, emigrants left in open defiance of local and Italian

Tonzar, La valigia e l’idea, 84-85. Longo had been one of two vice-commanders of Italy’s combined partisan
command staff, the Corpo volontari della libertà (CVL). Pavone, A Civil War, 195.
29
Ruggero Bersa, “Relazione del Comp. Ruggero Bersa,” 15 June 1947, APC-IG, Federazioni: Gorizia, Anno 1947,
mf 140, p 1811. Togliatti’s opposition to the controesodo was not merely a public show. According to Bersa, at some
time between the PCI-Gorizia’s First Provincial Conference (mid-June 1947) and Monfalcone’s return to Italy (midSeptember), he was invited by Lino Zocchi to meet with the PCI’s national leadership in Rome. According to Bersa,
Togliatti indicated that he did not begrudge the monfalconesi their participation in the PCRG and pro-Yugoslav
movement, but he asked Bersa (in Bersa’s words) “who and how many were the Communists who had not abandoned
the struggle in the location?” (Italics added). Fogar, “Seconda parte dell’intervista registrata rilasciata da Ruggero
Bersa,” November 1981, op. cit.
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In the testimony of Rino Russian, given to Andrea Berrini, Russian indicates that his father, Dante, was counseled
to stay by the PCI’s provincial secretary, though to no avail. Berrini, Noi siamo la classe operaia, 74-75.
31
ASG, Questura 1948, b 5, f 793. See also the case of Paolo D., a pro-Yugoslav militant who gave up his position as
an electric welder after 28 years at the CRDA, and that of Amedeo T.. ASG, Questura 1948, b 4, f 612; b 11, f 1755.
32
Maj. Kitson-Harris, Monthly Report of Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ Trieste Area, 28 February 1947, op.
cit.
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Unemployment remained critical in the Monfalconese in early 1947, despite the fact that the CRDA began to receive
new contracts in late 1946. By November 1946, the firm had secured contracts (mainly from Scandinavian firms) that
would allow it to employ 8200 individuals through 1948 and it even relaunched apprenticeship programs for certain
categories of workers (esp. welders), if in small number. Still, the estimated workforce of 8200 was several thousand
less than the wartime figure. In January there were still some 4563 unemployed in the district, of whom 2113 were
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Communist leaders. Though it is impossible to say precisely how many had resigned and emigrated
by the end of February or how many unemployed monfalconesi joined them in departing, certainly
in the first two months after the directive, over a thousand monfalconesi made the choice to leave.34
Pathways to Yugoslavia
Once a monfalconese made the choice to depart, he or she then had to find the means and
methods of relocation. For those heads-of-family who quit secure jobs to depart in early 1947, it
was the SU offices that did most of the heavy lifting. Though most envisioned their departure as a
permanent family relocation, in the short term, almost all left their families behind. 35 Instead, the
district SU assembled groups of roughly 25-80 emigrant workers and technicians, which, once
organized, departed together.36 Accompanied by an SU guide, they travelled by train or truck to
checkpoints near Sesana or Trieste, where they crossed into Zone B with little resistance. 37 In
accordance with the terms of the Duino and Belgrade Agreements that had established the AMG
and YMG, monfalconesi arriving at a Morgan Line checkpoint needed only to flash their blue
AMG ID card to gain free access to Zone B. As Ruggero Bersa recounts,
at the time, no one armed himself with a [formal Italian] passport to pass into Yugoslavia:
entire families, with all their household goods loaded on the most varied means of
men (1553 heads of families), 1592 women (530 heads of families), and 858 would-be apprentices. Kitson-Harris,
“Monthly Report of Monfalcone Group CAO…,” 30 November 1946, op. cit.; Kitson-Harris, “Monthly Report of
Monfalcone Group CAO to AMG HQ Trieste Area,” 31 January 1947, op. cit.
34
The three most important reasons are that (1) the regulations governing movement across the Morgan Line made it
difficult to track migrants (discussed below); (2) not all migrants crossed at legal crossings; and (3) there are often
problems of definitions in the documents. Many documents list workers who have left for “Yugoslavia,” not clarifying
if Pola or Zone B are included in this term. Both would be annexed to Yugoslavia with the implementation of the
treaty, but until September 1947 Pola was legally part of Zone, A and Zone B legally distinct from Yugoslavia.
Officials were inconsistent and imprecise in their usages of these terms.
35
SCAO Meeting Minutes, 3 March 1947, NARA 331, UD1981, b 9188, f 11304/115/289.
36
Per CAO Hill, these were “offered good terms and good jobs in Jugo-Slavian industries newly built or under
construction and at the time of the signature of the contract they will receive an amount of money (rumours say of
50.000 lire but it’s uncertain).” Capt. Hill, “Monthly Report, Jan 1947,” 28 January 1947, op. cit. For emigrant
testimony, see Alfredo Bonelli, “Testimonianza del monfalconese Buttignon Angelo,” 28 April 1978, IRSML, Fondo
Cominform, b 99, f 8; “Testimonianza del monfalconese Donda Onorio,” 5 March 1978, IRSML, Fondo Cominform,
b 99, f 8; “Testimonianza del monfalconese Nicola Angelo,” 10 March 1978, IRSML, Fondo Cominform, b 99, f 5.
37
The Gorizia Questura files indicate that some individuals organized these expatriations full-time. ASG, Q 1948, b
4, f 516.
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transport, crossed the demarcation line between Zone A and B without the slightest check
or hindrance by the Allied border authorities; rather, one almost had the feeling that they
would have built golden bridges for whomever left Zone A. 38

And so the bulk of monfalconesi crossed the Iron Curtain with ease, though, as will be seen in the
final chapter, the AMG was far less eager to see them go than Bersa suggests.
But not all monfalconesi found the emigration process so straightforward, especially those
who, for one reason or another, lacked the proper AMG ID card to pass freely across the Morgan
Line. Those who had misplaced their ID card or who were under the age of 18 had to find another
way across, though doing so was no more difficult in the first months of 1947 than it had been
when Silvano Cosolo crossed the border clandestinely on foot the summer before. 39 In fact, the
pro-Yugoslav institutions of Monfalcone and Trieste had a well-developed network of peoplesmugglers, which had been used in the past to aid the clandestine expatriation of various “partisanrefugees.” Most often, trained Communist militants brought such individuals across the border
into Zone B, either hiding them in trucks that passed through rarely-staffed rural checkpoints near
Gorizia or guiding them by foot through the wilderness, as with Cosolo.40
Whether emigrants crossed into Zone B legally or illegally, they tended to go through a
similar process of integration upon arrival in Yugoslavia. Though some of the most skilled workers
and technicians learned of their work destination before departure, most did not. 41 The majority

Fogar, “Seconda parte dell’intervista registrata rilasciata da Ruggero Bersa,” November 1981, op. cit.
Cpt. M. Heaton Armstrong, “Control of MORGAN Line,” 15 April 1947, NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9211, f
11304/115/529.
40
“Partisan-refugees” were typically Communist partisans sought by the Italian or AMG courts for various Liberationera crimes, especially the violent settling of scores against former Fascists. The Monfalcone Communist Party HQ,
for example, helped the perpetrators of the infamous Schio Massacre expatriate to Yugoslavia. Comm. Gen. del
Governo Palamara (Trieste), B[x] Giovanni di Antonio…” (N. 13/1/1405-55) and attached, 15 February 1955,
AGPCM-UZC, Sez II, Jug, b 18, f 163. In September 1947, the Italian Foreign Ministry indicated that the SU
possessed “a well-organized ‘recruitment’ network” and “means to send those with interest over the frontier of Zone
A unbeknownst to both our Frontier Authorities and those of the Allies.” Legazione d’Italia (Belgrado), “Lavoratori
italiani in Jugoslavia” (Tel. N. 266/44), 4 September 1947, ASDMAE, AP 1946-50, Jug, b 30, f 3.
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passed through Vipava (Vipacco) on their way to Fiume, which served as a sorting and allocation
center for workers trying to make Yugoslavia their new home. 42
Movements in Fits and Starts, Spring-Summer 1947
If January and February were months of frenetic activity for those tasked with organizing
the transfer of monfalconesi to Yugoslavia, the months that followed were much calmer. By
March, Inspector Lendaro of the local VGPC noted a deceleration in the rate of departure. He
reported that “the communists have almost suspended their settings-out,” explaining this as a result
of monfalconesi having become aware of the true reality of life in Tito’s Yugoslavia. 43 Rather than
realizing Lendaro’s prediction that departures would cease, however, the months of spring and
summer 1947 saw emigration continue, if in less spectacular form than the mass departures of
early that year. From month to month, a continual stream of departures ebbed and flowed, made
up of disparate groups of emigrants.
First among them were the dependents and family members of those heads-of-families who
had left so suddenly in January and February. By the late spring of 1947, many of these workers
had established themselves in Yugoslavia, at which time they sent for wives, children, and elderly
parents to be brought across the border by SU aids.44 In March 1947, the twenty-two-year-old

This applied to both legal and clandestine border-crossers. Legazione d’Italia (Belgrado), “Lavoratori italiani in
Jugoslavia” (Tel. N. 266/44), 4 September 1947, op. cit.; Pin-Giuricin, “I motivi di una scelta,” 360-64; Cosolo,
Amare… Sarajevo, 18-19.
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Insp. Lendaro, “Monthly Report on the Corps Activity, Mar 1947,” 22 March 1947, NARA, RG331, UD1981, b
9186, f 11304/115/278.
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ASG, Questura 1948, b 8, f 1167. There are a great many files in the Gorizia Questura’s cabinet records detailing
such migrants. Another was the Vermegliano electrician Ermanno D. P. and his stepbrother Nereo V., who, as late
teenagers, emigrated in July 1947 to join their father/stepfather, who had been working in Yugoslavia for months.
ASG, Questura 1948, b 12, f 1902. See also ASG, Questura 1948, b 1, f 90; b 2, f 205; b 8, f 1298; b 9, f 1407; and b
10, f 1483. On the guides, see ASG, Q 1948, b 4, f 516. In some cases, the emigratory activity of a family played out
in three different stages involving three different generations. The mechanic and father Tullio B. departed for
Yugoslavia in May 1947, seeking to join his parents, who had previously settled in Abbazia (Opatija). He left his wife
and two children behind until he could organize their transfer the month after – and all of this despite Tullio being not
particularly politically active. ASG, Questura 1948, b 1, f 165. In some cases, young monfalconesi who had passed
into Yugoslavia in years prior pulled their siblings across in mid-1497, as with the pair of brothers from Staranzano,
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Mafalda P. of San Pier d’Isonzo departed in May to join her husband, a pipefitter, who had settled
in Fiume in the first days of March 1947. Hundreds of such reunions occurred in the middle of
1947. They became so common that the AMG held discussions over the high number of
monfalconesi whose attempts to cross into Zone B at Sesana en route to Fiume had been foiled
due to their lack of the required blue AMG ID card. Such cards were not issued to people under
18 years of age and, almost certainly to prevent the separation of children from their parents, the
AMG made an exception, allowing Monfalcone residents to pass the border using only their
communal identity card.45 For those families whose end-goal was reuinification inside Yugoslavia,
it was primarily in the middle third of 1947 that this occurred.
But not all of those who left in mid-1947 were dependents of workers who had departed in
the frantic emigratory wave that kicked off that year. Though the pro-Italian Radio Venezia Giulia
waged an anti-Yugoslav broadcast campaign to slow emigration in mid-1947 – it warned that
Yugoslavia was a haven for expatriated Italian criminal assassins and that emigrant workers would
be “at the mercy of the Titoist exploiters with no way out” – both Il Lavoratore and delegations of
pro-Yugoslav monfalconesi and triestini who toured Yugoslavia pushed back against such
negative images.46 With so many conflicting ideas about Yugoslavia in circulation, many workers
continued to give up their jobs as the months passed, making the decision to migrate well after the

Romano and Alfredo D. Alfredo, a young mechanic and one of the earliest emigrants, had been working in the
Belgrade naval yards since December 1945. It was in May 1947 that his younger brother Romano finally joined him.
ASG, Questura 1948, b 4, f 514.
45
The report was sent to GSI of the Allies’ Central Mediterranean Force, indicating an uneasiness with this procedure.
This was seen above all as a practical necessity. Cpt. M. Heaton Armstrong, “Control of MORGAN Line,” 15 April
1947, op. cit.
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Radio Venezia Giulia, Summary of Broadcast, 2000hrs, 23 April 1947, AGPCM-UZC, Sez II, Jug, b 2, f 30. The
reference to Yugoslavia as a haven for criminal assassins is in RVG, Summary of Broadcast, 2000hrs, 20 June 1947,
AGPCM-UZC, Sez II, Jug, b 2, f 30. SU-Trieste, “Viaggio della delegazione triestina dei Sindacati Unici a Belgrado,”
May 1947, op. cit.
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original UAIS directive and its counter-directive.47 Included in this wave were a number of
peasants, sharecroppers, and fishers, as well as many strongly pro-Yugoslav women – most young
and single – certainly not recruited by the SU for their industrial skills. 48 This new emigratory
wave of mid-1947 disabused both Inspector Lendaro and AMG officials of the illusion that this
emigration would soon come to an end.49 By late May, the AMG had confirmed the emigration of
76 whole families and another 1294 individual workers from the Monfalconese. 50
A final emigratory wave then came shortly before the implementation of the Peace Treaty.
In those early September days, many who had hesitated or otherwise delayed their departure made
the jump, fearing that their access to Yugoslavia might be cut off. Typical of these eleventh-hour
migrants, was the twenty-three-year-old Liliana V., engaged to a pro-Yugoslav worker named
Alberto, who had worked in Belgrade since quitting his job at the CRDA in February. Seemingly
fearing that the Italo-Yugoslav border would be sealed following the arrival of Italy, Alberto

47

Though in early April the CRDA seems to have stopped reporting the names of workers who resigned with the
intention of transferring to Yugoslavia, the final list available (or at least the latest that I have been able to locate) lists
23 resignations between 29 March and 4 April. Unsigned (CRDA), “Elenco degli operai licenzati spontaneamente dal
29 marzo a 4 aprile 1947,” Undated (April 1947), NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9189, f 11304/115/308.
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For agriculturalists and fishers, see Attilio B. (peasant), Gregorio Z. (sharecropper), Dorino U. (sharecropper),
Giulio F. (“agriculturalist”), and Nicolò L., respectively at ASG, Questura 1948, b 2, f 264; b 12, f 1993; b 12, f 1810;
b 5, f 717; b 6, f 675. Regarding women emigrants, the police most often explained their emigration as motivated by
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“Rations [sic] cards - Unentitled persons,” 3 May 1947, both in NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9159, f 11304/115/86.
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Intelligence Summary No. 2, May 1947, op. cit.
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0 families and 7 workers; (5) Monfalcone (including Panzano): 29 families and 699 workers; (6) Ronchi: 11 families
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holdings. Gombač, “Controesodo tra poteri popolari e GMA,” in Il mosaico giuliano, eds. Altieri and Puppini, op. cit.,
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returned to Monfalcone the day before Transfer Day, marrying Liliana. The two then ran off back
to Belgrade. In doing so, Liliana left behind her parents and a stable job, but she assured she would
not be separated from her partner.51 She was one of the last monfalconesi to depart for Yugoslavia
before the return of Italy, bringing to a close an eight-month period of intense emigration that, like
the exodus in the opposite direction, occurred in fits and starts, its participants often waiting until
the last moment to jump into the unknown.
Socialism
For the thousands of monfalconesi who departed in the first two months of 1947, as well
as those who would departed later, there were a thousand individual choices to depart. Though all
monfalconesi lived in a certain shared context – the looming return of Italy, daily terror attacks,
persistent ration problems, unresolved workplace grievances, and ever-greater competition with
arriving esuli – each had unique circumstances, which created unique constellations of motivations
for departure. Though it is impossible to determine accurately the number of migrants who
departed for each particular motivation, it is worthwhile to examine the various shades of these
motivations and the complex ways in which they combined to motivate individuals’ departures.
The controesodo has been mythologized as an ideologically motivated departure of selfsacrificing workers committed to constructing socialism with their industrial skills and political
fervor.52 As Ruggero Bersa recalled in a late-Cold-War interview, the monfalconesi emigrants
were “comrades who enthusiastically emigrated to Yugoslavia with the precise intention of
contributing, with their experience as highly qualified workers and technicians to the rehabilitation
and development of partially obsolete industries.” In a statement that is far from unique in its
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ASG, Questura 1948, b 12, f 1850.
Il Lavoratore’s article of 17 January 1947 had already attempted to frame the controesodo in this way.
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linkage of industrial skill and left-wing sensibilities, Bersa suggested that the controesodo served
as “a brilliant example of internationalist sensibilities, and in the shipyards of Fiume and Spalato
and in the factories of every party of Yugoslavia where they were employed, they were highly
respected for their technical capacity and for their political commitment.”53 Mario Tonzar put it
more succinctly when he recalled that the monfalconesi emigrated due to “the idea of socialism,
of a new humanity…. We… abandoned work, home, everything. We went away only with our
suitcase. Our suitcase and the idea.”54
Included among the monfalconesi emigrants were many skilled workers with long leftist
pasts and a commitment to “constructing socialism” in Yugoslavia. Individuals like Valerio
Beltrame, who had been a PCI militant in the CRDA during the Fascist period, a confinanti after
the Fascist crackdowns of 1942, a partisan, and then a primary AgitProp organizer for the PCRG
clearly fit this bill. The welder Paolo D., who had spent 28 years as one of the CRDA’s staunchest
anti-Fascists, gave up his job in February 1947 to move to Yugoslavia. 55 In fact, of the 47 members
of the workshop-level PCRG cells for the CRDA’s Shipbuilding Department, at least 24 (51%)
would emigrate. Most of these twenty-four, Paolo and the two eldest Bandelli brothers among
Fogar, “Terza parte dell’intervista registrata rilasciata da Ruggero Bersa,” November 1981, op. cit. Berrini believes
this sentiment is best captured by the active verb “to forge” (forgiare) rather than the term “faith” (fede) with its
connotations of irrationality and passivity. Berrini, Noi siamo la classe operaia, 7-9.
54
Tonzar contrasts the motivations of monfalconesi with those of esuli, who he says moved under “hardships and
miseries” caused by Tito’s regime and the harsh Istrian environment. Tonzar, La valigia e l’idea, 78. Bersa and Tonzar
were far from unique in their assessment. Spartaco Romano recalls that monfalconesi left to “collaborate in the
construction of socialism,” while the goriziano Franco Giraldi recounts that they were “the best specialized workers
of the shipyards of Monfalcone [who] chose to go voluntarily to Yugoslavia, to Fiume to help the… modernization
and the growth of socialism.” Alfredo Bonelli believed that the monfalconesi “were [in Yugoslavia] voluntarily, to
remain here, to stay here for the rest of their lives.” They were “the greater part of the Party of the Monfalconese, a
group of comrades among the most combative and most solid of Western Europe, and an elite, too, from a technical
and professional point of view.” Bonelli, “Sesta testimonianza del monfalconese Romano Spartaco,” 23 October 1981,
IRSML, Fondo Cominform, b 99, f 2; Giraldi, “Intervista a Franco Giraldi,” interview by Alessando Cattunar and
Kaja Širok, 8 August 2009, Strada della memoria: Archivio della memoria, transcript at
http://www.stradedellamemoria.it/easyne2/LYT.
aspx?Code=4704&IDLYT=6605&ST=SQL&SQL=ID_Documento=267 (accessed 3/22/2017); Bonelli, “Prima
intervista con il partigiano profugo Ballardini Sauro (Topo),” 2 July 1980, IRSML, Fondo Cominform, b 99, f 4.
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them, would leave in the first months of 1947.56 Politics was likely the primary motivating force
for such individuals, as is suggested by several participants, among them the CRDA joiner and
PCRG member Angelo Nicola. Nicola stressed that many were “convinced [they could] give their
technical contribution and labor for the construction of socialism.” 57 It is even possible that they
undertook this emigration with reluctance, understanding their actions as self-sacrificial, the
subordination of one’s own desires to the needs of socialist reconstruction.
But departures in pursuit of socialism could take on other inflections. In the case of young
Communists in particular – those often dubbed dangerous “extremists” by the local Communist
leadership – there seems to have been a generational divide at play, with those closely tied to
partisan movement feeling that the old leadership, the Comars and Bersas and Ferlettiches, did not
demand enough and were, in fact, blocking the new, Resistance-tested generation from assuming
leadership of the local “progressive” movement. As the former Communist Youth organizer and
emigrant Giuseppe Franti would later attest,
I attended the Party School at Monfalcone: and I was amazed by the fact, for example, that
one such as Comar could give lessons on Marxism while, in fact, he didn’t know a thing
about Marxism: certain youth already knew it much better than he and [the old leaders].
Personally, I respected and admired Comar, but I recognized that there were some youth
capable of giving him lessons.
And there was the problem. Certain intelligent youths had to expatriate or be
thrown out of the Monfalconese movement.58

Though Franti himself would emigrate with the agreement that he would serve on the BrčkoBaroviči railway and then be released from his position as a Party functionary, there were certainly
some who felt that it was not only Italy, but also the entrenched leadership of their own movement,
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that would prevent them from achieving that which they had aimed to create in 1945.
The tension between individual workers and the Communist Party became more acute in
the spring of 1947 as the zone’s Party, syndicates, and cultural associations were reconstituted
within an Italian national framework. This process was painful and difficult.59 At the First
Provincial Conference of the reconstituted PCI-Gorizia, held in mid-June, Ruggero Bersa
suggested that the primary problem facing the provincial Party was that “the middle class – the
intellectuals and, still worse, the white-collar class – has not been approached by us,” but instead,
because of certain “prejudicial” actions of the district’s Communists, had succumbed to
chauvinism and entered into battle against the local “democratic” forces. 60 He urged Monfalconese
Communists to form an increasingly close alliance with the retailers and clerks that had become
so reviled, as this was the PCI’s path to a democratic seizure of power. Far from reflecting all
monfalconesi’s hopes for the future, then, the new PCI line often worked directly against them. If,
under the PCRG, many workers had become frustrated that the territorial struggle required a crossclass, pro-Yugoslav alliance and the indefinite postponement of the showdown with the “remnants
of Fascism,” under the PCI, the goal of getting rid of these social categories no longer seemed to
exist. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that disillusioned Monfalconese came to realize that they
had no place in these new organizations and made their exit. As they continued to emigrate through
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the summer of 1947, almost none joined the reconstituted PCI branch. 61
Finally, the notion of constructing socialism was often a misnomer. In many cases,
individuals hoped to escape to a society with already constructed socialism. This was especially
common for older monfalconesi, and particularly those with long leftist pasts. Spartaco Romano’s
father said as much to his son as he set off for Fiume, leaving Spartaco behind in Monfalcone. As
Romano recalls, “my father said, ‘I want to live the last years of my life under socialism. I’m
packing up and getting out of here.’” 62 As such, it was not the appeal of suffering and toiling to
construct the new world that won these longtime militants to the idea of emigration, but rather a
hope that a lifetime of unrewarded struggle could be made right by stepping across the border. And
Romano has no illusions: “Many comrades had to have thought like him.” 63
Fear
But for monfalconesi whose efforts to construct local socialism had driven them to fight
within the UAIS and PCRG, there was another clear reason to depart: personal safety. In early
1947, right around the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty, the wave of threats and attacks
against pro-Yugoslav militants reached its climax. Such attacks were certainly a crucial factor in
motivating pro-Yugoslavs to depart, and they did not stop after the signing. Instead, there was a
lull in the middle of the year, which gave way to a string of increasingly bold attacks as the
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implementation of the treaty approached in September. On 29 August, for example, a group of
fifteen esuli headed by a pro-Italian CRDA clerk chased down and attempted to murder a proYugoslav naval mechanic in broad daylight just outside the shipyard. The worker, who, unlike his
brother, had refused to bend to threats and take refuge in Yugoslavia, survived only due to the
intervention of three plainclothes policemen. 64 For the pro-Yugoslavs of Monfalcone, the events
raised a terrifying question. If such violence occurred under the “impartial” AMG, what could they
expect when their home district returned to the Italy, which saw them as sellouts and traitors? 65
For many, the fear of potential violence was too great to remain, though anonymous terror
and targeted attacks were not universally effective in driving pro-Yugoslavs and former
garibaldini out of the zone. Though many of those threated made the choice to depart, seasoned
partisans such as Mario Fantini, Vinicio Fontanot, and Ferruccio Barbo refused to bend to such
violence, perhaps because they were convinced that departure meant acknowledging that
“Fascists” had triumphed. Although Fantini did not depart following the bombing of his building
(see chapter five), all three of the UAIS militants residing in the building with him did, taking their
families with them. 66
The choice to depart was easiest for those who, due to egregious acts of violence that they
or their family members had committed against pro-Italian neighbors, felt themselves at great risk
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of targeted retribution. In early 1947, for example, three families from San Pier d’Isonzo with ties
to the local GAP uprooted themselves because one of the GAP’s members had gunned down the
twenty-two-year-old pro-Italian Ottavio Nonnino in the hot autumn of 1946 “solely because he
was of Italian sentiments” (or so the local carabinieri commander believed). 67 Though the AMG
sentenced the shooter to sixteen years in prison, those with ties to the GAP knew that Ottavio’s
father, Primo, would seek revenge for the death of his only son. Family members of the suspected
murderers of Agostino Perin did the same. 68 For such individuals, the border served as a buffer
that could protect them from those esuli and native monfalconesi who would readily answer the
call to avenge the martyrs of the pro-Italian cause. 69
Survival
But the Morgan Line was not only a shield; it was also a tool. For many Monfalconese
families, it served as a vital instrument in family survival strategies that, when paired with bordercrossing, aimed to mobilize resources from each side of the border. The porosity of the border and
the inability of the AMG to impose discipline on crossings allowed clever monfalconesi to use the
border to ameliorate, if not eliminate the joblessness and hunger that pervaded the home district.
In some cases, this was an end in itself, detached from or even despite the participant’s political
beliefs. Most often, however, strategies of border exploitation were informed by deeply held proYugoslav beliefs, playing out among families that for other reasons had decided to relocate
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permanently to Tito’s new state, either partially or wholly.
The most common way that monfalconesi exploited the existing bordering system was the
simplest: families sent their young sons and daughters or, less commonly, their male heads across
the border in pursuit of work and to lessen the family’s burden in meeting food and lodging needs.
This had become a common strategy beginning with the layoffs of 1946, and in 1947 many
monfalconesi continued to treat Yugoslavia as a resource, a land of work.70 For some bordercrossers, as with the twenty-two-year-old Nerina M., the assumption of work in Yugoslavia was
envisioned as a short-term transactional necessity. Despite never having been politically active,
the bachelorette Nerina, whose father was unemployed and whose family had no means to live,
emigrated to Yugoslavia in early February 1947 to help her family meet its basic needs. She would
remain there working until December, at which point her father found a job. As soon as word
reached Nerina of her father’s employment, she packed her bags and returned home. For her and
many emigrants who crossed the border with these limited material motivations, the temporary
nature of their expatriation was never in doubt.71 The archival records are filled with cases in which
families straddled the border in the attempt to find employment for all members. 72
The allure of employment was so powerful that it drew across the border even some
avowed anti-Communists and pro-Italians. Indicative of this trend is the worker Carlo C., born in
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Monfalcone in 1924. Despite being a staunch pro-Italian and member of the DC, he found himself
out of work in the postwar and departed for Yugoslavia to find a job. His pro-Yugoslav cousin,
Antonio P., had recently relocated to Pola with his family, and, though this cannot be known with
certainty, it seems likely that Carlo tapped his cousin to find him a job, overcoming both
intrafamilial political divisions and his ideological aversion to Tito’s Yugoslavia to assure his
ability to survive.73 Another pro-Italian, Antonio A., married to a Southerner from a family of
“distinguished” pro-Italian activists, made a similar choice, leaving his wife behind and heading
to Yugoslavia for work.74 A final case, that of Luciano S., is particularly illuminating. Though his
father was a UAIS member and Communist, Luciano joined the DC in the postwar and worked as
a clerk at the CRDA. However, when he lost his job, he ingratiated himself with the pro-Yugoslav
movement in March 1947, securing a job as a drafter in Fiume’s shipyard through the SU. And so
Luciano, an anti-Communist pro-Italian, went to Yugoslavia, leaving behind his pro-Yugoslav,
Communist father.75 Carlo, Antonio, and Luciano were joined by a surprising, if still small number
of pro-Italians – most anti-Communist – who chose Yugoslavia out of necessity or convenience.76
But steady paychecks were not the only thing that families sought when they sent members
across the Morgan Line. Many families of the Monfalconese also sought to straddle the border so
that they could maximize the goods they received through state provisioning systems, particularly
by collecting rations on both sides of the border. Though families had almost certainly used the
border in this way from the first moment of departures, in early April 1947 the Ronchi communal
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president informed CAO Kitson-Harris that some families had continued to collect rations in the
name of youth who no longer resided in the Monfalconese. Whereas families who sought to bring
furniture and property across the border had to register their departure at the communal offices,
individual migrants who left families and property behind could cross the border under pretext of
a quick stay and instead remain in Yugoslavia to work, leaving their ration cards behind to be filled
by family members. 77 With rations provided by Yugoslavia to both participants in the Youth
Brigades and workers at the major, state-run industrial sites, the migrant, in theory, would be no
worse off. All that was required was the migrant’s periodic return to the commune to renew the
card – an easy thing to do especially for those monfalconesi working in Fiume or Pola.
Though such survival strategies created situations in which families often found themselves
divided by the border and tapping into rationing systems on both sides, it would be a mistake to
interpret this phenomenon as evidence that economic necessity (to the exclusion of politics) was
the primary motivation for most monfalconesi’s departures or that they envisioned their relocation
lasting only so long as such strategies remained viable. 78 Individual monfalconesi’s responses to
everyday necessity cannot be separated from ideology, as ideological lenses – for many, the myth
of Yugoslavia – framed the range of opportunities they believed the border to provide. Faith in
Yugoslavia’s economic recovery and just provisioning system gave many the confidence needed,
for example, to cede voluntarily their invaluable ration cards to family members and depart for
unknown corners of Yugoslavia, at times without pre-arranged labor contracts.
In some cases, economic opportunities provided by border-straddling functioned as a brake
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upon the speed of family relocations – an encouragement to stagger departures – rather than a force
driving monfalconesi rapidly across the Iron Curtain. This is confirmed by the responses of many
monfalconesi to the eventual breakdown of this method of collecting double rations in mid-1947,
when the AMG moved quickly to stamp it out. Shortly after receiving notice of the phenomenon,
CAO Kitson-Harris dispatched a memo to all subordinate CAOs and communal presidents,
reminding them that such activities – particularly collecting rations in someone else’s name – were
serious criminal offences. He ordered each to carry out a detailed survey of the departures from
the district so the AMG could invalidate the ration cards of such individuals. 79 When the AMG
completed its survey in May 1947, many families lost the ability to exploit the border in this way.
Yet the response of many was not what might have been expected had their border-crossing been
purely pragmatic. Rather than returning home, it was in this context that many families finally
reunited across the border. The AMG’s crackdown removed one of the main forces that tethered
certain members of Monfalconese families to their home zone while relatives began putting down
roots in Yugoslavia. This is part of the reason that the late spring of 1947 marked a low-point in
emigration, as these were the months in which these strategies remained most effective.
Family
Family ties also had an impact on individuals’ decisions to emigrate based on interpersonal
bonds. It was often the case that one or two eager family members could exert a strong pull on
others, dragging people behind them. This was inevitable for young children. But for many spouses
and adolescent children of would-be emigrants, it was not always certain that they would depart
with their family member, especially in cases where extended family members remained with
whom a resistant individual might stay. Archival records are generally insufficient to allow the
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disentanglement of the various motivations that spurred a decision to emigrate, but it is clear that
many less-than-eager spouses were dragged across the Morgan Line. Most often, politically active
husbands pulled their wives across the border, as when Elvina C. brought herself and her daughter
across the Morgan Line to join her radically pro-Yugoslav husband Angelo in Pola, despite her
persistent opposition. 80 But eager wives could also pull their husbands across the border, as when
the fanatically pro-Yugoslav wife of one Aldo F., “forced [him] to expatriate to Yugoslavia against
his will.”81
But “pulling” was not the only way in which family concerns had an impact on emigration
decisions. The prospects of a radically transformed family life in Yugoslavia also served as a key
motivation for some migrants. Even for migrants with a strong commitment to radical leftism and
an active record of service in the PCI or PCRG, familial concerns weighed heavily on their minds
as they contemplated departure. Eugenio Pin, a longtime anti-Fascist and skilled welder elected as
a worker representative to protest piecework in the 1930s, had taken on a leadership role within
the CRDA’s pro-Yugoslav organizations in the postwar years, even becoming the head of the
PCRG cell in his workshop.82 For all his concern with workplace reform, Pin was also deeply
troubled with his family life. As his daughter Mirella recounts in her memoirs, since the early
1930s, Eugenio had been in a committed relationship with Mirella’s mother, who found herself
married to a husband from whom she had been separated for nearly a decade, but from whom she
could not secure a divorce under Italian law. Eugenio was thus unable to marry his partner, and
Mirella, born two years into the relationship, took the name of his partner’s estranged husband. To
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add insult to injury, Pin had been forced to bear the burden of Fascism’s punitive “bachelor tax,”
while supporting his unrecognized daughter and de facto spouse. For Pin, when the UAIS directive
came in early 1947, it was a moment of liberation. He could not only to pursue his dream of living
in a socialist country, but also right a fifteen-year-old injustice. In early March, he resigned and
set in motion a plan to relocate his family to Fiume, certain that Yugoslavia would grant Mirella’s
mother a divorce and allow them to marry.83 Eugenio Pin fits the archetype of the skilled, leftmilitant worker, but his choice to depart was more complex than a desire to “construct socialism.”
It was based also upon his faith that Yugoslav Communism meant liberation from oppressive
social norms. 84
Ethnicity
Though the controesodo occurred alongside with mass relocations of ethnic minorities
across the Europe, ethnicity appears not to have been a determining factor in motivating
monfalconesi to depart for Yugoslavia. Only a handful of residents of Doberdò del Lago, the zone’s
single universally-acknowledged “Slovenian” village, chose to relocate.85 Moreover, throughout
the district, the vocabulary of the pro-Yugoslav struggle was from its first moments that of ItaloSlavic fraternity – of the well-defined and distinct category of Italians joining Yugoslavs upon the
grounds of shared politics. From contemporary speeches to factory broadsheets (and appearing
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also in ensuing reflections of participants), the Italianness of the pro-Yugoslavs remained a key
theme in political discourse.86
Borderland residents often do not treat ethnicity as a fixed category of identity. Rather,
they possess a range of cross-ethnic skills that allow them to deploy particular identifications in
particular contexts.87 Eugenio Pin, as a fluent Slovene-speaker, is an example.88 Though Pin
participated fully in the political battles of Italo-Slavic fraternity and though he had a range of
ideological and personal motivations that inspired his departure, it is possible his choice was eased
by his possession of skills that would allow him thrive in Yugoslavia. 89 In such cases, ethnic
ambiguity should be seen as a facilitating, if not sufficient factor in the choice to migrate.
Choosing to Remain
Though a large number the district’s pro-Yugoslav departed, not all did, which begs the
question: why did some remain? Here too, the question was not simply one of supporting
Communism, or even supporting Yugoslav Communism. Instead, monfalconesi made the choice
to stay based on a complex mixture of political commitment, personal ties, familial obligation, and
fear of the uncertain and unfamiliar.
For some, the choice to remain was strictly political – even for many committed
Communists. Spartaco Romano was one such individual. Despite Romano’s partisan past and
Communist convictions, he had broken from the UAIS and local Communist Party shortly after
liberation, when both embraced the pro-Yugoslav stance. The problem was not so much that he
disliked the Yugoslavs, but rather that he felt Monfalcone to be Italian. Romano was not so
Mario F[x] (CLN-Turriaco [OF]), “Turriaco libera ha eletto ieri sera il suo Comitato,” 25 May 1945, op. cit.; Comp.
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opposed to the pro-Yugoslavs as to find himself unable to socialize with or engage in political
activity alongside them. In fact, he regularly fought against esuli alongside the mostly proYugoslav garibaldini. He simply left them when they marched for Yugoslavia. 90 When the UAIS
directive came in 1947 and Romano’s entire family elected to depart – father, mother, brother,
sister, and brother-in-law – he instead chose to stay. As Romano would recount over three decades
later, he made that choice “because everyone should struggle for socialism in the place where he
finds himself, and not go to do it where he will be safer.”91 It seems that many of the other longtime
Communist militants felt the same way, among them key partisan figures like Mario Fantini and
Vinicio Fontanot. Fontanot’s choice must have been particularly difficult, as, after losing his father
and both his brothers in the struggle against the Axis, his sister Elsa made the decision to depart
with her husband and children, leaving Vinicio alone in Ronchi. 92
However, just as the choice to depart was very rarely determined by politics alone, so too
was the choice to stay. Personal ties and everyday concerns like those that pulled many
monfalconesi to depart also worked in the opposite direction, exerting a sort of gravitational pull
on would-be eager migrants. Such was the case for Sergio Parenzan, a respected CRDA worker
who had risen to candidacy in the PCRG, motivated by a faith that the return of Tito would solve
the multitudinous daily problems left unresolved with liberation. As Parenzan recalls, over the
course of 1947 he watched three-quarters of his friends depart to the east. As those friends had
prepared to depart, they had often asked him “Sergio, are you not coming?” To this he had always
responded sadly that he could not. His father had died the year prior and his mother could not get
by without him. Thus Sergio, a longtime militant for Yugoslavia who otherwise undoubtedly
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would have departed with his comrades, remained at home. 93
Whatever the reason, the active decision of many Monfalconese Communists to remain in
their home town contributed further to the division of the district’s families and often served to
make this not just a temporary arrangement – a product of family survival strategies – but rather a
permanent state of affairs. For those who chose to remain while their families departed, the
decision could be just as much a jump into the unknown as that undertaken by those departing for
Yugoslavia. Moreover, with Italy set to return in September 1947 and Cold War tensions on the
rise, many had to wonder how if such decisions might soon become permanent and irreversible.
Monfalcone italiano: Monfalcone after Transfer Day
On 15 September 1947, Monfalcone returned to Italy, and as had long been predicted, the
bombs began to fly again. 94 On 16 September, the day after the Allied soldiers withdrew, proItalians unleashed a wave of grenades and explosives that rocked the homes of former proYugoslavs and Communist-aligned organizations in Monfalcone, Pieris, Ronchi, and
Staranzano.95 In Staranzano, three trucks filled with anti-Communist partisans and esuli arrived in
the afternoon, whereupon they disembarked and split up. Some broke into the homes of pro-
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Yugoslav families, threatening “grave harm” to anyone who remained after midnight. Other
surrounded the headquarters of the Communist-aligned orchestra and popular theater, breaking the
ground-floor windows with stones and throwing five grenades into the building. Those present
escaped serious harm by fleeing upstairs as the grenades exploded on the ground floor, but several
received light injuries. As the attacks unfolded over sixty minutes, the perpetrators faced no police
or military resistance. Only when the truck from Monfalcone tried to return and wreak havoc closer
to the town center did the carabinieri intervene, firing three shots that convinced the partisans and
esuli to disperse and to abandon their cache of unused explosives. 96 As for the anti-Communist
partisan association ANPI-Gorizia, its secretary suggested that these incidents had been provoked
by Communist (and especially pro-Yugoslav) attacks on esuli and police and that his partisans has
been active in intervening to prevent a “natural popular reaction” of summary justice against those
who had perpetrated Titoist abuses and pushed for Yugoslav annexation just shortly before. 97
Even after the restoration of order some days later – an order periodically shattered by new
flurries of bombings – the conditions of life for monfalconesi of leftist and especially pro-Yugoslav
extraction were far from rosy. One of the first actions of the newly appointed and anti-Communist
prefect, Giovanni Palamara, was to outlaw unauthorized public gatherings under the pretext that
“public manifestations, in the present difficult times, represent an effective danger of great
disturbances.”98 This was followed soon by orders to erase any physical signs of what the proYugoslavs had formerly called “Monfalcone antifascista,” including the various graffiti that still
sprung up, asserting that “this here is Yugoslavia.”99 Replacing these would be the physical signs
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of what might be termed “Monfalcone italiano.” But beyond Palamara’s authoritarian style,
monfalconesi faced persistent housing shortages, high unemployment, a limited number of
apprenticeships for the district’s youth, and persistent food shortages, the last of which the
communal president predicted would require a continuation of rationing for some time, lest there
be widespread famine.100 Those on the far left, especially pro-Yugoslavs, faced unapologetic
discrimination from the anti-Communist personnel directing the communal labor offices and the
CRDA personnel department.101 With the tacit approval of Palamara, the CRDA management
proceeded with its longstanding strategy or replacing such workers with esuli, using the latter as
spies and anti-Communist muscle within the shipyard.102
Despite the departures of 1947 and the repressive measures against Communists of all
territorial allegiances, Monfalcone continued to be the center of left-radicalism in Gorizia
Province, even if the leftist forced remained deeply divided. Even with the exodus of CRDA
workers, the Communists won a majority (nearly 54%) of the votes in the CRDA’s syndical
elections of May 1947 – the first since syndical fusion occurred.103 Moreover, several
monfalconesi, among them Bersa, Mario Geromet, Ottone Zanolla, and Mario Fantini, sat on key
positions within the PCI-Gorizia’s Federal Committee.104 But under the surface, the reconciliation
of the mass of working monfalconesi with the PCI was uneven at best. Throughout 1947 and 1948,
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PCI leaders fretted over the degree to which monfalconesi accepted the PCI’s moderate,
democratic line and whether the zone’s revolutionary “deviationism” might prove to be a
liability.105 Party leaders noted that large numbers of working monfalconesi rejected the PCI’s
conciliatory policy toward the lower middle class and its electoral strategy of allying with the PSI
in the looming 1948 election. What seemed a reasonable alliance on paper meant on the ground an
alliance of workers who just the year prior had been bitterly divided on the territorial question. 106
Such comments reveal the deep frustration and alienation felt by many monfalconesi who
had long fought to transform radically their community, but who had achieved very few of their
ends. In this context of hardship and alienation, a steady, if much smaller stream of eastward
clandestine expatriations persisted even after September 1947 – these now unquestionably illegal
under Italian law – as monfalconesi sought relief or utopia in Yugoslavia.107 Though the new year
did not bring a complete stoppage of expatriations to Yugoslavia, by the beginning of 1948 they
had slowed to such an extent that one can say that the controesodo had ended. By and large,
monfalconesi had made their choices about which side of the Iron Curtain promised them the best
lives and the most secure futures. Some five-thousand ended up in the East.
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Interpreting the Controesodo
Though the precise number of those who emigrated to Yugoslavia will likely never be
known (see Appendix C for a closer examination of the numbers), there were a range of
motivations, processes, and timelines for those five-thousand who decided to depart. The
complexity of the choice to emigrate exemplified in the cases of Eugenio Pin and Sergio Parenzan
was the norm, rather than an exception. In recent years, historians and even participants have come
to recognize the multidimensionality of the emigrant motivations. They have broken free from
earlier interpretations that ascribed a universal explanatory role to the desire of monfalconesi to
“construct socialism,” adding to these an awareness of economic hardship related mainly to the
decline of the CRDA and a fear of pro-Italian retribution.108 To these, one might fruitfully add two
more categories of primary motivations that have received little attention. The first, touched on
slightly by Berrini and Pin-Giuricin, includes familial concerns, understood both in the narrow
terms of seeking to keep families intact and in the wider terms of seeking out a society that would
allow the full flowering of one’s family life. 109 The second involves family survival strategies. For
many, Yugoslavia offered resources – particularly jobs and doubled rations – that could be
exploited by straddling the border, and even a number of pro-Italians and anti-Communists put
aside their politics and made use of these opportunities. They formed a small subcurrent of the
wider population flow, diverging from broader controesodo in spirit, if not in the direction of
migration.
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Most migrants were pro-Yugoslavs of varying intensity and activity, and to try to break
their motivations down into distinct categories of “political” and “apolitical” or “political” and
“mundane” is difficult. The way in which such monfalconesi thought about “apolitical” or
“mundane” motivations was often informed by the myth of Yugoslavia and by their understanding
of Communism as a negation of everyday Fascism. It was a faith in the existence of the bountiful
Yugoslav marketplace and its just system of exchange that allowed monfalconesi to conceive of
border-straddling strategies. It was faith in the New Yugoslavia’s liberal divorce laws and its
commitment to individual liberation and happiness – faith in the “radiant future” – that led so many
to see their familial ambitions as realizable only across the Morgan Line.
Whatever the motivations of the individual emigrant, the controesodo as a whole cannot
be separated from the long experience of Fascism and the failures of purging the “remnants of
Fascism” from local society. If anything, the controesodo was a revolt against the district’s PCRG
and its PCI successor, in part because they failed to achieve concrete results, but also because they
reframed the struggle and the social coalitions of the struggle in a way that ignored the principal
grievances of people on the ground. In this, scholars like Anna di Gianantonio are right to stress
that the emigration was as much about fatigue and disillusionment as optimism about
Yugoslavia.110 This is why, as Gombač has stressed, spontaneity and individual choice were the
defining features of the controesodo, not organization and central direction. 111 This is not to say
that organization did not exist or that Yugoslavia did not exploit the willingness of monfalconesi
to emigrate in order to gain propagandistic and economic advantages; rather it is to suggest that
emphasizing organization attributes causation to something that was merely a source of
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acceleration and facilitation. The UAIS directive of January 1947 – or, more accurately, the SU’s
transfer network, which became known by way of this directive – was merely a set of resources
that provided the necessary logistical support for individuals who otherwise had had a longstanding
desire to relocate. The fact that so many youths refused to return to the Monfalconese after their
Youth Brigade service and that so many monfalconesi clamored for relocation already in the fall
of 1946 is proof of this spontaneity. Among them was Silvano Cosolo of Pieris.
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Chapter 7: A New Life Beyond the Iron Curtain
A breath of fresh air. It’s easy to say! First of all, in order to change the air definitively it
was absolutely necessary to expatriate. Expatriate where? To the west, Italy. To the north,
Austria. To the east, Yugoslavia…. I chose Yugoslavia. But to expatriate alone one needed
to be an adult. At the time, I was just sixteen…. 1
– Silvano Cosolo, emigrant to Yugoslavia.

Shortly after the young Silvano Cosolo passed into Yugoslavia on foot in the summer of
1946, he arrived at a predetermined police station and was placed on a train to Fiume. Once Cosolo
disembarked at his destination, he met up with several young monfalconesi who had preceded him,
among the first to have emigrated. After a short while, he took his leave and headed to the local
SU headquarters, which served as a hub for gathering and then placing Italians arriving from the
west. There, he faced a question that he probably should have expected, even though he had not:
where would you like to live? Caught off guard, Cosolo pondered the question for a short while.
Then, recalling a story he had heard in school about Franz Ferdinand, he answered “Sarajevo!” 2
For those who ventured into the land of Tito, differences in experience emerged from the
moment of arrival, often resulting from answers to questions as simple and predictable as this.
There was no universal experience of Yugoslavia. Monfalconesi experienced life in Tito’s new
country differently based on the time of their arrival, the location in which they settled, and their
own choices once in Yugoslavia.3 Political affiliation and the possession or lack of an SU labor
contract were often decisive factors in shaping migrants’ first experiences, including settlement
location and employment opportunities. Those who arrived individually, without ties to the PCRG
or its mass organizations, could expect a month or more of miserable “voluntary” labor brigade
work before receiving a permanent position – a reality that caused many to flee before earning a
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permanent job. Those with PCRG ties or an SU contract, both because of political connections and
the skills implied by the SU contract, mostly ended up in a major Yugoslav city, where, in the
estimation of Italy’s Frontier Police, one could live well, depending on one’s family conditions. 4
Despite this variance, there were also experiences shared by a majority of monfalconesi,
which shaped how they assessed life in their adopted homeland. All needed to navigate not just
concrete difficulties of relocation – finding a place to live, finding a school for one’s children, and
establishing social networks – but also potentially more jarring encounters with cultural difference
and with the fulfillment or disappointment of their aspirations. Since most came to Yugoslavia
with high hopes and expectations, they had to weather the storm as their hopes for and vision of
Yugoslav socialism bumped up against Yugoslav realities. Given a lack of contemporaneous
documentation, it is exceedingly difficult to reconstruct migrants’ range of experiences and
reactions, not least of all because the PCI destroyed the single greatest set of records on the topic
in the 1950s during destalinization. 5 Nevertheless, it is worth the attempt, as their reactions reveal
much about how they thought about socialism.
As for Cosolo, who left behind detailed memoirs, his first experienced hinged upon his
answer: Sarajevo. As a teenager with no notable work skills, but a demonstrable history of proYugoslav activity, he had an unusual freedom to choose his settlement location. Yugoslav
authorities thus honored his request, shipping him to the Bosnian capital.
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Encountering a New Land: Monfalconesi in Bosnia
In choosing Sarajevo, Cosolo chose the Yugoslav interior over the more commonly
selected Croatian coastal towns. In turn, this meant electing to live in a comparatively
underdeveloped and diverse region. Despite these conditions, he was not the only foreigner to
choose Bosnia. He had been preceded by several of his neighbors, as well as workers from southern
Italy and other European countries, all of whom would experience Sarajevo differently. 6
For a young man like Cosolo, having lived his entire life in a Fascist Italy with Catholic
values and limited tolerance for national minorities, life in Bosnia was liberating. On the one hand,
for a young man coming of age, the atmosphere of gender equality and sexual liberation provided
a wide range of novel experiences. Particularly remarkable to Cosolo was the degree to which
Bosnian girls were “available” (disponibili), not in a strictly sexual sense, but rather in the sense
that they could freely socialize and freely pursue physical and emotional love in a way prohibited
in Catholic, bourgeois Italy. 7 On the other, Cosolo marveled at the Baščaršija neighborhood – the
“Kasbah” of Sarajevo – and the easy cohabitation of Muslims and Christians:
A few steps beyond Tito Street [a main boulevard ending at the Baščaršija] and there it is,
in the place of the large palaces of before, everything is a series of hovels where wood is
abundant, small streets that are narrow and flooded with women in Arabian garb and with
the classic veil and with men with the same clothes and the red fez, as can be seen in the
images from documentaries shot in the Middle East.8

In his mind, the shared Partisan struggle, in which monfalconesi could rightly claim a place, truly
had united the Yugoslav nations, allowing Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox believers to “mix
comfortably without any difficulty in work or in the city’s social gatherings.” 9 In this atmosphere

Cosolo, Amare… Sarajevo, 23-25.
Ibid., 61-67, 73-76.
8
Ibid., 41. See also Di Gianantonio et al, L’immaginario imprigionato, 171.
9
Cosolo, Amare… Sarajevo, 43. Cosolo recounts the example of a Bosniak work-team leader, who regularly
interrupted his work to pray in the middle of the workshop, never once teased by his coworkers or harassed by the
state or his superiors. Ibid., 46.
6
7

283

of cultural freedom and mutual tolerance, Cosolo, like other young monfalconesi who ventured to
Bosnia in 1946 and 1947, recalls feeling that he belonged and that he was truly understood. 10
For all the perceived advances of the new socialist culture, the choice of Bosnia also had
its drawbacks. Most monfalconesi in Bosnia, Cosolo included, found work at the Zelejeznička
Radiona, a rolling stock workshop tasked with disassembling old and damaged stock, salvaging
parts, and assembling new stock. There, whether single or with families, they lived as a cohesive
colony, lodging in military-style barracks without running water or electricity. Though Cosolo
found these accommodations acceptable – his primary complaint was a lack of soap, which left
him feeling perpetually dirty and undignified – those workers who were heads-of-family quickly
became frustrated with the lack of privacy in the barracks. Such workers found the lodging to be
well below their expectations and their pay insufficient to remedy this situation. Though as a single
man Cosolo soon had sufficient savings to rent his own apartment in the city, those with familial
expenses found themselves trapped in the barracks, unable to save enough for rent and facing longterm detachment from their families whom they refused to subject to such conditions. 11
It was because of these conditions that the Monfalconese colony at Sarajevo went on strike
in the winter of 1946/47. Fed up with perceived violations of their contracts and convinced that
these conditions were a result of the “old regime” director who refused to listen to their demands
and who exploited workers without regard for their well-being, the older men put down their tools,
soon joined in solidarity by Cosolo and young colonists. The strike, conceptualized as not just an
economic action in the workplace but also a political action against the old regime, garnered
political attention and brought a visit by the Bosnian president. Cosolo recalls that the president
listened to the workers’ demands, judging them legitimate, after which the authorities came and
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took the firm director away.12 In this early period, then, the Sarajevo colonists, whose experiences
were so determined by their family conditions, lived both the reality and myth of socialist
Yugoslavia. On the one hand, they soon realized that Yugoslav workplaces were not all so
fundamentally transformed as to allow for dignified, autonomous, and well-remunerated work. On
the other, the responsiveness of Tito’s state to worker demands appeared both swift and just. To
many, the strike must have seemed a demonstration of monfalconesi and Yugoslavs constructing
socialism together.
Awaiting Tito in Pola
If Sarajevo was a marvelous novelty, the same could not be said of Pola, the second most
common migration destination. In Pola, where monfalconesi could live along the familiar Adriatic
Sea and where, like Fiume and Spalato, the town bore a familiar cultural heritage, the experience
of arrival was very different, not least of all because the town remained under AMG administration
until its transfer to Yugoslavia in September 1947. Most monfalconesi in Pola arrived under SU
guidance as the Yugoslav government negotiated the purchase of Pola’s Scoglio Olivi Shipyards
in early 1947, anticipating and preceding Yugoslavia’s arrival in the town. 13 The shipyard had seen
an exodus of its skilled, mainly Italian laborers beginning in summer 1946, which had, per Italian
intelligence, left at the shipyard “only a small band of unskilled manual laborers of Slavic origin.” 14
For monfalconesi who arrived to take these vacant positions, the first impression was certainly one
of having climbed the status hierarchy and realized career ambitions long frustrated in Monfalcone.
Yet in other respects, monfalconesi arrivals in Pola found the town in conditions much like
the violent, divided Monfalcone they had left behind. Like Monfalcone, Pola had long been
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gripped by a struggle between pro-Yugoslavs and pro-Italians, the AMG estimating upon its arrival
a roughly 60-40 split in favor of Italy. Monfalconesi arrived just as the struggle reached its violent
climax. 15 In fact, in early January 1947 a pro-Yugoslav crowd attempting to prevent the removal
of local flour mill to Italy had assaulted the police escort sent to aid the removal. The police had
responded by shooting into the crowd, killing three and wounding nine more.16 These tensions
remained high throughout the signing of the Peace Treaty in February, during which time a
veritable flood of monfalconesi arrived in Pola. So many arrived during that period that a young
pro-Italian tough from Trieste, formerly implicated in the knifings of pro-Yugoslavs in his native
city, could knock on the door of Pola’s UAIS headquarters on the day before the signing of the
Peace Treaty and claim to be another comrade recently arrived from Monfalcone. The doorman,
unable to keep track of all the arriving monfalconesi, opened the door, at which point the
undercover triestino greeted Pola’s UAIS members and their Monfalconese comrades with a
grenade, killing one and wounding three more.17 Though the political situation cooled down
considerably in the spring with the departure of many pro-Italians for Italy, monfalconesi found
that the flight of a large share of the town’s shopkeepers and merchants brought a supply crisis and
a worsening of black-market conditions. 18 For monfalconesi who had chosen Pola, most of 1947
was spend in anxious expectancy. The arrival of Tito’s government could not come soon enough.
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Fiume and the Broad Horizon of Possibilities
While monfalconesi arriving in Bosnia experienced the dual shocks of that region’s
extreme diversity and economic backwardness and those arriving in Pola experienced grenades
and tension, those who chose Fiume arrived to a fêting. Seeing the monfalconesi as central to the
realization of the Five Year Plan and Yugoslavia’s successful socialist transition, the Yugoslav
authorities did all they could to make their transition enjoyable. 19 As Il Lavoratore described to
monfalconesi who remained back home, those who made the jump were greeted at the Sušak train
station by representatives of Fiume’s municipal council, who bestowed upon them food, lodging,
and a bit of spending money, “lavishing the workers so that they feel at home.” They received
rooms in the best hotels of Abbazia (Opatija) and nearby suburbs, “where one time were housed
the great magnates of industry and commerce,” and ate ample breakfasts and dinners in the mess
of Fiume’s largest hotel.20 And these claims, though written for propagandistic ends, do not appear
to be too much of an exaggeration, nor did they apply solely to Fiume. When the SU-Trieste sent
a delegation to inspect conditions of recently-arrived workers in the country’s larger cities, the
report suggested that it could not describe how workers in Belgrade and other cities were treated
“because never in the history of the world was a worker treated in such a way.” 21 All throughout
Yugoslavia, skilled Italian workers who arrived in early 1947 reported high pay and the receipt of
quality housing at the expense of the state.22 Thus, even if Mirella Pin-Giuricin recalls certain
lingering “economic discomforts” related to lingering wartime destruction, the more important fact
was that the monfalconesi “were welcomed with open arms” by the new city and the new state.23
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This welcome was cultural as well as economic. Monfalconesi soon found ways to
participate in organizations like the Union of Italians of Istria and Fiume (Unione degli Italiani
dell’Istria e di Fiume, UIIF). Created late in the war, the Union aimed to facilitate left-wing
Italians’ contributions to a new socialist culture for Tito’s Yugoslavia. 24 Other monfalconesi made
their contributions outside official cultural organizations. Mirella Pin-Giuricin’s mother organized
a Monfalconese acting troupe that put on typical anti-Fascist partisan theater, including such
original works as Heroic Youth, a play about a young partisan who, captured by his enemies,
endured torture and blinding without giving up the names of his comrades. After showings in Pola
and Fiume, the troupe received an invitation to Zagreb, where it put on the show to much official
acclaim. 25 Expressing shared values with the host state, free to use their own language, and living
in a city in which native working-class radicals had risen to control the offices of Political
Commissar and People’s Tribunes, the monfalconesi at Fiume would have felt welcome.26
Moreover, for those who arrived in early and mid-1947, the grievances of marketplace
Fascism, as well as economic hardship itself, appeared something already or soon to be relegated
to the past.27 A glimpse of their conditions can be had from a report sent back to Rome from the
Italian Legation in Belgrade in early September. At that time, skilled Monfalconese laborers
received higher pay than local workers of comparable skill – between 15-19 dinars per hour with
a steady 200 monthly hours of work – not to mention a month of annual paid vacation, health
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insurance, access to the price-controlled ration system, and free or subsidized meals in the mess
halls of their firms. 28 Moreover, for those who had left their families in Zone A, the Morgan Line
offered an opportunity for enrichment. The ability to live well and cheaply in Yugoslavia combined
with Tito’s “political” fixing of an artificially high dinar-to-lira exchange rate to create conditions
in which monfalconesi could send previously unthinkable amounts of money back home. 29 It was
not uncommon for skilled workers to remit as much as 50,000-70,000 lire per month in 1947 while
still living comfortably in Yugoslavia. 30 For monfalconesi such as Fioravante, interviewed by
Andrea Berrini, the conditions of material life were quite good at that time.31
But the changes in the economy went well beyond an increased ability to secure the means
of subsistence, also affecting the nature of commercial or shopping interactions. By the time the
monfalconesi arrived in Fiume, Tito’s regime was already well on its way to transforming these
sectors. In mid-1946, it had launched an offensive against private commerce in Fiume,
“unmasking” and punishing sixty merchants for alleged obstruction of normal provisioning and
for speculation on worker hardship. 32 The campaign against private merchants should not be
surprising, as prominent Yugoslav leaders such as Slovenian President Boris Kidrič had long seen
commercial speculation as the most “primitive form of exploitation.” He envisioned reorganizing
urban commerce to be carried out by way of largescale shops within state-run firms. He believed
this would achieve increased economies of scale, a reduction of transfer costs, increased worker
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loyalty to their firm, and an easy way for the state to accumulate capital for state investment.33 To
implement this vision, in mid-1947 the leadership introduced the “guaranteed provisions” system
in all industrial firms with over 200 employees, officially shifting the provisioning of industrial
workers into the hands of their firms and the state-run stores, and de facto prioritizing industrial
workers in the battle to secure provisions. 34 For monfalconesi, gone were the days of dealing with
the “Fascist” shopkeepers intent on gouging and exploiting by nature of their monopoly over vital
goods. Finally, they realized a demand they had made since the war years.
In the workplace, too, everyday Fascism appeared to have been dealt a significant blow.
The Titoist regime had carried out a purge of the 3 May Shipyard in 1946 and frightened many
native skilled workers, technicians, and directors into flight, leaving the shipyard a sort of virgin
land at a time when Yugoslavia was embarking on its ambitious Five Year Plan. 35 Monfalconesi
such as Angelo Buttignon and Onorio Donda recall immediately assuming leadership positions in
both the technical staff and, as Donda indicates, “accepting syndical appointments at the level of
the factory.”36 No migrant speaks to this broadening of horizons as clearly as Giuseppe Franti, who
himself rose to be a major figure in the shipyard’s Planning Office:
It wasn’t just a political force that arrived at Fiume, but also one working, technical,
scientific. The nerve points of the shipyard and of the industries of Fiume were staffed by
monfalconesi. These were not bums who had arrived from Monfalcone, but rather trained
people with all the trappings. Workshop heads, head technicians, department heads from
the Monfalcone shipyard had taken directive positions in the establishment of Fiume. 37
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Of the Planning Office’s thirty-one employees, Franti recalls that twenty-seven were monfalconesi,
though the other four were “people of the Party,” including the Bosnian Serb director who “knew
nothing.” Though the manager retained ultimate authority over production decisions under the
theory of “one-man management,” in practice he leaned heavily on his Monfalconese vicedirector, allowing the monfalconesi to run the firm. 38 For those who rose into the ranks of
management, work life attained the autonomy, respect, and meaning that they so closely associated
with workplace socialism. They had become Il Lavoratore’s “master-workers.”
The attainment of workplace liberation was not exclusive to the technicians and directors.
Italian sources indicate that it was easy for Italian workers to gain recognition for skilled status, as
“they know how to do more than the local workers, which is very easy because… one speaks of
workers coming from the country, while even an unskilled Italian can be considered a headworker.”39 No longer finding themselves on the lower rungs of the labor totem pole, many
experienced a newfound workplace freedom. One worker interviewed by Berrini recalls that in
Yugoslavia there was, at the very minimum, “the rule of the workers,” which meant freedom to
take smoke and restroom breaks at will and freedom from the foreman’s rigorous checks on labor
intensity and piece production. 40 But such freedom was not absolute. Limits remained for those
who had been less successful at climbing the labor hierarchy, and one-man management meant
that unions and workers’ councils lacked authority to determine unilaterally the methods and paces
of production. Still, accompanied by steady work under the Five Year Plan and the Yugoslav
state’s investment in the most modern production machinery – chief among it a 43-meter-tall, 50-
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ton electric crane defined as the “most modern and largest in the Balkans” – it appeared to most
monfalconesi in Fiume that quotidian work life was undergoing a serious transformation. 41
In addition to experiencing broadened horizons with their pocketbooks and in the
workplace, monfalconesi in Fiume saw new opportunities for cultural and educational
advancement. This had been a key theme in Il Lavoratore as far back as December 1945. When
Fiume inaugurated its People’s University, the paper had announced the “pruning away [of] all
veils in which Fascism wrapped [education] to make it a political instrument,” later declaring that,
in Fiume, “to elevate ever more the people – this is the order of the day.” 42 To a degree, such
claims were realized in those first years at Fiume. Giuseppe Franti, who arrived after service on
the Youth Railway, recalls fondly his time at the Fiume schools, attended by “monfalconesi and
fiumani, half and half.” At evening school, Franti found “teachers of fame, even scientists” and
the opportunities “stupendous.” There, workers who, like him, had done only two years of postelementary schooling before leaving for a CRDA apprenticeship, could learn math, physics,
chemistry, history, economics, philosophy, political science, and languages. In his memory, at
least, the schooling was so effective that “in one year, two years were done: I did two years of it,
and thus four years. At the end they gave me a diploma, we’ll say for general culture.” 43 If Fascist
education had meant the closing of opportunities to working-class families, then socialism meant
broadened educational opportunities and cultural elevation, which Yugoslavia delivered. 44
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For the monfalconesi who arrived in 1947, the concurrent departure of Italian fiumani for
Italy must have been a mystery. Hidden from sight was the fact that just the year prior, Fiume’s
streets and shops had been nearly bare. Italian-speakers had feared to walk the streets in groups or
at night lest an OZNA agent appear and cause minor or major problems. The shops had sold “rarely
distributed” and “absolutely insufficient” rations of bread and peas, while Italian fiumani, “literally
suffer[ing] starvation,” struggled to scrape together the basic means of subsistence on the black
market and by traveling to Trieste. 45 If the monfalconesi were aware that their comfort was
purchased with expropriated property of fiumani who had fled and left apartments, furniture, and
possessions behind, they were not deeply troubled.46 Identifying departed fiumani with the esuli
who had terrorized them back in Zone A, their position toward those fiumani whose apartments
they occupied and even toward those Italian-speakers who remained was predominantly hostile. 47
For all the positive novelties that monfalconesi in Fiume experienced as they encountered
Yugoslav socialism, their integration into local society was thus neither seamless, nor complete.
Beyond hostility toward the local Italian-speakers, monfalconesi increasingly came into conflict
with their Slavic compatriots – a condition that worsened significantly as the Five Year Plan
unfolded. As the plan progressed, thousands of Croatian peasants arrived in Fiume to assume
factory jobs, often lacking entirely in industrial skills and failing to meet monfalconesi’s standards
of hygiene and manners.48 In the words of Giuseppe Franti, which betray a condescension that has
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long outlasted his time in Yugoslavia, the arriving Croats were “ugly, filthy, bad.” 49 Many of these
Croats soon realized that monfalconesi received preferential treatment, which exacerbated their
often deep-seeded resentments toward Italians for the destruction wrought during the Fascist
period.50 Others, including even those Croats who had been industrial workers for some time, came
to resent that the monfalconesi rose so rapidly up the labor hierarchy. Though freed from rigid
workplace discipline and gaining a substantial increase in their own autonomy, the monfalconesi,
now as work-team leaders and directors attempting to make good on FYP projections, directed
Croat workers in ways that fueled the latter’s resentment.51 The confluence of longstanding
resentment with short-term frustrations led many Croats in Fiume (and Yugoslavs in other cities)
to label monfalconesi as unwanted, privileged foreigners. They voiced their anger in a nationalist
language that ran counter to the idea of Italo-Slavic fraternity cherished by many monfalconesi.52
As months passed, the relationship between Croats and monfalconesi deteriorated and, by year’s
end, the monfalconesi existed in a largely contented isolation from wider Croatian Fiume.53
Though many monfalconesi accepted their existence as a hermetic community, there was
a single feature of this isolation that appeared as a repeated source of frustration: their detachment
from the KPJ. While many did not care to join the Yugoslav Party, likely thinking that membership
in the Party (still a demanding party of cadres) was not worth the effort in a socialist country,
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others like Giuseppe Franti sought to join, but to no avail. 54 In fact, even the most devoted, lifelong
Communists from Monfalcone – including those who had spent years in Fascist confino and then
headed the pro-Yugoslav struggle – had difficulty gaining admission. 55 Only a very select group
made such inroads or found ways to integrate with local Party networks. Renato Rigonat was one.
Recruited into the Party’s youth wing as an organizer, he then struck up a relationship with the
KPJ member Mila Siaz in 1947, marrying her the following year. 56 Two others were the
multilingual Eugenio Pin and his daughter Mirella, who would later marry the Voce del Popolo
writer and KPJ member Luciano Giuricin, an Italian speaker from Rovinj (Rovigno). 57 But even
without Party membership, for most monfalconesi in Fiume, the first months seemed to vindicate
their choice to leave the Monfalconese behind. From the hero’s welcome they received to their
systematization within the local factories and markets, life appeared to be good and getting better.
The Limits of Liberation: Everyday Grievances in Yugoslavia
By the second half of 1947, this began to change, and it changed in large part because of
the Five Year Plan for which monfalconesi had been brought to Yugoslavia. Because of shifting
diplomatic and economic contexts, the regime drastically reworked the FYP as it unfolded
beginning in 1947. Due to the plan’s wide-ranging transformative aspirations, these changes
radiated outward from the economic sphere to have an impact on nearly all aspects of life in
Yugoslavia, proving to be a drastic and negative turning-point for most monfalconesi.
The primary cause for this shift was that Yugoslav planners had predicated the entire
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funding program for the country’s rapid industrialization on the receipt of large amounts of foreign
aid, which failed to materialize as the plan got underway. From the outset, KPJ leadership had
envisioned a transition more akin to Lenin’s New Economic Policy than Stalinism, believing that
regulated private ventures (especially in agriculture) should be allowed to coexist with and
gradually fall prey to developing state and cooperative ventures. The state would foster the latter
two categories relying upon capital accumulated from state control of agricultural exchange, the
expropriation of foreigner and “collaborator” property, and, most importantly, the inflow of
foreign loans, machinery, and consumables from both its partners in the victorious Grand Alliance
and the new community of Soviet-aligned states.58 However, from the first months of the FYP, the
expected aid and trade was forthcoming from neither the Soviet Union, nor the Soviet satellites,
nor the Anglo-Americans. Instead, the British had frozen $47 million in gold reserves that
Yugoslavia’s royal government-in-exile had brought to London, while Truman’s United States,
rather than providing Yugoslavia with cheap consumables, removed Yugoslavia from a list of
priority aid targets in January 1947 and then indefinitely banned the shipment of American
foodstuffs, machinery, and war-related materials to Yugoslavia.59 From the Soviets, the Yugoslavs
also received little, despite the April 1945 mutual aid treaty and various Soviet promises. With
relations soured by Tito’s persistent independent streak and Stalin’s attempts to control Yugoslavia
like a satellite, the USSR even cut off deliveries of war-related materials by 1948, forcing
Yugoslavia to dedicate an unexpectedly large share of its budget and developmental focus to
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military production.60 The only substantial aid the regime received in the postwar years, some $415
million of UNRRA aid, expired in early 1947 as the FYP began. 61
The failure to secure aid, trade, and loans compelled the KPJ to issue radical revisions to
its methods of funding the plan, which rippled outward with an equally radical impact on the
experience of everyday life in Yugoslavia beginning in the second half of 1947. To fund the
country’s industrialization drive – viewed as a goal the regime must realize at any cost – Yugoslav
planners saw only one realistic option: they would use up-front cash payments to purchase the
necessary goods and machinery from whomever would sell. To garner this cash, the state would
increase its exports of chief domestic goods – livestock, timber, and agricultural products – while
simultaneously driving workers to produce at greater efficiencies and demanding that they and
their families consume far less of the domestic product now destined for export. 62
The new policy’s stress on cash exports proved particularly disastrous in the workplace for
those monfalconesi – the vast majority – employed in the state sector. For many, especially those
employed in the interior regions of the country, work conditions in Yugoslavia had always left
much to be desired, as the Sarajevo strike of winter 1946/47 shows. The presence into 1947 of
Cosolo’s hated “old regime” boss reflected a concession to necessity in a Yugoslavia that lacked
experienced technical and managerial personnel and had a dire need to maintain high-efficiency
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production in state firms. This need only increased as the FYP got underway, as did the regime’s
attendant reliance upon “old regime” managers.63 This became apparent to Cosolo who, after
leaving the rolling stock workshop for a brief stint in a youth labor brigade, took a job making
cigarettes at Sarajevo’s tobacco factory. There, too, he found the director to be harsh, domineering,
and prone to sexual harassment of female employees. When Cosolo asked one of the factory guards
– a friend and ex-Partisan – why this boss remained, the guard explained that cigarettes were a
chief source of state revenues. Thus, the director would remain until someone of equal managerial
skill could be found.64 Over time, many monfalconesi must have asked themselves questions
similar to the one Cosolo posed himself, namely “how it could be possible that the new power,
administered by those forces that had fought in the Resistance to liberate themselves from this type
of scum, had failed, even in the immediate postwar, to throw that filthy individual out of the
factory.”65 Unaware of the international conditions that shaped Yugoslav policy, Cosolo and others
certainly realized that encounters with “old regime” management were far from atypical in Tito’s
young regime. With the introduction of a system of labor booklets (radne knjižice) in March 1947
and strict regulations placed on the ability of foreign workers to change jobs – enacted so the state
could better control labor for the FYP – many found these managers impossible to escape. 66
But beyond mere manager-employee tensions in the workplace, the productivity and export
drive of 1947-48 also led to concrete and often frustrating changes in labor culture and labor law.
Chief among these was a redoubled effort to promote participation in voluntary labor campaigns
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and “socialist competition” in the workplace. These programs, which the regime had early on made
central to its efforts to accumulate capital, became more important as the state sought to cut wage
expenses and increase returns on its domestic investments. Regime theorists believed socialist
competition to be an effective means by which it could draw out “hidden” reserves of productivity
that had been unrealized under the uninspiring capitalist labor system. Presented as great
opportunities by which workers might gain both material bonuses and prestige, more often than
not monfalconesi experienced these programs as a series of unwanted and uncomfortable
pressures. 67 At times, tensions over the obligation to work and to work quickly caused divisions
within the monfalconesi themselves. Such was the case with the migrant Renato Valcovich, who,
after a time in Sarajevo, ended up working in the Belgrade aeronautical industry. He recalls being
approached and asked to do “voluntary” shock labor on a day off. Exhausted and already a bit
disillusioned, he refused, at which point the head of the factory committee, a monfalconese,
accused him of being a troublemaker and Trotskyite. 68 One can imagine that such cultural
pressures to perform voluntary labor and to work at breakneck paces might not have appeared too
different from the pressures exerted by the Fascist piecework clerk back home.
By the middle of spring 1948, any actual distinction between shock work and piecework
ceased to matter. Under continual pressure to maximize production, the regime announced on 29
May that a new pay system was coming to Yugoslavia in July. A new piecework system would
replace existing wage pay, with bonuses granted for production at above-normal efficiency. 69 The
return to piecework, foreshadowed by the year-long campaign to increase productivity by non-
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pay-related measures, restored a key component of what many monfalconesi considered a
“Fascist” labor system and provoked complaints of Italian workers in Yugoslavia for years. When
an Italian diplomatic delegation visited Italian workers in Bosnia over two years later, workers
lamented that work was done by piecework, “or, in local terms, ‘as usual.’” 70 Far from being the
country they had envisioned, in which workers were freed from regimentation and hyperdiscipline, Yugoslavia was reviving such sources of frustration, merely shrouding them in the
language of worker pride and socialist progress. Even for those lucky enough to be in Fiume and
Pola, the changes of 1947-48 showed the liberated workplace to be, at best, a project deferred for
the foreseeable future.
If changes in the workplace caused serious resentments, those in the marketplace were even
more pronounced. Over the biennium of 1947-48, with aid halted, products increasingly oriented
toward export, and the Yugoslav state attempting to implement a new system of exchange that
would both look socialist and afford greater state control over the flow of goods, supply conditions
crashed from their precarious recovery the year prior. As two Italian defectors from OZNA would
report upon their return to Italy in August 1948, “the internal conditions in this area have
deteriorated continually in the past year. Production declines with the latest nationalization decree
and has reached a disastrous point. Goods and foods cannot be found. When they put to market
after a delay of some months they have deteriorated.”71 With the decline in the availability of goods
and a new system put in place to oversee the distribution of these goods, monfalconesi encountered
new difficulties in procuring food, which revived old or generated new resentments.
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Neither all monfalconesi, nor all Italians experienced the weight of Yugoslavia’s changing
policies equally, and those in Fiume appear to have had it worst. There the state’s campaign against
private commercial interests was well underway by February 1948, by which point only state stores
and factory cooperatives were allowed to sell goods of the first necessity, driving many small shops
out of business or serving as the means by which they could be “absorbed by the Government of
the people” into the “cooperative complex.”72 The campaign to quash private commerce was so
intense that several Fiuman shopkeepers and merchants committed suicide as winter gave way to
spring. Yet even with the mechanisms of exchange reordered – or perhaps because of it – residents
of Fiume could find only “laughable quantities” of goods through the state supply system, much
of the domestic food product having been redirected abroad as cash exports.73 Bureaucratic
blunders and inefficiencies contributed to widespread shortage in Fiume in 1948, as when, in the
words of one official, “in the Fiume markets a tomato could not be found,” while many sat unsold
on the nearby Adriatic island of Lusinj (Lussino).74 In April and May, as the state extended the
same measures to the interior cities of Monfalconese settlement in the pursuit of liquidating private
commerce, state stores and cooperatives in Belgrade, Ljubljana, and elsewhere failed to meet basic
ration standards, let alone monfalconesi’s expectations for a just standard of living. 75
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In all cases, single men were most able to bear the brunt of Yugoslavia’s new austerityexport economy and system of exchange, with larger families finding it increasingly difficult to
get by. Already by January 1948, the Belgrade Legation reported that the pay received by Italian
workers was, in many cases, “sufficient just for the maintenance of a single person” and that many
of them – most likely those who had come over without SU contracts – no longer received the
supplemental rations reserved for heavy laborers, nor access to the workplace messes or subsidized
lodging.76 For single workers, at least, the provision of meals in factory messes and the rooting of
the new distribution system in the factory shops provided some relief. 77 As late as March, there
were still some exceptionally lucky skilled workers who, slotted for work in well-supplied
workplaces and possessing state housing and mess access, could send half of their earnings home
in remittances.78 Such discrepancies in pay and benefits almost certainly generated resentments
within the monfalconesi community that operated along the fault lines of “privileged” versus
“unprivileged” worker and single workers versus families of migrants.
But if resentments were growing within the community, the most intense resentments were
those turned outward, toward the host community and host state. As more Monfalconese families
found it difficult to meet their basic needs within the confines of the regular supply system, they
witnessed others within Yugoslav society – particularly those that possessed the membership in
the KPJ or OZNA – gain special treatment. For these individuals, the state made available special
stores, always prioritized higher than the standard workplace shops. Thus, Mario Tonzar recalls a
joke common in Monfalconese circles during those months, namely that the KPJ was “the party
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of the sacks,” because one could identify a Party member by the full packet of goods carried around
under arm. 79 At Pola, Valerio Beltrame and his Monfalconese comrades observed the same thing.
Beltrame had come to Pola from Fiume in January 1948, tasked with running the mess hall at the
Pola Arsenal, where roughly 800 workers, including many monfalconesi, labored. Under the new
austerity conditions, he found the task exceedingly difficult, as there was a complete lack of goods.
At the same time, he witnessed well-stocked mess halls for the military, with “food stores put at
the disposition of the officers and their families in enormous quantities, while nothing could be
found for families of the laborers; and all this in the full light of day.” 80
By the spring of 1948 at the latest, “shopping” in Yugoslavia had shifted from a relatively
easy and self-affirming activity for monfalconesi to one of contention; from a position of being
among the “most equal of equals” in Tito’s Yugoslavia, they steadily fell to a subaltern position.
As the availability of goods retracted, the experience of “shopping” made clear the limits of their
inclusion into Yugoslavia and the limits of Yugoslavia’s transformation. Though the mechanisms
of goods allocation and exchange were different from those of Fascist-era and postwar Monfalcone
– gone was the hated shopkeeper – the central characteristic of discrimination had manifested itself
again in the form of dual systems of stores. The cooperatives and factory stores of the real
Yugoslavia were not those of mythical Yugoslavia, and monfalconesi once again found themselves
on the losing end of a discriminatory economy due to their exclusion from a ruling party. The
emigrant Riccardo Bellobarbich, fairly unique for having retained a somewhat favorable view of
Tito and Yugoslavia even after his return, recalls that the existence of special stores was perhaps
the chief failing of Yugoslav socialism. Though “the musicians had changed,” the stores betrayed
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the fact that “the music was still the same.” 81 By that spring, such frustrations had given birth to
“concrete forms of protest” in Fiume, in which Monfalconese women “spontaneously” expressed
their discontent.82 Women composed the vanguard in the campaign to create a just form of
commerce in Yugoslavia, exactly as they had during the campaign against the Monfalconese’s
shopkeepers. As in Monfalcone, they had little success.
Reversing Course
As monfalconesi lived, worked, and shopped in Yugoslavia, they became aware of the
limits of liberation provided by that country. Though the speed at which they made this realization
varied, the longer monfalconesi lived in the New Yugoslavia, the clearer it became that Tito’s
regime would not or could not deliver on their vision of socialism. For some – and particularly
those who arrived in 1946 without skills or SU contracts – it took only months for the mythic
image of Yugoslavia to crumble. At that point, they began to look back longingly toward the town
and social networks they had left behind. In fact, just as the controesodo reached its apex, the first
consequences of this disillusionment were felt back in Monfalcone. In February 1947,
Monfalcone’s police inspector indicated that, though migrants continued to set for Yugoslavia,
some had begun to return, and it was “not often [that] they can hide their disappointment and
disillusion [sic].”83 In March too, a small trickle of monfalconesi returned home, passing back into
the AMG using their AMG ID cards.84
It was only as Yugoslavia’s austerity-export regime ushered in a new host of everyday
grievances, however, that disillusionment translated into the attempted repatriation of a sizeable
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number of monfalconesi. In September 1947, as Yugoslavia’s economy straining under the weight
of socialist transition and workers’ real earnings plummet, the Italian Legation in Belgrade noted
the beginnings of “a repatriation movement, if until now still rather limited in relation to the total
number of co-nationals present here.”85 In the post-Treaty contexts of late 1947 and early 1948,
which saw an end to free mobility across the Morgan Line, monfalconesi began appealing to a
wide range of Yugoslav and Italian diplomatic offices for authorization to return home. 86 Luigi B.,
a fellow traveler of the UAIS and PCRG who had emigrated to Spalato in March 1947, found that,
contrary to the promises of the myth of Yugoslavia, he was not able to “make a fortune and
improve the economic situation of his family composed of a wife and three children.” Due to “bad
treatment existing in Yugoslavia for the workers” – or at least citing that reason to police upon his
return – he repatriated in late February 1948.87 Returning shortly on Luigi’s heels were many more,
including the young brothers, Giuseppe and Guido D. These two, having been some of the district’s
most vocal supporters of Yugoslav annexation, spent just over a year working together at the Tito
Shipyard in Kraljevica (Croatia). However, with meat having disappeared from the town in mid1947 and the distributions of goods through factory shops regularly carried out with three weeks’
delay, they decided that life had been better in Italy. 88
The early repatriation movement was particularly evident in Sarajevo, where Silvano
Cosolo observed the dissolution of the Monfalconese “colony” to which he belonged. In the winter
of 1947/48 that colony experienced “a slow but continuous outflow of village neighbors and of
Bisiachs who returned to the Monfalconese and Pieris.” 89 Among them was the quadragenarian
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garibaldino, Giuseppe D., who had worked alongside Cosolo in Sarajevo’s railcar workshop.
Having tired of life in Sarajevo after eight hard months, Giuseppe transferred to Fiume in late
summer 1947, from where he returned to Monfalcone in January of the following year. 90 Having
stood at 200 in the winter of 1946/47 when it went on strike for socialism in Tito’s Yugoslavia, by
summer 1948 the Sarajevo colony was reduced to just Cosolo and one other, a Pieris native
nicknamed “Toni Suarin.”91
By early 1948, repatriation had become a notable phenomenon. Though scholars briefly
touched on these early repatriations in the initial scholarship on the controesodo, none have
followed up on this line of inquiry. 92 For most scholars of the controesodo, it was not the
persistence (or reemergence) of everyday grievances that proved to be a catalyst for repatriation,
but rather a cataclysmic event with its origins in the distant centers of power.93
The Cominform Resolution: Stalin, Tito, Monfalconesi
That event was the publication of the Cominform Resolution on 28 June 1948. 94 SovietYugoslav relations had deteriorated markedly in the winter of 1947/48, particularly as Tito
continued to provide active support to the Greek Communists and to push to establish himself as
the leader of Balkan Communism against Stalin’s wishes. When Tito supported a purge of the anti-
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Yugoslav faction within the Albanian Communist Party in February-March 1948, events came to
a head.95 A series of exchanges ensued between the Soviet and Yugoslav Parties, in which the
Soviets minimized the role of the Yugoslav Partisans in the liberation process and accused the KPJ
of ideological deviationism and in which the KPJ insisted that the situation was all a big
misunderstanding. Fearing that Stalin’s disfavor might provoke schisms within the Yugoslav Party
– schisms that might fall along national fault lines and embolden Croatian leaders like former KPH
secretary Andrija Hebrang to challenge Tito’s primacy – the security forces of Aleksandar
Ranković moved quickly to nip this in the bud. Tito loyalists arrested Hebrang, as well as leaders
who had expressed agreement with Soviet criticisms, whom they implicated in a supposed Soviet
plot to infiltrate and control Yugoslavia. When Stalin finally issued an ultimatum that the Yugoslav
leadership appear before the Cominform and accept “socialist criticism,” the Titoists refused. With
this, they assured both their excommunication from the Moscow church and the outbreak of an
internecine conflict within Yugoslavia between Titoists and “Cominformists,” fought with all
means of espionage and state repression. 96 In the words of Ivo Banac, “the split that emancipated
the KPJ from the Soviet Union promoted home-grown Stalinism.”97
The Cominform Resolution was a “bomb” for the monfalconesi in Yugoslavia. They had
certainly felt the impact of hidden international developments as their standard of living
plummeted through early 1948. However, they were in no way prepared for the news of late June.
They did not realize, for example, that the climaxing food and fuel crisis resulted in part from the
KPJ’s decision to stockpile such vital supplies in preparation for a potential Soviet invasion. 98
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Catching them entirely by surprise, the Tito-Stalin Split pitted the “two myths of the Communist
world” against each other.99 It ushered in a period of chaos and disorientation in which individual
monfalconesi and Monfalconese communities struggled to come to grips with competing claims,
often assessing these claims in light of their own experience of Tito’s now-“rogue” state.
The range of experiences and circumstances faced by monfalconesi led to a variety of
responses to the Resolution. The smaller, interior communities – most notably those of Zagreb,
Belgrade, and Ljubljana – found themselves particularly isolated and limited in their range of
potential responses. In Zagreb, where there lived some 1000 Italians, of whom 200 belonged to
the PCI and a separate 200 were monfalconesi, members of the Italian Cultural Circle listened to
Radio Moscow and, in the words on the Ligurian partisan exile Adolfo Sottile, decided on “the
justness of the [Soviet] criticism.”100 They resisted initial attempts by Italian Titoist leaders to
convince them to see the Yugoslav perspective and, when it became clear that the Titoists would
deny them the ability to contact the Italians of Fiume and Pola, decided to lay low and camouflage
themselves as best as possible given their relatively small numbers. 101 In Belgrade, the Italian
Cultural Circle that organized some 300 “Italian workers from Monfalcone, Trieste, and other
Italian provinces” likewise sided overwhelmingly with Stalin. However, following a heated debate
with a local KPJ leader over the correctness of the Resolution, its leaders elected to dissolve the
circle, fearing it would otherwise be considered an organized oppositional body. 102 In Ljubljana,
dread was omnipresent and “politics [was] little discussed” among the Italian expatriates. 103
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In the Croatian coastal towns, where monfalconesi resided in greater numbers, they
responded more vocally. At Fiume, where the bulk of the old leadership resided, the response was
decisive. Though a handful sided with Tito, among them the confinato Desiderio Rigonat (brother
of Renato), the distinguished gappista Riccardo Giacuzzo, and a portion of the staff of the Italianlanguage Voce del Popolo, the majority of monfalconesi at Fiume came out strongly in favor of
the Cominform. 104 The leadership, including a core prominently placed within the shipyard’s
Technical Office, accepted the Cominform Resolution as just criticism and made their stance
known. One participant recalls that “I resigned from my syndical appointment and abandoned any
type of political activity. I worked at the shipyard and that was it. Many other comrades did the
same.”105 Among the most vocal were the longtime Communist militants and dedicated Stalinists,
Ferdinando Marega and Angelo Comar, who even led pro-Stalin rallies in the naval yards, urging
workers to drown out concurrent Titoist rallies with the singing of the “International.” 106 When
Croatian president and KPH head Vladimir Bakarić arrived shortly thereafter to try to shore up
support from the economically indispensable monfalconesi, the latter shouted down his
suggestions that the Cominform Resolution was a mere misunderstanding, causing him to depart
with great disappointment. In early July, the monfalconesi at Fiume refused similar entreaties by
the shipyard director, Triestine Titoist leaders, and another key KPH official, Slavko Komar, the
last of whom told monfalconesi that they were foreigners who should mind their own business. 107
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Similar scenes unfolded in Pola. Following the initial meetings at Fiume, Bakarić travelled
there to attempt to break the monfalconesi of Pola away from the position of those at Fiume.
Gathering thirty Monfalconese leaders in Pola, Bakarić expounded upon the contributions made
by monfalconesi to the construction of Yugoslav socialism and implored them to disavow the
Resolution. The monfalconesi, Valerio Beltrame among them, rejected the plea and instead issued
four criticisms of Yugoslav socialism: (1) the discriminatory provisioning system, which
privileged KPJ officials and Yugoslav Army officers over ordinary workers; (2) the lack of
democracy, given that workers were free to discuss KPJ policy only when they supported it; (3)
the coercive cooperativization of agriculture, which was causing major food shortages; and (4) the
national chauvinism of Croats and Croatia. 108 To the surprise of the monfalconesi, Bakarić
recognized these problems, but countered. He laid out concrete measures Yugoslavia was taking
to build socialism and insisted that Yugoslavia would not allow Soviet calumnies to undermine
the gains made by the long-suffering Yugoslav peoples during the liberation struggle. For a brief
time, Beltrame recalls, the Pola leadership found this argument “quite persuasive,” but, when they
arrived in Fiume some days later on a mission to bring the monfalconesi of Fiume back into the
Titoist fold, things fell apart. The monfalconesi of Fiume remained “resolutely against Titoism,”
which drove the Pola delegation to reconsider its position. By the time the delegation members left
Fiume, they once again were on the side of Stalin and they too had adopted the strategy of their
comrades at Fiume: withdraw and cease participation in all forms of syndical life, political
meetings, cultural organizations, and voluntary labor.109
The overwhelming coherence of monfalconesi to the Cominform Resolution is striking,
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particularly given that so few had maintained ties with either the PCI or the PCTLT, from which
they might have received aid in the struggle. A mere 70 PCI members resided in Fiume in 1948,
few monfalconesi.110 In Pola, too, Beltrame recalls that “there were no contacts with members of
the PCRG [PCTLT] or the PCI” and that the community made its decisions “on local initiative.”
The monfalconesi of Pola understood themselves to be “comrades thrown into battle and
abandoned to [their] fate.”111 In part, this rapid decision had to do with the figure of Stalin and his
primacy within the postwar Communist pantheon, though this is far from a sufficient
explanation. 112 An unwavering loyalty to Stalin can explain the actions of those militants who had
been fighting for the USSR long before Tito’s Partisans even existed but is less compelling for the
mass of ordinary workers. More significant for these individuals seems to be that, for those not yet
disillusioned by the difficulties of everyday life in Yugoslavia, the Resolution shattered the lens
of contextual redefinition.113 Cominform critiques of Titoist “deviationism” provided
monfalconesi a compelling framework through which to understand the failures of Yugoslavia to
make good on their vision of socialism; at the moment of its publication, monfalconesi ceased
viewing the persistence of everyday grievances in Yugoslavia as the result of an incomplete
passage to socialism and instead took them as indicative of Tito’s fundamentally mistaken path.
Mario Tonzar indicates in his memoirs that, “despite certain difficulties that could be seen there,
the sentiment that had brought us to Yugoslavia made us overlook certain things that we found
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nearly exactly in the Resolution.” In a statement echoed by Beltrame, Tonzar concludes that,
“when the pot was uncovered, we got the sense that that which we had seen before, but kept inside,
corresponded to reality.”114 Thus, at the meeting between Pola and Fiume monfalconesi, the
leadership of both communities decided to follow the lead of those individual monfalconesi who
long before had been disabused of contextual redefinition; they decided on mass repatriation,
urging their comrades to go quickly to the Italian Consulate at Zagreb to secure passports. 115
As the monfalconesi of Pola, Fiume, and elsewhere awaited their exit documents, the
situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated rapidly following the failed reconciliations of early July. This
was especially the case at Fiume, where a portion of the Monfalconese leadership refused to accept
the withdraw-and-expatriate strategy and instead maintained a stance of belligerent support for the
Cominform. According to a report written by an anonymous “Mario” and smuggled to the PCI that
September – the best single source from which to reconstruct a series of confused events –
monfalconesi took the lead in criticizing the Yugoslav regime in public meetings, among them
Albano Olivieri (one of the “Big Five”), Giuseppe Franti (a former Communist Youth organizer),
and Alfredo Brenci (former director of the UAIS publication Il Progresso). 116 In many cases, this
took the form of public speeches in the Fiume shipyard. Franti himself recalls leading one mass
meeting in which some 4500-5000 workers participated: “I climbed on a crane and shouted, ‘Stalin
is right, it’s not true, what’s this talk about Stalin, why?’ I was the stupidest out of everyone.” 117
By the first days of August, such activities had landed Franti in the clutches of UDBA,
accompanied by Brenci and Olivieri. Though Bakarić again held a meeting with the Monfalconese
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leadership, attempting to use heavyweights such as Ferdinando Marega, Otto Ferlettich, Fioravante
B., Volmaro Buttignon, and Angelo Comar to win over the mass of workers, he again met stubborn
refusal. The Titoist press of Fiume and wider Croatia responded with a vitriolic campaign against
the Italian Cominformists at Fiume, while the police, alleging sabotage, arrested Adriano Fontanot
and other Monfalconese technicians who had earlier been headhunted from the CRDA. 118
While the most outspoken critics found their way to jail in August 1948, life became quite
hard even for those monfalconesi not involved in anti-Tito protests. State-controlled firms such as
the Fiume and Pola shipyards fired hundreds of workers for suspected Cominformist sentiments,
often after they were denounced as Il Lavoratore or L’Unità readers, while also ceasing payment
for the “distance indemnity” that was contractually guaranteed to workers whose families had
remained in Monfalcone.119 When workers sought the assistance of Italy’s diplomatic services to
enforce their contracts, Yugoslavia informed Italy that this was no concern of Italy, given that
monfalconesi had contracted individually with the Yugoslav state rather than through Italian state
services. 120 In the context of the unfolding Titoist-Cominformist struggle, even the most innocuous
of monfalconesi could find themselves the objects of suspicion, as did Pino Petean, who, full of
youthful enthusiasm, had emigrated to Yugoslavia in his early 20s. Though Petean abstained from
the various anti-Tito activities in which most monfalconesi engaged, he still found himself in jail
shortly after the split on suspicion of sabotage. Another young worker had accidentally broken an
engine in the Fiume shipyard and UDBA was searching for a saboteur. Luckily for Petean, he was
dating the sister of the shipyard director and, through her influence, was released eight days later.
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Without her, he may well have ended up in the same cells as Olivieri and Fontanot. 121
These worsening conditions served as the backdrop for the mid-August climax of Fiume’s
unfolding drama. Likely with the intention of circumventing the obstinate monfalconesi leadership
and going directly to the wider community, Croatian and Triestine Titoists organized a conference
at Fiume’s Partizan Theater (Teatro Fenice), inviting the Italian community. By the time the
gathering started, the theater hall was, in the words of the attendee Riccardo Bellobarbich, “chock
full, in large part with Italians.” 122 Yet, even before the event began, a poor outcome seemed
evident. As Bellobarbich recalls, the chief Titoist representatives, Bakarić and Ivan Regent, had
positioned themselves on the stage, leaving all monfalconesi to sit in the crowd as passive
observers. There was no doubt that this was to be a one-sided exchange. As Mario Tonzar recounts,
with this power dynamic in place, any attempt at true dialogue could only corroborate Titoists’
preconceptions of Monfalconese subversion.123 Bellobarbich recalls that the monfalconesi
themselves came to the theater with “more a desire to clash than to come together.”124 With both
sides feigning a will for dialogue, the conference devolved into disaster. As Regent read his
prepared statement, monfalconesi tried to shout him down, even letting fly cries of “Viva Stalin!”
Regent pressed forward, but, in the words of Bellobarbich, “at a certain point everyone got to their
feet singing the ‘International’ and we left the theater.”125 After exiting, the monfalconesi marched
through town in an ill-conceived display of defiance before dispersing back to their residences in
Abbazia. 126 Far from resolving the Cominform Resolution crisis, the conference did much to
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generalize the threat of the monfalconesi in the eyes of Yugoslav officials.
The fallout from the Partizan conference was immediate. The atmosphere in Fiume had
become, in the words of an anonymous La Voce del Popolo staff member, “extremely agitated.”127
Feeling themselves increasingly insecure, the Monfalconese leadership decided to smuggle
Ferdinando Marega back to Italy to re-establish contact with the PCI, dispatching him just before
UDBA agents arrived at his door.128 Those who sent him were less lucky. In the last third of
August, UDBA agents arrested a large portion of the Monfalconese leadership, among them
Vittorio Cernigoi, Volmaro Buttignon, Salvatore Bersa, Fioravante B., and Otto Ferlettich,
bringing the total detainees to roughly fifty. 129 Included too was the elderly father of Spartaco
Romano who had departed for Yugoslavia so full of hope to live the last years of life under
socialism. 130 Yugoslav security forces shipped their prisoners, along with their spouses and
children, to a mining colony at Zenica in the interior of Bosnia, where they were to work out the
remainder of their labor contracts in both physical and social isolation. Though several spouses
asked to return to Italy, Yugoslav authorities made it clear this was not an option. 131 Buried within
their labor contracts was a provision stating that the signatories would work wherever the Yugoslav
authorities deemed opportune, so long as transportation of family and goods was provided free of
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charge. 132 Crammed into barracks and semi-finished apartments, they were forbidden from leaving
Zenica, which many found disagreeable for its weather and its large Muslim population. 133 By
year’s end, the entire group had requested that the Italian Consulate at Zagreb aid them in
repatriation to the Italy that they had so eagerly left behind in 1947. 134
For the Monfalconese community at Fiume, deportations heightened an already dizzying
sense of disorientation. If many had initiated the repatriation process before the Cominform
Resolution or immediately afterward, the cataclysm of deportations accelerated the process,
though the choice often remained difficult, even in the context of UDBA repression. In his secret
letter to the PCI, the anonymous “Mario,” a former Party leader who had escaped the recent arrests,
explained the dilemma of both the mass of monfalconesi and the leaders who remained at large:
the Italians… are not in a condition to be able to repatriate. Who would give them work in
Italy? Here they have their families and some furniture. Should they abandon everything?
They lack even the financial means for the travel expenses. The ex-leaders of the P[arty],
including the writer, do not want to repatriate under these conditions. The masses would
claim to have been abandoned. They have always demonstrated faith in us. Therefore, if
one must and one can depart, we will depart for good and what will be, will be. 135

As “Mario” recognized, for some – particularly those with few remaining ties to the Monfalconese
– the decision of where to go was equally problematic as whether to go. Many continued to look
east. For a brief time, some monfalconesi hoped the PCI might arrange their extraction en masse
to Romania, Bulgaria, or Hungary. Still others, including many from Belgrade and interior
settlements, proved unwilling to wait for passports. Instead they made their own arrangements for
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extraction to Romania or Czechoslovakia or fled back toward the Italian border, several seemingly
shot dead by Yugoslav border guards in the process.136 Whether leaving illegally or legally, by the
end of September, the vast majority of monfalconesi in Yugoslavia appear had made clear moves
to depart. Even if temporarily torn between their possessions and their safety, most chose the latter.
For those who requested formal passports, the process could take a shockingly long time,
subjecting one to a long period of police harassment. Monfalconesi often had to wait months to
secure their Italian travel documents and then months more to secure a Yugoslav exit visa, during
which time one was likely to be hounded by Tito’s security forces. The winter of 1948-49 was thus
one that monfalconesi spent in fear and hiding. In the interim, monfalconesi developed survival
strategies, including reviving the Fascist-era clandestine support network called the Soccorso
Rosso, keeping the same name. The group collected aid and food donations for the family members
of political detainees, while also helping keep track of those who were arrested.137 Though the
majority of monfalconesi appear to have departed Yugoslavia by early 1949, that year saw the
extension of the anti-Cominformist repression to the monfalconesi community of Pola, now devoid
of potential Fiuman allies, and its renewal in Fiume itself. 138 By year’s end, Yugoslavia had
expelled many of those it arrested in 1949 and the year prior, dumping them at the Italian border.
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Among them were several members of the Zenica group, including Angelo Nicola, who later
lamented that he lost all his carpentry equipment and his workbench in the process. 139
Despite this loss, Nicola was in retrospect quite lucky. A small number of monfalconesi –
roughly fifty – ended up on Goli Otok and other of Tito’s gulag islands, enduring (or succumbing
to) years of backbreaking labor and torture for their real or supposed Cominformism. 140 Though
Goli Otok is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the single example of bojkot (boycott) will
suffice to demonstrate the suffering of those on the island. When placed under bojkot, a prisoner
had to remain silent, perform strenuous physical labor at the quarries, “guard” buckets of
excrement for periods of hours in the middle of the night, and sleep separate from the other
prisoners, all while being denied precious cigarette ration and subjected to insults and beating by
non-boycotted inmates, many of whom participated in the cruelty lest they be boycotted
themselves. This horror often lasted up to two months and, in exceptional cases, even longer.141
Mario Tonzar was one of the unfortunate exceptions, enduring four long months of bojkot in Goli
Otok. He emerged from the island prison only in 1953, following the death of Stalin. 142
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Big Moments and Small Moments
Goli Otok was one endpoint for monfalconesi in Yugoslavia. For many historians and many
participants, Goli Otok is now the dominant “meaning” to be taken from the narrative of the
controesodo. In such interpretations, the Cominform Resolution and the Partizan theater incident
mark high points in the drama of the monfalconesi as a collective body, the catalyst for a nearuniversal move toward repatriation. This is a somewhat natural outcome, as much of the research
to date has been undertaken with the aim of exposing Titoist oppression or has relied on sources
written by or drawn from those exceptional individuals who lived through this extreme side of the
emigration. Yet ordinary people often experienced (and recount) this period less with reference to
the great “breaks” or “turns” of history and more within the framework of everyday life. 143 The
focus on June 1948 and Goli Otok obscures as much as it reveals, particularly if we take the stories
of Goli Otok survivors such as Franti and Tonzar as representative. In fact, the experiences of
monfalconesi in Yugoslavia were much more varied.
The focus on the Cominform Resolution and Goli Otok has not only obscured the variety
of experiences in Yugoslavia; it has also shaped how historians have interpreted the testimonies
left by surviving monfalconesi. Even Anna Di Gianantonio and her colleagues, while attempting
to reconstruct the experiences of monfalconesi in Yugoslavia, have fallen prey to overemphasizing
the Cominform Resolution. They have taken the vastly different explanations of the quality of life
in Yugoslavia as the result of memory in the wake of the Resolution: either the trauma of the postResolution experience results in monfalconesi remembering their entire time in Yugoslavia as
horrible or that same trauma leads them to frame the pre-Resolution experience as one of plenty
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and happiness and thus as a paradise shattered by the intra-Communist rift.144 Though this may be
true to a degree, such clashes in emigrant testimonies are at least as likely to reflect extreme and
rapid changes in living conditions during the emigrants’ stay in Yugoslavia.
In the end, not all monfalconesi would leave Yugoslavia after the Cominform Resolution,
nor be pressured to do so. Those who had integrated most actively in Yugoslav society or sided
openly with Tito received better treatment. Such was the case with Mirella Pin. She remained with
her father, her mother, and her future husband, Luciano Giuricin, who carried the vital KPJ card.
Even a half-century after the fact, Mirella and Luciano maintain that Tito was constructing
socialism in Yugoslavia and that their family was right to say. 145 In the interim period, Luciano
continued writing for La Voce del Popolo, which even through 1949 encouraged monfalconesi to
renounce the Cominform Resolution, pledge allegiance to Tito, and continue assisting in the
construction of Yugoslav socialism. 146 Eugenio Pin, perhaps confident that Luciano’s Party ties
would shield him from suspicions, aided monfalconesi released from Goli Otok in their efforts to
reintegrate into Fiuman society, though few chose to stay. 147 Even among those who remained,
faith in Yugoslavia was not universal. Renato Rigonat, long active in KPJ youth organizing in
Fiume and married to a Serbo-Croatian Communist, remained until 1953, experiencing minimal
abuse in the anti-Cominform campaign. Only after applying for an exit visa to return to Ronchi in
1952 did UDBA hound him and his family. But his decision to remain after 1948 was more due to
inertia and his wife’s desires than his view of Yugoslavia. Well before his departure he had become
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convinced that Tito’s new state was not building socialism. 148
Equally important, however, were the forgotten hundreds who left before the Resolution.
Some of them had likely never expected to reside permanently in Yugoslavia, but many were
monfalconesi who had eagerly departed for Tito’s land of nascent socialism only to find that
Yugoslavia was not what they had expected. The developmentalist socialism of Tito’s Yugoslavia
precluded the realization of many of their hopes, while the changing international conditions of
1947-48 – particularly Yugoslavia’s isolation from both West and East – forced Yugoslav
leadership to adopt new policies in direct contrast with Monfalconese hopes for a socialist society.
These changes replicated some of the experiences in the workplace and marketplace that
monfalconesi had long associated with Fascism. Capturing their frustration are the words of the
Emilian partisan, Sauro Ballardini, who lived in Fiume between 1946 and 1948 as a partisan exile.
Speaking of the Italians in Fiume, Ballardini recalls that “we wanted to leave the country because
the existing socialism that we found there was different than that which we had imagined during
the Resistance.”149 Many monfalconesi who thought like Ballardini returned to Italy before the
Resolution, returning to a country that was itself going through major Cold War convulsions.
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Chapter 8: West-East Migration, Cold War Paranoia, and the Construction of the Iron
Curtain
He is constantly and secretively surveilled by the corps.1
– Monfalcone carabinieri on the recently repatriated, Mario R., November 1948.

On 7 October 1948, Mario R., a middle-aged mariner from San Canzian d’Isonzo, passed
westward through an Italian border checkpoint, showing repatriation papers he had received from
the Italian Consulate at Zagreb. After fifteen months spent working in Pola, he returned to his
hometown, but his homecoming was far from convivial. Informed of Mario’s imminent return by
the consul, carabinieri began to track his activity as soon as he crossed the border. As a former
UAIS member, he was known to harbor “Communist philo-Slavic sentiments” and was considered
a threat to the country. For over fifty days the carabinieri tracked his movements and contacts,
attempting to uncover anything that would reveal the presumably sinister motives for his return.
What they found, however, was unexceptional. Mario had never assumed a major leadership
position in any pro-Yugoslav organization, nor committed violent acts against pro-Italians.
Moreover, his commitment to Yugoslavia and Communism was in doubt, as he had initiated the
repatriation process well before the Cominform Resolution due to disillusionment with life in Pola,
and he had abstained from politics since his return. All evidence refuted fears that Mario was a
threat. Nevertheless, even after fifty days of surveillance, the carabinieri concluded their report
with a telling line: “He is constantly and secretively surveilled by the corps.”2
The disparity between the resources dedicated to surveilling Mario and the actual threat
that he posed to the Italian state is both striking and informative. It reflects the intense paranoia
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generated by the back-and-forth movements of monfalconesi from Yugoslavia, which unfolded in
an era of deep uncertainty – one of territorial contestation, Cold War polarization, and the first
postwar Italian elections. The movements of Mario not only occurred within this context of
uncertainty, they also helped create and shape it. And he was just one of thousands.
The “Troika:” Yugoslav Infiltration, Communist Plots, and the Red Revolution, 1945-46
Understanding the paranoia surrounding Mario’s repatriation in 1948 requires a deeper
look at how the Italian state viewed the Communist world’s policy toward Italy in preceding years,
which in turn cannot be disentangled from different actors’ attempts to achieve their own goals by
influencing state or societal perceptions of this policy. Whether due to genuine belief or more
opportunistic instrumentalization, Italian officials denied that June 1945 had marked the end of
Tito’s (and Stalin’s) aggression and instead wove complicated narratives about Communist plots,
in which Monfalcone and monfalconesi came to play prominent roles.
Chief among the weavers was Feliciano Ricciardelli, who from his peripheral position as
head of the VGPC’s Criminal Investigative Division continued with the central task set for him
during his Fascist-era service as director of Trieste’s political police – namely protecting Italian
Trieste from “Slavo-Communism.” During the biennium 1945-46, he repeatedly and loudly
sounded alarm bells about impending Communist aggressions, providing the interpretive lens
through which the state would view Monfalconese politics and mobility. This process began in
late November 1945 when Ricciardelli sent an urgent message to Police Chief Luigi Ferrari in
Rome warning of plans by the Yugoslav military and the PCRG to resolve the “Trieste Question”
by fait accompli. He advised that “the Carsic territory up to the suburbs of Trieste” had been
organized militarily under the command of the garibaldino leader, Anton Ukmar, with even “the
smallest village” possessing a cell and each cell a cache of weapons, vehicles, and foodstuffs.
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Should the Yugoslavs not receive Trieste through negotiations, Ricciardelli alleged they planned
to “unleashed an upheaval of a social character, followed immediately by an insurrection of
partisans, giving way to an intervention of the regular Yugoslav Army,” which they believed
would succeed due to Western Allied “fatigue” and a “predisposition of America and England to
yield to violence, rather than come to armed conflict with Russia.” 3
Though fear that a red eastern wave would wash over part or all of Italy was not new, the
detail of Ricciardelli’s reporting raised the specter of Communist aggression to new heights and
garnered the attention of Italy’s top echelons of military and security leadership. 4 In the two months
that followed, his warning appeared nearly verbatim in intelligence reports issued to Prime
Ministers Ferruccio Parri and Alcide De Gasperi by the heads of the national carabinieri and Naval
Ministry cabinet.5 It became a model for subsequent analyses of Venezia Giulia’s vulnerability,
particularly in its articulation of both the process of armed takeover – social upheaval, partisan
insurrection, and regular military invasion – and uncertainty over the Anglo-Americans’
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stand. Ambassador Quaroni (Moscow), “VENEZIA GIULIA” (N. 523/222) to Foreign Minister De Gasperi, 16 July
1945, ASDMAE, AA PP 1946-50, Jug, b 6.
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willingness to defend the region against armed aggression. Equally important, as part of his
November warnings to Ferrari, Ricciardelli also drew attention to efforts by the PCRG and OZNA
to provide military training to “philo-Slavic” Triestine youth in the forests around Sesana (Sežana),
just beyond the Morgan Line, with the purpose of preparing them for armed insurrection. 6 Thus
buried within the wave of reports – and largely overlooked for the time being– was the idea that
Yugoslavia might serve as a training-ground for “anti-Italian” paramilitary forces destined for
deployment within Italian territory.
If fears of a Yugoslav seizure of Zone A were firmly entrenched within the Italian security
apparatus by the turn of 1946, a series of key Cold War developments both at home and abroad
led Italian statesmen and security figures to reconsider the scope of “Slavo-Communist” ambitions
that same winter and spring. At home, Parri’s unity government collapsed in early December 1945
and the tensions between monarchist and republican factions intensified in the run-up to Italy’s
1946 referendum on the monarchy. Abroad, the re-ignition of the Greek and Chinese Civil Wars,
Stalin’s election speech in February 1946, and Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in March called
into question the fragile postwar peace. Moreover, as the Council of Foreign Ministers debated
Venezia Giulia’s territorial fate and pro-Yugoslav giuliani made their position known in the piazze
of Monfalcone and elsewhere, Italy’s ministers received a flood of reports that Soviet and Sovietallied forces were amassing millions of soldiers in Yugoslavia in preparation for a drastic action. 7
In the wake of these developments and Monfalcone’s strong pro-Yugoslav showing during

6

Insp. F. Ricciardelli (VGPC-CID), Untitled Report to Chief of Police (Rome), 4 November 1945, ACS, MI, DGPS,
AA GG RR 1944-46, b 59, f 116.
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In March, the War Ministry indicated that some 150,000 Soviet and 700,000 Hungarian soldiers had been deployed
to Yugoslavia and that Hungarian airbases were stockpiling petrol and other supplies. Reports of a Soviet military
build-up continued to arrive through early June. Col. Capo Ufficio Pasquale (Ministero della Guerra-Ufficio
Informazioni), “Unità sovietiche in Jugoslavia e nella Venezia Giulia” (N. 86498/3/3), 25 March 1946; Pasquale (MGUI), “Forze sovietiche in Jugoslavia” (N. 86937/3/3), 8 June 1946, both in ASDMAE, AA PP 1946-50, Jug, b 6, f 1.3
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DGPS, AA GG RR 1946-46, b 59, f 116.
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the Border Commission visit, Italian security forces, with Ricciardelli’s prodding, both became
increasingly concerned with a potential Communist aggression extending into Italy proper
(beyond Zone A) and placed Monfalcone increasingly at the center of Yugoslavia’s projection
into Italian territory. In a report that eventually reached the desks of both Ferrari and De Gasperi,
the Questore of Udine described an “extremely strong” OZNA organization stretching from Fiume
through the vital node of Monfalcone and into Udine Province at Cervignano, which plotted to
seize for Yugoslavia not just Zone A, but also Italian territory up to the Tagliamento River on the
coming May Day. 8 And though May Day passed without incident, fears did not dissipate.
Instead many began to consider that the looming referendum on the monarchy might serve
as just the spark that domestic and foreign Communists needed to put their plans into action.
Ferrari soon informed De Gasperi and other ministers that former garibaldini leaders of Friuli,
most notably Mario Lizzero (Andrea), had reconstituted GAP cells in various Udine communes,
the units loyal to Yugoslavia.9 De Gasperi regularly corresponded with leaders of the Allied
occupation force to seek assurances in case Italians voted that June to keep the monarchy and the
PCI responded with a coup attempt. In mid-April, perhaps trying to leverage the Communist threat
into greater Anglo-American aid for the DC, De Gasperi even raised the possibility with the Allied
Commission that Tito’s forces might be involved in helping the PCI prepare for a larger aggression
aimed at overturning the sociopolitical order of Italy. However, top Allied commanders dismissed
this. In May, Admiral Stone informed De Gasperi that the Western Allies considered a Communist

Questore di Udine, “Attività e propaganda Jugoslava” (N. 01057), 12 March 1946, ACS, MI, DGPS, AA GG RR
1944-46, b 59, f 116. Italics added. This threat was taken seriously in some circles. Just days before the action was
supposed to occur, the War Ministry transmitted to De Gasperi an elaborate report on what it claimed were the precise
details of the insurrectional component of the aggression. Pasquale (MG-UI), “Piane insurrezionale delle formazioni
partigiane filo-slave” (N. 86669/3/3), 20 April 1946, ASDMAE, AA PP 1946-50, Jug, b 6, f 1.3 Segnalazioni riservate
MG VG 1946.
9
Capo della Pol. Ferrari, “Venezia Giulia” (N. 442/10548), 27 May 1946, ACS, MI, DGPS Div AA GG RR, b 58, f
VG 1944-46.
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uprising of national scope “improbable” due to a strong Anglo-American presence, even if the
situation regarding Friuli and Zone A was less certain. 10
However, not all Anglo-American and Italian officials shared this skepticism, and this was
especially the case for Friuli-Venezia Giulia. This is made clear by their support for the rapid
expansion of pro-Italian paramilitary bodies in the region, organized with the primary purpose of
resisting a Yugoslav invasion or pro-Yugoslav insurrection. To Ricciardelli’s delight, in mid-1946
both Anglo-American military officials (especially the British FSS) and certain security figures
in Rome began to look upon units like the Divisione Gorizia and the Fratelli d’Italia (Udine) with
increasing favor. Already by late 1945, AMG intelligence indicated that De Gasperi was actively
funding the Divisione Gorizia. In May 1946, Ferrari urged him to go further and help coordinate
the paramilitary preparations of the Divisione Gorizia with those of Gorizia Province’s antiYugoslav Italian Partisan Association (API), which refused to cooperate with the former due to
the inclusion of monarchists and ex-Fascists in its ranks. 11 Simultaneously, Army Chief of Staff
Raffaele Cadorna Jr. sent an emissary to Trieste to reassure the two- or three-thousand-strong proItalian paramilitary apparatus there that, in case of Yugoslav aggression in Zone A, the men could
consider themselves in regular service to the Italian Army, with all the benefits it entailed. 12
Though all of this came to naught – Italians voted away the monarchy in June and deprived
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Pupo has suggested that De Gasperi did not himself believe that the PCI had plans in place for a national uprising,
but rather he was exploiting Anglo-American anti-Communism for DC gain. On a regional level – particularly
regarding Friuli and Emilia-Romagna – there was less confidence. For example, Stone indicated that it was possible
that the former, a PCI stronghold, could suffer a PCI-backed uprising to create an independent republic if Italy retained
the monarchy. Pupo “Alcuni documenti,” 14.
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RG331, UD1981, b 9294, f 11304/137/93. On the Italian state’s knowledge of the Divisione Gorizia see ACS, MI,
DGPS, AA GG RR 1944-46, b 59, f 116; ACS, MI, Gab, 1944-46, b 138, f 12148; and ACS, MI, Gab, 1944-46, b
271, f 26232. Particularly relevant from the latter is Capo della Polizia, “Divisione Gorizia” (N. 224/74103), 7 May
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was very slow to develop. Buttignon, “Il sentimento nazionale italiano,” 111-12.
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the Communists of their alleged pretext for agitation – both the Italian state and Western Allied
forces continued to grow concerned about the fate of Zone A and the activity of monfalconesi as
territorial negotiations neared their conclusion. In the lull between the visit of the UN Border
Commission and the Twelve Days’ Strike, Trieste Area Commissioner Smuts informed SCAO
Bowman that many pro-Italians of the zone had grown frightened of a coup due to the proYugoslavs’ “ominous” quiet.13 Meanwhile, Ricciardelli continued to funnel alarming news both
directly to Ferrari and through the Udine questura.14 In June, the latter informed the Interior
Ministry of a meeting of “Slavophiles,” held at a farmhouse outside of Cervignano, where a former
political commissar of the Divisione Natisone and two Slovenian officers met with thirty members
of the Monfalcone UAIS and the Cervignano OZNA. The monfalconesi and cervignanesi were
tasked with organizing civilians and partisans into “armed units, ready for every eventuality,”
including serving as the spearhead of a future Yugoslav invasion. 15
In this context, just days before De Gasperi ceded the Foreign Ministership to Pietro
Nenni, his office dispatched a seventeen-page report directly to Ferrari. It stressed that, apart from
dealing with the soon-to-be Free Territory of Trieste, “the most urgent problem in regards to
Italy’s new eastern frontier is that of the spiritual, economic, and political normalization in the
Lower Monfalconese,” considered “the entry point for a vast politico-social agitation in Italy.”16
It was also in this context that Ferrari issued the so-called “Troika” circular of 19 September 1946,
informing his subordinates of the existence of a 280,000-person organization – primarily Italian
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Communists – which, under Stalin’s command and with Yugoslav backing, was ready to engage
in insurrection on a national scale. 17 What had emerged within the top political and police offices
was an image of a subversive network of national scope, connected to foreign Communist powers
by way of intermediaries in the disputed Julian lands. The regional nodes were said to be
composed in part of trained OZNA agents, but also “ordinary” UAIS members and garibaldini,
above all from the Monfalconese.18 Indeed, the Foreign Ministry (MAE) report stressed that the
PCI’s new Gorizia Federation would be the primary vehicle for Yugoslav projection into Italy, as
“details are already available proving that the organizations now dependent on the UAIS will pass
en masse into the Communist Party, where they will be able to operate with a certain ease.” 19
If Ricciardelli had helped transform Monfalcone from a regional problem into a national
menace by the summer of 1946, he also began to court more significant patrons in his struggle
against Yugoslav influence in Zone A. Certainly, Italian forces had provided aid to pro-Italian
paramilitaries, but such aid seemed far from sufficient to stem the Titoist tide, let alone to roll it
back. Thus, he began to seek out avenues of communication with US President Harry Truman. In
early June 1946, Ricciardelli indicated in a top-secret report to Ferrari that he had successfully
impressed upon a major of the US Army the precarious political situation in the zone. This major,

The document was discovered by the PCI and published mockingly in L’Unità. Pupo, 13. Pupo and others, while
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set to return to Washington from his present observation mission, had agreed “to submit for the
examination of President Truman the political situation in this area.” 20
Emigration Fears: Yugoslavia as a Staging Ground and the “Greek Thesis”
It was just as Italian and (to a lesser extent) Anglo-American anti-Communists reached
this peak in their obsession over Monfalcone’s role in a westward projection of Communist power
that thousands of these suspect monfalconesi began to move eastward into Tito’s New Yugoslavia,
often clandestinely. Given their nature as instruments of power, territorial states have always
perceived as threatening any undisciplined movement of peoples across their borders, and postwar
Italy and the AMG were no exception to this rule. 21 The contested and ideologically-charged
nature of the Italo-Yugoslav border and the distrust that both Italy and the AMG bore for many
borderlands residents only intensified this anxiety. Thus, from the very moment that the Allied
and Italian forces registered the departure of thousands of monfalconesi to Yugoslavia in midJanuary 1947, they kept tabs on this movement, even if most observers explained it in its early
days as the result of economic necessity. 22
It was only in March that the perceived security implications of this migration began to
change. On 12 March, across the Atlantic, President Truman had gone before the US Congress.
There he made his famous speech in which he laid out the Truman Doctrine, defining the victory
of the anti-Communist faction in the Greek Civil War as vital to US security interests and
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requesting Congressional approval for an economic aid package to be sent to bolster faltering antiCommunist governments in Greece and Turkey. Perhaps with Trieste and Italy in mind, Truman
warned that “terrorist activities” of foreign-backed Greek Communists threatened “the very
existence of the Greek state” and that the collapse of Greece could lead to a rapid westward and
southeastward spread of Soviet influence. 23 In this context, it did not take long, for the motivations
of Monfalcone’s emigrants, as well as a smaller stream of Italian emigrants from the Old
Provinces, 24 to be distorted by Cold War paranoia, brought into discussion of both the Communist
“Troika” in Italy and wider Communist aggressions throughout Europe.25
By all indications, the first step in this process came not from the Italian or AMG security
forces, but from the newspaper L’Ora d’Italia in Rome. Just two weeks after Truman’s speech,
the paper, directed by the monarchist, qualunquista Constitutional Assemblyman Emilio Patrissi,
placed monfalconesi front-and-center in this global drama with an article entitled “Soviet Intrigues
at Our Eastern Border.” Assuming the “Troika” to be a reality, L’Ora d’Italia criticized the
“careless indifference” of the Italian government in confronting the situation of the eastern border.
Having received secret intelligence reports from confidential Julian sources – likely Ricciardelli
or the pro-Italian paramilitaries – the paper drew attention to joint Yugoslav and PCI scheming,
namely a supposed recruitment campaign in Friuli to send fighters to join “the bands that infest
the Greco-Macedonian frontier.” According to the author, Lino Zocchi (“Ninci”), ex-commander
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of the Garibaldi Divisions in Friuli and PCI secretary in Udine, oversaw the transfer of the recruits
to Yugoslavia and then Greece by way of collection stations at Monfalcone. Such recruitment, he
claimed, ran parallel to another military organization headquartered at Monfalcone. This body
“link[ed] the Italian partisans of the Friulan plain with those Slovenes of the mountains” and
“dispatch[ed] groups of young Communists into the mountains, where Titoist Partisans train them
in arms” and prepare them for “a common action, in the mountains and in the plains,” at the
moment of the Allied withdrawal. 26 With this article, L’Ora d’Italia transformed West-East
migration into a question of dire importance for Italian security. It painted a picture of concerted
subversive activity with its epicenter at the dreaded “philo-Slavic” stronghold of Monfalcone, in
which the PCI, in concert with the PCRG and KPJ, purposefully funneled young Communists and
garibaldini into Yugoslavia for two interrelated ends: (1) fighting for Communism abroad in the
Greek Civil War (the “Greek Thesis”); and (2) preparing guerrilla fighters who would bring the
armed struggle home at the earliest opportunity, perhaps as soon as the looming implementation
of the Peace Treaty. It globalized perceptions of the Cold War at home by stressing the
interconnectedness of its theaters and served as a key piece in Italian anti-Communists’ campaign
to pull the American containment umbrella over Italy by mobilizing the eastern threat. 27
In the spring months that followed, the Greek Thesis blossomed from a fanciful
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proclamation of Italy’s anti-Communist press into a subject of deep concern for the state, though
the state arrived at no internal consensus as to the true depths of the threat posed by eastward
migration. After investigations, local carabinieri in Udine concluded that a recruitment ring
existed, shipping recruits to join “guerilla bands, which from foreign soil, would later be called to
work against Italy in this zone,” but the provincial police chief, Questore Durante, expressed
skepticism given that most were “not of young age, nor of excessively extremist ideas,” but rather
“unemployed and in large part bricklayers.”28 In Rome, Interior Ministry intelligence sided with
the carabinieri, asserting repeatedly that the Yugoslavs, aided by Lino Zocchi, actively recruited
youths from northern Italy to train near Fiume as guerrilla combatants and then go to Greece, still
other recruits from wider Italy trained as OZNA agents and then returned to their respective home
cities (a clear allusion to the “Troika” idea). 29 In May, Prefect Vittadini of Udine confirmed that
at least 117 Italian citizens had been recruited in Udine alone, though he sided with Questore
Durante, stressing that there was little to indicate that udinesi emigrated for anything other than
finding employment as mechanics, bricklayers, and carpenters in war-damaged Yugoslavia.30
Nevertheless, Ministerial intelligence issued an order on behalf of Ferrari instructing Durante,
despite his skepticism, to identify recruiters and combat their activity with vigor, as the Allied
authorities had neither “the ability nor the will to stop it.” 31
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No later than July, as monfalconesi and others continued to flow into Yugoslavia, the
problem of clandestine emigration reached the desk of De Gasperi. In a comprehensive report,
Police Chief Ferrari indicated that such emigration had changed in nature and scope. It had shifted
from an emigration of individuals fleeing prosecution for Resistance- and Liberation-era crimes
– one can think here of the perpetrators of the Schio Massacre of July 1945, helped to escape to
Yugoslavia by none other than the Monfalcone Communists – to a more organized efflux of PCIor PSI-loyal workers recruited by agents of “philo-Slavic” organs. Moreover, recruits from distant
regions of Southern Italy increasingly joined the typical borderland recruits in departing.32 Police
paranoia came out in the form of internal contradictions in the report. First stating that there “does
not appear that up to now there have been created in Yugoslavia any units destined for the guerrilla
war in northern Greece,” the report concluded that “one Zocchi or Zolli [Lino Zocchi] … is
presently at Ljubljana, where he organizes units of young Italian Communists, especially friulani,
which are then sent clandestinely… to the southern frontier of Albania and to Bulgaria in support
of the Greek guerrilla fighters.” Moreover, building upon long-developing fears that Yugoslavia’s
Youth Brigade program served as cover to train young radicals in revolutionary and
propagandistic activities, the report ended with a cryptic warning. It advised that “it has been
confirmed that Italian youths in Yugoslavia who show themselves in possession of the necessary
aptitude are subjected… to special courses of Communist catechization, to transform them into
capable and obedient militants, who will be utilized, where and when necessary, in important and
risky Party missions.” 33 With this, clandestine West-East emigration was defined at the highest
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levels of state as a first-rate security problem. 34
But the Italians were not the only ones for whom this migration proved troubling; the
Anglo-Americans in Italy and Venezia Giulia, long suspicious of the zone’s pro-Yugoslavs, also
lost sleep over West-East migration. Lt. Col. Gardner, the Area Commissioner of Trieste, warned
the SCAO repeatedly of “anti-Allied and anti-De Gasperi” youth crossing the Morgan Line near
Muggia to receive guerrilla training for later service in “the International Army or some contingent
of the Jugoslav forces.”35 The Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), stationed at Trieste to deter
Yugoslav and Soviet aggression, entertained this same idea throughout that spring and early
summer. 36 Only after several months did they indicate that “interrogation of persons apprehended
by both British and Americans for illegal attempts to enter Jugoslavia [sic] has not shown in any
instance that the subject had been recruited for military training or service.” 37 In the meantime,
Truman’s cabinet had drafted contingency plans for a US response to a potential Communist coupinvasion in Italy, and it launched a “political warfare” campaign there, the means of which had
previously been “dysfunctional or nonexistent.”38 It is quite possible that Ricciardelli’s warnings
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or even paranoid contemplation of West-East migration played a part in that escalation.
The First Efforts to Halt Emigration: Bordering the AMG (1947)
Despite eventually rather decisively refuting the Greek thesis, in the interim months, the
Anglo-American forces in Italy took no chances. Beginning in summer 1947, the AMG and
TRUST joined the Italian state in attempting to construct a more rigorous border regime with the
aim of keeping Italian Communists on the western side of the emerging Iron Curtain. For the
AMG, the impetus to solidify the border came too from the realization that, at least since early
1947, many suspect monfalconesi had easily moved back and forth undetected.39 Yet until
September 1947, when the peace treaty formally went into effect, efforts to construct this Iron
Curtain were critically limited by the fact that, according to the terms of the agreements
establishing the AMG in 1945, the AMG could not obstruct the free passage of residents of Zone
A (including monfalconesi) into Zone B. Despite desiring to halt ongoing emigration from Zone
A, it had no legal basis to do so.40 Thus anti-emigration measures were applied primarily in two
ways during the summer of 1947: (1) by both Italy and the AMG to those entering Zone A from
Italy; and (2) by the AMG to all non-residents of Zone A crossing into Zone B or Yugoslavia.
Within the bounds of legality, TRUST, the AMG, and the Italian state thus sought to stamp
out West-East movement and transform Churchill’s metaphorical Iron Curtain into a real and
existing border regime that would keep suspect individuals in the West. This project began in June
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1947 when, prior to discounting the Greek thesis, TRUST attempted to root out and close rural
expatriation points used by Old-Province emigrants. One of the first it discovered was an
unguarded footbridge across the Isonzo at Volaria (Volarje), just southeast of Caporetto (Kobarid)
and far enough away from the nearby American block post at Dolla (Dolje) to be crossed
undetected under cover of darkness. When TRUST discovered this, it immediately increased
military patrols.41 The Italian state simultaneously instituted patrols along the Italo-AMG border
to prevent Italian citizens from even entering Zone A, mainly targeting the west bank of the Isonzo
abutting the Monfalconese.42 The AMG and Italy also worked to break existing recruitment
networks, arresting those responsible for guiding Old-Province Italians across the Volaria route
and recruiting migrants from the south of Udine Province. 43
Of course, all of these were merely half-measures, limited by legal restrictions and by the
looming shift in the border, but this did not stop Italian security forces from looking forward. In
mid-July, just weeks after Ferrari’s critical report to De Gasperi and in anticipation of Italy’s
imminent return to Zone A, the Military Command of Udine issued internal border control
guidelines for the first months after the transfer, during which the military was expected to play a
key role in bordering efforts. The commanding general defined Monfalcone as one of the zone’s
critical “nuclei of philo-Slavic populations” and deemed the halting of clandestine eastward
emigration as one of the force’s high-priority concerns. Drawing upon notions of Communist
“embedding” within wider population movements, the memo warned border forces that saboteurs
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and guerrillas might appear “camouflaged” as workers or refugees attempting to enter the
country.44 If Italy could only combat West-East migration in the margins before September 1947,
targeting the minority of emigrants who came from the Old Provinces, a clear framework was in
place to interpret the movements taking place in Zone A and beyond.
The Year 1948: Prefect Palamara, Repatriation, and the Election
It was with “Transfer Day” that the thousands of expatriated monfalconesi became an
Italian problem, and in late 1947 hundreds began banging on the door, demanding they be let back
into a reconstituted Gorizia Province. The deep sense of vulnerability generated by economic,
social, and political chaos in the province, felt by both native goriziani and the movers and shakers
in Rome, affected responses to the Monfalconese emigration. Having long realized that Gorizia’s
situation would be delicate, Prime Minister De Gasperi had created the Office for the Border
Zones (UZC) the year prior, tasking it with protecting the territorial integrity and cultural
“Italianness” (italianità) of Italy’s borderlands.45 The UZC had almost immediately determined
that Gorizia Province would require a prefect of “exceptional capabilities” to manage economic
crisis, a large Slovenian minority, and the population of the Monfalconese, which, though “Italian
in race, is largely philo-Slavic in sentiment.”46 To govern this tinderbox, the UZC and De Gasperi
chose Giovanni Palamara, granting him a mandate to protect the border province from national
and political threats at all costs.47
When Palamara arrived in Gorizia in September 1947, he immediately went to work
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taming the “philo-Slavs,” including those perceived as most threatening: repatriates from
Yugoslavia. Though repatriations had been ongoing since mid-1947, the flow increased at the turn
of 1948, creating major public security concerns. From the very beginning of Palamara’s tenure,
both he and his provincial security forces opposed repatriation en masse of expatriated “philoSlavs.” They foresaw that mass repatriation would lead to violent encounters between “philoSlavic” repatriates and anti-Communist, nationalist residents such as the esuli.48 More critically,
they feared the reconstitution of a strong far-left movement in the Monfalconese – one with radical
goals and (suspected) conspiratorial methods. Italian consular offices in Zagreb and Belgrade
reported a spike in repatriation requests, and the central carabinieri offices warned the Foreign
Ministry that these former residents were “anti-Italian” in their “near-entirety.” Echoing
sentiments of local carabinieri, they asked that passports be denied because the applicants sought
“to undertake actions in favor of the philo-Slavic elements residing in Italy and, if necessary, to
provoke disorders and use violence to impose their ideas and achieve their ends.” 49 The same was
suspected of the many monfalconesi who simply ignored the passport issue and repatriated
clandestinely over a still-porous Italo-Yugoslav border.50
Despite the security forces’ strong and persistent opposition to the repatriation of “philoSlavs,” the Italian consular offices in Yugoslavia ignored these warnings. Operating under the
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assumption that closely-monitored subversives at home were less dangerous than free-ranging
subversives abroad – an assumption that, as will be seen, had been in place for some time – the
Foreign Ministry facilitated repatriation of passport-less monfalconesi and other Italians
expatriated to Yugoslavia since 1945, of which they estimated there were 10,000, including some
2400 working at the Fiume shipyard alone. 51 By freely issuing one-way fogli di rimpatrio
(repatriation passes) or, less commonly, short-duration regular passports, the Foreign Ministry
sought to bring about what it called the definitive repatriation of Italians in Yugoslavia. 52
As “philo-Slavic” repatriates flooded back into Gorizia Province both legally and
clandestinely, Palamara and the carabinieri faced mounting security concerns, particularly as they
looked forward to a historic moment in the life of the young Italian Republic: the first postwar
election, scheduled for April 1948. In the months preceding the election, a widespread belief
developed that the leftist Democratic Popular Front, headed by the PCI, had a good chance to win.
This translated into a profound dread for anti-Communists. Given the imminence and stakes of
the coming election, it is not surprising, then, that Palamara and the Italian security forces, whose
confidence had been shaken further by unfolding Communist advances in Greece and
Czechoslovakia, began to suspect the repatriation of monfalconesi to be not the result of hundreds
of individual choices (as it largely was), but rather concerted Yugoslav and Soviet machinations
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to sway this election. 53 By mid-February, Palamara and provincial carabinieri forces warned their
superiors that “philo-Slavic” repatriates, including women, returned in order “to undertake intense
Slavo-Communist propaganda.”54 Such suspicions were amplified by the fact that, in the case of
many repatriates, Yugoslav authorities had made exceptions to state policies barring the granting
of exit visas to foreign nationals who lacked passports from their home countries (into which
category most monfalconesi fell).55
But beyond fears that Yugoslavia was orchestrating the return of voters and propagandists,
Palamara feared he was witnessing the deployment of a highly-trained Communist paramilitary
force nested within this wider repatriation wave, just as L’Ora d’Italia and state security forces
had predicted a year prior. In early February, Palamara learned that eight young men from San
Pier d’Isonzo had repatriated to their home town using various checkpoints. Carabinieri
investigations had revealed, however, that all eight were pro-Yugoslavs who had been members
of the town’s GAP and who seemed to be operating under orders from Yugoslavia. 56 Though the
simultaneous return of this San Pier d’Isonzo GAP cell was a bit exceptional, as the carabinieri
and police launched investigations into (often clandestine) repatriations, they realized that tens, if
not hundreds of threatening individuals had returned in the first weeks of 1948. Among them were
the twenty-one-year-old garibaldino, Otello L, who had sat on the Titoist district council in May
1945, and Rodolfo F., a twenty-six-year-old gappista from Staranzano known for his UAIS
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activism and for having threatened pro-Italians.57 Such reports elicited an immediate increase in
surveillance, Palamara ordering the carabinieri to “follow these repatriations closely” and to
monitor carefully “the activity of the repatriates themselves.” 58
This suspiciously-timed repatriation of numerous gappisti came on the heels of a flurry of
news and events that seemed to confirm Palamara’s fears, both of PCI plotting generally and of
the specific role of repatriated emigrants in this plot. During the first weeks of January there were
at least two instances in which representatives of the revolution-minded Milanese Federation of
the PCI arrived in the Monfalconese to hold meetings with the province’s partisan leaders, the
second of which supposedly yielded the creation of seven-man, well-armed Communist squads to
be held at the ready in anticipation of an “opportune moment.” 59 Simultaneously, on 14 January,
the leader of the district’s clandestine pro-Italian paramilitary, Pietro Dominutti, was gunned
down on the streets of Staranzano after the pro-Yugoslavs accused him of orchestrating a recent
wave of terrorist attacks against the homes of Mario Fantini, the Barbo family, and others. One
explanation for this murder, soon well-known not just to Palamara but also Ferrari and Interior
Minister Mario Scelba, was that it was a settling of scores; just as likely, it could be read as an
effort to decapitate the pro-Italian paramilitary in anticipation of the election. 60
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A final piece of information coloring Palamara’s view of monfalconesi repatriation was a
report detailing the interrogations of a man named Alfonso D. B., whom Gorizian frontier police
had arrested for attempting clandestine repatriation. Under interrogation, Alfonso admitted to
having emigrated clandestinely to Yugoslavia for work, claiming that Yugoslav forces had
arrested him, sent him to a concentration camp, and forcibly repatriated him due to his hesitancy
to embrace Communism. While at the camp, Alfonso and other Italian internees, of which there
were many, had been approached by PCI agents seeking volunteers for various paramilitary
forces. Among these were a brigade destined for Greece, and also multiple units that, aided by
30,000-40,000 heavily armed Yugoslav soldiers amassed at Vipacco (Vipava), which would serve
as the spearhead of a Yugoslav invasion of Italy if the Communists lost the election. Grimly,
Alfonso concluded his testimony with an assertion that “the purpose of the invasion is not solely
the conquest of Trieste and of Gorizia, but of all of Italy.” 61
By mid-February, Palamara felt compelled to warn his superiors of the grave danger posed
to Italy by a combination of foreign and domestic Communist enemies. He passed on Alfonso D.
B.’s testimony and, in a critical top-secret report to Ferrari, he signaled the existence of a
thousand-strong “Slavo-Communist” paramilitary apparatus in Gorizia, formed of ex-garibaldini
and decommissioned Titoist soldiers who during the AMG period had proven themselves
committed to Yugoslav annexation.62 The latter report identified Monfalcone, Ronchi, Cormons,
and Gradisca as the primary bases of this paramilitary, presenting it as an heir to the “Natisone”
Division, but reorganized into self-contained, isolated cells. The unit possessed “light and heavy
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machine guns, assault rifles, submachine guns, and a good supply of ammunition and hand
grenades,” hidden in the hills along the Italo-Yugoslav border. Heading the cells of Monfalcone
and Ronchi were said to be Mario Fantini and Vinicio Fontanot, while the entire paramilitary, part
of a wider Communist military zone in Friuli and Venezia Giulia, came under the command of
Lino Zocchi and his lieutenant, Mario Lizzero. Zocchi specifically captured Palamara’s attention.
The prefect indicated that Zocchi “spoke Italian with a foreign accent” and that, between his time
as ANPI and PCI secretary in Udine and his current secretaryship in Gorizia, this capable guerrilla
commander had been assigned “special duties” in Trieste.63 By referencing Zocchi and his special
duties, Palamara did more than just sound the alarm on the paramilitary’s ties to a foreign power.
He also connected the paramilitary to the longstanding phenomenon of West-East emigration, as
Zocchi had long been labelled the chief architect of those clandestine emigration rings by which
the Communist Party covered its efforts to prepare a guerrilla army. 64
In the final two months before the election, renewed fears of a Communist invasioninsurrection, reinforced by Palamara’s reporting, drove forward what Elena Agarossi and Victor
Zaslavsky have termed a “Italy’s drift toward civil war.”65 Such reporting began to have an impact
at the central levels of state, eliciting the direct involvement of Interior Minister Scelba. In March,
as election day approached, Scelba, who in his capacity as a member of the DC’s Executive
Committee had played a key role in pushing the DC to create its own “defensive” paramilitary,
enquired as to the concrete actions that Police Chief Ferrari had undertaken to dismantle the APG
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organization and seize its weapons. 66 Rather than receiving positive news, Scelba learned that the
situation had grown worse. In the interim, the prominent Milanese Communist Giancarlo Pajetta,
known for having led the temporary occupation of Milan’s prefectural headquarters in 1947 when
Scelba sacked the partisan-prefect Ettore Troilo in favor of a strongly anti-Communist candidate,
had stopped in Gorizia on a return trip from Belgrade. There he had met with key Gorizian
Communists, including monfalconesi, supposedly ordering the creation of five more PCI assault
brigades, which would aid “a Communist seizure of power should the elections turn out
unfavorable to the Popular Front,” particularly by eliminating policemen. 67
The possibility of civil war was certainly on Scelba’s mind, and less than two weeks later
– three days before the election – he circulated the famed (but likely apocryphal) “Plan K”
document to each of the republic’s prefects, carabinieri commanders, and police commissioners.
Purported to be a blueprint of PCI plans to seize power in the case of Popular Front defeat, it
detailed PCI plans to announce a Popular Front victory, accuse De Gasperi of falsifying the results,
and seize power through a combination of sabotage, mass protest, and partisan actions.68 Though
the document did not explicitly mention Gorizia Province (nor any other), nor repatriated
monfalconesi, it is easy to see how the latter could be understood to fit within the scheme. Since
March 1947, Monfalcone had been viewed as the ingress point for Communist agitation in Italy,
and Palamara’s reporting from this vulnerable periphery only reinforced the idea in the months
before the election. It propelled Italy’s polarization and its drift toward civil war. As Italians sat
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anxiously awaiting news of the results from 18 April, many also oiled their guns, preparing to
defend their faction’s expected victory in the case of the opposition’s treachery.
After the Election: Combatting “Fuoruscitismo” and Constructing the Iron Curtain
When the results finally came in, they showed that the DC had scored unexpectedly large
victories both nationally and in Gorizia Province – and, to the surprise of many, the guns proved
unnecessary, with the PCI honoring the outcome. The Communist paramilitaries of Gorizia and
Udine did not rise up in concert with a Yugoslav invasion, nor did the PCI on a national scale
implement any variant of Plan K, though fear of such action had certainly pushed many voters
into the arms of the DC and solidified its parliamentary majority. 69 Nevertheless, Palamara
remained on edge, particularly as rumors circulated that many monfalconesi, including many
repatriates, were discussing the possibility of “return[ing] to the mountains.”70 The experience of
managing the public order crisis in the months before the election had left him deeply suspicious
of repatriated monfalconesi and those still abroad. Thus, when there was a renewed wave of
clandestine emigrations from Gorizia Province in the wake of the Popular Front defeat, Palamara
repeated the well-worn ideas that such emigrants – or at least some of them – emigrated to engage
in activity directly threatening to Italy’s security. 71
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Alongside this recent expatriation wave, however, was a new and equally problematic
wave of monfalconesi heading the opposite direction, returning home in the wake of the
Cominform Resolution of late June 1948. In fact, as UDBA initiated its first wave of repression
against “Cominformists” in Yugoslavia that fall, what had been a moderate stream of repatriation
requests became a deluge. For Italian (and American) policymakers, who for some time remained
uncertain whether the Tito-Stalin Split was genuine or merely a ruse meant to lower the guard of
the anti-Communist camp, such individuals remained the object of deep suspicion. Thus, the
Italian state decided that, even with the election threat passed, the further stabilization of the
democratic-capitalist order required a definitive resolution of the problem of movement across its
eastern border. Claims that Yugoslavia served as a staging-ground for Italian expatriates to
prepare for Communist actions in Italy had never been definitively proven or disproven, and with
such high stakes, uncertainty could not be tolerated. As the combined efforts of the Interior and
Foreign Ministries were brought to bear on this problem in mid-1948, it soon became clear that
such a resolution would require not just the prevention of further clandestine emigration, but also
an increasingly coordinated effort to deal with those already abroad.
It was the latter of these questions that the state addressed first, as it was the issue that
generated the greatest tensions, particularly as ministerial forces sought to balance the security
needs of Gorizia with those of Italy generally. This had been a concern regarding the monfalconesi
ever since Gorizia Province returned to Italy in 1947. As with the pre-election period, various
members of the public security apparatus and broad nationalist swaths of society continued to
push back against repatriation. Palamara himself, at the same time that he built up fears of their

Gorizia Province) experienced major upheavals following the failed assassination of Palmiro Togliatti in mid-July,
Palamara claimed that it was individuals like those trained at Abbazia who had fomented the disorder. Palamara,
“Espatri clandestini lungo la frontiera Italo-Jugoslava” (N. 02570/Gab/P.S.), 27 July 1948, in the same.
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subversive activities in Yugoslavia, argued against allowing them to repatriate to the borderlands,
instead suggesting that they might be resettled in the country’s interior.72 But this did not stop the
Foreign Ministry, which forged ahead with repatriation. In July, under continual pressure to
disallow the return of “philo-Slavs,” Vittorio Zoppi, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Political
Office, informed consular offices in Yugoslavia that, after careful consideration, the ministry had
decided that “the denial of the passport, even limited to cases of especially undoubtable gravity,
would end up creating an exile-ism [fuoruscitismo] that it is in our interests to avoid, above all in
such a delicate frontier zone.” Thus, the consular offices should “abstain from any discrimination
in the granting of passports and continue to report immediately the individual names [of those
granted documents] to the relevant Questure and to the Interior Ministry.” 73 With this cable, Zoppi
reaffirmed the state’s year-old approach to the clandestine expatriate community in Yugoslavia,
articulating this policy clearly for the first time as a fight against fuoruscitismo.
The term used by Zoppi – “fuoruscitismo” – was a familiar one to career bureaucrats within
the Foreign and Interior Ministries. Though the term derives from “fuoruscito,” or “exile,” the
Fascist-era security apparatus had used this same term to describe the formation of combative
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anti-Fascist communities abroad. In a sense, then, “exile-ism” does not capture the entire meaning
of fuoruscitismo, which connotes continuing subversive political activities targeted at the
homeland. During the Fascist era, OVRA and various other Fascist security forces had been
deeply troubled by the subversive potential of Italian exiles in France. Such forces rightly
identified groups like Carlo Rosselli’s Justice and Liberty (Giustizia e Libertà) as a threat, which
proved prescient when GL transformed into the Resistance-era Action Party (Partito d’Azione). 74
More closely related to this study, many Socialist and Communist monfalconesi had fled from the
regime in the 1920s and joined the community of fuorusciti in France, often later fighting in the
Spanish Civil War or Italian Resistance and were some of these even among the postwar
expatriates to Yugoslavia.75 In Zoppi’s order, then, there was a certain continuity of language with
the Fascist regime, but also a continuity of a logic of control: political enemies should be kept in
the country so much as possible where they can be denied a free range of activity. 76 Even if
unarticulated, this had been the state’s policy toward expatriates in Yugoslavia before Zoppi’s
order and would remain so thereafter, despite the rapid deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations,
which made Yugoslavia a less threatening haven for fuorusciti. Throughout 1949, the Foreign
Ministry repeatedly reaffirmed this policy, indicating that the value gained from repatriation
outweighed any problems former fuorusciti might cause upon return.77
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Yet the preference to have monfalconesi expatriates back on the western side of the Iron
Curtain did not equate to comfort with these individuals being in the country, even after the
Cominform Resolution. Most were still Communists and loyalty to Stalin had helped put many at
odds with Tito’s regime. Moreover, the difficulties of balancing the provincial security needs of
Gorizia with those of Italy nationally generated significant tension between ministerial offices. To
overcome contradictory interests, Italy developed a rigorous surveillance regime to track suspect
citizens in the latter half of 1948, the first line of defense being a set of standardized repatriation
practices involving both Italy’s police and its consular offices. In May, even before the
Cominform Resolution, the Foreign Ministry ordered its consular offices in Zagreb and Belgrade
to exercise “greater cautions in the issuance of documents to Italian citizens who would present
themselves [for repatriation] without a regular passport.”78 Here the term “documents” refers
specifically to the low-detail repatriation sheets (fogli di rimpatrio), which had, in the past, often
been issued to expatriates lacking other identification. Instead, the ministry now favored the use
of more detailed short-term regular passports, which the consular services issued only after the
police or carabinieri in an expatriate’s hometown had confirmed certain details about him or her
(such as address, birthdate, and paternity). This measure, which combined with the subsequent
consular norms of granting such passports in a slow and steady trickle and providing police with
weekly lists of passports issued, facilitated the tracking of even the most unexceptional of
repatriates such as Mario R., discussed in this chapter’s introduction. 79 Each and every repatriate
was (theoretically) subjected to weeks of surveillance upon return, those deemed exceptional often
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given the police designation “Category Z” (threats to the state), which in many cases resulted in
well over a decade of surveillance. 80
Yet the assurance that expatriates returned in an ordered and manageable fashion was just
one side of the coin in the fight against fuoruscitismo. The other was the prevention of additional
clandestine crossings that might bolster this potentially subversive community-in-exile. And so
the Italian state, with Palamara at the helm, began to take steps to construct an impermeable Iron
Curtain along its eastern border, the primary purpose of which, somewhat counterintuitively, was
not to prevent infiltration (immigration) from the Communist East.81 Rather, just as East Germany
constructed the Berlin Wall in 1961 as a barrier to emigration, so too Italy began turning a
metaphorical dividing line into a real bordering system with the aim of keeping people in.
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Though an integral component of the fight against fuoruscitismo, the implementation of a
more rigorous border regime required an immediate catalyst, which came in spring 1948 in the
form of reports that clandestine emigration to Yugoslavia was again on the rise. In May, the
Gorizia carabinieri signaled a resurgence of clandestine emigration among friulani and other
Italians, with crossings taking place at San Floriano to the north of Gorizia. The commandant
reported that tens of workers had already emigrated, with hundreds more lingering in San Floriano
and nearby towns awaiting the assistance of the guide Bruno G., the former director of the local
UAIS and the town’s current PCI head. Moreover, he stated unambiguously that this was “a vast
organization directed, without doubt, by exponents of the PCI” and primarily seeking to expatriate
Communist cardholders. Though he indicated that the primary motivation was seemingly finding
employment, he also specified that each was outfitted with a giant military backpack filled with
food and clothing effects.82 Palamara responded by forwarding the report to the UZC and the
Interior and Foreign Ministries, stressing the necessity of “energetic measures to cut such
clandestine activity off at the root,” which he followed two weeks later with assertions that there
was not sufficient evidence “to exclude that the organization, mainly organized for the ends of
labor, could also serve the purpose… of the formation of guerrilla brigades for possible future use
in Greece and within the National territory [Italy].” 83 With Palamara having re-sparked
discussions of the “Greek thesis,” Scelba’s Interior Ministry enquired further about the potential
of Yugoslavia forming guerrilla units from labor emigrants, though Palamara had no concrete
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evidence.84 Even after the carabinieri informed Palamara that the Greek thesis was “completely
baseless,” he insisted that this did not discount the possibility of Yugoslavia serving as a trainingground and marshalling-ground for later efforts to spearhead a takeover of Italy. 85
With these fears in mind, Palamara took the initiative to shore up the border. He directed
the Gorizia carabinieri to “stamp out this clandestine activity” through an “intensification of
services” at the San Floriano crossing-points, by which he probably meant a reallocation of
existing manpower to more strongly target that area. 86 However, manpower was scarce, and this
was little more than a stopgap measure like those introduced by the AMG in 1947.87 In the face
of increased patrols around San Floriano, would-be emigrants simply adjusted their route, crossing
the border further north, near Caporetto. In July, Palamara ordered a redeployment of border
forces there, but such measures again proved ineffective. 88
Palamara’s individual initiatives were salvaged, however, following the increased interest
in the problem in Rome, and particularly the intervention of Undersecretary of State Giulio
Andreotti, De Gasperi’s right-hand-man. In May, Andreotti enquired with Prefect Vittadini
(Udine) and Police Chief Ferrari as to what concrete measures might be implemented in concert
with Palamara to put a stop to such emigration. 89 Though Vittadini personally thought the Greek
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thesis was baseless and the emigration not as threatening as Palamara claimed, he responded with
a two-pronged plan that would become the basis of the Italy’s bordering efforts along the ItaloYugoslav border. First, there would be the reinforcement of the block post network, targeting
known problem areas. Second, he would oversee the implementation of police and carabinieri
patrols along roads leading to the border to halt would-be expatriates upon approach, which
bordering officials such as Inspector Bicchi of the Fourth Zone of the Frontier Police recognized
as the weak point in the current anti-emigratory system.90
Throughout the second half of 1948, then, Italian officials – especially Palamara and
Bicchi – worked to put these and other measures into practice. The two repeatedly requested
additional men, police dogs, and Jeeps from the Interior Ministry. 91 More importantly, in late 1948
they suggested the deployment of various immobile bordering tools, particularly in the problem
areas along the Isonzo to the north of Gorizia city, which, due to the hilly terrain and dense foliage,
were a preferred location for clandestine crossing (Figures 19 and 20). In fact, already by June the
two had begun pushing for the creation of an extensive barrier network (rete di sbarramento)
along that section of the Isonzo. Though military authorities were wary of devoting significant
resources to a permanent barrier at that time and thus refused – ongoing Italo-Yugoslav
negotiations cast doubt upon the finality of the border – the two received support for a system of
floodlights to illuminate the river at night, as well as for the extensive use of barbed wire netting. 92
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Their regular requests for funds to construct a network of sentry boxes (garitte), particularly at
minor crossing points, seems to have met with less favor.93
If Palamara’s and Bicchi’s attempts to secure immobile resources for their border forces
yielded only mixed results, the situation regarding personnel and mobile resources was much more
successful. To demonstrate the fruits of their labor it is necessary only to examine the state of the
Cormons Sector in April 1949, which was responsible for the portion of the border between the
Casa Noris (just outside of Gorizia along the Isonzo) and Mernicco (to the northwest of Cormons
near where Udine and Gorizia Provinces meet). In that month, Bicchi reported that this twentykilometer stretch now had regular block posts staffed by 10 brigades of the Guardia di Finanza,
not to mention two stations each of carabinieri and regular police. Supplementing the “frontline”
(prima linea) forces were also six carabinieri stations in the hinter-areas, in “direct contact with
the front line” and tasked with patrolling roads leading up to the border. The border regime in
place, then, was three kilometers deep and twenty long, occupying the full-time attention of 230
men from various bordering services at a ratio of one man per 285 feet of border. Despite the
vastness of the resources dedicated to this endeavor, Bicchi indicated that the existing bordering
regime was still insufficient, mainly because of the terrain and the lack of coordination between
the three groups tasked with bordering (carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, and regular police). Due
to poor coordination, there were major gaps in patrols, which could only be fixed with “a unity of
command” or the construction of a metal fence (rete metallica) along the section.94

confine sull’Isonzo” (N. 3104/5-Gab), 24 November 1948; Palamara, “Vigilanza confine dell’Isonzo” (N. 36/2-Gab),
28 March 1949, in the same. Silvano Cosolo recounts that he was caught off-guard by Italy’s use of barbed wire when
he repatriated in July 1948. Amare… Sarajevo, 168-78
93
Prefetto Palamara, “Garitte per vedette lungo il confine” (N. 3755/Gab), 26 October 1948; Insp. Bicchi, “Garitte
per la vigilanza alla Frontiera” (N. 64/4), 3 March 1949, both in ASG, Pref. Gab. 1945-82, b 267, f 601, sf 1949.
94
Insp. Bicchi, “Sconfinamenti” (N. 681/4), 19 April 1949, ASG, Pref. Gab. 1945-82, b 222, f 494, sf Emigrazioni –
Espatri… 1949. The poor coordination of the border services had long been viewed as a problem. Mag. Com. Pagliaro
(Guardia di Finanza-Gorizia), “Punti di riunione in zona di frontiera” (N. 9581/2), 29 October 1948, ASG, Pref. Gab.
1945-82, b 267, f 601, sf 1949.

355

The state of the border regime at Cormons was not typical of the rest of the border – at
least not at the time of the report – although throughout the remainder of 1949 Palamara would
push to extend this system to the entire border. In May, Palamara again informed the Interior
Ministry that he had insufficient men to guarantee a “continuity” of service along the entire
frontier, with the result that he had to rely on paltry “sweeping services” in certain stretches. 95 The
Ministry, now dedicated to stamping out all clandestine emigration, ordered Prefects Palamara
and Carnevali (who had replaced Vittadini at Udine) to continue developing their “coordinated
plan of services of repression and surveillance,” which soon resulted in a drastic extension of the
rigorous patrol system operated by the carabinieri and other forces, to include significant stretches
that had formerly remained only irregularly patrolled. 96 In Gorizia Province, the security forces
implemented continuous and coordinated motorized patrols along the twelve-kilometer stretch
running from the small village of Jamiano – roughly a kilometer east of Monfalcone and
essentially the southernmost point along the Italo-Yugoslav border – to Merna (Miren) Airport,
just south of Gorizia City. 97 With this key development, the rigorous patrol system now stretched
over the entirety of the Italo-Yugoslav border for Gorizia Province, and all indications are that
Carnevali established similar practices in Udine Province.
Despite continual efforts to increase manpower and supplies, regularize patrols, and
increase inter-service coordination, clandestine expatriations continued, and by the summer of
1949, Palamara came to believe that the deficiencies of the existing border regime were not so
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much quantitative as qualitative.98 Having wracked his brain for potential solutions, he returned
to a suggestion that Bicchi had made nine months prior when analyzing the problems of patrolling
the Cormons Section. On 11 July, writing to the DGPS and the new Chief of Police, Giovanni
D’Antoni, Palamara stressed that he felt “compelled” to point out the insufficiency of antiemigration measures along the border. The terrain simply did not allow patrols to be effective, no
matter the number of men assigned the task. And so, he proposed a radical solution to a radical
problem: the only possibility was to construct “an adequate protective metal fence” (adeguata rete
metallica di protezione) along the entirety of the border.99
It remains unclear exactly how or if D’Antoni responded to this request. The file detailing
these bordering efforts ends rather abruptly, but D’Antoni’s decision in late 1949 to dissolve
Italy’s four Inspectorates for the Frontier Police (including Bicchi’s Fourth Zone office in Udine)
and place Frontier Police agents under the regular provincial commands suggests a normalization
of the border regime in the post-Cominform Resolution context, not its intensification.100
Regardless of the outcome of Palamara’s proposal, the proposal is significant in itself. Though
radical Fascists of the 1930s had proposed to “hermetically seal” the Italo-Yugoslav border with
a fence that would protect Italy against the political and ethnic threats of “Slavdom,” the fence
had not been imagined as a tool to keep people inside Italy, but rather a means of keeping foreign
and deported threats beyond national borders.101 The novelty of Palamara’s proposal came from
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its motivation of penning citizens in, which emerged as a universal method of fighting the Cold
War, even if applied differently on each side of the Iron Curtain. 102 Moreover, even if Palamara’s
proposal was denied, his radical solution is noteworthy when compared to contemporary
bordering situations along the rest of the Iron Curtain. Regarding the intra-German border –
admittedly an imperfect comparison given the fact that East Germany did not function as an
independent state until that October – Palamara’s proposal preceded the DDR’s first intra-German
border fence by three years.103
Even if Palamara did not secure his metal fence, he had overseen the creation of a border
regime that rivaled and likely surpassed any other in the history of Italy in terms of its rigor and
resources. Italy’s eastern border, which for most of its history had remained untamed wilderness
only sporadically patrolled by border forces, had become, over the course of a year, the grounds
of an extensive, motorized patrol system functioning with unprecedented coordination and
regularity, supplemented at vital points by barbed wire and floodlights. Though the rapprochement
between Italy and Yugoslavia that followed the Cominform Resolution undercut efforts to further
strengthen this border, the forceful initial push of 1948-49 should not be dismissed, nor should
the fact that Italy constructed this border as a blockade to would-be fuorusciti travelling east.
In the process of expatriating and repatriating, “ordinary” monfalconesi and Italians had
provided a small but real contribution to the polarization of Italy and the world into Cold War
camps. Their politics and movement had seemingly corroborated narratives of regional and global
Communist conspiracies and helped generate the fears that solidified the DC majority and drew
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Italy under the United States’ containment umbrella. Their mobility indirectly contributed to the
creation of a new and imposing border regime, while concretizing an Italian state doctrine of
controlling and repatriating fuorusciti that defined its approach for years to come.104 In short,
Mario R. and his fellow monfalconesi had helped define the grammar of the early Cold War.
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Conclusion
We were not a foreign body, but rather a force that could have revolutionized all of Fiume. 1
– Giuseppe Franti, Monfalconese emigrant.

Giuseppe Franti’s reflections on his time in Yugoslavia, recorded some thirty years after
the fact, highlight a duality of hope and disappointment. In a single sentence, Franti expressed both
a sense of rightful belonging in that country – of familiarity rather than foreignness – and a sense
of alienation. In his mind, the monfalconesi were a force that could have revolutionized Fiume,
because they shared the values that undergirded the Communist project and they were committed
to constructing the society they saw in their imaginations. But they never received the opportunity.
His story of Yugoslavia is one of promise unrealized and, ultimately, hope unraveled.
If Franti’s words reflect the common interpretive framing of the controesodo – one that
ends up at Goli Otok, as Franti himself did – it is equally important to shine light on the tremendous
sense of hope that he and others felt as they departed, as well as the processes by which these hopes
emerged and took form. The Monfalconese migration cannot be understood outside the context of
Monfalcone’s wider twentieth-century experience, and particularly its experience of the Fascist
dictatorship and the long anti-Fascist struggle, all of which bore a unique inflection due to
monfalconesi’s position at the peripheries of the state and nation.
The duality of Fascism and anti-Fascism runs like a red thread through the actions of
monfalconesi for the entire period of 1943-48. Particularly important is the understanding that
“Fascism” for many of Monfalcone’s residents was not a narrowly defined set of state institutions
or PNF cardholders, but rather a wider constellation of individuals with whom they had repeated
social interactions and to whom they attributed culpability for everyday grievances that correctly
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or incorrectly became identified as “Fascist.” Chief among these were marketplace reforms that
opened new opportunities for shopkeeper graft – connected at times, but not always to PNF
members – and the implementation of new work processes that deskilled work and increased paces
to frenetic rates, using piecework and the squadrista-clerk as the “Fascist whip.” Whether these
associations reflected objective reality or not, many monfalconesi made the chasing of “everyday
Fascists” like the shopkeeper and piecework clerk a central component of their local conception
of anti-Fascist Resistance.
As the Second World War unfolded, the location of contested Monfalcone between the
Anglo-Americans arriving from the West and Tito’s Partisans in the East granted to monfalconesi
and exceptional range of choice as to how they would pursue their liberation from Fascism. It
granted their Resistance an additional dynamic largely unaccounted for in Claudio Pavone’s
classic history of the wider Italian experience. 2 As the limits of transformation in liberated Italy
became clear, support for the annexationist ambitions of Tito’s Partisans became a means by which
monfalconesi could pursue the most radical conception of Resistance. Put differently, fighting for
the arrival of this supposedly “foreign” power became a means to pursue Pavone’s class and civil
wars. Due to the guiding role of the Italian and Slovenian Communist Parties in organizing this
armed struggle, monfalconesi came to understand their vision of Resistance as largely coterminous
with the construction of “socialism” or “Communism.” And though the hopes of monfalconesi
appeared to be realized in May 1945 during the brief period of Yugoslav occupation, cracks
quickly began to show between the monfalconesi and the Yugoslav state. Radical monfalconesi’s
uncompromising demands to purge the “remnants of Fascism” bumped up against the needs of
Tito’s regime as a state struggling to survive its infancy in a hostile international setting. Already
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in May 1945 the autonomy and rebelliousness of monfalconesi at home foreshadowed what would
happen in Yugoslavia some three years later.
Even after war’s end, the desire to purge society of the “remnants of Fascism” far more
than Marxist-Leninist conviction drove many monfalconesi to throw themselves headlong into the
territorial struggle on behalf of Yugoslavia. In doing so, they privileged the potential
transformative effects of Yugoslav annexation over ethnic ties to Italy. Encouraged by an everevolving myth of Yugoslavia that directly responded to their grievances toward Fascism and by
frustrations over the AMG’s allowance of the persistence of perceived “everyday” Fascists, tens
of thousands of ordinary monfalconesi fought vigorously, if futilely for Tito’s return. It was for
this reason that the self-identified “anti-Fascist population of the City and District of Monfalcone”
wrote to CAO Kitson-Harris during the climactic Twelve Days Strike, defining their struggle as
one against a “resurgent neo-Fascism” and for the “destruction of a past of hunger, misery,
oppression, and disastrous war.”3 Local monfalconesi understood the territorial struggle less
through the framework of a forward-looking global struggle of Communism against liberaldemocratic capitalism than through the backward-looking framework of Resistance and the
struggle of local Fascism versus anti-Fascism. Though propagandists dovetailed the Monfalconese
conception of socialism-as-anti-Fascism with a more doctrinal Marxism-Leninism, their most
effective propaganda was that which expressed Yugoslavia’s transformation through the lens of
everyday concerns relevant to monfalconesi, not through an emphasis on class warfare and the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Ultimately, the contours and impact of the myth of Yugoslavia in
Monfalcone suggest not only that Marxism-Leninism might have played a less important role than
once assumed in the ideological bifurcation of the continent after 1945, but also that there was no
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single myth of the Communist world.
In the end, global diplomatic circumstances militated against Monfalcone’s incorporation
into Yugoslavia, and a combination of AMG and Italian opposition, local pro-Italian violence, and
popular disillusionment broke the pro-Yugoslav movement by spring 1947. But popular frustration
was not only aimed at the AMG, Italy, and Monfalcone’s pro-Italians. It also fell directly upon
both the PCI and the PCRG. The former’s moderate, democratic line promised little redress for
monfalconesi’s grievances, whereas the PCRG, operating first and foremost as a mechanism for
the westward projection of Yugoslavia’s borders, engaged in the inconsistent strategy of stoking
monfalconesi’s expectations of a defascistized society, while simultaneously trying to forge crossclass alliances that would bring the greatest number of giuliani into the pro-Yugoslav camp.
Disillusionment and the desire to escape the vestiges of Fascism spurred thousands of
monfalconesi to seek liberation through emigration. Though the participants in this migration left
in distinct waves and with different constellations of motives, they believed their aspirations in the
realms of community, work, safety, and material well-being could be realized in Tito’s New
Yugoslavia. This dynamic of local disillusionment and outwardly-projected hope is particularly
evident in the migrants of early 1947, who jumped at the chance to relocate and who left secure
sources of income, bringing whole families along with them. But the migrants of early 1947 are
indicative of the controesodo in another way, too: they left against the will of local and Italian
Communist leaders, forging their own path using the opportunities provided them and undermining
local Communism in the process.
If the Monfalconese experience of Fascism, war, and postwar fit within a wider Italian or
European experience and reveals much about borderland politics, popular notions of liberation,
and the legacies of totalitarian dictatorship generally, the same generality does not apply to the
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population transfer of 1946-47. That transfer appears sui generis in history, the result of universal
hopes and processes flowing together perfectly with a set of circumstances particular to the
Monfalconese. It was not the first time that large numbers of workers and even their families had
migrated to a Communist country. Waves of German workers and then idealistic American
feminists and “new women” arrived in the Soviet Union in the early interwar period, followed
closely by a wave of American workers who departed the Depression-ravaged States in the 1930s.4
Yet several characteristics distinguish the Monfalconese controesodo from these other migratory
movements. Among them are the facts that it occurred (for many, if not all) without economic
necessity, it involved multigenerational family movements, it was envisioned by many to be a
permanent move, and it involved a community that – from the time of departure through the
Cominform Resolution – remained remarkably cohesive. Undoubtedly this cohesion was at least
partially the result of a final distinguishing factor: many migrants had participated actively in the
anti-Fascist Resistance, including in armed struggle.
If Giuseppe Franti and his fellow monfalconesi failed to revolutionize Fiume, their
migration, particularly in light of this final distinguishing characteristic, did not fail to have a
revolutionary impact on the Cold War. Their migration, misunderstood from the very beginning
by Anglo-American military leaders and by Italian politicians, served to escalate Cold War
tensions, legitimate the US policy of containment, generate a fever-pitch of paranoia around Italy’s
1948 election, and motivate Giovanni Palamara to construct the first workings of what would have
likely become a robust Italian Iron Curtain, had not the Cominform Resolution radically altered
the region’s diplomatic contexts. In an instance of notable historical irony, monfalconesi thus
helped create, albeit inadvertently and indirectly, the conditions that led their lives in Yugoslavia
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to become so miserable by the turn of 1948. Serving as a focal-point of suspicion, they helped
drive forward the polarization that led Western powers like the US to intensify the economic
strangulation of Tito’s regime, which in turn forced the latter’s reorientation toward an austerityexport economy. As a result, monfalconesi experienced changes in their Yugoslav workplaces and
marketplaces that not only contradicted the myth of Yugoslavia but also appeared to reconstitute
the very “Fascist” abuses from which they had fled. Convinced that the Cominform Resolution
could not but be correct given this experience, monfalconesi responded to that Resolution with an
intransigence that reinforced the intra-Communist schism opened in the summer of 1948.
Ultimately, the Monfalconese experience highlights multiple avenues for future research,
not all exclusive to Italian or Adriatic history. First, one might ask to what degree the process of
ideological formation described in the Monfalconese case occurred within wider Italy and Europe.
In the case of Italy, it is likely that regional or local variations in Fascism resulted in distinct
conceptions of “everyday” Fascism at those levels, which in turn might have created distinct
understandings of Resistance and socialism. Outside of Italy, the applicability of this processual
model becomes less clear. Italy’s Fascist dictatorship was unique in that it was the first of Europe’s
fascist regimes; the ventennio provided the lengthy period necessary for everyday grievances to
graft themselves on to the term “Fascism.” 5 More could be done to explore the degree to which
this same process played out in Nazi Germany. 6 If it did not play out similarly in Germany, this
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might help explain certain distinguishing features of postwar Italy, including its possession of the
largest Communist Party in Western Europe. If, for many Italians, the discourse of the “remnants
of Fascism” was more than just a propagandistic smear – if instead it was something that responded
to longstanding grievances and deeply rooted associations – this may have driven them directly
into the arms of the party perceived to be the most radical in its opposition to Fascism.
Two additional avenues of research appear particularly compelling. First, across the
continent more research is needed on both popular and regime understandings of “socialism” and
the complex interactions between them. Particularly in the immediate postwar and for “ordinary
people,” the Communist world was not necessarily one understood through the prism of “Marxistbased options for social change.”7 The process of mediation between popular aspirations and the
leading doctrines of Communist parties and regimes must be examined more closely. Second, this
research raises the question of whether there were additional cases of permanent, voluntary
relocation across the Iron Curtain and the degree to which they resembled the controesodo. One
might compare the Monfalconese departures to the migration activities of the thousands of other
Italians, including friulani, who migrated across the Iron Curtain in smaller groups during those
same years. Such a comparison would not only provide a more complete picture of West-East
migration from Italy but also explore the degree to which the unique features of the Monfalconese
migration – the cohesion, partisan history, and pro-Yugoslavism of the Monfalconese community
– shaped Italian and Anglo-American responses to this mobility.
As for those monfalconesi who departed for the East in 1946-47, by the 1950s most
returned to the Monfalconese, though not all remained. Silvano Cosolo, who had expatriated
clandestinely in 1946, returned equally clandestinely in 1948 in the wake of the failed assassination
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attempt of Palmiro Togliatti, which he believed might spark a revolutionary moment. Interrogated
by carabinieri as to his recent activities, he stated he had been touring Italy the whole time. With
no tangible proof to the contrary and no legal basis to charge him with clandestine emigration
given the postwar territorial ambiguities of Monfalcone, the marshal in charge of Cosolo’s
investigation let him go.8
Some five years later, Renato Rigonat returned, though he found Ronchi still deeply
divided over the past territorial struggle and suffered continual harassment. When he sought out
work in the CRDA, an office head told him that he should go back and seek a job from the Titoists;
when he sought to enroll himself and his son in the state’s compulsory social security program, he
found the clerk to be an old squadrista who told him to go seek his “rights” over there as well.
And so Rigonat made only a temporary stop back in the Monfalconese. In late 1953, he departed
Ronchi for Switzerland and then France, from whence he would return only in 1981, after thirtyfive years of living abroad between East and West. 9
Just as Rigonat was leaving, Mario Tonzar and other Goli Otok survivors made their return.
Like many of the more committed militants who had departed Monfalcone in 1947, Tonzar
immediately went to the PCI headquarters, where he found a warm welcome. Though many of the
old comrades who had headed the local PCRG were still there, the leadership was largely new,
including many monfalconesi who had remained behind while their neighbors departed by the
thousands.10 Among them were Spartaco Romano, who had been the local PCI secretary until
1949, after which he assumed leadership of the local metallurgical union and then a seat on the
municipal council. 11 There too was Sergio Parenzan, who would play a key role in the labor
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movement within the shipyard for years to come. 12 Silvano Cosolo, who had temporarily emigrated
to Switzerland in search of work after his return to Monfalcone, arrived back the following decade,
assuming, along with Mario Tonzar, a position on one of the zone’s municipal councils as part of
the PCI ticket.13
Thus, within a decade of their departure, many of those youths who had participated in the
anti-Fascist struggle and the cross-Curtain migration of the 1940s had returned and had assumed
once again leadership roles in their community’s political struggle. Though largely against their
own desires and intentions, Cosolo and Tonzar finally fulfilled Romano’s prescription that the
Communist militant “struggle for socialism in the place where he finds himself, and not go to do
it where he will be safer.”14 In the middle and later periods of the Cold War, these men continued
to pursue their visions of progress and liberation, though with a more gradualist approach. Gone
were the attempts to remake the world in a day and to eradicate fully and uncompromisingly the
remnants of “everyday” Fascism. Gone too was the hope that these difficulties could be overcome
by migrating beyond the confines of Italy. The shift in the monfalconesi’s approach and aspirations
is captured well by Romano’s reflections on his own transformation during the tumultuous 1940s:
At the beginning, in my enthusiasm, I too thought that I would be able to rule the world in
twenty days. Now that I am older, I’ve realized that historical periods are slower to mature,
and who knows how many years will still have to pass before it is possible to create a
society a little more just, more humane, more free. 15
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Appendix A: Glossary of Political, Economic, Cultural, Social, and Other Organizations in
the Monfalconese:
Allied Military Government (AMG) - The Allied Military Government was a caretaker government
established by the Anglo-American occupiers in the wake of the Duino and Belgrade Agreements.
Its purpose was to administer Zone A of the contested Italo-Yugoslav border territories until a
formal peace treaty went into effect. Operated by the Allied 13th Corps and organizationally
distinct from the AMG in the rest of Italy, the AMG of Venezia Giulia functioned in the large Zone
A (including the Monfalconese) until September 1947 and then in the smaller Zone A of the Free
Territory of Trieste until 1954. Though nominally neutral, it had an anti-Communist and thus proItalian orientation in practice, putting it at odds with the local pro-Yugoslav movement. Heading
the AMG in Trieste was SCAO Col. Alfred Bowman, while CAOs Maj. J. Kitson-Harris and
Capt./Maj. F. Hill were the responsible officers for Monfalconese district and Monfalcone
commune respectively.
Associazione partigiani giuliani (APG) - The APG, or Julian Partisan Association, was a partisan
association that spanned Zones A and B of the contested borderlands, consisting mostly of proYugoslav ex-garibaldini, many of whom had served in units that fought under Yugoslav command
from 1944-45. Between 1945-47, it had tense relations with the regional API and the largest
partisan association in Italy, ANPI, because of its perceived support for Yugoslav annexation of
Zone A.
Associazione partigiani italiani (API) - The API, or Italian Partisan Association, was a partisan
association operating primarily in Zone A between 1945 and 1947, consisting of pro-Italian
partisans from a range of political parties. It enrolled partisans with politics ties to the DC, PDA,
and PSIUP, and, to a limited extent, those with Communist sympathies, but a pro-Italian stance on
the territorial question. It developed close ties with ANPI in Italy. In the Monfalconese, it was
dwarfed by the APG. Most of its support came from areas closer to Trieste and Gorizia.
Comitato distrettuale di liberazione nazionale (CDLN) - The CDLN, or District Committee of
National Liberation (in Slovenian ONOO, or Okrajni narodnoosvobodilni odbor), was the districtlevel organization of anti-Fascist, anti-German Resistance that was loyal to the Slovenian
Liberation Front. It was distinct from the pro-Italian CLN. After liberation, the CDLN
administered the zone until the AMG’s General Order 11 (August 1945), after which it operated
as a shadow government for the zone’s pro-Yugoslav forces.
Cooperativa del Lavoro (CL) - The CL, or Cooperative of Labor, was a consumer cooperative
founded in November 1945 by the pro-Italian syndicates (SG) to compete with the district’s proYugoslav consumer cooperative (CCLM). The CL received subsidies from Italian governments
due to its perceived ability to draw monfalconesi away from the pro-Yugoslav movement.
Cooperativa di Consumo Lavoratori del Monfalconese (CCLM) - The CCLM, or Workers’
Consumer Cooperative of the Monfalconese, was a consumer cooperative formed in the
Monfalconese by the zone’s pro-Yugoslav forces in November 1945. It had close ties with the
PCRG through the liaison Mario Geromet and was understood as a critical tool for mobilizing
supporters of the pro-Yugoslav movement. The cooperative failed in its initial ambitions of
370

replacing the district’s shopkeepers and facilitating Yugoslav annexation but has survived in the
form of the Coop grocery stores that today populate towns and cities of northeastern Italy.
Cooperative operaie di Trieste, Istria e Friuli (CO) - The CO, or Workers’ Cooperative of Trieste,
Istria, and Friuli, was founded in Trieste in the late-Habsburg period with a strong working-class,
anti-shopkeeper orientation and close Socialist ties. It survived the arrival of Italy, but the Fascists
subordinated it to the Ministry of Corporations in the 1930s and sold shares to major banks,
eliminating its previous working-class orientation. Several postwar attempts by left-wing and proYugoslav organizations to regain controlling interest in the cooperative failed.
Democrazia Cristiana (DC) - The DC, or Christian Democracy, was a postwar political party build
upon the legacy of Italy’s intewar Popolari and headed by Alcide De Gasperi. The party was
greatly underrepresented in the Monfalconese relative to its strength in Italy, but it did have some
local support among monfalconesi of anti-Communist and/or pro-Italian sentiments. Though
numerically weak, the Monfalconese DC was a key party of the AMG’s anti-Communist unity
council from 1945-47, just as the national party became the United States’ party of choice in Italy’s
1948 elections.
Difesa Poplare (DP) - The Difesa Popolare, or Popular Defense, was the Communist-led partisan
police force formed by the Garibaldi Brigades of Venezia Giulia in the last period of the
Resistance. Its functions were primarily those of uncovering and punishing black-market activities,
spying on and detaining Fascists and “reactionaries,” and maintaining public order. The
organization was generally pro-Yugoslav in orientation, responsible to Yugoslav commanders and
the pro-Yugoslav CDLN, but not all members were pro-Yugoslav. The AMG dissolved the DP in
June 1945.
Divisione Gorizia (DG) - The Divisione Gorizia, or Gorizia Division, was an anti-Communist,
pro-Italian paramilitary founded in late 1945 in Gorizia, but soon operating in much of Zone A. Its
primary purpose was to collect information on the pro-Yugoslav movement and resist a potential
Yugoslav aggression in Zone A. Its members ranged from ex-Fascists to anti-Fascist partisans of
anti-Communist bent, and thus it had tense relations with more stringently anti-Fascist pro-Italian
paramilitaries such as the API. Thought the AMG looked unfavorably upon the DG, the latter
received support from individual Anglo-American military officers and the Italian state.
Gioventù comunista (GC) - The GC, or Communist Youth (also known as SKOJ, or Savez
komunističke omladine Jugoslavije) was the youth branch of the Communist Party in the
Monfalconese. Versions of it existed under the PCdI, PCI, and PCRG. In the clandestine period, it
remained organizationally distinct from the normal Party to protect its members.
Gruppo d’azione pattriotica (GAP) - The GAP, or Patriotic Action Group, was a network of urban
partisan cells consisting primarily of Communist garibaldini and operating mainly from 1943-45.
The Monfalconese GAP had close ties with the PCdI/PCI and the Titoist intelligence services. Its
members, organized into small, isolated cells, performed actions including intelligence-gathering,
requisitioning, sabotage, and the execution of the zone’s leading Fascists. After the establishment
of the AMG, much of the Monfalconese GAP withdrew to Yugoslavia and remained intact under
the command of Riccardo Giacuzzo.
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Komunistička partija Slovenije (KPS) - Founded in 1937, the KPS, or Slovenian Communist Party,
was a component party of the wider Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ). Important leaders included
Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič. Though Communist Slovenes of the Monfalconese had
organized within the PCdI during the interwar period, after the OF’s declaration of its intention to
annex the Primorska, the KPS fostered a network of cells parallel to those of the PCdI. In August
1945, the parallel KPS and PCI organizations in Venezia Giulia merged to form the PCRG.
Lega nazionale (LN) - The LN, or National League, was and Italian irredentist organization
founded in Trieste during the late Habsburg period. Though dissolved under Fascism after the
successful “Redemption” of much of the eastern Adriatic lands, Italian nationalists of Venezia
Giulia refounded it in 1946 during the territorial struggle. Its nominal function was to foster and
protect Italian culture in the eastern Adriatic, but in practice it did much more than this. It became
a focal-point for pro-Italian politics and served as an umbrella under which otherwise opposed proItalians from ex-Fascists to pro-Italian Socialists might cooperate for the ends of protecting Italian
territorial integrity. The Monfalconese branch was involved in gun-running and supporting proItalian paramilitaries.
Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda or Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda (OZNA) - Founded in mid-1944 under
the leadership of Aleksandar Rankovič, OZNA, or the Department for People’s Protection, was
the primary security and secret police agency of early Titoist Yugoslavia. OZNA’s methods were
typically Stalinist, modelled after the USSR’s GPU/NKVD. During the war period, the
organization developed ties with the Monfalconese GAP, and several of the zone’s leading PCRG
members were OZNA agents. The department was later reorganized and renamed UDBA.
Osvobodilna fronta (OF) - The OF, or Slovenian Liberation Front, was a unity council of antifascist, anti-Axis political parties that arose in April 1941 after the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia.
Though it incorporated several parties, the KPS retained de facto power over the organization and
gave to the OF its two main leaders, Boris Kidrič and Edvard Kardelj. The OF engaged in political
and civil resistance and became a key component of Tito’s Partisan coalition. The OF program
emphasized the complete liberation of Slovenia, understood as all territories inhabited by largely
Slovenian populations, and stressed the need for Slovenian borders to be pushed westward up to
the Isonza (Soča) River. Late in the war the OF organized cells in the Monfalconese, which became
the basis for the postwar CDLN.
Partito comunista d’Italia (PCdI) - The PCdI, or Communist Party of Italy, was Italy’s primary
Communist Party of the interwar period, founded in 1921 and responsible to the Comintern. It was
a party of disciplined cadres. The PCdI garnered much support in the Monfalconese before
Mussolini outlawed the party in 1926. It continued to operate in clandestinity and became the most
active anti-Fascist party of the Monfalconese, though its program remained that of conspiratorial
preparation rather than direct confrontation with the regime. In 1943, the PCdI was renamed the
PCI and soon took on a very different program.
Partito comunista della Regione Giulia (PCRG) - The PCRG, or Communist Party of the Julian
Region, was founded in August 1945 after the merging of the parallel PCI and KPS organizations
in Venezia Giulia. Thought nominally autonomous, the PCRG took orders from the KPS and
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emerged as the backbone of the Julian pro-Yugoslav movement. It was a party of cadres and
exercised tight control over a range of pro-Yugoslav organizations in Zone A, including the
CDLN, SU, APG, UAIS, UDAIS, UGARG, and CCLM. It was the most influential political party
in early postwar Monfalcone. The directive body in the Monfalconese was the CDM, or District
Committee of Monfalcone (Comitato distrettuale di Monfalcone). For a brief time in 1946, the
CDM split into separate districts for Monfalcone (IV Rione) and Ronchi (V Rione), but this was
shortlived. The PCRG dissolved in the Monfalconese in mid-1947 in anticipation of the zone’s
return to Italy, though it remained active in the Free Territory of Trieste as the Communist Party
of the Free Territory of Trieste (PCTLT).
Partito comunista italiano di Venezia Giulia (PCIVG) - The PCIVG, or Italian Communist Party
of Venezia Giulia, was a splinter communist party that operated in Zone A during the period of
the AMG. The party was vociferously pro-Italian, breaking from the pro-Yugoslav PCRG, but also
from the PCI in Rome, which it criticized for its hesitancy to embrace an openly pro-Italian
position on the Trieste Question. Though the PCIVG was vocal and gained some support in
Gorizia, it was far less prominent in the Monfalconese.
Partito comunista italiano (PCI) - The PCI, or Italian Communist Party, was the direct descendant
of the former PCdI, renamed in 1943. Following Italy’s armistice with the Allies in September
1943, the PCI embraced armed resistance, giving birth to the Garibaldi Brigades, but its political
line de-emphasized the social-revolutionary nature of the Resistance in order to facilitate its
participation in an anti-Fascist unity coalition. In the last years of the war it transitioned from a
party of cadres to a mass, democratic party set on winning power at the polls. The “Trieste
Question” thus emerged as a major problem for the PCI, which feared to appear “anti-national” by
supporting Yugoslav territorial claims. Only gradually did the PCI come out as pro-Italian on the
question of Trieste and the Monfalconese. The PCI was the dominant Communist Party of the
Monfalconese until August 1945, when the parallel PCI and KPS organizations in Venezia Giulia
merged to form the PCRG. Following the signing of the peace treaty in February 1947, the PCI
reconstituted its Gorizia Federation, including in the Monfalconese.
Partito d’Azione (PDA) - The PDA, or Action Party, was a liberal-socialist political party that was
heir to Carlo Rosselli’s network of exiled anti-Fascists called Giustizia e Libertà. The party played
a key role in the anti-Fascist Resistance under the leadership of Ferruccio Parri. It sat left-of-center
on a national scale, with its republican, liberal-socialist platform. However, due to its outspoken
pro-Italian position on the Trieste Question, the Monfalconese (and Julian) PDA became home to
a much wider range of supporters inconsistent with its national profile. These included some
chauvinistic nationalists and ex-Fascists, drawn to the PDA because it was the most active and
organized opposition to the pro-Yugoslav movement. The PDA was part of the AMG’s antiCommunist unity council from late 1945. From 1946, several of its leading members carried out a
terrorist bombing campaign against prominent pro-Yugoslavs.
Partito socialista italiano di unità proletaria (PSIUP) - The PSIUP, or Italian Socialist Party of
Proletarian Unity, was the largest Socialist party in Resistance-era and postwar Italy and likely the
second-largest party overall in postwar Monfalcone. Headed by Pietro Nenni, the party aspired to
social revolution and was generally favorable to the USSR, but it rejected Yugoslav
annexationism. It was the primary organizational pole for left-wing radicals of the Monfalconese
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and Trieste who were committed to maintaining Italian sovereignty in their region. It became a
component of the AMG’s anti-Communist unity council in the Monfalconese.
Sindacati Giuliani (SG) - The SG, or Julian Syndicates, was a pro-Italian trade union that arose in
Zone A in late 1945 in opposition to the pro-Yugoslav SU. The union was backed by the AMG,
the pro-Italian political parties of the zone, and even to some degree by the region’s industrialists.
Members came largely from supporters of the pro-Italian parties and the zone’s white-collar
workers. After an initial period of tense and partially successful cooperation between the SU and
SG on labor issues in the winter of 1945/46, the divisiveness of the territorial question caused
cooperation between the two to break down entirely. In November 1945, the SG gave birth to the
CL as an alternative to the pro-Yugoslav cooperatives and continued to pursue other workerfriendly measures, if with little success. With the return of the Monfalconese to Italy in 1947, the
zone’s SG branch was incorporated into the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL).
Sindacati Unici (SU) - The SU, or Unitary Synidcates, was a pro-Yugoslav trade union that
operated in Zone A, Zone B, and Yugoslavia. In the Monfalconese, the SU was a direct descendant
of the Resistance-era UO network. The SU dominated the CRDA factory council during both the
period of Yugoslav administration and the AMG years. It was responsible to the PCRG, which
controlled the SU by placing veteran militants in key SU leadership positions. In cooperation with
the SG, the SU achieved some concrete gains for Monfalconese workers in late 1945 and early
1946, but by mid-1946 relations had entirely broken down. The Monfalconese section of the SU
dissolved in mid-1947 following the signing of the peace treaty but continued to operate in Trieste
and Yugoslavia.
Unione antifascista italo-slavo (UAIS) - The UAIS, or Italo-Slavic Anti-Fascist Union, was a proYugoslav mass organization controlled by the PCRG and operating in Zones A and B of the
contested Italo-Yugoslav borderlands. Though the PCRG remained a restrictive party of cadres, it
engaged a much larger group, including anti-Communists, in its politics through the UAIS. The
latter put forward a program of Italo-Slavic fraternity, the eradication of Fascism in all forms, and
the annexation of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia. The group attempted to influence treaty- and
border-makers through a politics of mass protest and demonstration, which often put it at odds
with the AMG and its police. The organization dissolved in the Monfalconese after the signing of
the peace treaty in 1947, but it continued to operate in Trieste thereafter.
Unione delle donne antifasciste italo-slava (UDAIS) - The UDAIS, or Italo-Slavic Union of AntiFascist Women, was an affiliate organization of the UAIS that spanned the same time period and
focused on organizing women. Like the UAIS, the UDAIS was controlled by PCRG members.
Much of the group’s activity involved honoring the fallen partisans of the zone and engaging in
marketplace protests against the AMG’s rationing and supply system.
Unione gioventù antifascista della Regione Giulia (UGARG) - UGARG, or the Union of AntiFascist Youth of the Julian Region, was a youth-based affiliate of the UAIS that operated during
the same period. It was controlled by the GC and organized protests against youth unemployment.
Unità operaia (UO) - The UO, or Workers’ Unity, was a clandestine, multiethnic anti-Fascist
organization that operated throughout the Julian region during the Resistance era (1943-45),
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specifically within the region’s factories and workplaces. The organization had its basis in PCIKPS negotiations in Trieste, though it was not an exclusively Communist organization. The
Monfalcone shipyard emerged as the stronghold of the UO with some 6000 supporters, where it
conducted partisan-support activities, sabotage, and other operations. Shortly after liberation, the
UO transformed into the SU.
Venezia Giulia Polizia Civile (VGPC) - The VGPC, or Venezia Giulia Civil Police, was the AMG
police force constructed rapidly in the second half of 1945 to police Zone A. It included both
Italian and Slovenian agents. The force was nominally neutral on the territorial question, though
in practice it was pro-Italian and anti-Communist because most of the senior officers were Fascistera appointees noted for their Italian nationalism. Such officers consistently marginalized the
Slovenian agents and clashed with Zone A’s pro-Yugoslav forces. In September 1947, the VGPC
ceased to have jurisdiction in the Monfalconese, though it continued to operate in Trieste.
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Appendix B: Chart of Postwar Organizations in the Monfalconese by Type and Stance on
the Territorial Question (Table 1):

Political Parties

Mass Cultural-Political
Organizations
Trade Unions
Consumer Cooperatives
Partisan Associations and
Paramilitaries
Police and Administration

Pro-Yugoslav
PCRG
GC

UAIS
UDAIS
UGARG
SU
CCLM
APG
GAP

Pro-Italian
DC
PDA
PSIUP
PLI
PCIVG
LN

SG
CL
API
DG
AMG (nominally neutral)
VGPC (nominally neutral)
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Appendix C: The Monfalconese Emigration by the Numbers:
The controesodo is perhaps the only instance of mass West-East migration during the Cold
War. It is worth establishing as accurately as possible the number of monfalconesi who left, as
well as if they have any defining demographic features. However, any such attempt runs up against
source limitations. These limitations are many, but they fall into three general categories. First,
there are problems of terms and specificity. Whereas AMG officials often used locational terms
inconsistently, Italian state documents produced from 1947 onwards talk of “Italians” or giuliani
in Yugoslavia, rarely talking of monfalconesi specifically. Second, there are problems of
documentary gaps. On the one hand, there were many monfalconesi who crossed the border
clandestinely or without registering their departure, leaving official statistics incomplete (for
example, Silvano Cosolo does not appear in any official documents, despite having spent years in
Yugoslavia). On the other, official reports tend to focus on “workers” or heads-of-family, leaving
children and (often) wives unaccounted more. Finally, there are issues of timing. Given that a
notable number of monfalconesi began to return from Yugoslavia by the turn of 1946/47, estimates
that came after are inevitably incomplete.
Because of these difficulties, existing estimates of the number of controesodo participants
have varied widely. Conservative estimates have tended to come in at roughly 2000. This is
implied with the title of Andrea Berrini’s book on the topic, which is subtitled “the two-thousand
from Monfalcone.”1 The historian Enrico Cernigoi has estimated that some 800 total monfalconesi
arrived at Pola, with “more or less the same number” settling in Fiume and a handful of smaller
communities dispersed throughout Yugoslavia. 2 On the other end of the spectrum, the participant
Giuseppe Franti has claimed that some “tens of thousands” of monfalconesi relocated to the

1
2

Berrini, Noi siamo la classe operaio.
Cernigoi, Scelte politiche e identità nazionale, 295. Boris Gombač falls in this same camp.
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supposed eastern utopia.3 Between these two extremes is Marco Puppini, who has guessed that
there were some 2000-2500 workers from the CRDA who, together with their families and workers
from other worksites, totaled roughly 3500. 4
Based on the available documentation it seems that Puppini’s figure is the closest, though
he too may have underestimated the total by as many as 1500 people. In an effort to establish a
baseline figure for the Monfalconese emigration to Yugoslavia and to learn as much as possible
about emigrant monfalconesi, I have kept a running list of emigrants. The list includes information
about each emigrant I have come across, including the migrant’s name and, when available,
demographic, occupational, familial, and political data. Though the data is incomplete and uneven,
the list is helpful in establishing a baseline figure for emigrant population and for drawing attention
to certain qualities of the emigrant population.
Before discussing my findings, it is necessary to describe the sources and methods I used
to compile the list. To create the list, I have used a wide range of sources, including primarily
archival documents and published memoirs. The most significant sources fall into three categories.
First there are various lists generated by (or archived by) the AMG, including ration-control
surveys and lists of CRDA workers who quit their jobs to go to Yugoslavia.5 Such sources tend to
list only workers and heads-of-family, leaving out the spouses, children, and parents who
emigrated alongside the listed workers. The second major source base consists of the individual
police files compiled by the Gorizia Questura in 1948 as they attempted to surveil repatriating

Bonelli, “Prima intervista con il monfalconese Franti Giuseppe, 27 March 1980, op. cit.
Puppini, “Il ‘controesodo’ Monfalconese in Jugoslavia, op. cit, 71. This is roughly in line with Ruggero Bersa’s
recollections. Bersa estimated that “no less than 2400 workers of the shipyard, another hundred laborers from the
Solvay, and numerous peasant families” left the district. Fogar, “Seconda parte dell’intervista registrata rilasciata da
Ruggero Bersa,” November 1981, op. cit.
5
These lists are primarily held in NARA, RG331, UD1981, b 9159, f 11304/115/86; b 9189, f 11304/115/308; and b
9198, f 11304/115/388.
3
4
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monfalconesi.6 I received exceptional access to these files, but only for 1948. Inevitably, many
migrants repatriated after 1948 have gone undetected. Third, I have used a wide array of documents
from Italian state archives which contribute random additions. Between the Gorizia Questura files
and the random archival documents, I have identified nearly 350 additional emigrants beyond
those in the AMG sources, which reveals how incomplete the original AMG lists were.
In terms of methods, there are two notable concerns worth mentioning. The first involves
the methods of utilizing data from different AMG lists, especially the lists of workers who quit
their positions at the CRDA in early 1947 and the lists of workers confirmed to have emigrated.
Given the context, it should be assumed that most of those who quit their jobs in early 1947 did so
to emigrate, particularly given that the UAIS directive had recently been issues. Still, for workers
who show up on the list of resignations but are not specifically listed as emigrants in other sources,
I have not included them in my list. There are some 200-300 such workers.
A second methodological decision involved the treatment of potential double-listings.
Given that I am drawing information from many lists and that a single individual might appear on
multiple lists, I have had to be careful to cull out repeats. Because I have addresses, birthdates, and
paternity information for most migrants, I have been able to eliminate many of these rather easily.
In some cases, however, there are variations within migrant information that raised questions of
whether I was dealing with two similarly-named individuals or one. The two most common ways
this problem manifested itself was (1) when I came across a single name listed in various sources
under different addresses and (2) when I found similar names with slight differences in spelling.
In the first case, I operated under the assumption any additional shared information between the
two lists (i.e. the same birthdate or same paternity) was sufficient to indicate that this was one

6

These files are at ASG, Questura 1948, bb 1-12.
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individual who had simply moved residence. In the second, I removed one of the two names when
there were only slight variations in spelling (i.e. the surname Capputto vs Caputo) without
additional evidence to suggest these were distinct people or when the two names simply reflected
differences of Italian and Slovenian spelling (i.e. the given name Giovanni vs Ivan or the surname
Bandelli vs Bandelj). The only instance in which I did not eliminate doubled in this way was when
there were two individuals with the same name, the same addresses or no address information
available, no birthdate information available, and the same name for their fathers, but with one
case listing the father as deceased (i.e. “fu Antonio”) and the other listing the father as living (i.e.
“di Antonio”). In such rare cases, I left both individuals on the list, since there is the possibility
that these were father-son duos living together in the same home.
To date I have identified 1923 emigrants by name, but, because the sources tend to focus
on workers and heads-of-family rather than these workers’ dependents, it is safe to say that the
figure was much higher. Of the 1923 listed emigrants, 348 are known to have emigrated with
families, though no information is provided on the families. Of these heads-of-families, almost all
either settled in Pola (217) or Fiume (125). Even if one assumes each of these migrants had a
spouse and just two children – a conservative estimate – this would add an additional 1044
migrants. Moreover, from cases in which family composition is a bit more defined but in which
no specific names are provided, I have identified a further 55 emigrant spouses and children. In
cases where a family has been said to have brought “children,” of which there were six, I assumed
the lowest possible figure of two. Given that most of the emigrants I know by name come from
lists of workers who quit the CRDA, there are relatively few women on the list. Moreover, the
women listed were always specified as young and single, meaning it is unlikely there is doubling
between nameless spouses and the named women on the list.
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Taking the sum of these figures, the baseline to this point would be 3022. However, there
remain roughly 1200 emigrants on my list for whom I simply do not have enough information to
determine if there were dependents brought along or not. For such cases, it should be assumed that
many did. The majority of individuals on my list come from the AMG’s May 1947 ration-control
survey, in which there were 1294 workers listed as having emigrated as individuals rather than
with families. This categorization should be taken as provisional, however, as the AMG’s rationcontrol survey was completed before many emigrant workers had time to establish themselves in
Yugoslavia and send for their children, spouses, and/or parents in Monfalcone to join them. If one
takes the totality of this data into consideration, as well as the shortcoming of the sources, a total
population of 5000 monfalconesi migrants seems most likely.
Such a figure is largely borne out by contemporary reports. Immediately before Transfer
Day, the Italian Legation in Belgrade submitted a report on the question of Italians in Yugoslavia,
estimating cautiously that there “are about 10,000 [postwar Italian migrants in Yugoslavia],
coming in large part from Friuli, from Trieste, and from Monfalcone” alongside whom there were
much smaller numbers from Central Italy and the Mezzogiorno.7 Subsequent Italian Foreign
Ministry reports indicate that some 400 Italian managers and technicians and 2000 workers arrived
to work in the Fiume shipyard after liberation, which roughly parallels the PCI’s own estimate that
“in 1947 there emigrated over 3000 workers from the district of Monfalcone solely to the region
of Fiume.”8 Such estimates, however, only counted the workers who emigrated, failing to account

Legazione d’Italia (Belgrado), “Lavoratori italiani in Jugoslavia” (Tel. N. 266/44), 4 September 1947, op. cit. Though
the document talked of “clandestine emigrants,” a term that theoretically should have excluded the bulk of
monfalconesi, who passed into Yugoslavia legally during the period of the AMG, subsequent documents clarify that
monfalconesi are included under this category. Legazione d’Italia (Belgrado), “Emigrazione clandestina in Jugoslavia”
(N. 1758/180), 21 August 1947, ASDMAE, AP 1946-50, Jug, b 30, f 3.
8
Console Pinto, “Connazionali venuti in Jugoslavia senza passaporto ed emigrazione clandestina” (Tel. N. 79/21), 11
March 1948, op. cit.; MAE, DGAP, VI Ufficio, “Protesta dal Partito Comunista Italiana” (Telegraph N. 24469) with
Attachment, 12/21/49, ASD-MAE, AA PP 1946-50, Jug, b 72, f 2 Emigrazione clandesta in Jugoslavia. In line with
7
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for the many non-working migrants that could include children, spouses, and elderly parents. With
these figures and with the knowledge that so many of the monfalconesi technicians and skilled
laborers had sought assurances that their families could be well accommodated upon arrival, it
seems safe to establish a figure of 3500 for Fiume.
Establishing the baseline for other communities is much more difficult. There is scant
evidence on the number of monfalconesi at Pola, where many monfalconesi found jobs in the
shipyards, though Pola is without doubt the second-most-common location for settlement. My list
includes 250 individuals who emigrated to Pola, 217 of whom were heads-of-family known to
have brought their dependents with them, but about whose dependents nothing is known. Given
the presence of so many whole families, Cernigoi’s estimate of 800 feels like an appropriate
baseline, though the figure may well have been closer to 1000. Regarding Sarajevo and its
environs, which seems to have been the third-most-common destination, especially populated by
the youth emigrants of 1946, Silvano Cosolo recalls living in what he terms a “colony” of
monfalconesi, with 200 working alongside him in the railcar workshops alone as early as winter
1946/47.9 With this, a figure of 250-300 seems likely for Sarajevo. Making estimates for the other,
less common migration destinations is nearly impossible, though it is known that in many cities
(Maribor, Ljubljana, Jesenice, Belgrade, Spalato, Zagreb), there were sufficient Italian migrants to
warrant the creation of Italian cultural circles. Each of these locations likely served as the home of
50-200 monfalconesi transplants.10 Finally, dispersed throughout the country in various worksites
that stretched from Bosnia (Tuzla and Kragljevica) to Slovenia (Kočevje) to Croatia (Mali Losinj,
the PCI’s later estimate, Bersa claimed in June 1947 that 2500 workers from the soon-to-be-reconstituted Gorizia
Province had left for Yugoslavia. Bersa, “Relazione del Comp. Ruggero Bersa,” 15 June 1947, op. cit.
9
Cosolo, Amare… Sarajevo, 47-48.
10
Consul Pinto estimated that roughly 1000 Italians had migrated clandestinely to Zagreb by early 1948, for example,
though, based on the wider body of documents, monfalconesi appear to have been a minority there. Console Pinto,
“Connazionali venuti in Jugoslavia senza passaporto ed emigrazione clandestina” (Tel. N. 79/21), 11 March 1948, op.
cit.
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Koper, and Porec) were some 100-200 others, more often than not young, single migrants.
In addition to tracking numbers, my list allows me to provide at least some basic statistical
data about the Monfalconese migrant community. The tables and charts below tell that story.
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Table 2. Decade of Birth of Monfalcone Emigrants:
Decade
Number
Percentage
Before 1900
99
10.55%
1900s
220
23.45%
1910s
258
27.51%
1920s
291
31.02%
1930s
35
3.73%
1940s
35
3.73%
Total
938
100.00%
Note: Of the 938 emigrants whose birthdate is known, the oldest was born in 1875. There were
17 infants (born 1945 or later).

Chart 1. Migration Destination in Yugoslavia:
Fiume, 351
(18%)

Pola, 250
(13%)
Sarajevo, 18
(1%)
Zagreb, 18
(1%)

Unknown, 1246
(65%)

Belgrade, 15
(1%)
Other, 18
(1%)

Note: data taken from 1923 emigrants known by name.
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Spalato, 7
(0%)

Chart 2. Migrants to Fiume with Unaccounted-For Families:

Heads-of Families
Known to have
Brought Families,
Members
Unknown, 125

Total Migrants
from Families
whose Members
are Accounted For
(Heads-of-Family
and Dependents),
226

Note: Based on the 351 individually-identified migrants known to have settled in Fiume.

Chart 3. Migrants to Pola with Unaccounted-For Families:
Total Migrants
from Families
whose Members
are Accounted For
(Heads-of-Family
and Dependents),
33

Heads-of Families
Known to have
Brought Families,
but Whose
Members are
Unaccounted-For,
217

Note: Based on the 250 individually-identified migrants known to have settled in Pola.
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Chart 4. Primary Occupation of Monfalconese Migrants:
Mechanics, Various
(Meccanici), 29
Naval Department
Worksquad
Leaders
(Capisquadra
navali) , 2

Smiths (Fabbri and
Fabbrinave), 5
Mechanical
Fitters
(Montatori
meccanici), 2

Pipefitters
(Tubisti), 13

Lathe Operators
(Tornitori), 10

Iron Carpenters
(Carpentieri in
ferro), 18
Welders
(Saldatori and
augogenisti), 9

Electricians
(Elettricisti), 9

Joiners
(Falegnam
i), 13

Other Clerk
(Impiegati),
6

Head
Technicians
and Technical
Clerks (Capi
tecnici,
impiegati
tecnici,
disegnatori
tecnici, etc.),
14

Wood
Carpenters
(Carpentieri
in legno), 3

Unspecified or
Other
Carpenters, 3

Other, 28
Housewives
(Casalinge), 29

Shop
Assistants
(Commesse), 2
Sharecroppers
(Mezzadri), 2

Unspecified Workers
(Operai), 33
Drivers
Apprentices
(Autisti),
(Apprendisti),
3
2
Full-Time
Communist Party Bricklayers
(Muratori), 2
Organizers, 2

Note: Of the 249 migrants whose occupations are definitively known.
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Painters (Pittori), 5
Unskilled Laborers
(manovali), 5

Figures (Photographs and Maps)
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Figure 1. Mussolini speaks to a crowd of workers at the Monfalcone shipyard, 19 September 1938.
“Mussolini parla ai lavoratori del Cantiere (18 settembre 1938).” Photo courtesy of the Museo
Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it). The date in
the MUCA archive photo title is incorrect.
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Figure 2. Map of Friuli and Venezia Giulia before the Great War. The Isonzo River flows
southward through Gorizia, passing just to the east of Gradisca and to the west of Monfalcone,
emptying into the Adriatic. “Il Litorale Adriatico prima della grande guerra.” Map courtesy of the
Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 3. The workers’ quarter of Panzano with the shipyard to the right. Notice historic
Monfalcone in the background (left), along with the distant Carsic hills. “Quartiere operaio.”
Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery
(www.mucamonfalcone.it).

Figure 4. Socialist meeting outside of the Monfalcone shipyard during the biennio rosso (1920).
“Comizio socialista all’esterno del CNT, 1920 circa.” Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica
di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 5. Monfalconese Fascists surround Francesco Giunta (bottom center, facing the camera),
early 1920s. “Fascisti monfalconesi attorniano Francesco Giunta.” Photo courtesy of the Museo
Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 6. Workers gather outside the CRDA in anticipation of an anti-Fascist, anti-war march, 26
July 1943. “Manifestazione antifascista ai CRDA di Monfalcone, 26 luglio 1943.” Photo courtesy
of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 7. Partisans of the Fontanot Brothers Brigade. Notice the two barefooted partisans. “Brigata
Fratelli Fontanot [3].” Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital
multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 8. The Central Command of the Garibaldi Division-Natisone along with Yugoslav Partisan
officers. The commandant, the monfalconese and CRDA worker Mario Fantini (Sasso), is third
from the right, looking at the division’s political commissar, Giovanni Padoan (Vanni) of
Cormons. “Comando Divisione Garibaldi Natisone.” Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di
Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 9. Monfalconesi greet the Yugoslav troops, 1 May 1945. Notice the sign in the center-right:
“Monfalcone in the New Yugoslavia of Tito.” “The Celebrations of the IX Corpus.” Photo
courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery
(www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 10. A crowd of pro-Yugoslavs gather outside Monfalcone City Hall shortly after liberation,
1 May 1945. Note the giant red star and the Yugoslav and Italian red-starred flags.
“Festeggiamenti.” Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia
gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 11. Map of the two military occupation zones as they existed between June 1945 and
September 1947. Monfalcone is part of Zone A, administered by the AMG. “La ‘Linea Morgan’
con la Zona A e B della Venezia Giulia.” Map courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s
digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 12. Map of the Free Territory of Trieste (1947-1954) showing Monfalcone as part of Italy’s
reconstituted Gorizia Province. Despite plans for the entire Free Territory to transition to selfgovernment, in practice Zone A remained under Anglo-American administration until 1954, Zone
B remaining under Yugoslav administration. “Carta del Territorio libero di Trieste 1947-1954.”
Public domain source taken from WikiCommons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Territorio_libero_di_Trieste_carta.png. Retrieved 14 August 2017.
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Figure 13. The common pro-Yugoslav slogan “we want popular power” adorns the wall of a
Zone A home, paired with a red star. The photo is without date, but it is likely from the time of
the UN Delegation’s visit in March 1946. Photo courtesy of the Museo Cantieristica di
Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 14. “The Will of the Monfalconesi.” In this article, Il Lavoratore shows the Rocca bearing
a red star and the phrase “we don’t want Italy here,” as seen from Monfalcone’s central piazza.
Though this image is from October 1946, the Rocca had borne similar symbols and phrases from
the moment of liberation. Il Lavoratore, “La volontà dei monfalconesi,” 5 October 1946.
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Figure 15. The pro-Yugoslav residents of the outlying village of Pieris gather in the village’s
central piazza as part of an UAIS demonstration on an unknown date. Photo courtesy of the Museo
Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it).
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Figure 16. A pro-Yugoslav procession passes through Monfalcone on an unknown date. Note the
prominence of red-starred tricolors, Tito portraits, and posters bearing the phrase “long live Tito!”
Though it is cut off, the poster on the left seems to indicate that the marchers at the front of the
column belonged to the Liberation Front (OF/FL) partisan network of Panzano. Photo courtesy of
the Museo Cantieristica di Monfalcone’s digital multimedia gallery (www.mucamonfalcone.it.
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Figure 17. The pro-Yugoslavs of the Monfalconese gather in Monfalcone’s central piazza for a
mass demonstration on 11 August 1946. Note the red stars on the various tricolors, as well as the
portrait of Tito in the front center of the crowd. Unknown photographer, IFSML, Fondo Riccardo
Giacuzzo, b 3, serie 21, n 265, G01/00031/0021/0000/0000/00001.
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Figure 18. Reproduction of a threat letter delivered to the home of Sergio Bortolutti, head of the
UAIS in the Monfalconese, in September 1946. Bortolutti and his family are “invited to depart
from ITALY before the day on which the Peace Treaty is signed.” The letter is signed by the
Divisione Gorizia, whose role in the wider terrorism campaign is disputed. Il Lavoratore, “Le
bombe non servono,” 30 September 1946.
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Figure 19. A photograph of the terrain between Gorizia and San Floriano, where many Italians
continued to expatriate to Yugoslavia well into 1948. It is easy to see how the hilliness of the
terrain and the density of the foliage would limit the effectiveness of border patrols. Photo taken
by the author, February 2017.

Figure 20. Another photo of the terrain between Gorizia and San Floriano. Photo taken by the
author, February 2017.
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